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Before the end of World War II, an essential element in maintaining the peace 
and ensuring future economic prosperity was the establishment of three inter-
governmental organizations that would work in concert toward economic coop-
eration and progress. Two of them, the Bretton Woods institutions—the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank)—came into being with little delay. The third, the
International Trade Organization (ITO), never came into existence, mainly because
the Havana Charter was not ratified by the United States Congress.
In place of the ITO, a group of countries negotiated the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which, after a precarious start, was brought
into effect by means of a protocol of provisional application that offered few
guarantees for its survival. Over time, the GATT managed to expand its mem-
bership, carry out successive multilateral trade negotiations to liberalize access
to markets, and develop a dispute settlement system. The GATT system of
multilateral trade agreements was replaced by the newly created World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995.
Over time, the GATT/WTO system has gradually improved its relation-
ships with the IMF and the World Bank. At the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, ministers agreed to a ‘declaration on achieving greater coherence in
global economic policy making’, in which they called on the WTO to pursue
cooperation with the IMF and the bank. This ministerial decision accorded
with Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, which set
out the basic functions of the WTO. The Ministerial Declaration spurred closer
relations between the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, and a great deal has
been achieved.
The overall structure and internal mechanisms of the WTO, the IMF, and
the World Bank are not the same. In some respects, they differ noticeably.
These differences in institutional structure, decision-making procedures,
and cultures inevitably have repercussions for their ability to cooperate in a
coherent manner. For historical reasons, the relationship between the three
legs of the original Bretton Woods stool has never fully attained the aims of the
post-war planners, nor has it led to cohesive policies and efficient allocation 
of responsibilities.
The world economy has now suffered a severe jolt, testing the very viabil-
ity of the international financial system. The financial crisis that erupted in
2008 in the United States, and went on to endanger the global economy, has
brought into sharp relief the ineffectiveness and lack of coherence in the inter-
national economic system. Governments have reacted both individually and
jointly to this deepening crisis, and it has become crystal clear that only their
utmost efforts will be enough to overcome the recession as it spreads and
threatens overall welfare around the world.
One needs only to read the communiqué of the Group of 20 after its
November 2008 Summit Meeting to identify the wide range of problem areas
in which governments need to cooperate if their individual stimulus efforts
are to succeed.
Trade, finance, credit, and monetary policy inevitably transcend national
borders. The world economy is one integrated whole. A given measure taken
by any one country will inevitably have repercussions on others. Only effective
and coordinated cooperative action, including steps that need to be taken by
inter-governmental organizations, will help to provide the necessary equilib-
rium. The leading international organizations have a crucial role to play at 
this critical juncture, and prominent among them are the IMF, the World Bank,
and the WTO.
In response to the global financial crisis, leaders of the Group of 20 nations
have committed themselves to reform the Bretton Woods institutions, in 
particular the IMF and the World Bank. The President of the World Bank and
the Managing Director of the IMF have appointed high-level commissions to
look into significant and meaningful reform of those two institutions. What
about the WTO? Why is it not on the G20 leaders’ radar screen? How can the
intricate linkages between international finance and trade be ignored?
The GATT/WTO system is almost exactly as old as the IMF and the World
Bank. The WTO also needs institutional reform to put it in step with the
demands of the 21st century. All three organizations are woefully outdated.
The visions that led to their creation belonged to leaders who had lived through
the 1920s, the Great Depression, and the war years.
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Today, the world economy is immeasurably more complex, multifaceted,
and integrated than it was at the end of World War II. New financial struc-
tures, procedures, and interests have multiplied. Many countries have attained
independence over this period. Developing countries are now rightfully tak-
ing a much greater share in global production, trade, and investment. The
rapid economic growth in the emerging economies, in particular, has been
stupendous and is bringing with it the rise of a middle class in these countries
as well as a host of social, political, and environmental challenges. Multina-
tional corporations are becoming increasingly diverse and powerful. The envi-
ronment has become a subject of enormous importance for the future of
mankind. The world—its problems and challenges—has completely changed
since the 1940s when the original Bretton Woods system was conceived.
We are 70 years on and in the middle of a threatening and severe reces-
sion. This is the time for action. Governments failed to act in concert in the
1930s, and widespread misery was the outcome of selfish “beggar-thy-neighbour”
policies that were designed to respond to each country’s own problems, while
they hoped that the devil would take the hind-most. As we well know, he took
them all one by one.
Today, we are increasingly witnessing governments taking protectionist
and nationalistic measures that may very well yield immediate results from
their narrow point of view, but whose cumulative effect will be to isolate
economies, obstruct the channels of trade and finance, lead to seriously
increased disputes in the WTO and other forums, and impede the economic
recovery we are all aiming for.
Within its sphere, the WTO is working to analyze these issues and to propose
solutions. This is as it should be, but the current financial crisis calls for more.
Most particularly, governments have not taken the unpalatable, difficult deci-
sions they should have adopted in the Group of 20: the acceptance by all of a
status quo commitment under which no new restrictive trade measures would
be imposed.
Parallel to and provoked by the current crisis, the IMF and the World Bank
have initiated their own reform processes. World leaders seem determined to
redesign the IMF, in particular, to meet the challenges of the current financial
crisis. Should the WTO not join them in an equivalent endeavour, not only
will it be left behind, it will have missed the first real opportunity since the
multilateral trading system was created to become a strong and valid partner
in the Bretton Woods triumvirate.
In the past, the GATT/WTO system has shown its capacity to evolve with
the times: witness the gradual evolution of the dispute settlement system;
the innovative, although ill-fated, Tokyo Round agreements; the initially 
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controversial, and now fully accepted, incorporation of trade in services into
the system; and the massive Uruguay Round outcome. Even the Doha Round
negotiations, while not concluded, have shown a tendency toward progressive
innovation, especially in the areas of trade rules and dispute settlement. There
is reason for optimism when it comes to the rules; however, the institutional
aspects of the WTO as an organization are often overlooked.
The Sutherland Report on the future of the WTO in 2004 and the War-
wick Report in 2007 have contributed perceptive insights into the functioning,
objectives, and special characteristics of the multilateral trading system.
Let us never lose sight of the fact that the WTO agreements are ‘hard law’.
Governments are well aware of the direct and indirect consequences of rules
and commitments undertaken in the WTO, and they are understandably cau-
tious and prudent. To cite one example: in several rounds, changes in the 
dispute settlement system were adopted on a provisional basis, and it was only
after they had proved to work in practice that the membership adopted them
permanently. Any change in the institutional structure and procedures of the
WTO will follow the pattern of the past; it will come at the end of a protracted
and complex negotiation conducted by its Members and approved under the
rule of consensus.
One aspect of the functioning of the WTO that calls for review is the dura-
tion of the multilateral trade negotiations. Initial rounds, such as those held at
Annecy and Torquay, lasted a few months. Admittedly, the participation and
the subject matter were considerably smaller than has been the case subse-
quently. The Dillon and Kennedy rounds were somewhat longer. Each succes-
sive round has taken longer. The Tokyo Round commenced in 1973 and
concluded in 1979, the Uruguay Round took place from 1986 to 1994, and the
Doha Round, which commenced in 2001, will hopefully finish in 2009 or 2010.
The results of the Doha Round will be applied most likely over a transitional
period of five years.
Admittedly, governments must conduct multilateral trade negotiations
with care, and detailed preparation and consultation is required. Innumerable
factors can cut across the best-laid plans, including the vagaries of internal
politics. But unfortunately, the overall aims of a multilateral negotiating round
risk losing significant contact with reality when there is a lapse of 10 or 15 years
between the date of commencement and the date of implementation of the
results. In the modern, fast-changing world we live in, this process has to adapt
to meet current realities on an ongoing basis.
Clearly, it is imperative that governments conclude the Doha Round at the
earliest possible moment, to avoid repeating errors of the past and to prompt
economic recovery. But they also need to strengthen and modernize the 
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multilateral trading system by focusing on reform of the WTO as an institu-
tion. In doing so, they must ensure that the WTO, the IMF, and the World
Bank are capable of responding effectively, through their respective institu-
tional structures, to the extremely close interconnections between their respec-
tive spheres of action.
This book explains why institutional reform of the WTO is so necessary 
at this critical juncture in world history. It contains thoughtful views from
contributors on key aspects of the WTO that need to be redesigned to meet the
challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, it includes contributions from
researchers in the developing world as well as in developed countries. Rather
than simply analyzing the current functioning of the WTO, its problems and
challenges, this volume is also a call to action. It lays out proposals that are
likely to become a blueprint for reform of the WTO as an institution.
Its contents are abundantly worthy of reflection and subsequent action.
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1
Why Institutional Reform 
of the WTO Is Necessary
DEBRA STEGER
I. Origins of This Book
This book emanates from an international, collaborative project on institutional
reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), organized by the Emerging
Dynamic Global Economies (EDGE) Network and funded by Networks of
Centres of Excellence Canada and the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC). This project, which commenced in 2007, includes major
research institutions and leading researchers in Africa, Asia, Europe, North
America, and South America. Inspired by the Report of the Consultative Board
to Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (the Sutherland Report),1 it has
three major research themes: decision-making and internal management of
the WTO; relationship between the WTO and regional trade agreements; and
transparency. The contributions in this book were initially presented and 
discussed at a workshop, ‘Institutional Reform of the WTO’, held at the Cen-
tre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo, Canada,
in March 2008.
In 2003, WTO director-general Supachai Panitchpakdi appointed a consul-
tative board, chaired by former director-general Peter Sutherland, to address
institutional challenges facing the WTO in the future. The Sutherland Report
was published in 2005, on the tenth anniversary of the WTO, but has met with
little response from the Members of the WTO. Among other things, the Sutherland
Report expressed serious concern with the spread of preferential trade agree-
ments and recommended that the WTO subject such agreements to meaning-
ful review and effective disciplines. On dialogue with civil society, it suggested
that the membership should develop clear objectives for relations with civil
society but did not go further to recommend specific avenues for engagement.
With respect to decision-making, it recommended that Members take a fresh
look at variable geometry as well as approving decisions by a critical mass. It
also proposed that the role of the Director-General and Secretariat be strength-
ened and improved and that a senior officials consultative body be established.2
The Sutherland Report was both comprehensive and pragmatic; it addressed
serious questions relating to the governance and legitimacy of the WTO as an
international organization. It provided an excellent start—it asked the right
questions about very important issues and made pragmatic, practical recom-
mendations. If anything, it did not go far enough.
The first Warwick Commission was established in 2007 with a broad man-
date to examine the governance of the multilateral trading system and to make
recommendations to improve it. It noted that there is waning support for fur-
ther opening of markets, particularly in industrialized economies, and empha-
sized that sustaining the WTO is a collective responsibility on the part of all
Members.3 It recommended, inter alia, that consideration be given to the use
of a critical mass approach to decision-making. On dispute settlement, it rec-
ommended the establishment of a Dispute Settlement  ombudsman, the
strengthening of transparency mechanisms including acceptance of amicus
curiae briefs, and consideration of cash compensation as a remedy when com-
pliance is not forthcoming.4 With respect to preferential trade agreements, the
Commission encouraged major industrialized countries to refrain from nego-
tiating such agreements with each other and emphasized the need to clarify
WTO disciplines and strengthen review mechanisms for such agreements.5
Finally, it recommended that ‘a process of reflection’ be established in the WTO
for Members to consider the challenges facing the multilateral system and
develop a plan of action to address them.6
The Doha Development Round has stalled, with little prospect of real
progress being made on the negotiating front in the foreseeable future. This is
an appropriate moment to reflect on the WTO as an institution and do some
serious thinking about reform of the institutional structures of the WTO.
II. Why Institutional Reform of the WTO Is Necessary
There are a number of reasons that institutional reform of the WTO is important
at this time in the history of the multilateral trading system.
We are at a transformational moment in the history of the world. The rapid
rise of the emerging economies—China, India, and Brazil—has shifted the
global power balance, and the influence of the United States as a hegemonic
power is declining. The current architecture of the international system was 
4 Part I Why Institutional Reform Is Necessary
created in the 1940s by developed countries, led by the United States and Great
Britain, for a very different world and time. As originally conceived, there were
to be two Bretton Woods organizations: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(the World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO). While coun-
tries had agreed to establish the ITO, the organization was stillborn because 
the agreement was not ratified by the U.S. Congress. In its place, 23 countries
negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which came
into effect by means of a protocol of provisional application. In 1955, GATT con-
tracting parties negotiated an agreement to create the Organization for Trade
Cooperation (OTC). However, that organization also was not approved by the
U.S. Congress. It was not until 1995, as a result of the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round, that the World Trade Organization was born.7
A major challenge for the next decade will be how the international system
responds to the dramatic transformation taking place in the global economic and
geopolitical landscape.Will the existing international organizations—the IMF, the
World Bank, and the WTO—survive or will they be replaced by other new organ-
izations? Will the large emerging economies seek to develop their own alliances and
new organizations or will they work within the existing global system? 
The financial crisis has highlighted the need for more international regu-
lation of the global economy, not less. The Washington Consensus is no longer
the prevailing ideology in Washington and around the globe. Leaders of the
Group of 20 nations, including the major emerging economies, have called for
a ‘Bretton Woods II’ to reform the IMF, in particular, and the World Bank.
France and Germany have promoted a stronger regulatory role for the IMF
over the global financial system, while Brazil and India have insisted that global
power imbalances in the decision-making structures of the international finan-
cial organizations must be addressed first before any expansion of its mandate
is contemplated. China has recently signalled that it is willing to contribute
more money to the IMF, but only if major changes to its governance struc-
tures are made.
All three international organizations face major legitimacy and account-
ability crises because their internal voting and decision-making structures do
not reflect the realities of the new power relationships in the global economy.
The heads of the IMF and the World Bank recently appointed high-level com-
missions to recommend reforms to their internal governance structures. The
Sutherland Report and the Report of the First Warwick Commission have
made recommendations on the future of the WTO, but both reports have been
largely ignored by WTO Members. If the international economic organiza-
tions are to be relevant, accountable, and effective in the dynamic global 
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economy of the 21st century, significant institutional reforms are needed.
Government leaders need to make this a priority.
Unless developing countries are able to actively participate in the design of new
governance procedures for the international economic system, the very relevance
and legitimacy of these organizations will be at risk. It is a turbulent time in the
international system, but in times of stress and uncertainty, ideas for reform can
be a powerful beacon to help guide developments in institution building.
This is a particularly difficult time for international negotiations—witness
the problems with the Doha Development Round—because new clubs and
alliances have not yet been formed. China and India, in particular, are recog-
nized by the United States and the European Union as major economic pow-
ers, but they are criticized for not yet using their influence and fulfilling their
responsibilities on the world stage. In the Doha Round, for example, China
and India are playing a watching, waiting, and learning game, rather than
showing leadership in pressing for a conclusion. The real threat to the inter-
national community would come if these major developing country powers
were to develop their own alliances and institutions and not participate in the
established international economic institutions.
International organizations, including the United Nations, the IMF, and
the World Bank, have recognized that their governance structures are outdated
and are engaged in major reform processes in order to respond to the criticisms
about legitimacy, accountability, and decision-making. However, these con-
cerns are not even on the radar screen of Members of the WTO. Why is this so?
A key reason is that the negotiations in the Doha Development Round have
been so difficult and protracted. The primary objective of Director-General
Pascal Lamy and WTO Members is to conclude the Doha Round of multilat-
eral negotiations. Until that is concluded, no other major issues can be addressed
within the organization. However, the longer the current impasse continues,
the greater the risk that the WTO will become increasingly outdated and irrel-
evant to the world community. As the Warwick Commission astutely observed:
There is evidence that many of the lessons of the 20th century are in danger of being
‘unlearned’ in the 21st century, especially in relation to the importance of multi-
lateral institutions, and the rules, norms and principles that underpin them. That
a malaise afflicts the multilateral trade regime is suggested not only by the impasse
in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations but also by other symptoms
in the contemporary global economy linked to the global trade agenda, including
the protests that accompany the ministerial meetings of the WTO; near permanent
rumblings of discontent by diverse groups of countries from within the organi-
sation; and growing resort to alternative forms of economic governance, includ-
ing bilateral and regional PTAs.8
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Furthermore, a major institutional negotiation in the Uruguay Round led to
the establishment of the WTO as an international organization with its own
charter9 and quasi-judicial dispute settlement system.10 In the transformation
from the GATT to the WTO, important new institutions were established,
including the WTO itself and the Appellate Body.11 While the dispute settlement
system has functioned effectively and efficiently since 1995, the decision-making
processes in the WTO are in need of improvement. When it comes to negoti-
ations and rule-making, the WTO, in many respects, functions much like the
old GATT. The new rules for decision-making and amendments, set out in
Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement, are rarely used, and instead, mem-
bers resort to the familiar GATT practice of decision-making by consensus.
The new rule-making procedures in the WTO Agreement have been charac-
terized by commentators as ‘cumbersome’ and even ‘impossible’ to use.12 While
there was a recent comprehensive negotiation that led to the establishment of
the WTO as an international organization, the Uruguay Round negotiators
unfortunately ‘did not get the job done’.13 Much remains to be done to improve
and strengthen the governance procedures within the WTO.
The efficiency of the dispute settlement system contrasted with the inefficacy
of the decision-making and rule-making system has created an imbalance in
the institutional structures of the WTO. The Uruguay Round reforms, includ-
ing the establishment of the Appellate Body, propelled the dispute settlement
system into a judicial model, with compulsory jurisdiction, binding decisions,
and arbitral procedures for compliance, setting an example for other interna-
tional legal systems. The result is a strong, effective dispute settlement mech-
anism coupled with weak, ineffective, political decision-making procedures.
Unlike domestic legal systems, it is almost impossible for decisions of the
Appellate Body to be corrected by the legislative bodies—the Ministerial 
Conference or the General Council. This situation cannot persist indefinitely
without damage to the WTO as an institution, especially as pressures increase
on the dispute settlement bodies as a result of the inability of Members to
negotiate or clarify the rules in the Doha Round.
Because the rule-making procedures of the WTO are so difficult, countries
are turning increasingly toward negotiating regional trade agreements. While
regional trade regimes have not been shown to provide the same economic
benefits as multilateral agreements, there is growing business pressure, espe-
cially in the rapidly growing economies of the world, to negotiate new regional
arrangements. New regional trade alliances are being forged among develop-
ing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, which have not had a history of
regional trade agreements. The United States and the European Union have also
embarked on aggressive strategies to negotiate bilateral arrangements with
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many countries and regional trade agreements around the globe. The explosion
of regional trade agreements is causing growing fragmentation of the multilat-
eral trading system and serious erosion of the most-favoured-nation principle.
With the exception of the European Union, the dispute settlement mech-
anisms of the regional agreements are relatively weak, particularly when com-
pared with the WTO. Thus, while the regional regimes are easier to negotiate
and conclude than the WTO is to amend, there is an imbalance between the
rule-making and dispute settlement mechanisms of regional agreements. And
it is the opposite imbalance from that of the WTO. Although the relationship
between the WTO and the regional trade agreements is not clear, we can expect
to see more interaction between them in the future. In particular, the strong
WTO dispute settlement system will likely be pressed to hear more cases involv-
ing possible conflicts or differences between the rules of the WTO and the
regional trade agreements.
Looking into the future, a vibrant, relevant WTO would have a mandate to
deal with international economic regulation generally, not just trade. The Doha
Round is focused on market access: in agriculture, in goods, and in services.
Many new issues—competition, investment, technology, environment—are
not on the agenda in the current round. As a result, these issues are being nego-
tiated in regional trade agreements and other bilateral agreements. The issues
of interest to multinational business, such as rule of law/good governance
behind the border, corruption, corporate social responsibility, exchange rates,
and immigration, are not even a glimmer in the eye of multilateral trade nego-
tiators. Why not? Partly because the WTO decision-making and rule-making
procedures are so cumbersome, if not impossible, to use that governments and
private parties have moved to other forums. As a negotiating machine, the
WTO is clearly not able to keep pace with the most recent developments in
the rapidly changing world economy. It risks becoming irrelevant if its gover-
nance structures are not improved to allow for more flexibility in negotiations
and rule-making.
Finally, there has been much criticism of the WTO from non-governmental
organizations and civil society, challenging its effectiveness, accountability, and
legitimacy. These are important concerns that deserve serious consideration by
WTO Members. The chapters in this book examine the WTO in light of good
governance principles and make recommendations for its strengthening and
improvement as an international organization.
The WTO is not sui generis; it is one among international organizations.
This is a transformative moment in history for international organizations
generally, and the WTO faces effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability 
challenges similar to the others. The WTO lacks many of the management
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structures and rule-making processes that are taken for granted in other inter-
national organizations. For example, it does not have an executive body or a
management board, a Director-General or Secretariat with real powers to set
legislative priorities and propose new rules, a functioning legislative body,
formal mechanisms to interact with stakeholders and civil society, or formal
structures to approve new rules (other than the consensus of WTO Members
acting collectively, as the Contracting Parties did under the GATT 1947). In
many ways, it is the ‘least developed’ of the international organizations. Coher-
ence in the international trading system, among other things, demands that the
WTO develop more formalized governance structures to put it on a par with
other international organizations, make it more functional and efficient, and
render it more accountable to all its Members (including developing coun-
tries), stakeholders, and the public.
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Reinvigorating Debate on WTO Reform: 
The Contours of a Functional and Normative
Approach to Analyzing the WTO System
CAROLYN DEERE BIRKBECK1
I. Introduction
The debate on institutional reform and governance of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has now been underway for over 15 years.2 In 1999, only
five years after the creation of the WTO, the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial
Conference provoked intense demands for reform. By 2003, the failure of the
Cancun WTO Ministerial Meeting again sparked debate on WTO reform. Two
years later, when Pascal Lamy became WTO Director-General, he proposed
that WTO reform should be a key post-Doha priority.3 In the context of the
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations stumbling forward in fits and
starts, the most prominent focus of discussions of WTO reform has been
options for improving the WTO negotiation process.
Throughout the past 10 years there have also been a number of broader
debates about the governance of the multilateral trading system and calls for insti-
tutional reform at the WTO. Most recently, the onset of the global financial crisis
in 2008 reignited more wide-ranging interest in the role of the WTO in global 
economic management, prompting calls for the WTO to do more to sustain a
global open trading system, and in particular to take greater leadership on issues
of trade finance, aid for trade, and surveillance of protectionist measures.
In the face of existing and emerging global challenges, both critics and sup-
porters of the WTO pose common questions. Is the WTO as we currently know
it fit for its purpose? How can the WTO adapt to changing configurations of
economic power in trade, while ensuring the weakest countries are properly and
effectively represented? How can the WTO better respond to sustainable devel-
opment concerns, ranging from poverty reduction, development, and food
security, to sustainable fisheries and climate change? Is the WTO’s current
institutional form appropriate or, are there reforms—incremental, fundamental,
or both—that would better equip the WTO to reflect and address both con-
temporary needs and those likely to emerge in the future? 
Amid a growing body of scholarly literature and policy commentary on
the governance and institutional reform of the WTO, this chapter proposes a
distinctive approach. To set the context, Part II presents a brief overview of
key themes in the existing literature, emphasizing the scope of debates on WTO
reform. A full review and evaluation of the specific details of proposals offered
through the course of these debates is beyond the scope of this chapter. This
chapter does, however, highlight the differences among authors regarding what
the WTO reform debate is and should be about, including with respect to the
feasibility and desirability of a reform agenda. Part III proposes a new five-
pronged approach to the question of WTO reform. It argues for (1) analyzing
the WTO as a ‘system’; (2) disaggregating and analyzing the governance of
each of the functions this system serves and should serve; (3) acknowledging
the informal nature and dynamism of many practices regarding the gover-
nance of these distinctive WTO functions; (4) grounding reform proposals in
clear normative principles and priorities, namely to respond to the needs of
developing countries and advancing sustainable development; and (5) devot-
ing greater attention to analyzing the political strategies for achieving pro-
posed reforms.
The chapter concludes with some preliminary observations on the reform
priorities this approach reveals.4 It provides indicative examples of how this
approach to the WTO reform question yields the prospect of a more broad-
ranging reform agenda than many existing studies, and a reinvigorated 
dialogue on many now ‘tired’ reform themes.
II. Existing Literature on WTO Reform: 
The State of Debate
The study of WTO governance is concerned with the set of processes, princi-
ples, norms, and institutions through which rules and practices for managing
global trade are generated and implemented. The study of institutional reform
of the WTO relates to a subset of these concerns—those specifically focused on
the ‘institutional’ aspects of the WTO. Narrowly speaking, these institutional
aspects concern only the formal organizational facets of the WTO. More broadly,
reference to the institutional aspects of the WTO may also apply to the cultural
habits, practices, rules, and procedures that govern how the work of the WTO
is supervised, managed, and implemented. Depending on the topic at hand,
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authors writing on ‘WTO reform’ sometimes refer explicitly to institutional
aspects of that reform.
For some authors, a far wider set of issues falls under the WTO reform
umbrella, including proposals for reform in respect of the principles and scope
of the WTO’s agreements or the substance of particular aspects of WTO nego-
tiations (such as those related to the Doha Round). For example, when some
analysts write of WTO reform, their emphasis is on limiting the scope of the
WTO negotiating agenda (i.e., to ensure it does not cover investment issues),
or expanding its scope (i.e., to ensure it covers issues of high importance to
developing countries, such as movement of labour or the operationalization
of principles, such as special and differential treatment). This chapter inten-
tionally focuses tightly on the governance and ‘institutional’ agenda for WTO
reform. That said, it is important to acknowledge that the issues are often
entangled: some aspects of round negotiations are directly related to issues
that arise in discussions of the governance of the multilateral trading system
(e.g., disciplines for regional trading agreements, principles of special and dif-
ferential treatment, reform of the dispute settlement system).
The scope of the literature on WTO governance and institutional reform
is vast. As noted above, the majority of attention has been on reform of the
WTO’s negotiation process, as well as its dispute settlement process5 and the
appropriate relationship and balance between the two.6 Additional recurring
areas of interest include (i) the internal governance and management of the
WTO Secretariat, its ideal size and budget, as well as the role of the Director-
General and the related selection process;7 (ii) the intersection of WTO rules
and other global norms on issues ranging from human rights and the environ-
ment to food safety and labour standards;8 (iii) the WTO’s relationship with
civil society,9 industry, and parliaments;10 (iv) the appropriate role of the WTO
in global economic governance and its relationship to other international
organizations and agreements;11 (v) the relationship between WTO agree-
ments and the growing number of regional and bilateral trade arrangements;
and (vi) the balance between the WTO’s judicial and legislative functions.12
The prominence of each of these areas of debate on governance and insti-
tutional reform has fluctuated over time. In the lead-up to the election of the
WTO’s Director-General, for instance, debates about the appropriate powers
of the Director-General and the election process resurface. Similarly, debates
on the ‘Green Room’ tend to intensify around the time of WTO ministerial
conferences and mini-ministerial meetings.
The debate on WTO reform has been punctuated by two major reports,13
a series of formal submissions from WTO Members, and a suite of proposals
from academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) covering a
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diverse range of reform topics. In 1999, the failure of the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference prompted then Director-General Mike Moore to call on a group
of eminent experts for advice about institutional reform, resulting in a report
entitled ‘The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New
Millennium WTO’ (the Sutherland Report).
A variety of countries have submitted proposals on aspects of institutional
reform, including Canada, Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom,
and a number of developing countries, such as the Like-Minded Group (LMG)
of 15 developing countries (led by India).14 After the 2003 collapse of the 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting, Pascal Lamy (at that time the European Union’s
trade commissioner) famously characterized the WTO as a ‘medieval institu-
tion’ and tabled a European Commission proposal for WTO reform. Then, in
2007, amid concerns about the slow progress of the Doha Round and prolif-
erating regional and bilateral trade agreements, the Warwick Commission, an
independent commission of experts chaired by a former Canadian minister
for trade and foreign affairs, published its report, ‘The Multilateral Trade
Regime: Which Way Forward?’ (the Warwick Report).
To date, the vast majority of the scholarly literature on the governance and
institutional reform of the WTO has emanated from developed countries and
is dominated by the analytical perspective of lawyers and economists.15 The
involvement of political scientists and scholars of international relations on
the reform agenda has been relatively scarce and recent.16 Despite the long
engagement of developing country scholars on questions of trade and devel-
opment in the multilateral trading system, their input on debates regarding
WTO governance and specific proposals on institutional reform has been sim-
ilarly tentative, general in nature, and recent compared to the intense engage-
ment of developed country scholars on the topic.17 The agenda, contours, and
themes of the scholarly literature on institutional reform thus remain strongly
defined by the preoccupations of developed country scholars, even where they
are development-oriented in purpose.
Academic work on WTO reform is supplemented by a vast body of com-
mentary by former WTO insiders (both from governments and the WTO Sec-
retariat), NGOs, civil society groups, and industry associations, as well 
as governments and parliamentary bodies.18 Here we find a more consistent
interest in what developing countries may have to gain from improvements
in the governance and institutional aspects of the WTO. Several intergovern-
mental organizations have also published documents that include reflections
on the purpose and performance of the WTO system and proposals consistent
with their respective mandates (e.g., labour, development, public health) and
related stakeholder groups.19
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The remainder of this section highlights several crosscutting themes that
underlie the WTO reform debate. Across the spectrum of scholarly and 
policy analysts, most studies of WTO governance and institutional reform con-
cur that a core purpose, if not the core purpose of the WTO, should be to pro-
tect a stable, multilateral, rules-based approach to international trade. For
many of these analysts, the WTO’s agreements represent the ‘rule of law’
in the realm of international trade: a global public good that warrants protection
in its own right. Beyond that point of consensus (though still not universally
shared), the scope of and prescriptions for reform vary as widely as do perspec-
tives on the usefulness, goals, and mandate of the WTO.
The tensions in the WTO reform debate are amply illustrated in the literature
on reform of WTO decision-making, rule-making, and negotiating processes.
For free trade advocates, this interest is spurred by concerns about the per-
ceived inefficiency of the WTO system in achieving agreements on trade 
liberalization. These advocates often cite the economic benefits of liberalization,
as well as its contribution to peace and political stability, as justification for
seeking more efficient ways to conclude new trade deals.20
Critics counter that proposals for negotiating process reform that aim simply
to achieve trade liberalization faster misunderstand the scope of the WTO’s man-
date. The WTO is now as much concerned with the regulation of world trade as
its liberalization, and the task of negotiating global trade regulations presents 
different challenges than that of exchanging market access concessions.21 Further-
more, implementation of agreements may involve distinct political, institutional,
and budgetary considerations at the national level. Many who share this line of
thinking emphasize that while trade liberalization may well be a purpose of the
WTO, is it not the purpose of the multilateral trading system and should not be
pursued as an end in itself. Rather, trade policy—and trade liberalization—should
be shaped in light of public policy objectives, such as growth, employment, and 
sustainable development, set out in WTO agreements. The appropriate speed 
and efficiency of negotiation processes able to reflect those goals may rightly vary.
Beyond negotiating processes, some scholars advocate fundamental, struc-
tural reforms of the WTO. This includes calls for constitutionalizing the WTO—
that is, for constructing a constitution for the WTO—to bolster both the strength
and legitimacy of the WTO’s rules.22 The varied proposals that fall under this
heading are challenged by those concerned that constitutionalization would
erode national sovereignty and risk emphasizing economic goals over broader
public policy objectives. Some critics call instead for acknowledging the useful-
ness of and need for greater political contestation rather than more rules at the
WTO, and for creating and maintaining spaces within the WTO where political
debate can occur within the multilateral trading system.23
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A further crosscutting area of tension has been the debate on how to boost
developing country participation in global trade and make the multilateral
trade system more responsive to developing countries. Proposals on these issues
extend back to the 1960s when Part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was established (which, among other elements, introduced 
the notion of special and differential treatment for developing countries).24
The discussion on how to make the WTO work better for developing countries
has subsequently greatly expanded, inspiring increased engagement from gov-
ernments, NGOs, and scholars alike.25 Here again though, more emphasis has
been placed on the immediate and important question of what kinds of trade
agreements would best benefit developing countries, rather than on the process
of achieving better trade deals or ensuring that the governance of the multi-
lateral system and its institutional features provide the greatest opportunities
for the perspectives of developing countries; this question needs to be addressed.
Importantly, the perspectives that development analysts bring to the reform
discussion do not always fit neatly within the boundaries of the agendas defined
earlier by developed country scholars. There are shared interests in questions
of the reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and in improving rule-
making processes. But development-oriented analysts devote greater attention
to matters such as understanding and empowering developing countries in
the WTO rule-making process, the potential and pitfalls of coalitions among
developing countries, and how to operationalize the principle of special and
differential treatment. Developing countries and development advocates devote
far more attention to the importance of improved trade-related capacity build-
ing and technical assistance as part of the institutional reform debate, though
there has been surprisingly little attention to the details of how this significant
activity should be provided and governed.26 Developing country analysts and
development-oriented analysts also devote greater attention than many devel-
oped country counterparts to the interaction between international organi-
zations and regimes, and to the coherence of their work.27 In particular, many
development analysts are concerned with ensuring synergy between the work
of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, as well as
the overseas development assistance that bilateral government donors pro-
vide.28 There is also a high degree of interest in how the interaction of differ-
ent international regimes, most notably the trade and climate regimes, affects
developing countries.29
A further crosscutting theme that attracts the attention of WTO critics and
supporters alike is that of improving the accountability and transparency of the
WTO and expanding opportunities for public participation.30 Reacting to 
the anti-globalization backlash against the WTO around the time of the 1999
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Seattle Ministerial Conference, many scholars have also taken up questions about
the legitimacy of the institution.31 Some scholars proposed ways to bolster the
validity of the WTO, while others argue that only the fundamental transforma-
tion of its purpose and processes can boost its legitimacy.32 Further, some scholars
argue that the process of vigorous debate within civil society about the pros and
cons of ‘constructive engagement’ with the WTO and the prospects for reform
are in themselves a source of legitimacy for the institution.33
The result of debates on accountability and legitimacy has been a suite of
reform proposals—some more abstract and others very specific—that aim to
embed principles of democratic process, inclusiveness, transparency, and rep-
resentation in WTO decision-making. These in turn have provoked counter-
proposals and rebuttals. Some developing countries, for instance, oppose calls
for greater civil society participation in the WTO’s formal decision-making due
to concerns this would offer greater advantages to better-resourced NGOs in
developed countries. Some analysts caution against proposals for a greater role
for the private sector and/or civil society in WTO deliberations arguing that
the trade-offs with efficiency may be too high and that problems of accounta-
bility and transparency should first receive attention at the national level, through
enhanced and more participatory national trade policy-making processes.34
Civil society organizations have also appealed for constraints on the influence
of big business and multinational corporations in the WTO agenda-setting
and negotiating process.35 On the other hand, advocates of greater developing
country participation in the trading system often argue that the increased
engagement of developing country business interests in national preparations
for multilateral negotiations is a vital prerequisite for them to extract greater
benefits from the multilateral trading system.36
To date, political analysis of the strategies for achieving proposed WTO
reforms (and the constraints that frustrate the prospect of such reform efforts)
has attracted far less attention than the proposals themselves.37 This reflects a
weakness more broadly in the literature on international regimes and organ-
izations, which has offered greater attention to the emergence, formation, and
design than to regime change or organizational change.38 That said, some
scholars and commentators do consider the politics of the WTO reform debate.
Some critics question whether the WTO is in fact amenable to the kinds of
fundamental institutional redesign advocated by other scholars.
Skeptics of the prospects for the reform of formal decision-making and
negotiation processes at the WTO emphasize, for instance, that trade 
negotiations are necessarily informal and that prospects for restructuring them
from the outside are extremely limited.39 As an alternative, they propose
processes of learning and gradual, incremental change as more likely vehicles
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for change, where players themselves devise more efficient strategies for 
deal-making. Some analysts also offer strategies for organizing among devel-
oping countries.40
A compelling case has also been made that the recurring ‘crises’ of the 
multilateral trading system—and the reform debates these generate—are used
to the advantage of its most powerful Members.41 More broadly, a number of
anti- or alter-globalization critics of the WTO system raise fundamental ques-
tions about the accountability of the WTO and the status of national sovereignty
in the face of powerful global institutions. They question not only the pur-
pose but also the plausibility of many reform proposals, as well as the under-
lying economic model underpinning the WTO—one that they argue focuses
too much on consumption, economic growth, and control of global economic
activity by large corporations. They argue that transforming the global economic
system, and the WTO included, to promote equity and environmental sus-
tainability requires ‘bottom-up’ democratization through the work and grow-
ing power of social movements rather than ‘institutional tinkering’ from above.42
III. A New Approach to WTO Governance 
and Institutional Reform
This section sets forth five elements of a new approach to the question of
appropriate institutional reforms at the WTO that responds to the contempo-
rary global challenges and the evolution of the WTO’s functions and practices.
A. A ‘Systems’ Approach
In 1997, John Jackson described the WTO as a set of legal agreements and an
institutional framework to administer the implementation of these agree-
ments, settle trade disputes, and provide a forum for ongoing negotiations.43
In so doing, he reinforced the GATT tradition of seeing the WTO as a legal
regime, albeit now with a more formalized institutional structure and stronger
dispute settlement mechanism at its heart. Over the past 15 years, however,
numerous scholarly efforts have also characterized and analyzed the WTO as
an ‘international organization’. While the WTO Secretariat may indeed be char-
acterized and analyzed as an ‘international organization’, this approach has
important constraints. In 2006, for instance, a debate on this subject emerged
between staff at the WTO Secretariat and the One World Trust regarding the
difficulties of applying the literature on the accountability of international
organizations to the particular case of the WTO.44 The Secretariat staff argued
that the Member-driven character of WTO decision-making and the legally
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binding nature of agreements among its Members are characteristics that make
it difficult to discern what exactly one is holding ‘the WTO’ accountable for and
what the WTO is in that context. The Secretariat’s argument is that WTO Mem-
bers rather than the Secretariat are responsible for the content of particular
WTO agreements, and that this distinguishes the institution from large inter-
national bureaucracies such as the World Bank and IMF, which have a vast
array of activities. This example illustrates the challenges of analyzing the WTO
as an ‘organization’.
Day-to-day language provides a hint of how we might more usefully 
analyze the WTO. The WTO is frequently referred to coterminously as the
‘multilateral trading system’. Rather than examine it as a legal regime or as an
‘organization’, a promising alternative is to examine it as a system. What then
would a systems approach involve? We know that the WTO is indeed a legal
regime built on contractual legal obligations between Members, but that it is
more than a set of agreements.45 The WTO is also clearly more than merely a
negotiating forum. The WTO also comprises a Secretariat, which is a discrete
international organization and bureaucracy with a budget and work program
defined by Members46 that includes responsibilities ranging from the admin-
istration of agreements and meetings to the provision of training and techni-
cal assistance. Importantly, however, the scope of activities and outcomes for
which the WTO Secretariat is directly responsible is smaller than those that
WTO Members call on the multilateral trading system to deliver on.
A systems approach acknowledges the composite nature of the WTO and
the variety of actors involved in delivering and conducting the various func-
tions and services of the multilateral trading system. While WTO Members
conduct most of the formal business of the WTO, the Secretariat provides sig-
nificant support and conducts important activities. The WTO Appellate Body
is, for instance, a distinct but linked international organization with its own
budget and working practices. Further, the work of WTO system is animated
by interactions among Members (that conduct much of the day-to-day business
of the system) and the actions of a host of international agencies, including but
not limited to the WTO Secretariat, as well as NGOs (public and private inter-
ests), and experts/individuals. This fact is exemplified in the case of the train-
ing, technical assistance, and capacity-building function of the WTO system, where
some of the work is funded and implemented directly through the 
Secretariat, but much is implemented through collaborative arrangements
with other international organizations and bilateral donors, and also inde-
pendently by these and non-government actors.47
A systems approach to WTO reform acknowledges the range of actors, in
addition to the WTO Secretariat and WTO Members, that ‘do the work’ of the
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system and explores how they interact to advance that work. This systems
approach can then be applied to each of the particular functions the WTO 
systems serve.
B. A Functional Approach
In addition to its widely discussed negotiation and dispute settlement functions,
the WTO system serves a range of additional functions often neglected by
scholarly literature, including (i) monitoring and surveillance; (ii) research;
(iii) capacity building, technical assistance, and training; (iv) regime mainte-
nance; (v) interaction with other international organizations; and (vi) public
outreach and information sharing with a range of non-state stakeholders.
A functional approach prompts us to explore how to isolate the appropriate
political processes for tackling the distinct functions of the multilateral trad-
ing system. The proper formats and processes for negotiation, policy dialogue,
problem-solving, monitoring and information exchange, and dispute settlement
differ. These may involve various roles for the WTO Secretariat and for its
Director-General.
For each of these functions, a series of governance questions can be asked,
including about the process through which decisions are made and imple-
mented.48 How are priorities set and who is involved? Who controls budgetary
resources? How is performance monitored, assessed, and evaluated? A ‘func-
tional’ approach to studying the WTO that examines each of these independ-
ently, and the links between them, yields new insights into the challenges and
priorities for reform.49 First, it enables us to see the full range of areas in which
governance reforms might generate benefits for sustainable development and
developing countries. Second, it provides ‘oxygen’ to now stale debates on issues
such as the appropriate degree of public ‘participation’ in WTO activities,
the scale of the WTO Secretariat, and how effectively developing countries
participate in and influence each of the functions of the system. Third, a func-
tional approach extends the scope of reform literature to consider the full range
of the WTO’s functions. The post-negotiation dimension of the multilateral
trading system’s activities has a significant impact on Members, especially
developing countries. In particular, closer attention to post-agreement bar-
gaining is critical for properly understanding the experience of developing
countries in the global trade system and the range of challenges to which pro-
posals for WTO reform should respond. Power politics occur both within
global trade talks and in the interpretation and implementation of any result-
ing agreements.50 There is also a need for greater attention to negotiation
processes that occur outside particular trade rounds, such as negotiations
related to accessions, the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round, and ongoing
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talks that occur in WTO committees. Each of these aspects involves intense
political bargaining over timing, trade-offs, adjustments, and burden sharing.
C. Acknowledge Dynamism
The study of WTO reform must begin with an up-to-date appreciation of how
WTO decision-making occurs in practice across the WTO’s functions and 
how this has changed over its first 15 years. The practice of international trade
decision-making now differs considerably from that of the early days of the system
and, indeed, the prevailing practice at the launch of the Doha Round.51 Whereas,
for instance, proposals on WTO reform in the late 1990s focused on concerns
about the exclusive nature of the ‘Green Room’ and called for formalization of
the negotiating process to enhance representation and transparency, the process
of negotiations has now evolved and proven far more dynamic than many
commentators acknowledge. Power configurations are evolving, and there is
constant improvisation with respect to strategies for reaching consensus and
closing deals. One of the clearest examples is that in light of the expanding use
of coalitions as tools for representation, the infamous Green Room attracts
far less criticism than it had previously. That said, there are still important
enduring complaints regarding the ability of most of the more than 100 develop-
ing country WTO Members to participate effectively in Green Room processes
and WTO decision-making, particularly the poorest and weakest among them.52
There is also far greater involvement by non-state stakeholders across WTO
activities than anticipated in much of the initial scholarship on reform. The par-
ticipation of developing countries in the Dispute Settlement Understanding has
evolved as have its practices with regard to public access to proceedings. The
WTO Secretariat’s own work is implemented through a variety of formal and
informal processes that are dynamic and have evolved over time, and recent
analyses have demonstrated how the Secretariat itself may be an actor in its own
right, including in WTO negotiations at given moments.53 The WTO’s prac-
tices and policies on internal transparency have improved considerably over
time.54 Much has also changed since the early, more abstract discussions of the
links between trade and so-called non-trade issues. The WTO system has
already been called on to respond to an array of global challenges that have taken
it well beyond the initial far tidier world of market access negotiations.
D. Grounding Analysis in Normative Purpose 
Reforming the WTO demands clarity as to the objectives and benchmarks
against which proposals for institutional reform ought to be tested. Scholarly
proposals on WTO reform too often lack a clear articulation of the goals and
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challenges that proposals seek to address or they focus only on a narrow objec-
tive. Proposals for reforms necessary to speed the process for reaching new
WTO deals, for instance, neglect broader questions on how to ensure the mul-
tilateral trading system advances the ends for which it was established, which
include improving economic welfare in all countries, poverty reduction, sus-
tainable development, stability in global trade relations, and a guard against beg-
gar-thy-neighbour trade policies. Yet proposals for WTO reforms are frequently
advanced on the basis of ill-defined concerns about weak ‘efficiency’ or 
‘performance’ without adequate specificity regarding what these concepts mean
or the distributional impacts of proposed reforms. Too often scholars write of
improving the performance, efficiency, or credibility of the WTO, but it is
unclear what they consider the broader normative purpose or benchmarks
against which the WTO’s performance, efficiency, or credibility should be
judged. A sharper focus on such substantive goals would spur recognition that
the mandate and purpose of the multilateral trading system are deeply contested
both by WTO Members and its diverse stakeholders.
The focus of reform proposals ought not to be limited to helping sustain
the WTO per se, but rather on whether reforms help foster progress toward a
WTO system that better delivers on the goals set out in its preamble. If sustain-
able development and improving the plight of developing countries should
be, and indeed are, at the heart of political debates about the global trading
regime, the discussion of institutional reform and WTO governance should
also be motivated by and judged against its ability to address these challenges.
Proposals for WTO reform thus need to address two critical political priorities:
(1) how to bolster the relative power of developing countries in the system,
and (2) how to ensure the system better responds to sustainable development
priorities. The challenge for those concerned with WTO reform is to discern
how and in what ways proposed reforms address these two inter-linked goals.
Of course, not all commentators share the view that these goals should indeed
be a core purpose of the system or of reform, and others may prioritize other
aspects of the preamble (such as the calls for raising standards of living and
ensuring full employment, or expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services). There is, however, a clear political and legal rationale for a focus
on sustainable development and developing country needs (recognizing that
those of particular countries may vary widely) as a benchmark.
In legal terms, the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the WTO (the WTO Agreement) recognizes the importance of sustainable
development, calling on governments to conduct their economic and social
objectives in trade relations in a way that allows 
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for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sus-
tainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.55
The WTO’s preamble also recognizes that the particular needs of developing
countries in the trading system include, inter alia, the objective of greater
employment. Several of the WTO agreements detail general principles and
objectives that emphasize Members’ development and public policy objectives,
as well as other national goals such as political security.56 In 2001,WTO Members
reaffirmed normative objectives in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, stating
their conviction that the open, multilateral trading system and sustainable
development ‘can and must be mutually supportive’ (Para 6, Doha Minister-
ial Declaration) and making development the stated purpose of the Doha
Round. In addition, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights) and Public Health highlighted that trade poli-
cies should not stand in the way of efforts by countries to respond to public
health priorities. Several WTO Appellate Body decisions have recognized the
importance of non-trade considerations and agreements in their reports on
trade disputes.57
Those who argue that the WTO ought not to be a ‘development institution’
or a sustainable development organization or indeed anything more than a
forum for commercial bargaining have already been overtaken by political
reality. Issues of sustainable development and the concerns of developing coun-
tries feature prominently in a number of ongoing trade negotiations. The fact
that trade deals are so difficult to reach is in part because governments cannot
escape the need to address political issues regarding equity, social, and environ-
ment impacts. Many of the obstacles to the conclusion of new trade deals are
linked to the real-world need for governments to respond to political demands
and tension over development and sustainable development challenges. Nego-
tiations are protracted precisely because the issues before states are complex,
demand intensive processes of learning (about challenges, implications, and pos-
sible solutions), and require time-consuming efforts to build political support
for potential deals in Geneva and among Members.
The call for a WTO that is more friendly to sustainable development 
and developing countries has moved far beyond early debates that pitted pro-
development advocates against the WTO in general or trade liberalization 
in particular.58 Indeed, in the years since the WTO was established, the trade
and sustainable development debate has evolved considerably59 as advocates
have explored different ways to ensure that the WTO’s substantive rules and
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agreements, and the balance of concessions in the Doha Round, properly incor-
porate and address sustainable development considerations. However, skeptics
argue that the prospect for achieving, implementing, and enforcing truly 
balanced rules will remain thwarted until fundamental institutional reforms
are achieved that address the broad array of decision-making and governance
processes at the WTO.
At the launch of the WTO, environmentalists expressed concern about the
potential ‘scale’ effects of liberalized trade on the environment and warned
that global trade rules may have a chilling effect on national environmental
regulations and undermine global environmental agreements.60 There is now
a more nuanced recognition that some trade rules and flows may help 
promote more environmentally sustainable outcomes while others may drive
or contribute to unsustainable production, distribution, and consumption
practices.61 Although some argued that the prospect of greening the WTO was
structurally limited,62 others now acknowledge that the understanding of trade,
environment, and sustainable development issues has evolved considerably
and that much progress has been made.63 Indeed, there is now greater involve-
ment of developing countries and experts in defining a southern agenda for
trade and environment.64 Some developing countries are now proponents of
a sustainable development approach to trade policy formulation and to 
specific aspects of trade negotiations.65 More generally, the scope of the sustain-
able development agenda at the WTO has broadened from issues such as 
eco-labelling requirements and addressing declining global fish stocks, to trade-
related dimensions of the effort to stop climate change.66
The call to ground analysis in normative principles and priorities is also one
for acknowledging the need to enable rather than suppress political contesta-
tion at the WTO. Here, several scholars have already called for bringing more
politics into WTO negotiations and decision-making as a desirable outcome
and for finding more spaces for political contestation to occur.67 Similarly, the
institutional reform agenda is not a technical, legalistic, or bureaucratic 
matter that can be ‘solved’ without a thorough consideration of the political
demands and concerns driving divergent perspectives and expectations about
the end goal(s) of the WTO. These will necessarily affect recommendations
on the purposes and strategies for WTO reforms.
Debates that slow current WTO negotiations are not about whether sustain-
able development considerations should be taken into account, but rather how
they can be taken into account. On the social front, negotiations on non-
agricultural market access and services stall because Members have competing
national policy considerations to address with regard to poverty alleviation, the
creation of good quality work,68 risks to social cohesion from rapid adjustments,
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and their own ability to manage the economic and social adjustments. The
deadlock on negotiations in agriculture is driven by fundamental concerns
about livelihood, food security, and the fate of the ‘bottom billion’ people in
the world in approximately 50 failing states that defy efforts to reduce poverty.69
Members have taken up environmental considerations in a discussion of
rules on fisheries subsidies and liberalization of trade in environmental goods
and services, and there is mounting interest in the relationship between trade
rules, the emerging climate regime, and biofuels. Across the range of trade-
related environment issues, the challenge is to forge solutions that address
social, development, and political considerations and constraints of both devel-
oped and developing countries.
The under-representation of developing countries in WTO decision-making
and the inadequate response of the WTO system to the varied needs of devel-
oping countries remain central challenges in the daily work of the Doha nego-
tiations. Concerns about asymmetric outcomes of the Uruguay Round and
the negotiation process have fuelled a broad recognition of the need to improve
the accountability and responsiveness of the WTO system to developing coun-
try priorities.70 The addition in the Uruguay Round of a strong regulatory
agenda to the WTO’s traditional liberalization focus generated significant tech-
nical and institutional challenges for developing countries.71 Developed coun-
tries have too rarely fulfilled their promises to take development considerations
into account in multilateral negotiations or to translate into meaningful 
outcomes their commitments to provide technical assistance and promote
technology transfer.72
The emphasis of WTO Members and the Secretariat on Aid for Trade since
2005 reflects the recognition that capacity building to date has done little to
empower developing countries to make effective use of the WTO system. Recog-
nition of the political imperative for greater efforts that assist developing coun-
tries has permeated up to key policy-makers, including several Directors-General
of the WTO.73 Core challenges for developing countries that remain inadequately
addressed include tariff escalation, disciplines on agricultural subsidies, the fail-
ure to understand how these countries trade, and the asymmetric nature of
accession negotiations for new developing country Members.74 In this context,
developing countries have maintained their long-standing calls for special and
differential treatment.75 They have added a call for ‘policy space’ to enable them
to balance trade liberalization with targeted measures to promote balanced
growth, poverty reduction, and industrialization.76 In the Doha Round, they
make a forceful case for a more development-oriented round and have articu-
lated clear proposals for how this might be achieved.77 In this endeavour they have
been joined by legal scholars,78 development economists,79 and NGOs.80
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In sum, the WTO reform discussion takes place in the context of real-world
economic, social, and environmental pressures and political debates over ongo-
ing negotiations. They cannot be isolated from them. The current financial
crisis illustrates how quickly the interests and priorities of states can shift, high-
lighting that processes for dialogue and debate within governance systems are
especially important at times when global economic performance weakens.
E. Devising Political Strategy 
A final aspect of the proposed approach to WTO reform concerns the politics
of reform. First, the power politics that permeate the WTO system will surely
also affect the political viability and direction of reform.81 An important dis-
tinction among scholars is between those focused on devising an ‘ideal type’
of WTO and those focused on politically achievable change in the short and
medium term. On both counts, a recurring weakness is that of limited 
systematic consideration of the political prospects for reform and strategies
for making proposed changes happen. There has been careful consideration of
the role of the United States in the GATT/WTO system and the prospects 
of U.S. support for reforms, particularly in Congress.82
Recent shifts in the balance of economic power among states in the nego-
tiations, and particularly the rise of countries like India and China, call for a
deeper assessment of the political prospects for reform proposals. More broadly,
some scholars have noted the importance in general of sustaining political
interest in the WTO as a dynamic and relevant international organization.
Already, they note the risk that a WTO with a weak legislative function will
undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the strong adjudicative function
embodied in the dispute settlement mechanism.83
IV. Conclusion: Political Challenges, Research 
Priorities, and Proposals
What should a better multilateral trading system look like? To answer this
question, this chapter has argued that scholars need to explore new ways of
thinking about the purposes of reform and the way in which the WTO is ana-
lyzed. It has argued for analyzing the WTO as a system. This approach enables
us to properly account for the range of actors that are involved in the work of
the WTO. It also broadens the scope and richness of reform proposals and
generates different recommendations than analysis that starts by describing
the WTO as either an intergovernmental regime or international organiza-
tion. Further, this chapter has called for attention to the range of functions
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that the multilateral trading system serves. Asking questions about the gover-
nance of particular WTO functions provides new insights into the challenges
of reform and broadens the scope for debate about the system as a whole, not
just its negotiation and dispute settlement functions.
This chapter has also argued that a clear point of view on the ends and
goals of the trading system is a necessary prerequisite for intelligent discus-
sion of WTO reforms and makes the case that proposals for WTO reform
should be grounded in the objectives of sustainable development and empow-
erment of developing countries in global trade governance. An important chal-
lenge—not addressed in detail in this chapter—concerns the kinds of indicators,
benchmarks, or questions that can be used to measure how WTO reform pro-
posals and governance (that is, the process by which decisions are made and
implemented) contribute to, or constrain, progress in the area of sustainable
development. Finally, this chapter has argued that reform proposals should
acknowledge and allow the need for a permanent space or spaces for political
contestation within the global governance or trade—as well as for greater atten-
tion to how reform proposals can be made attractive to WTO Members.
To indicate where this analytical approach could lead, this chapter concludes
with examples of some of its implications for the WTO reform debate in rela-
tion to four of the functions noted above: monitoring, negotiation, research,
and capacity building.
A functional approach to the analysis of needs for WTO reform prompts
greater attention to the WTO’s monitoring function.84 The recent financial
crisis has already spurred interest in greater surveillance by the WTO Secretariat
of protectionist measures by Member States. But a careful examination of the
monitoring function in light of the dual objectives of ensuring that it helps
advance sustainable development and empower developing countries spurs a
deeper and broader reform agenda. How could we reform the trade policy
review (TPR) process to better serve as a tool to help governments integrate
development considerations into trade decision-making? One option would be
for the TPR process to include an assessment of the effects of trade rules in light
of development objectives and an identification of national trade-related hur-
dles that impede their realization. The review process could also perform a
stronger role as a catalyst for governments to organize appropriate capacity
building. Specific reform proposals could include making the trade policy
review process open to the public; involving multi-stakeholder processes at
the national level in the development of the national trade policy review reports;
inviting recognized international experts as commentators in the trade policy
review meetings in Geneva; inviting commentaries from other interested
national and international parties (for example, other IGOs [inter-govern-
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mental organizations], industry groups, NGOs, academics, etc.); and integrat-
ing a new component into the trade policy review process for least developed
countries (LDCs) that evaluates the fulfilment by developed countries of their
capacity building commitments to LDCs. The adoption of a ‘systems’ approach
leads us to consider that the monitoring function need not, and perhaps 
cannot, be performed by the WTO Secretariat alone. Instead, the WTO’s 
monitoring function might also be improved by engaging non-state actors
through an independent monitoring mechanism.
The approach advocated in this chapter might also lead us to move beyond
many of the existing proposals for enhancing the research function of the
WTO. To date, there have been several calls for greater research capacity within
the WTO Secretariat. A development-oriented and systems approach would
instead lead us to favour increased support for independent research and ana-
lytical capacity in developing countries at the national and/or regional level in
universities, think-tanks, and research centres, as well as in the regional/national
headquarters of various UN agencies.85 (Some initial steps in this direction
are already being taken by the WTO Secretariat, albeit amid calls to still boost
the WTO’s own research capacity.) In addition, a sustainable development 
perspective would prompt us to call on donors and national governments to
support national research and analytical capacity that considers trade objectives
in light of domestic development goals.
Regarding the WTO’s negotiation function, a systems approach leads us
to recognize the prominence of coalitions in negotiations and to consider how
there could be stronger financial support to the secretariats of developing
country coalitions, drawing on lessons learned from successful experiences
(such as those of the coalition of small and vulnerable economies) regarding
the effective internal management and operation of coalitions and improving
their negotiating capacity.86 Even the smallest countries with a limited inter-
est in market-access issues at stake in specific WTO negotiations have a long-
term interest in understanding and contributing to the development of
institutional rules, which they also have obligations to implement and enforce
at the national level. Support should thus be given to LDC WTO Members to
ensure they have permanent representation in Geneva. This can be accom-
plished either through mandatory contributions by Members to the WTO’s
core general budget, or through a voluntary, supplementary contribution
scheme. While such measures would not resolve all the questions surrounding
the best ways to structure and delineate the scope of WTO negotiations, with-
out representation it is difficult to see how the smallest developing countries
can hold the multilateral trading system as a whole accountable to them.
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Attention to the specific functions of the WTO system also leads us to 
consider the engagement of developing countries in decision-making for the
system’s capacity-building function. Improved capacity building will depend
on developing country leadership to push for more effective aid, better artic-
ulate their needs, and extract greater value from existing resources. Effective Aid
for Trade and capacity building demands that countries organize themselves
and stakeholders in order to benefit from both, including through support for
multi-stakeholder decision-making processes on trade policy, negotiating pri-
orities, and implementation. On the governance front, the implication is that
developing countries need a stronger role in the management of Aid for Trade.
Significant steps have been made in this regard to improve the integrated frame-
work for capacity building to developing countries. However, a careful exam-
ination of the data on trade-related assistance and Aid for Trade reveals that
the majority of assistance flows through bilateral agencies and a diverse range
of multilateral agencies beyond those involved in the integrated framework.87
Developed countries should shift their support from bilateral trade–capacity-
building initiatives, often driven by their own mercantilist priorities, to mul-
tilateral initiatives that offer great opportunities to delink assistance from
developed countries’ priorities. The focus of capacity building must be on
establishing durable capacity in developing countries and regions rather than
supporting a network of international trade consultants. Another shortcoming
concerns limited attention to monitoring and evaluation of capacity building
and Aid for Trade. This could be boosted through annual independent evalu-
ations and/or peer reviews of trade-related capacity building from the devel-
oping country perspective, which takes a sample of countries and reviews that
provision of assistance against the priorities established through the Enhanced
Integrated Framework, or in other national development strategies (such as the
World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). The point here is not sim-
ply to evaluate assistance on a project-by-project basis, but to seek metrics or
benchmarks for discerning how well assistance helps countries implement
trade policies, institutions, and initiatives that advance their development. Fur-
ther, there should be greater monitoring and public disclosure of regarding
the performance of each major donor. Proper acknowledgement of the range
of actors and levels at which capacity building is needed takes one away from
narrow WTO-centric views of the Secretariat’s work on training and techni-
cal assistance, but rather sees it in context.
Finally, a functional approach to the question of WTO reform also breathes
new life into an often sterile discussion on whether and how to boost ‘civil
society participation’.88 The functional approach highlights the ways in which
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civil society groups already do participate at different levels across the WTO’s
negotiation, research, capacity-building, and monitoring activities, as well as
the opportunities to further enhance these activities.
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3
A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making
THOMAS COTTIER
I. Background
A. Matching Substance–Structure Pairings 
Institutions, structures, and procedures are not ends in themselves. They serve
and facilitate the attainment of substantive goals. Domestic political processes
are shaped by constitutional law with a view to achieving and securing funda-
mental goals of justice of a given society. To some extent, these goals are equally
defined in constitutional law. The situation is no different for international
law and organizations. Decision-making processes serve and facilitate the
attainment of legitimate outcomes commensurate with the substantive goals
of the organization. Indeed, outputs and the legitimacy of outputs are directly
related to the decision-making process and institutional rules through which
outputs are generated. Thus structures and procedures need to be shaped in a
manner conducive to achieving substantive goals. They need to match and be
in line with each other. They are mutually dependent. The authority and legit-
imacy of the institution relies, in other words, on appropriate substance–structure
pairings.1 With the evolution of substance, structures and procedures equally
need to change, adapt, and evolve.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is not immune from needing an
appropriate substance–structure pairing. Members need to review the rela-
tionship between substance and structure, and assess reform options. Appro-
priate structures are, as much as trade liberalization, a means to an end: a
means to successfully achieve the goals of the organization, depicted in the
preambles of the various agreements. In a spirit similar to that of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, Member States recognized 
in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization that relations 
in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the pro-
duction of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means of
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.2
This preamble recognizes that international trade regulation serves different
and partially competing goals. It is required to strike a balance between differ-
ent objectives and maximize the attainment of them. This requires institu-
tions and processes that can cope with these complexities. The authority of
the multilateral trading systems depends on it, and structures and procedures
are of key importance.3 The challenges are well-known. They are constitu-
tional in nature and entail institutional issues within the WTO, as well as hor-
izontal and vertical problems relating to other fields of international and
domestic law, respectively.
Within the WTO the relationship between the political and judicial process
is at stake. This relationship includes the proper role and function of the Sec-
retariat vis-à-vis the political and judicial. It covers the effectiveness of decision-
making, the role of stakeholders, and the relationship between trade rounds and
regular activities in the process of law-making. Horizontal issues include the
problem of fragmentation and coherence in relation to other international
organizations and domains of international law. Vertically, the relationship
between WTO and domestic law and the impact of WTO law in trade policy
formulation, implementation, and enforcement within Members are predom-
inant concerns. This includes the relationship between WTO law and regional/
preferential trade arrangements. The latter are supposed to operate within the
bounds of the multilateral framework but increasingly suffer from inflation and
non-compliance with WTO rules.
A number of questions must be addressed under the rubric of WTO reform.
How can we achieve a better balance between law-making and judicial refine-
ment of WTO law in and by case law? How can we achieve better policy coor-
dination in addressing borderline issues among trade and other fields governed
by other institutions, such as culture, human rights, investment protection,
finance, monetary affairs, and development assistance? How do we make sure
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that WTO rules are taken seriously at home, by legislators and domestic courts
alike? How can we, in turn, ensure that rule-making responds to the needs for
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy? What are the possible legal tools
to bring about a proper, well-balanced system? How can the WTO best be
structured to cope with these issues and challenges?
It is striking that underlying institutional issues, notwithstanding the sig-
nificant challenges they pose, have not been addressed by Members. A wide
range of studies and reports, containing suggestions and recommendations, has
been essentially ignored in trade diplomacy and capitals.4 Calls by the Inter-
national Law Association to establish a committee or working group dealing
with institutional issues at the WTO have gone without official response.5
Within the Doha Development Agenda, institutional issues have been discussed
only in the context of reforming dispute settlement, an area where reform is
least required. Some efforts have been made to address the relationship to pref-
erential agreements and to enhance transparency.6 Yet disciplines have not
been substantially enhanced, and no common will to strengthen conditions
for preferential trade has been found.
Overall, the institutional reform taboo may be explained by expediency
and concerns that it may further delay, complicate, and impede the conclu-
sion of the current Doha Development Agenda under the 2005 Hong Kong
ministerial program.7 Institutional reform may be seen as a pretext to prolong
the current trade round. It may even be seen as a means to filibuster the process.
It is not suggested here that institutional change should be undertaken with a
view to concluding the Doha Round.8 The Doha Round can and must be com-
pleted within the current institutional rules and procedures. Members cannot
change the wheels of a running car.
Instead, it is important to recognize that the main difficulties in concluding
the Doha Development Agenda are rooted in complex substantive issues, mainly
in agriculture. They relate to classical issues of market access that GATT and
the WTO have successfully dealt with previously through a process of claims
and responses. Reductions of tariffs and domestic measures entail substantial
structural adjustment, which takes time to negotiate and implement. Fifty
years of arrears in agricultural reform are difficult to address, and the process
is bound to take time. The Doha Round remains less than a decade old.
Negotiations within the current round are focused on agriculture, non-
agricultural market access, and services. The July 2008 package was limited to
these areas and to certain rules.9 They will decide the fate of the Doha Agenda.
These issues can and must be dealt with under current procedures. In addition,
the current agenda on rule-making is relatively modest. It is limited to imple-
mentation and marginal improvements of existing agreements in rules,
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intellectual property, and trade facilitation. Aid for trade is not likely to result
in a new legal framework but is likely to work with funding and donor programs
within and outside the WTO. More ambitious tasks, in particular negotiations
on trade and investment and trade and competition, were not taken up.
The difficulties in concluding the current Doha Development Agenda are
often ascribed to outdated modes of negotiations. This is only partly true.
While it is not the case for core concerns and the current agenda, it explains
why more ambitious plans in the field of rule-making have failed. Some the
issues inscribed into the Doha Agenda show structural deficiencies. Reform
of the dispute settlement system came to a halt because the issue was addressed
in isolation and without linking the debate to the political process of decision-
making, which was left untouched.
Negotiations on trade and environment have largely been a disguise for
further market access issues. These negotiations have failed, despite an explicit
mandate, to take into account services and matters pertaining to technology
transfer and intellectual property rights.10 It is here that the structural limits
of present modes of negotiating separately on goods, services, and intellectual
property are visible. The WTO has not been able to face complex issues that
require the interface of different regulatory areas within the jurisdiction of the
Organization. The downsizing of the Doha Agenda in rule-making is attrib-
utable in part to structural deficiencies.
These deficiencies need to be addressed with a view to taking up the chal-
lenges of a post-Doha agenda.11 Leftovers, unresolved under the current modes
of operation, are likely to be carried over. The future is likely to entail complex
issues beyond market access. The challenges of climate change mitigation and
adaptation and of the financial crisis will require addressing these problems in
their full complexity, possibly involving the reregulation of tariffs, production
and process methods, subsidies in industrial and agricultural products, and
transfer of technologies. Labour standards and other social issues will likely
need to need to be addressed. Additionally, new approaches to the regulation of
financial services and cooperation with other international organizations, par-
ticularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (IBRD), and
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Trade and investment as well as trade
and competition are likely to be included. The world will need to see more, not
less, positive integration and rule-making in meeting these challenges.
The global recession of 2009 will likely make effective decision-making in
both the political and judicial arenas imperative in the coming years. Greater
sophistication will be required in dealing with the constitutional, horizontal,
and vertical issues that are confronting the WTO. The impetus for institutional
reform, however, goes beyond climate change and current events. At its core,
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institutional reform must deal with profound underlying issues in the context
of international trade regulation and international economic relations.12
B. The Changing Substance and Context of WTO Law
Long past are the days when the GATT, in light of extensive post–World War II
tariff-based protectionism, focused almost exclusively on reducing border 
protection and enhancing market access for goods traded. True, trade liberal-
ization remains at the heart of the WTO’s work. Market access remains of
paramount importance, entailing both border and domestic measures. There
was never a clear-cut distinction between the two. National treatment, from the
very beginning, related to domestic regulation and conditions of competition.
Much of the present Doha Development Agenda still belongs to the classical
domain of WTO law relating to border measures: non-agriculture market
access negotiations, reduction of agricultural tariffs, improvement of disciplines
on trade remedies, progressive expansion of national treatment in services
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Aid for Trade,
Special and Differential Treatment and Graduation, and the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) focus on market access. The main difficulties in
the negotiations are still in these classical areas of multilateral and bilateral
negotiations on trade concessions.
Despite the fact that classic areas of concern remain prominent, impor-
tant changes have taken place. They amount to a parallel of what Wolfgang
Friedman, in his time, termed the changing structure of international law when
it moved from a law of coexistence to a law of cooperation under the aegis of
the post-war United Nations Charter.13 First, with the progressive reduction 
of tariffs and the ban on quantitative restrictions on agriculture, the emphasis
of regulatory work has shifted to areas pertaining to domestic regulation and
securing fair conditions for investment in other fields. Non-tariff barriers
addressed in the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, standards on intellectual property in the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement),
domestic support in the Agreement on Agriculture, disciplines on subsidies
in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, domestic regulation
in GATS, and government procurement all essentially serve as a benchmark for
Members’ domestic laws.
Much of the work under the GATT since the Tokyo Round, including the
Uruguay Round, has been of a legislative or prescriptive nature. Future nego-
tiations are likely to see the realm of rule-making reinforced. Clear distinc-
tions between negative integration (prescribing limits to national sovereignty)
A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making Thomas Cottier 47
and positive integration (prescribing what Members are obliged to do) have
been blurred. But the latter is increasing. The challenges of climate change and
linkages between trade and issues such as the environment, human rights, invest-
ment protection, intellectual property, and the regulation of services, in partic-
ular financial services, will further enhance complex rule-making negotiations.
These negotiations will need to take into account elements pertaining to differ-
ent fields, combining goods, services, and intellectual property alike.
Second, the advent of binding dispute settlement has changed the relation-
ship of rule-making and adjudication. While panel decisions could be blocked
under GATT 1947, Members are today bound by decisions rendered pursuant
to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). No longer is there a power
of veto in dispute settlement. At the same time, decisions taken by dispute set-
tlement are difficult to review in subsequent legislation. While the instruments
of authentic interpretation and of revision of treaty provisions formally exist,
the tradition of working and negotiating in trade rounds extending on aver-
age to a decade practically exclude the possibility of legislative responses to
DSU decisions.14 In fact, the Appellate Body has the last word on interpreting
the agreements within the WTO. This results in an imbalance between law-
making and adjudication, placing a heavy responsibility on the case law in
developing WTO law.
Third, leadership has changed. GATT negotiations in 1947 and successive
rounds were launched during the Cold War and led by the United States. The
modes of negotiations were developed with a single power dominating the
process and others following suit. Eventually, trade negotiations developed
into a bipolar framework, with the growth and emergence of post-war Europe
negotiating at the table in Geneva with a single voice under a common com-
mercial policy. The core of the Uruguay Round agreement was the product of
U.S. and European Communities (EC) bargaining, with the results being even-
tually multilateralized. Others, such as Japan and large developing countries,
played an important but not decisive role.
With the advent of emerging economies, the WTO faces a multipolar world.
Since the Cancun Ministerial Meeting, major decisions have required the consent
of a number of countries, including Brazil and India. The accession of China
to the WTO in 2001 profoundly shifted the negotiating dynamic at the WTO.
While China still prefers a discrete voice in multilateral negotiations, it is evi-
dent that no major agreement can be achieved without its consent. The future
accession of Russia will further change the political economy at the WTO.
Shifts in the club of larger nations are not the only changes that have affected
the multipolar world. Medium and small countries have significantly increased
their participation and now seek to influence the process through ideas and 
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collation building. Efforts in recent years at building negotiating capacity in
smaller Members have paid dividends. Members increasingly operate in a con-
text of flexible, interest-driven coalitions.15 They may belong to more than one
grouping, depending on their interests. It is no coincidence that the WTO has
seen a growing number of informal coalitions with coordination going beyond
the former formula of groups of friends common in the Uruguay Round.
Fourth, information technology has significantly improved the transparency
of WTO work and documentation. Information about the WTO and its 
activities is broadly accessible and allows for much wider participation of non-
governmental organizations.16 The practical role of non-governmental organ-
izations and academic work has significantly enlarged the constituency of the
WTO beyond traditional producer interests. More people than ever before are
taking an interest in the work of the WTO, which for many years had been a
matter of specialists and government officials working outside the limelight of
international diplomacy.
C. Incremental Change and Evolution
While the substance and context has evolved, the formal structure of the WTO
has remained largely similar to that of the GATT 1947. The most significant
changes have been the evolution of the GATT agreements into a single under-
taking under the WTO and the fundamental structural changes undertaken in
dispute settlement. The modes of daily business and routine of committees
and the General Council have not substantially changed over the years. The
mantra of a member-driven organization, a forum of negotiation rather than
a multilateral body, still prevails.
The iterative process of round-based negotiations has essentially remained
the same since the creation of the GATT in 1947. It is hardly framed by inter-
national agreements.17 The letter of Article XXVIII GATT on tariff negotia-
tions was left behind a long time ago, and the cycles of multilateral trade
negotiations developed their own customary procedures and informal con-
ventions. Detailed voting rules, based on one-state one-vote in GATT 1947,
were also included in the Marrakesh Agreement but are not applied even when
consensus fails. Specific structures of negotiations are established to meet the
challenges of a particular round. The work is undertaken in formal and infor-
mal committees on the basis of consensus. Problems that are encountered are
addressed informally and bilaterally and are discussed in ad hoc processes,
guided by the chair of committees and negotiating groups, and the Director-
General of the WTO. The Green Room process, with tailor-made participation
of usually some 25 ambassadors of interested and hand-picked Members, is 
critical to bringing about compromise.
A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision-Making Thomas Cottier 49
The process is flanked by informal talks and coordination among delega-
tions in Geneva and support by the Secretariat  and NGOs. The role of trade
ministers largely depends on initiatives by Members and the strategies of the
Director-General. While mandatory biannual ministerial meetings are held,
informal negotiations take place in between meetings, both within the WTO
and outside on the initiative of Members. Linkages between agenda items are
made based on strategic as opposed to operational considerations. Negotiations
are not structured in a manner conducive to interfacing between different
areas, such as goods and services or intellectual property. The structure is char-
acterized by organizational fragmentation, and negotiations are essentially
conducted in parallel.
Although the basic modus operandi has not changed, the GATT and the
WTO have not been static. Changes have taken place over time and incremen-
tally within the bounds of existing structures. To some extent, diplomacy has
been able to adjust to new challenges. Bilateral tariff negotiations have been
gradually replaced by multilateral approaches applying formula-based tariff
reductions and sectoral initiatives based on critical mass. A comparable evo-
lution may be observed in negotiations on services, which increasingly rely on
sectoral agreements and critical mass.
Negotiations on rule-making have been conducted within structures orig-
inally designed for negotiating market access concessions. Up until the Uruguay
Round, this proved largely successful. It brought about substantive disciplines
within the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement and successfully created a num-
ber of side agreements under the GATT. Importantly, the ability to undertake
legislative work in between rounds has been used. The agreements on telecom-
munication, financial services, and information technology following the con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round are examples of this legislative work. So too is
the revision of the TRIPS Agreement, following the Doha Declaration on
Health, and the revision of the Agreement on Government Procurement. Yet
the pattern to date does not show constant or ongoing legislative work between
trade rounds. The WTO is far from a proper legislative process of deliberation
and decision-making comparable to law-making processes in domestic law.
Legislative accomplishments between rounds are the exception rather than the
rule. And auxiliary instruments have not been used, even in response to dis-
pute settlement.
Most significantly, the major reform of the dispute settlement system was
not accompanied by changes to the political processes of the WTO. This has
resulted in a new relationship between the political and judicial within the
WTO. Dispute settlement has evolved while negotiations have stalled. Some 
have argued that the resulting imbalance necessitates a return to the former 
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non-binding dispute settlement. The impact on sovereignty and the preroga-
tives of domestic legislators is not supported by the weak legitimacy of the
WTO.18 Some have argued that what is needed is a strengthened multilateral-
ism and political process. The proper balance should be achieved through an
enhanced political process rather than watering down dispute settlement.19
None of this has happened. Further refining of the DSU, in particular the 
creation of a professional cadre of panel chairs, a college of standing panellists
to draw on, and the ability to remand cases from the Appellate Body to the
panel, have not found sufficient support.
A new balance is being sought outside of the WTO. Legislators and domes-
tic courts continue to deny the potential of the direct effect of WTO law and
decisions in municipal law and of a more nuanced theory of justiciability, in
particular in the United States and the European Union. The imbalance between
the political and judicial process within the WTO has facilitated a return to a
dualist perspective of international law, delinking international and domestic
law.20 Legalization at the WTO is met with de-legalization of international law
in domestic fora.
In conclusion, the structures of the GATT and the WTO were shaped at 
different times, and for a different agenda. They were shaped for a process of
periodic tariff reductions and not law-making over time. They adjusted incre-
mentally, but the framework has reached its limits. New structural elements,
combining past experience and success with current and future regulatory
challenges, must be developed. The debate, which will be taking place after 
the completion of the Doha Agenda, calls for preparation and discussion. The
suggestion here is to work toward a two-tier approach to negotiations and rule-
making, incrementally building on past experience and constitutional thought.
II. Toward a Two-Tier Approach
A. Rounds and Permanent Fora of Negotiations
The tradition and success of negotiating tariff concessions and reducing levels
of domestic support show that trade rounds have been able to create necessary
momentum and political pressure. The same is likely to apply to concessions
exchanged in the field of services, albeit experience with services has been far
more limited. Both areas are able to respond to diverging needs of progressive
liberalization and individualized levels of commitment. Processes based on
specific requests and offers depend on a framework that allows for liberaliza-
tion in cycles. Absent deadlines or periods of intense pressure, tariff and serv-
ices negotiations could hardly succeed. They depend on give and take and the
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possibility to achieve overall package deals with regard to benefits and 
concessions made in what essentially has remained a mercantilist approach.
It is the shift to negotiating disciplines relating to domestic regulation in
WTO law that calls for a review of the negotiating process. These matters dif-
fer from individualized concessions. Rules are inherently uniform for all Mem-
bers, independent of levels of social and economic development and market
size. It is much more difficult to accommodate individualized needs in setting
international standards. These matters are complex, evolve at different speeds,
and induce different levels of interest on the part of Members. It is here that an
interest in the variable geometry of rights and obligations and membership to
instruments arises. Rule-making in WTO law thus should be shaped differ-
ently from the process of claims and response in tariff and non-tariff conces-
sions. Ideally, these matters should be dealt with under the agenda of ongoing
and continuous work undertaken in different standing fora of the WTO.
The question that arises is whether a dual approach could work or whether
ongoing legislation and rule-making inherently depend on pressure and the out-
comes of market access negotiations. Would it have been possible to conclude
the TRIPS Agreement, or the basis framework of GATS and the TRIPS Agreement,
outside the Uruguay Round? While there were few operational linkages, it is evi-
dent that they were essentially dependent on the overall dynamics of the Uruguay
Round. Thus it is hardly possible to build a two-tier approach on a complete dis-
tinction of concessions, on the one hand, and rule-making on the other hand.
Account must be taken of the political importance of each agenda item, and
rule-making cannot be dissociated from the dynamics of trade rounds. Nego-
tiations on framework agreements, setting the stage for decades to come, are
bound to be undertaken within the momentum and drive of trade rounds.
How then can we combine the momentum of trade rounds, the political
pressure needed to achieve outcomes, and the need for ongoing rule-making?
How can we ensure that basic principles, rules, rights, and obligations are
shared by all Members as the core of multilateralism while allowing for differ-
entiation commensurate with levels of social and economic development, and
largely diverging economic interests among Members? How do we avoid diver-
gences further increasing, as some will be bound and contained by disciplines
curbing protectionism while others opt out and are eventually left behind?
How can we avoid the situation that those assuming fewer obligations are taken
seriously? What can we learn from past experience? 
The definition and allocation of different regulatory fields to different reg-
ulatory levels with possibly diverging modes of decision-making is a major
challenge. Some may argue that the task is futile as Members will never be able
to agree, particularly in a multipolar world with traditions of liberal democracy
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no longer able to impose its ideals and tenets. Yet these objections cannot and
must not prevent academic discourse on the matter. It is only when a number
of viable options are on the table that diplomacy may be able to take the mat-
ter up and find ingenious compromises during long nights of negotiations.
We have not explored these options. Some suggestions are put forward here to
stimulate debate.
B. Constitutional and Secondary Rules 
WTO law, in line with the tenets of public international law, operates as a single
type of international agreement. Whether it is the Marrakesh Agreement 
establishing the Organization, the GATT with its profound and fundamental
principles of non-discrimination, the framework of GATS, or the detailed rules
of the TRIPS Agreement, and whether it is an understanding or an agreement
implementing particular disciplines relating to GATT, or a tariff or a services
schedule, they all are of the same standing and legal nature.21 WTO law does
not distinguish different and hierarchical sources of law. They all emerge essen-
tially in the same process, and the mutual relationship of the agreements is a
horizontal and often unclear one. Likewise, all the WTO instruments enjoy
the same status in domestic law forming international agreements of the same
type, whether they are dealt with as treaties or as executive agreements.
The time has come to learn from distinctions of primary and secondary
sources of law. While primary or constitutional rules setting out basic obliga-
tions and the framework for specialized regimes need to be set in an overall bar-
gaining process having the political momentum of a round, the implementation
of certain agreed on matters could be left to a secondary process in between
rounds. The distinction is firmly established in domestic law with basic distinc-
tions of constitutional law, legislation, executive orders, and administrative
regulation. It is well established in EC law with the distinction of primary law
and secondary rules, regulations, and directives.
Different sources of law allow the allocation of different modes of deci-
sion-making. In international law, the concept of secondary rules is normally
used for decisions and acts adopted by the bodies of an international organi-
zation. The same is true for the WTO.22 The concept is used here in a differ-
ent way. It stands for the proposition of introducing different categories of
international agreements within the constitutional framework of a multilateral
trading system, without necessarily turning the Organization into a body of
supranational law. This approach would allow reducing high-level negotia-
tions to core elements and issues within a package deal, and leaving other issues
to subsequent and well-framed negotiations.
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Basic agreements set out fundamental rights and obligations of a consti-
tutional nature. They are essential and binding on all Members. Today, they
comprise the agreement establishing the WTO, the GATT 1994, GATS, and
TRIPS. Tomorrow, it could be limited to a single constitutional WTO Agree-
ment comprising the structure and organization; different sources of law and
respective modes of decision-making; basic substantive and procedural obli-
gations, in particular non-discrimination; basic disciplines; exceptions and
transparency requirements. Such a single basic agreement would necessarily be
binding on all Members of the WTO. Rules on amending the agreement will
ensure that it remains a truly multilateral instrument and a single undertak-
ing. Variations among Members, currently pursued by means of largely 
ineffective special and differential treatment (S&D), could be effected by means
of graduation by linking the operation of rules to economic thresholds and
indicators of competitiveness of a Member or even of specific industries.23
Specific instruments, on the other hand, could be shaped in the form of
secondary rules, subject to the constitutional agreement, and not necessarily
binding on all Members. Today these instruments comprise Members’ schedules
and plurilateral agreements. Tomorrow, they could extend to agreements and
understandings implementing particular concepts set out in GATT 1994. It is
here that the single undertaking could be left behind and variable geometry
could take over. Combinations of single undertaking and variable geometry 
are conceivable.24 Solutions may be tailor-made, sometimes binding all Mem-
bers, sometimes not. Under a new WTO Agreement, different categories 
of instruments could be created and linked to specific procedures and mem-
bership requirements, ranging from single undertaking to bilateral,
plurilateral, or unilateral obligations.
Importantly, the structures and experience of differentiation are not
unknown to the WTO. The examples of negotiations on financial services and
telecommunication, mentioned above, demonstrate this point. While these 
negotiations were perceived as leftover issues, they could have been prospectively
designated as a matter to be addressed based on the results achieved in the
Uruguay Round. The GATS called for subsequent negotiations on a number of
issues, in particular subsidies and safeguards. Efforts might have been more 
successful if they could have been deliberately pursued on the basis of variable
geometry. The elaboration of new rules on access to essential drugs and the
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement can be perceived as an exercise in 
secondary legislation and treaty reform within a given framework. It is worth
considering whether it was necessary to undertake the effort as a matter for all
Members, or whether it would be sufficient to include those most concerned.
Finally, the process of accession follows a route of individualized commitments.
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These traditions could form the basis of a new legislative approach,
setting out different and distinct avenues of partly shared and partly distinct
rights and obligations among Members. It is conceivable to agree on core rights
and obligations and leave others to variable geometry. For example, the TRIPS
Agreement could have been limited to fundamental rules but have left the elab-
oration of more specific obligations to a longer-term and better-informed process.
It would have offered the possibility of bringing about graduation instead of
uniform rules applicable to all countries, independently of levels of social and 
economic development. In the future, sectoral negotiations in services and in
investment and competition could be conducted on such a basis.
A two-tiered approach built on framework agreements and implementing
rule-making would enhance the quality of outcomes at the WTO. It would
better serve the learning processes of smaller countries and developing coun-
tries, many of which have been unable to follow a large and detailed agenda of
negotiations. It would allow graduation and the needs of developing coun-
tries to be taken into account. In retrospect, a study could be made to deter-
mine whether negotiations on GATT side agreements, implementing specific
provisions since the Kennedy Round, did not contain elements of secondary
legislation. They were bound to stay within the framework of GATT, but were
not binding on all Members, and allowed key problems to be addressed by
those most affected. The codes may indicate that the idea of secondary legis-
lation does not exclude variable geometry when it comes to follow-up and
detailed rules on a particular subject matter. Such an approach could allow for
more graduation than the monolithic approach of the Uruguay Round and
the Doha Agenda.
C. Linking by Most-Favoured-Nation and Graduation
Fundamental rules in the constitutional framework will offer the basis for link-
ing results achieved in secondary rules. Importantly, the obligation to grant
most-favoured-nation treatment applies to all Members, whether or not sig-
natory to a particular rule of secondary order. The basic philosophy of the
multilateral system obliges Members to grant most-favoured-nation status to
all other Members, irrespective of whether they adhere to a particular instru-
ment of secondary order. The principle implies free-riding, which needs to be
addressed in defining the critical mass of membership required.25
Secondary rules may leave others aside, while granting rights to all third par-
ties representing smaller trade flows in a particular field. Not committing these
countries is tolerable from a point of view of conditions of competition.Yet once
outsiders reach competitiveness, mechanisms need to be designed in the 
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constitutional instrument to include them. It is here that the concept of
graduation is required. While a Member may not form part of an agreement
in the first place, it may eventually be obliged to join if certain conditions are
met in real economic terms. Members of the multilateral system, therefore,
may be eventually obligated to abide by multilateral rules. This prospect should
give them the right to determine whether they want to take part in the nego-
tiations in the first place or be prepared eventually to accept the results.
Such an approach is similar to that of plurilateral agreements, in particu-
lar the Government Procurement Agreement, while also combined with grad-
uated commitments. A Member would not be entitled to benefit from rights
without eventually joining when a certain threshold of competitiveness is
reached. This flows from the logic and experience of a truly multilateral 
system, as opposed to preferential agreements and bilateralism. The approach of
working with thresholds defining obligations to join could overcome the inher-
ent weaknesses of variable geometry witnessed under the Tokyo Round Codes.
D. Allocating Different Modes of Decision-Making
The two-tiered approach is meaningful only if it is linked to differentiation in
decision-making. There is no compelling need to apply the same decision-
making process to all WTO matters. It should be recalled that fundamental
reliance on consensus in dispute settlement—a specific mode of decision-mak-
ing—no longer applies in the process of assessing rights and obligations between
two or more Members.
It is thus conceivable to distinguish modes of decision-making in relation
to primary and to secondary rules. Primary rules could continue to operate
under a rigid principle of consensus, or alternatively with consensus-minus
or weighted voting with a particular quorum required, building on existing
WTO provisions. Secondary rules could be subject to alternative means, such
as consensus based on critical mass or weighted voting. In some instances, vot-
ing on the basis of one-vote one-state could be feasible, for example within an
executive committee. The two-tiered approach offers the potential to adopt
varied strategies of decision-making with respect to basic obligations and of
secondary norms. It also allows the adoption of different variants within these
categories. A single approach to decision-making must be rejected. Adopting
different modes will facilitate finding future agreement on sensitive issues.
1. Consensus
Consensus is the primary mode of decision-making within the WTO. In fact,
consensus is the mode of decision-making in a number of international organ-
izations.26 Consensus is based on equal representation of Members under the
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principle of sovereign equality. States see their interests best defended by 
consensus diplomacy. It has been most suitable for trade rounds and package
deals. Of course, consensus does not imply that Members are of equal impor-
tance and weight. Consensus implies an informal system of weighted voting,
as powerful Members are able to block consensus more easily than small and
medium-sized countries. In essence, it allows large players to block decisions
in political processes while the same remedy is available to others only at great
political cost. It ascribes power that, in reality, does not exist for most. The
recourse to the alleged democratic legitimacy of consensus, stressing sovereign
equality, therefore is merely formal and does not offer a true and transparent
account of power relations.
In WTO decision-making, the crucial question is whether large Members
need to retain veto powers in order to work within the Organization. More pre-
cisely, the question is whether single large Members need to be in a position to
block the adoption of a particular decision. Realists certainly would say so, as
control of international organizations is one of the main motivations for hege-
monic powers to participate. Debate is needed to determine whether this ration-
ale is suitable in a multipolar world. Blocking decisions today comes at high
political cost and may no longer be a tempting option. Successful decision-
making requires coalitions, and blocking may thus be limited to such coalitions.
Thus the United States and the European Union jointly, or Brazil and India or
China jointly, may be able to block proposals, but none of them could do so in
their own right. In other words, the system should adopt a consensus-minus rule.
In positive terms, a principle of consensus-minus could become the core
feature of a reasonably stable multipolar world. Consensus-minus will be highly
contentious, and its use may be limited to issues of secondary legislation dis-
cussed above. While trade rounds and negotiations of framework agreements
may continue to depend on consensus, consensus-minus may apply failing con-
sensus in matters of implementing framework agreements and work programs
adopted. Again, it is possible to modulate consensus rules for primary and sec-
ondary rules, or even within these categories. A new balance for the principle
of consensus-minus in dispute settlement could thus be found. Both are forms
of decision-making operating on a secondary level and are subject to fundamen-
tal agreement and consensus on underlying treaties. Furthermore, consensus-
minus may be positively formalized by adopting a system of weighted voting.
2. Weighted Voting
The idea of weighted voting reflects past experiences in the WTO and other
international organizations that decision-making based on the sovereign equal-
ity of states has not transpired in rule-making. Sovereign equality does not
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sufficiently respond to existing power relations. If formal voting is to be applied
and transparency achieved, voting rights should be shaped in a manner that
appropriately reflects the relative importance of Members within a multilat-
eral system. The principle was widely applied in international organizations in
the post-war architecture beyond Bretton Woods.27 Weighted voting can be
based on a number of criteria such as share of trade, GDP, dependence on for-
eign trade, and population size. Calculations show that a balanced allocation
of voting rights and powers to industrialized, emerging, and developing coun-
tries is possible and can be achieved.28
In practical terms weighted voting would implement the principle of con-
sensus-minus, as major powers are not able to block the adoption of a decision
on their own. And since decision-making in the WTO is generally a matter of
coalition building, weighted voting would also give a voice to medium-sized
and smaller Members. It is wrong to reject weighted voting simply based on past
experience in the Bretton Woods system.29 There are alternatives available that
would render the system reasonably attractive and equitable to all Members
alike. Weighted voting can be applied in matters pertaining to primary rules
as well as to secondary rules. It also can be used in adopting instruments of lim-
ited membership, thus complementing the critical mass approach.
Weighted voting still is generally considered ‘outside the box’ thinking.30 Yet
this conclusion has been drawn without careful examination of modalities and
the potential to modulate the principle for primary and secondary sources. More-
over, political scientists should look into the benefits of the system for govern-
ments seeking to balance competing interests. Results adopted on the basis of
weighted voting and in a transparent manner allow governments to concede
defeat at home and protect themselves from the pressure to block consensus.
3. Critical Mass 
Critical mass is an approach to bring about variable geometry on the level of
secondary rules to which all Members need not adhere. Members may agree
to negotiate a particular legal obligation provided that the main markets, and
thus the main partners, are included.31 The inclusion of key players is a pre-
requisite while others may abstain. The results of such negotiations are subject
to most-favoured-nation, thus all Members of the WTO benefit, even though
they do not participate in the agreement and are not subject to its obligations.
Past experience with sectoral initiatives in tariff reductions in the Uruguay
Round shows that this certainly is a viable avenue for addressing trade conces-
sions. As long as the main markets are included, free-riding by those absent from
the agreement is a lesser burden than the risk of failing to achieve agreement
under the consensus rule.
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The impact of critical mass in rule-making requires careful consideration.
There is a risk of creating a variety of asymmetric rights and obligations. It
may also encourage parties to abstain, thus avoiding the costs and benefits of
locking-in, potentially further widening the gap between those subject and
not subject to international disciplines fostering competition. It should be
recalled that the main incentive to opt for a single undertaking in the Uruguay
Round was to avoid the disadvantages of variable geometry inherent in the
code approach of the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. The concern could be
addressed by defining those areas where critical mass negotiations may take
place and those that would be excluded. Again, the two-tiered approach allows
different modes of decision-making to be combined and an overall balance to
be sought that would render the overall system more flexible.
E. Institutional Issues 
Ever since their inception, the GATT and the WTO have worked with flat insti-
tutional hierarchies, reflecting their single form of legal undertakings. All Mem-
bers are represented in the General Council and committees. Unlike most other
international organizations, the WTO does not have a formal executive or
steering committee with appointed and rotating membership. The steering
function is assumed by the informal green room process under the guidance
of the Director-General, and by informal conferences of ministers and offi-
cials from capitals.32 This informal mode renders access to negotiations a
volatile affair except for the main powers. Small and medium-sized economies,
let alone the least developed countries, risk being sidelined.33 Members are
forced to work within a system of flexible coalitions. The system has worked
reasonably well, though it has been criticized for lacking transparency and
accountability. Members and domestic constituencies face frustration when
omitted from the informal inner circles and excluded from negotiations.
Efforts at institutional reform could be built on a two-tiered approach
incorporating various modes of decision-making discussed above. Different
bodies could operate on different decision-making processes. Some could con-
tinue to operate on the basis of consensus, or consensus-minus (as in the Dis-
pute Settlement Body [DSB]). Some could be subject to weighted voting. Others
may be suited to operate under a one-member one-vote model. The powers of
ministerial meetings, the council, and committees could be shaped accord-
ingly. The two-tiered approach would allow examination of the potential role
of a parliamentary assembly and the assignment of specific functions not only
of an advisory nature, but also possibly entailing decision-making powers in
an effort to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Organization.34
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Conceivably, a consultative or executive committee could be created, which
includes major powers and represents other Members on the basis of their
size, geography, and level of development based on rotating membership fixed
for a number of years.35 The Executive Committee would need to ensure that
all pertinent interests and regions have a voice in decision-making. It could
be composed of Members reflecting all regions and levels of development,
including least-developed Members. Criticism voiced about previous efforts to
create a steering body (G-18) and the difficulties in bringing about effective 
representation need to be taken into account.36
The Executive Committee could be responsible for preparing major 
procedural decisions to be taken by the General Council and ministerial meet-
ings. It could decide on issues relating to the agenda of an ongoing round and
work on secondary legislation and housekeeping matters, including the appoint-
ment of key Secretariat personnel. Some matters could be allocated to the
Executive Committee for final determination, while others may be subject to
referendum in the General Council. In other areas, the Executive Committee
could be limited to providing advice and consultation. Decision-making would
be by consensus, but subject to voting, which on this level would allocate each
Member one voice of equal importance. Comparative studies may assist in
learning from the experience of other organizations, some of which have shown
a much higher level of organization and structure than the WTO.
Finally, institutional reform should also address the status and role of the
Secretariat.37 Again, the two-tiered approach allows functions to be defined in
more specific terms. While it may continue to work under established modes
in some areas, its role in others may be defined more precisely commensurate
with the legal framework and instrument at hand. Both in the process of
law-making and that of dispute settlement, its functions could entail limited
powers to take initiatives and defend the common concerns of the multilateral
trading system.
III. The Way Forward 
A. Formal or Incremental Reform?
The GATT and the WTO were built on experience. The 1947 Agreement was
modelled after the bilateral trade agreements of the United States of that era.
They provided the basis for an incremental evolution both of the negotiating
process and of dispute settlement within a broadly defined framework. The
latter emerged in practice and was codified for the first time only in 1979.
Decision-making and the structures of rounds evolved in diplomacy and do
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not find expression in binding legal documents. The powers of the Secretariat
depend much more on its expertise and skills than statutorily defined functions
and tasks. Perhaps the flexibility offered in past and present structures, and
the ease of developing customary practices, amounts to the great strength of
the WTO. Its success in bringing down tariff and non-tariff barriers may well
be assigned to a structure that allows for trial and error.
We are faced with the question whether reform should continue to take
place under this philosophy. Is it possible to adjust to the changing structure
of international economic law by changing practices under the current WTO
agreements? Suggestions to work with an informal directorate, critical mass,
restrictions on veto practices in the tradition of a Luxembourg compromise,
enhanced recourse to authentic interpretation of existing agreements, enhanc-
ing informal initiatives of the Secretariat, building better relations with other
international organizations in daily life, all seem to belong to a philosophy
building on incremental change.
Or have we reached the limits in the quest for appropriate structure–
substance pairings? Do we need formal reform? Should decision-making be 
formally reviewed? Should an executive body be established? Should the pow-
ers and role of the Secretariat be better defined? Should relations to other inter-
national organizations be more formally defined? What measures should be
taken to further enhance the transparency of the negotiating process? What is
necessary to render legislative responses to dispute settlement decisions a viable
option, contributing to a better sharing of responsibilities between the political
and the judicial process? 
Given the difficulties in reaching agreement, the informal avenue is attractive.38
On the other hand, a deliberate effort to change the rules provides more 
transparency and is better placed to restore and enhance the legitimacy of the
Organization.39 Debra Steger concludes that
the WTO needs major surgery in order to respond effectively to the new political
realities in the international economic system. The WTO is not the old GATT, and
members should abandon the mantras, myths and misunderstandings that are
no longer relevant.40
The idea of a two-tiered approach allows for a wide range of options to be
explored and offers a critical mass for negotiations and compromise. Regard-
less of whether a formal or informal route is to be pursued, it is important to
explore possible options from the outset. Most importantly, the goals of a
reform must be defined. Whether such reforms are eventually implemented for-
mally or incrementally is a secondary issue. It may be possible to develop a
two-tiered approach within the existing framework. Given the effect of WTO
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rules on daily life, issues of legitimacy, transparency, and accountability are
key to the Organization’s future and must be taken into account in designing
an appropriate path for reform.
B. Defining the Goals of Reform 
Whatever reform routes are chosen, a debate on the goals of reform is impera-
tive in order to secure commonly agreed directions for the multilateral system
in a globalizing and multipolar world. It is not simply a matter of redesigning
institutions. Legitimacy with regard to transparency and representation in the
decision-making process must be prioritized. The goals set forth in the pream-
ble of the WTO remain applicable today in times of globalization. However, they
must be bolstered by more specific targets. Answers to substance–structure
pairings will depend on specific answers to a host of questions that need to be
raised and discussed:
• How can one bring about and secure output legitimacy of rules? 
• What is the role of WTO in a world of multilayered governance?
• How can checks and balances against protectionism be attained while
allowing for appropriate policy space? 
• To what extent should the WTO enjoy enhanced autonomy in support-
ing these goals? 
• How does one properly define the relationship of multilateralism and
preferential agreements? 
• How does one properly define the relationship with other organizations
in a horizontal legal order? 
• How does one define the relationship between the WTO and domestic law? 
• Should it be entirely left to constitutional law, or is there a shared interest
in finding common ground within a doctrine of multilayered governance?
• How does one redefine sovereignty to the benefit of people?41
These are basic questions. They need to be asked. People will have different
responses, and so they will adopt different but informed attitudes to institu-
tional reform. Although perceptions may differ, a shared understanding that
the quest for appropriate substance–structure pairings cannot take place with-
out assessing and defining the fundamental goals of reform is essential.
C. Launching the Debate 
The ideas sketched out above merely indicate that there is room to think about
alternative options. All of this requires in-depth studies of options and inten-
sive debate. The debate should clearly be delinked from the fate of the Doha
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Development Agenda. It is not appropriate to change the rules of the game
while gambling is going on. The debate should go past the current round of
negotiations, regardless of its outcome. The problems noted above will continue
to exist well beyond the current round. A successful conclusion of the Doha
round will create the impetus to improve the multilateral system. A failure will
create the need to make efforts to save it. The underlying problems remain
common to both outcomes.
Further debate on the potential and options for implicit and explicit insti-
tutional reform will likely take place in academic circles, which will hopefully
inform thinking by governments. At the WTO, it would be feasible to create a
standing consultative committee that bridges academia, NGOs, governments,
and the Secretariat, essentially assuming the role of a think-tank. In due course,
and with a view to preparing post-Doha structures, a standing WTO commit-
tee on legal and institutional affairs should be set up, building on the lost tra-
ditions of the Committee on the Functioning of GATT (FOG) during the
Uruguay Round. The calls of the International Law Association to create such
a committee should be taken seriously by capitals. The current state of affairs,
the lack of attention and interest paid to issues of decision-making, and struc-
tures of decision-making outside the field of dispute settlement is one of the
main factors explaining the lack of well-developed options ready for debate.
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The current design of the international organization system regulating the world
economy was conceived by a small group of experts and politicians from the
United States and Great Britain in the early 1940s. The mandates and principles
guiding the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the envisaged
International Trade Organization were inspired by Keynesianism and embraced
by British and U.S. economists and high-ranking civil servants. These ideas also
resonated well within the political establishments across the transatlantic com-
munity.1 Two explanations, in the form of necessary conditions, for the genesis
of the global economic architecture have been advanced: first, the existence of a
‘constitutional moment’ after the end of World War II; and second, the presence
of a liberal hegemonic power to provide for an open and stable trade and mon-
etary regime.2 Today, the creation of new international organizations is rare
despite the opening of a new constitutional moment of liberal orientation after
the end of the Cold War.3 Not only is the establishment of new international
organizations costly, but there exists already a multitude of institutions that claim
(sometimes competing) regulatory authority over just about all policy issues.
Abandoning non-performing international organizations is also difficult.
Thus internal reform is the most likely observed outcome when thinking
about reforming international organizations. However, redesigning the rules
governing existing international organizations presents a number of challenges.
The power of the status quo stands out as a particular problem.4 First, actors
have learned and adapted to decision rules over time, allowing them to navigate
the system efficiently given the opportunities and constraints of existing rules.
This leads, in many cases, to the development of a substantial degree of ‘loyalty’
toward existing rules and resistance to change.5 Second, from the field of psy-
chology, we also need to take seriously the argument that actors are more likely
to defend existing practices and are relatively risk-averse when it comes to new
modes of decision-making where outcomes are hard to predict. Thus actors seek
a high degree of certainty that post-reform governance models will not lead to
pareto-inferior outcomes as measured in procedural and outcome influence.
Third, powerful nations hold a veto on the issue of redesign. If they are satis-
fied with the status quo, the contra-factual case that they will profit from design
change is most likely the hardest challenge to be faced in reform activities.
This chapter discusses two reform suggestions related to improving deci-
sion-making within the World Trade Organization (WTO). These proposals
have been promoted in two recent reports that discuss the future of the WTO.
The first (the Sutherland Report) advocates inter alia a stronger role for the
WTO Secretariat.6 The second (the Warwick Report) endorses a critical mass
approach to decision-making.7 This chapter explores both proposals further
with a view to improving and streamlining decision-making within the WTO.
Selected evidence from current and past practices in European Union (EU)
decision-making is discussed for the purpose of comparison across IOs (inter-
national organizations). The chapter is organized as follows. First, some reflections
related to reforming the current system are presented. Second, a more promi-
nent role for the WTO Secretariat in negotiations is discussed as well as new
decision-making rules. Third, alternative decision-making approaches lead-
ing to variable geometry (in particular ‘critical mass’) are analyzed. The chap-
ter concludes with a note on challenges that may influence future discussions
on reform in the context of the multilateral trading system.
II. Reflections on Reform
A. The Need for Reform
In recent years, international organizations have been subject to intensified
scrutiny from an ever-growing number of stakeholders. Many IOs suffer from
poor performance and appear insufficiently equipped to deal with 21st-century
challenges. The causes of underperformance, however, are not only found
within the organizations, but largely emanate from conflicting interests of the
members delegating to international organizations. In the case of the WTO, this
is borne out by the lack of timely responses to new challenges and general 
difficulties in finding consensus on further liberalization of markets and design-
ing new rules to govern the world economy.
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Early liberal contributions in the international relations literature analyzed
various ways international organizations help overcome obstacles to cooper-
ation.8 However, the nature of cooperation and the urgency of internationally
agreed policy responses to the challenges of globalization have changed over
time. In today’s world, international organizations need to provide services
beyond the general functions attributed to them in the past. These functions
have included the lowering of transaction costs and information asymmetries
as well as the enhancement of compliance. International organizations are
increasingly being called on to engage in positive integration and harmoniza-
tion initiatives that differ from traditional attempts to coordinate policies and
find mutually acceptable domestic practices and standards. In addition to
increased attention paid to performance, existing power structures behind inter-
national organizations have moved farther into the public and scholarly spot-
light. In this respect, the institutional capacity of international organizations
to control abuses of power by leading states within the system is increasingly
being assessed.9 Alongside this notion of creating accountable international
organizations, the broader concept of legitimacy receives continued attention.10
The WTO offers one of the most legalized multilateral platforms for dispute
settlement. The dispute resolution system has had some success in controlling
arbitrary discrimination, but owing to the nature of international politics it is
not feasible to eliminate the asymmetry of power completely.11 Despite its short-
comings, the performance of the new Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settling of Disputes (DSU) has been widely assessed as positive
in overcoming key deficiencies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)–type diplomacy in resolving trade disputes.12 However, the institu-
tional architecture of the WTO’s legislative branch, the negotiation platform, has
not kept up with the redesign of the litigation apparatus during the Uruguay
Round negotiations, resulting in institutional imbalance within the WTO.
B. WTO Reform in Perspective
In approaching WTO reform, four introductory remarks follow to put reform
proposals into a wider perspective of institutional change. First, reform proj-
ects can take various forms. The most likely reform type is incremental in
nature and is characterized by small and modest steps to accommodate some
of the pressures from outside and within the system. Examples of this type of
incremental change include the modification of informal processes, practices
to increase transparency, and granting greater access to a larger group of Mem-
bers to allow them to participate in restricted deal-breaking negotiation circles
(e.g., the Green Room). A number of initiatives to modify informal decision
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rules followed the failure of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999. These ad hoc 
measures focused on issues of transparency and participation.13
In contrast to incremental reform steps, package deals are more likely to lead
to substantial redesign. Big reform steps are usually part of horse-trading deals
that lead to (difficult to anticipate) design changes. As the Uruguay Round
results indicate, grand institutional redesign is easier to carry through as part
of a ‘single undertaking’. Against this background, it is interesting to note that
WTO Members have excluded negotiations on decision-making rules in the cur-
rent Doha Round. This reluctance to engage with design change also speaks for
WTO Members’ lack of interest in tackling governance issues.14 In the words
of a long-time panellist and former ambassador ‘the members are like ele-
phants: they are ponderous and are resistant to change’.15 Governance issues usu-
ally do not figure prominently on the agenda at the onset of a trade round. It
is not surprising that the reform of the DSU was introduced only in the 
second half of the Uruguay Round negotiations. In light of the GATT/WTO
negotiation history, the hope that the inter-round period will be utilized to
work on governance reforms corresponds to turning a blind eye to redesign.
Second, dominating paradigms are difficult to change. Paradigms serve
various functions. They are often constructed, advanced, and defended by the
powerful insiders of a system and by those who expect to profit from the sta-
tus quo.16 As a consequence, impetus for reform needs to develop from out-
side the inner circles of international organizations. Three paradigms have
become central to the WTO: the ‘member-driven’ nature of the Organization,
the consensus principle, and the ‘single undertaking’.17 The perception of many
WTO Members is that these paradigms serve their interests and thus they are
reluctant to engage in debates over change. In other words, a type of mental
‘decision-making trap’ has been created.18 This chapter critically addresses
above paradigms and builds an alternative approach that could assist in resolv-
ing the current impasse in WTO decision-making.
Third, the WTO is not an institution sui generis. Thus this chapter advo-
cates learning from other IOs and suggests a comparative perspective on deci-
sion-making. As the WTO is one of the most legalized international
organizations, this chapter encourages comparison with the most advanced
IO in global governance: the EU.19 Therefore, when discussing reform propos-
als, selected lessons from EU integration are introduced into the analysis.
Fourth, there is no such thing as an optimal decision-making system in
any polity. Value judgments largely depend on the political theory that under-
pins the analysis.20 Whereas some mechanisms might score well on the input
side (i.e., access, transparency, and intensive and non-hierarchical delibera-
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tion), other decision-making tools might score better on the output side 
(i.e., delegation, closed negotiations, qualified majority voting). In addition,
increasing input legitimacy could improve overall acceptance by stakeholders
but might not translate into output legitimacy (e.g., performance). Any detailed
reform discussion calls for a dynamic assessment of the potential effects on
input and output legitimacy, as well as important trade-offs between the two.
III. Additional Help from the Secretariat
A. The Current Role of the Secretariat
The Warwick Report was largely silent on the function of the WTO Secretariat.
In contrast, the Sutherland Report elaborates on the role of the Director-
General and the WTO staff in a chapter dedicated to this topic (Chapter IX).
The report refers to a type of malaise; the Director-General acts more as an 
international spokesperson and marketing executive than as an important
player in the negotiations. In addition, the lack of intellectual input from the
Secretariat and the Deputy Directors-General is lamented. Further exploration
of the optimal use of advice, expertise, and deal-brokering capacities is sug-
gested. In the view of the Sutherland Report, the WTO system suffers from 
‘a proliferation of back-seat drivers, each seeking a different destination, with
no map and no intention of asking the way’.21 In conclusion, the report calls
for a new institutional voice and the establishment of a true guardian of
the treaties by clarifying the poorly defined roles of the Director-General and
the WTO Secretariat.22
The weak role of the Secretariat in multilateral trade negotiations has to be
read in conjunction with the ‘member-driven’ nature of the WTO. Evidence
indicates that the role of the Secretariat in the negotiation processes has
decreased over time.23 Active membership, an increase in the average size of
trade missions, more attention paid to trade negotiations, and a greater num-
ber of services offered by the Geneva advisory community has weakened the
role of the Secretariat in negotiations. At the same time, the reluctance of Mem-
bers to delegate powers to the Secretariat has not changed. The growing dom-
inance of WTO Members might also be a reflection of increasing attention
being paid to controlling international organizations’ outcomes more gener-
ally. However, ‘member-driven’ governance creates costs that are often under-
estimated.24 These ‘sovereignty-related costs’ need to be weighed against the
benefits of delegating greater responsibility to the Secretariat and potential
delegation costs such as the abuse of the Secretariat’s autonomy.
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B. Strengthening the Secretariat
There are various ways to empower the Secretariat.One option would be to formally
increase the role of the Director-General and the Secretariat in managing 
negotiations to achieve similar standards to those that applied in the pre-Doha
era. This would be a move in the direction suggested by the Sutherland Report:
The Director-General and Secretariat should have the capacity and the standing
to be at the centre of negotiations during Ministerial meetings. Deputy Directors-
General and divisional Directors should work alongside facilitators throughout the
proceedings.25
This option could be further enhanced by asking the senior officials to become
more involved in the negotiations by chairing certain committees, which was
a practice in previous trade rounds.26
A more radical approach to strengthening the Secretariat within decision-
making would consist of transferring agenda setting prerogatives to the Direc-
tor-General. What would be the rationale of arming the Director-General with
such powers? The Doha Round has become bogged down in a peculiar version
of the ‘endless cycling’ dilemma. In the absence of any clear institutionalized
agenda setting, parties constantly table proposals.27 The current WTO system
follows opaque processes leading up to a flow of negotiation texts that even-
tually form the basis of final negotiations. There is insufficient transparency as
to the role of various actors in agenda setting. Most often, texts emerge from
discussions in informal negotiation groups. Throughout the process, the chair
(a representative of a Member State) with the help of the Secretariat steers the
process by tabling ‘non-papers’ to Members. In these papers, the chair attempts
to exclude certain items from the negotiation list and to specify key issues 
to be resolved. Only toward the end of negotiations, when signals from 
Members become explicit, will the chair table formal negotiation texts. Thereafter
a complex system of bargaining dynamics emerges: additional concessions are
exchanged and linkages created, and the pressure to obtain a final result mounts.
This is the time when the Director-General is usually asked to provide some
compromise formula.
One way to overcome endless cycling within a complex system of decision-
making is to streamline decision-making procedures by allocating agenda-
setting power to an elected group (e.g., a new form of the Consultative Group
of 18) or a supranational actor (e.g., Secretariat, Director-General).28 This chap-
ter advocates strengthening the role of the Director-General and the Secretariat.
WTO Members should grant more responsibility to these supranational actors
by delegating agenda-setting powers in the context of the negotiations.
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C. Complementing the Secretariat’s Powers: Reforming
Decision Rules
An additional step to complement shifting agenda-setting prerogatives would
be exploring means of moving away from the consensus principle and aban-
doning the single-package approach. These are difficult ‘cultural’ hurdles to
overcome, as the consensus principle and the single undertaking have received
near universal support from WTO Members in recent years.29 However, reform
would not require a giant institutional change, as there are already provisions
in the WTO Agreements that allow for certain decisions to be taken—if con-
sensus fails—under different modes of qualified majority voting.30
Inspiration for greater delegation of authority to the WTO Secretariat and
differentiated decision rules can be found by looking to the experiences of the
EU. European Union decision-making in many regulatory fields is character-
ized by a two-step approach.31 Translating this mechanism to the WTO, the
Secretariat would table proposals based on the input of the WTO Members in
the various committees that serve an advisory function. These proposals should
not reflect the median of all positions formally and informally communicated,
but the Secretariat would balance the vital interests of the Members and rep-
resent systemic interests that are supranational in character. As a second step,
these proposals would be discussed and deliberated on by the General Coun-
cil or other specialized committees and accepted or rejected based on a qual-
ified majority voting procedure.
The one-state-one-vote model needs to be revisited, as it does not reflect
the fact that states are diverse in size, leadership, and capacity to offer market
access to other parties. The current system, with its small group negotiations,
already recognizes a hierarchy among states within the international trading
system. A qualified majority voting system would only formalize the existing
hierarchy and tackle the current ‘organized hypocrisy’.32
While moving toward a qualified majority voting system could be an objec-
tive, it seems obvious not all areas demand the same voting thresholds. Deci-
sions on interpreting provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement should
be treated differently from negotiations on new rules that intrude into national
cultural and societal environments. In addition, Members should not engage
individually in painstaking regime management issues, such as micromanag-
ing budgets or constraining research activities. They should be encouraged to
decide by qualified majority voting to delegate more autonomy to the Secre-
tariat. Delegation could be accompanied by new oversight mechanisms such
as reporting requirements or establishing an independent evaluation office.
Help from the Secretariat and the Critical Mass? Manfred Elsig 73
The history of U.S. trade policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s illustrates
the costs of Congress controlling and micromanaging trade policy.33 This even-
tually led to pressure to delegate on an ad hoc basis more power from Congress
to the president.34 The internal EU debate on allocating competence between
member states and the Community to ‘negotiate trade’ is also instructive in
understanding drivers for change.35 While qualified majority voting had been
the dominant approach in negotiations related to trade in goods since the
inception of the Community’s trade policy, the modes of decision-making
related to other trade issues (i.e., services and intellectual property rights) grad-
ually shifted over time from unanimity to qualified majority voting. Two key
factors have led to increased delegation and strengthening of Community 
competence: the increasing number of EU members and the growing need to
provide leadership within the trading system.36 Today’s challenges for the WTO
as an organization can be viewed in a similar light.
Finally, to accommodate concerns related to sovereignty transfer, increased
delegation to the Secretariat must go hand in hand with additional ‘on the spot
control’ by Members. The suggestion by the Sutherland Report to convene
yearly meetings among ministers to resolve certain issues and, if necessary,
engage in horse-trading, as happens in the EU during council meetings, would
be an additional control mechanism to sell ‘more delegation’ at home.
IV. Variable Geometry and Critical Mass in the
GATT/WTO
The idea of using variable geometry approaches is not new in the GATT/WTO
context. In order to discuss different techniques of variable geometry, a distinc-
tion is usually suggested between three types of differentiated membership
schemes: special and differential treatment for certain groups of developing
countries, plurilateral agreements, and critical mass agreements.37 The focus
below will be on the latter two forms of variable geometry. It is argued that the
sharp distinction between critical mass (as discussed in the Warwick Report)
and plurilateral agreements should be reconsidered. The following section sug-
gests paying more attention to welfare-enhancing effects of cooperation and
the consequences of various incentives to free-ride.
A. The Plurilateral Experience
A variable geometry approach received lukewarm approval in the Sutherland
Report. In this context, the authors explicitly referred to plurilateral approaches.
The report states:
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[T]here should be a re-examination of the principle of plurilateral approaches to
WTO negotiations. This should pay particularly sensitive attention to the prob-
lems that those not choosing to participate might face. Further, the approach
should not permit small groups of members to bring into the WTO issues which
are strongly and consistently opposed by substantial sections of the rest of the
membership.38
There have been mixed experiences with so-called plurilateral agreements. These
agreements by nature exempt non-members from most-favoured-nation 
benefits.39 Two stand out: the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
of 1996 and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft of 1980.40
The support for the creation of the plurilateral GPA largely developed
within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). The agreement was first designed as an optional code during the
Tokyo Round negotiations.41 Unlike other codes, however, public procurement
was not taken up in the ‘single undertaking’ exercise of the Uruguay Round.
While key developing countries attempted to move the issue onto the multi-
lateral agenda, existing parties to the agreement were skeptical. They feared
lack of progress by including all Members and opted for a separate agreement,
which led to significant amendments and extensions of the existing agree-
ment.42 The GPA brought about considerable cooperation and market 
opening and produced aggregate benefits for the signatories. However, it has
not been successful in attracting new members.43
More recently, the existing plurilateral public procurement agreement has
been supplemented by two multilateral initiatives: first, preparatory work on
transparency in procurement practices; and second, multilateral negotiations
on public procurement of services. Neither initiative has made much progress.44
Advancement in the negotiations has been ‘hampered by the somewhat schiz-
ophrenic manner in which WTO Members have approached the subject, with
calls for the development of multilateral disciplines for services procurement
sitting alongside existing plurilateral disciplines […] as well as calls for a set of
multilateral rules on transparency and due process in public purchasing.’45
In August 2004, the council agreed that the issue of transparency ‘will not form
part of the Doha Work Programme and therefore no work towards negotiations
[…] will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.’46
The other plurilateral agreement still in existence is the Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft. It was the ‘only sector-specific agreement covering a
manufactured product that was successfully negotiated in the Tokyo Round.’47
However, it suffered from disputes related to subsidies in markets largely char-
acterized by oligopolistic structures. Both plurilateral agreements have attracted
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only a small membership. The sponsors include countries that have highly
competitive producers and service providers in the sectors concerned. Owing
to the lack of competitiveness of non-participants, these plurilateral agree-
ments do not pose a significant most-favoured-nation concern, nor an issue
of free-riding, which will be discussed below.48
B. The Warwick Version of Critical Mass and the Tokyo Codes
The Warwick Report has pushed the idea of variable geometry by introducing
its version of critical mass decision-making. The authors of the report argue
that ‘we have a clear precedent from the Tokyo Codes on standards, import
licensing, anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures and customs
valuation’as ‘negotiated outcomes relying on critical mass for their acceptance have
been applied on a MFN basis’.49 They refer to a decision of 29 November 1979
adopted during the Tokyo Codes adoption period.50 Thus the authors argue that
the logic of critical mass was applied during the Tokyo Round negotiations, but
they do not elaborate further on the lessons learned. A cautionary reading 
of automatic most-favoured-nation extension in relation to the Tokyo Codes
is warranted.
Whereas GATT membership increased in the 1970s and nearly 100 mem-
bers were engaged in the Tokyo Round negotiations, only a small group, driven
mostly by the United States and the European Community, were actively
involved in negotiations of the Tokyo Codes.51 The negotiations were organized
in a manner resembling a top-down pyramid shape.52 First, negotiations pro-
ceeded within bilateral (U.S.–EC) and small-group settings (U.S., EC,
Japan, and Canada: also called the Quad). Second, after initial agreement among
these groups, the dominant actors attempted to multilateralize the results by
offering some concessions to other potential parties to the agreements.53
The codes, however, were not the priority issue for developing countries.54
During the Tokyo Round, developing countries were focused on promoting a
development agenda and pushed for special treatment in more systematic
ways. Toward the end of the negotiations, some developing countries became
more engaged in the codes negotiations, but the concessions offered by the
key actors were perceived as too vague and as failing to fulfil the objectives of
the Tokyo Declaration.55
On the process side, developing countries lacked the means to participate
and lamented the failure to achieve a multilateral character. As one trade expert
noted, ‘smaller industrialized countries also complained bitterly about the lack
of multilateralism, though they still accepted the results’.56 The key deals were
struck between the United States, the European Community, and Japan. In
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other words, the critical mass was very small during the negotiations on non-
tariff barriers. In total only 17 members signed the process-verbal, which rep-
resented the formal acceptance of all the results.57 This of course represented
a political and a legal problem of ‘how to integrate the Tokyo Round accords
into the GATT legal framework in the context of a political process that had
left the majority of the GATT membership frustrated and alienated’.58
Did the codes extend most-favoured-nation to non-signatories? The Warwick
Report suggests that the Tokyo Codes negotiations applied such a logic 
characterizing a critical mass approach. However, a closer analysis of the nego-
tiating history shows that this is far from clear. The declaration that launched
the Tokyo Round and wording from the final negotiations suggest that these
codes applied without discrimination to non-members.59 At the same time,
the notion of ‘conditional most-favoured-nation’ was widely accepted. Non-
signatories were, to some degree, denied benefits originating from the codes,
including the rights to participate equally in the committees to implement the
codes. Winham writes:
[I]n two cases—the government-procurement and subsidy/countervail codes—
the substantive benefits of the agreements were intended to apply only to signa-
tories. For example, the access to government tendering which was extended in the
former code was available only to firms in other signatory countries, while on the
latter code nations like the United States made the injury test in countervail pro-
cedures contingent on the acceptance by other countries of the code’s disciplines
on subsidies.60
Thus the fine line between a plurilateral and a critical mass approach is diffi-
cult to draw here. Some codes could be labeled a partial critical mass. As most-
favoured-nation extension was far from obvious, the parties were left in limbo
as to the exact risks of discriminatory treatment.
C. The Post-Uruguay Round Sector Agreements
The idea of critical mass emerged again during the sector negotiations on trade
in services after the Uruguay Round. The sector agreements represented ini-
tiatives to liberalize markets.61 Can we learn any lessons from these agreements
that seem to have followed the critical mass approach? Three stand out: the
Information Technology Agreement, the Basic Telecom Agreement, and 
the Financial Services Agreement.62
First, there is a north–south pattern of membership (similar to that for the
plurilateral agreements and the codes). These agreements offer sector market
opening for products of great interest to industries in highly developed countries,
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and active membership is so far largely limited to OECD countries. In the case
of the Information Technology Agreement, there is evidence that Quad inter-
ests in particular had been reflected. In this respect, a strong push came from
a G7 Ministerial Conference on the global information society.63 Individual
firms and industry associations representing the knowledge and financial 
services industries lobbied hard for improved market access. In particular, the
U.S. government showed great interest in these agreements, particularly 
the financial services agreement. In contrast, developing countries faced strong
domestic political constraints, feared increasing liberalization in vulnerable
sectors, and were hampered by their lack of competitiveness. Participation
increased because of the differentiated levels of commitments for developing
countries and the perception of many Members that they would have to sign
the agreements to attract foreign direct investments.
Second, there was an implicit (and in the case of the Information 
Technology Agreement explicit) understanding that agreements need to attract
a sufficient number of producers or service providers in order to function
properly.64 Leading negotiators strategically signalled exemptions if other key
actors did not make sufficient commitments. The Basic Telecom Agreement
negotiations were deadlocked in 1996, and the U.S. representatives lamented
that the offers on the table were still inadequate ‘in part because the required
“critical mass” of membership (to prevent free-riding) had not been achieved’.65
In their assessment of the Basic Telecom Agreement, Hoekman and Kostecki
further stress, slightly euphemistically, that ‘additional time allowed a num-
ber of developing countries to improve their offer’.66 The story has been 
similar in the financial services negotiations, in which the United States (and
other countries) signalled in 1995 that they would not improve their commit-
ments and would take broad most-favoured-nation exemptions based on 
reciprocity should others not reconsider their offers.
Third, further work following initial successes has been very difficult,
calling into question the sustainability of these initiatives over time.
With respect to the Information Technology Agreement, various attempts to
enlarge product coverage failed. In most sector initiatives, there was a strong
push for market opening among leading service providers. However,
the momentum generated in the mid-1990s lasted only a short time. In addi-
tion, liberalization of financial services sectors was affected by the East Asian
financial crises in the second half of the 1990s and has recently made no 
tangible progress.
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D. Critical Mass: Most-Favoured-Nation 
and the Incentives to Free-ride
The Warwick Report discusses critical mass related to market access and rules,
and refers mainly to the post–Uruguay Round sector negotiations.67 In addi-
tion, the report lists certain criteria that should be observed when relying on
a critical mass approach. In sum, the Warwick Report demands that results of
critical mass negotiations not affect ‘the existing balance of rights and obliga-
tions’ and that the rights acquired by the signatories ‘shall be extended to all
Members on a non-discriminatory basis, with the obligations falling only on
signatories’. Thus the report shares the view that critical mass and non-dis-
crimination (extending most-favoured-nation to non-participants) go hand in
hand. The report contains some mixed signals: while an existing but not often
used decision-making procedure is promoted, the report attaches onerous con-
ditions for pursuing a type of variable geometry. By explicitly referring to uncon-
ditional most-favoured-nation when using critical mass, the report might have
even gone beyond the status quo. It remains puzzling why the Warwick Report
excluded the potential of plurilateral agreements from its analysis and did not
pay more attention to the rich history of codes negotiated during the Tokyo
Round and the post–Uruguay Round agreements. In any case, a dogmatic view
of most-favoured-nation as advocated in the report’s proposals could turn out
to be a non-starter as future initiatives will be constrained from the outset.
Instead of using a dichotomous distinction based on most-favoured-nation,
greater focus should be placed on the benefits of cooperation and on the free-
riding incentives that differ from sector to sector and between market-open-
ing and rule-making.68 Free-riding not only might affect the outcomes of the
negotiations but also exhibits spoiling capacities throughout the negotiations.
What are the free-riding effects related to different regulatory schemes and
various liberalization efforts to increase market access in goods and services?
There is variance as to the free-rider incentives prevalent in regulatory or mar-
ket-liberalizing cooperation. The incentive structure for those participating
(and abstaining) in critical mass negotiations appears different. If some lead-
ing trading nations agree to increase generic standards through a critical mass
approach, they will anticipate the effects of the most-favoured-nation exten-
sion clause. It is to be expected that parties will negotiate in the shadow of the
market power of the non-participants.69 Participants need to have a sort of
safeguard that allows them to take measures against abuse of free-riding (as wit-
nessed in the ITA and financial services cases).70 If this is not the case, critical
mass agreements will likely be limited in scope and effect.71 Free-rider issues
affect the degree of integration and cooperation as witnessed by the existence
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of various levels of commitments. In other words, Members need to receive
some benefits of cooperating beyond existing rules.
These incentives are even more applicable to market-opening strategies,
where countries are even more critical about free-riding (e.g., lowering recip-
rocal tariffs in medical devices or environmental goods if other important
exporters abstain from joining the critical mass and continue levying higher
tariffs). In these cases, the free-riding effects might be even more direct and
transparent than in cases related to rules or generic standards (e.g., health pro-
visions or environmental standards).
What flows from the above is the suggestion to revisit a dogmatic stand on
most-favoured-nation extension. To attach too many conditions discourages
solutions in the WTO context and further shifts these issues to bilateral or regional
trade arrangements. What is important in designing rules for the application of
critical mass is creating incentives for non-members to join. There should be no
additional strings attached. The general procedures for accession to the WTO have
set a bad precedent in this respect as joining the agreement becomes burdensome
due to the need to make bilateral deals with all members.
E. The EU Experience with Enhanced Cooperation
The concept of variable geometry has been debated in the field of EU integra-
tion studies for quite some time. However, it remains disputed whether vari-
able geometry in the EU context is a temporary deviation from a uniform ideal
or has more permanent features.72 In the former interpretation, variable geom-
etry is perceived as a dynamic approach whereby a handful of members inte-
grates faster. Those engaging in additional cooperation are perceived as
‘avant-gardist’ or part of ‘core Europe’ in a multi-speed community.73 Partic-
ipation in integration projects (e.g., in the common currency zone) allows for
some type of club benefits.74 The decision on non-participation is related
mainly to sovereignty concerns as governments acknowledge the functional
logic of further integration, but are constrained by domestic politics. This con-
cept is different from ‘Europe à la carte’.75 In the EU context, the British opt-
out from social policy (differentiation in the so-called social protocol in the
Maastricht Treaty) comes to mind. This exception seems more a long-term
opt-out following the ‘à la carte’ logic. This type of laggard strategy by some
members slows deeper integration efforts by other members.76
Overall, there are few empirical cases of differentiated integration in the EU
(e.g., Schengen regime, Western European Union, common currency). Never-
theless, debates on how to deal with variable geometry in more systematic ways
have increased in recent years. During intergovernmental conferences, EU
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members have attempted to spell out more clearly the conditions under which
variable geometry should proceed.77 A new concept that came up in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s has been the mechanism of ‘enhanced cooperation’.78
The Amsterdam Treaty has described the mechanism as a last resort that can
be triggered ‘when (the Council) has established that the objectives of such
cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a
whole’. The idea was to find an institutional answer to the growing hetero-
geneity among EU member states in view of enlargement. Existing members
anticipated additional pressures for flexibility mechanisms to follow the exam-
ples of Schengen and the Euro. The majority of countries aspired to control for
future differentiation (and groups cooperating outside the legal system, such
as the Schengen regime) by channelling new initiatives through the EU’s insti-
tutional framework.79 However, the specific obligations attached to applying
‘enhanced cooperation’ were hindering its use, such as the last resort condition,
the high threshold for initiating the process, and the minimum number of
members to be included. Later reforms have redesigned rules to allow for more
flexibility to trigger the process to make it more attractive. In addition, more
attention has been paid to the relations with non-members and to designing
mechanisms to prevent non-members from arbitrarily having an impact on
decision-making within the more integrationist group.80
What are the potential lessons to be drawn from the EU’s experience with
variable geometry generally and with ‘enhanced cooperation’ in particular?
There seems to be an implicit understanding that variable geometry is a pos-
sible avenue for integration. However, many member states and supranational
actors (including the Commission and the European Parliament) seem reluc-
tant to go down this path. There is a widespread perception that ‘enhanced
cooperation’ could create discrimination, and concerns have been voiced in
relation to failure to join the avant-gardist camp. There exists an ambiguous
attitude of members to let others move ahead, with a tendency to attach exces-
sively stringent rules. However, while new initiatives under ‘enhanced cooper-
ation’ have not yet materialized, some evidence suggests that the possibility to
apply this method may unlock certain negotiations.81 In other words, the exis-
tence of an option for recourse to a flexible instrument to move more quickly
among a like-minded group might under certain conditions encourage lag-
gards to move. However, if conditions are too onerous, the threat of moving
more quickly within institutional rules might not be credible.82 This could be
instructive in thinking about how to design critical mass in the world trading
system. In light of existing ‘outside’ modes of variable geometry (e.g., bilateral
and regional trade agreements), it is even more urgent to consider going down
a path of differentiated integration under the auspices of the WTO.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed two reform proposals and has attempted to sketch
a new scenario for decision-making in the WTO. Strengthening the Secretariat,
combined with a move toward more structured decision-making processes
beyond the single package approach and consensual decision-making repre-
sent the best way forward for the WTO. Furthermore, empowering the Secre-
tariat by allocating agenda-setting power could assist in overcoming some of
the endless cycling problems as witnessed in the Doha Round. In addition, a
redesign of procedures and decision rules (e.g., the selective recourse to 
qualified majority voting, dropping the ‘single undertaking’) could help main-
stream processes.
As to the critical mass approach, the above discussion questions the potential
of using this type of variable geometry as approved by the authors of the War-
wick Report. This chapter has argued that the conditions advocated by the
Warwick Commission might be too onerous in light of the history of variable
geometry in the GATT/WTO and the EU. It could be further asked whether 
not all negotiations (including classical tariff negotiations where a deal needs
to be struck between principal suppliers of individual goods and key importers)
have followed a version of the critical mass approach.83 In reflecting on the 
variance in negotiation processes across the Tokyo Codes, Winham concludes
that ‘the answer appears to lie not in the negotiation process itself, but rather
in the substance of what was being negotiated’.84 In any case, more systematic
research is needed to understand the promises and perils of critical mass 
decision-making. In addition, more experiments with this approach are needed
to test the effects of partial most-favoured-nation exemptions on degrees 
of integration.
Finally, this chapter suggests combining various reform measures. A stronger
supranational actor (e.g., the Secretariat) could play a role in a critical mass
approach, not least by representing the interests of the membership as a whole
and in particular by assisting those who remain (temporarily) outside.
The time for rethinking WTO decision-making is ripe. In light of the inertia
of the status quo, it seems that only a package solution that would allow for some
concession-trading could be a potential avenue for change. Such a package,
however, as the Uruguay Round has shown, cannot be an institutional reform
package alone, but needs to be enhanced with tangible concessions on addi-
tional market-opening commitments. For the current round, a reform discus-
sion is too late, but it would become pertinent again should the Doha Round
fail. But here lies a paradox. Moving toward a more mature system of deci-
sion-making with clearer mandates and committee deadlines will make trade
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rounds redundant. However, in order to put in place a more elaborate and 
up-to-date system of decision-making, an institutional design package would
need to be adopted in the context of another trade round.
A. More Challenges Ahead?
There are a multitude of factors that explain the current deadlock in WTO
negotiations. The lack of leadership is one important factor. The ‘liberal transat-
lantic moment’ has lost momentum. The transatlantic partnership has suf-
fered some of its worst crises since the end of World War II. These crises, which
developed in the security field, have certainly affected the capacities of the
United States and the European Union to manage and drive international trade
negotiations. Three additional elements, which are subjects of study and debate
in the field of international relations, seem to have affected cooperation incen-
tives in the current Doha Round.
First, an (older) controversy that has divided neo-realists and neo-liberal
scholars could be instructive in understanding newer developments in the
global trading system: the role of absolute versus relative gains from interna-
tional cooperation.85 As we move toward a multipolar trade world, some of
the leading actors (the United States and the European Union) are showing
signs of reluctance to agree to deals that asymmetrically profit other emerging
nations (relative gains concerns). Not only are these types of agreements dif-
ficult to sell at home to negatively affected constituencies, but some emerging
powers (e.g., China and Brazil) pose certain challenges to the United States
(and to some degree to the European Union) with regard to foreign and secu-
rity policy. There is lack of research on these systemic pressures and their poten-
tial effects on different negotiation strategies in the future, including pursuit
of greater bilateral agreements.86 However, there is a real concern that the cur-
rent financial crisis and the negative spill-over effects on growth figures within
the real economy will make parties even more suspicious and lend support to
those actors pushing for relative gains.
Second, the relationship between regionalism, bilateralism, and multilat-
eralism continues to affect current trade negotiations. Key trade powers have,
over the last decade, redesigned their venue-shopping strategies. In particular,
they have created additional platforms to negotiate trade that function as strong
alternatives to the multilateral trade arena. These outside options affect, in the
words of negotiation theories, the potential zone of agreement. States with
strong alternatives will hold out to get a better deal. In addition, export-oriented
firms that are pushing for liberalization of markets might be satisfied 
with bilateral and regional approaches as long as these offer substantial increase
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in export opportunities. This in turn will lower the support of export indus-
tries to counterbalance import-competing industries’ voices within the 
multilateral context.
Third, there is a commitment problem related to the growing power of
legalization of some international arrangements. The increase in the binding
nature of international trade law has affected the willingness of trading nations
to commit to additional liberalization.87 The argument runs that WTO Mem-
bers are reluctant to adopt new rules and to agree on additional market liber-
alization as they (and their domestic interest groups) have learned the lessons
of a strong dispute settlement system. In addition, many of the parties have
come to realize that changing rules is difficult in a consensus-driven organi-
zation and thus the ‘shadow of cooperation’ increases. As states value future ben-
efits of cooperation, there is an incentive to bargain hard for a good deal,
leading to costly stand-offs.88
A final observation relates to developing countries. A key challenge remains
to assist developing countries (beyond the powerful developing countries) in
benefiting more from the multilateral trading system. The history of EU inte-
gration has shown that in order to successfully create a common market with
rules that in the long run apply to all market actors from various members, rich
members need to provide incentives and resources to assist the integration
process. The EU has invested considerable financial resources in developing
infrastructure and other basic services in its less developed regions. Within the
WTO context, the aid-for-trade debate has opened an additional door for
developing instruments to assist smaller and weaker parties to further inte-
grate into the world trading system. Financial assistance to address supply-
side constraints should go hand in hand with technical assistance to mainstream
trade within national development strategies and should be coordinated bet-
ter among international organizations working in this area. In addition, spe-
cial and differential treatment for the least developed countries means also
finding new and innovative ways to empower weaker states within existing
and future governance models.
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Improvements to the WTO Decision-Making
Process: Lessons from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank
ALBERTO ALVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ
I. Introduction
A comparative assessment of the internal governance of the WTO, the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a valuable tool to improve on recom-
mendations to enhance the WTO decision-making process. This is because some
of the WTO reform proposals include suggestions similar to what is already in
place at both the IMF and the World Bank. However, for this comparative analy-
sis to arrive at meaningful recommendations, it has to take into account two
important issues: first, the Bank’s and the IMF’s organs and decision-making
processes are, obviously, related to each organizations’ particular mandate and
objectives. Care must be taken when suggesting that institutional features of the
Bank and the IMF be employed by the WTO. Second, these three organizations
have been subject to increasing criticism in recent years and, at the time of this
writing, are undergoing important reform processes as a result of the current
world financial crisis. Consequently, any recommendations for the WTO based
on the institutional history of the IMF and the Bank must be adjusted to current
trends in institutional design, marked not only by concerns for efficiency but
also for adequate representation of developing and least developed countries.1
This chapter illustrates how the history of the World Bank and the IMF, and
particularly of the functioning of and inter-relationship between their boards
and managements, may assist in improving recommendations to create a con-
sultative body in the WTO and to enhance the position of the WTO Director-
General and the WTO Secretariat. This chapter is divided into four parts.
Part II analyzes the internal management of the IMF and the role played by each
of its decision-making bodies, the relationship between them, and the decision-
making processes that have adopted. Part III carries out a similar assessment
of the World Bank. Part IV looks at the WTO, and makes recommendations 
to improve proposals aimed at enhancing WTO decision-making. Finally,
Part V presents some general conclusions.
II. Internal Management of the IMF
The IMF was created with the aims of promoting international monetary 
cooperation, orderly exchange arrangements among its Members, exchange
stability, and furnishing Member States with financial assistance for balance 
of payment difficulties. The IMF pursues these objectives through two main
activities that are carried out by all its organs: surveillance and the provision
of conditional financial assistance.2 The former relates to the provision of
advice to IMF Members regarding adequate economic policies and the use 
of peer pressure to persuade Members to pursue such policies. The latter
involves providing Members with, subject to conditions related to the adop-
tion of sound economic policies recommended by the IMF, financial assis-
tance to resolve temporary balance of payments difficulties.3
Today, the IMF has 185 member countries, which were traditionally divided
into two groups: the industrial economies and the developing countries.
The former have not drawn on the Fund for decades but dominate the IMF’s
decision-making process, while the latter do draw on the IMF but do not control
decision-making.4 Until recently, there was a third category of IMF Members:
those with broad access to capital markets and that have accumulated large
reserves, such as Asian and oil-exporting countries. These Members made
infrequent use of the IMF’s resources and, therefore, did not need to follow its
policy recommendations.5 The current economic crisis may produce a shift
among these emerging markets. Already Hungary, Ukraine, Iceland, Pakistan,
Latvia, Serbia, and Belarus have asked the IMF for financial support to cope with
the crisis,6 and negotiations are underway with El Salvador and Turkey.7 Other
European Union countries, such as Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Lithuania,
may soon join the growing list of countries seeking IMF assistance.8
A recent evaluation of IMF governance carried out by the IMF Independent
Evaluation Office (IEO) points out that the strongest feature of such governance
is effectiveness, while the weakest aspect is the accountability and voice of
developing country Members.9
IMF governance occurs within three bodies: the Board of Governors, the
Executive Board, and the IMF management. In general terms, the Articles of
Agreement approved in Bretton Woods have a clear emphasis on rules rather
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than on principles. However, reforms introduced at the end of the 1970s
reversed this. The result has been an IMF that vests a wide discretion in the Exec-
utive Board, guided by principles identified by the IMF’s Members.10 The IMF
system of governance has evolved and adapted to the needs of new conditions
in the global financial world.11 However, according to the IEO, the IMF lacks
‘clarity on the respective roles of the different governance bodies, and in 
particular between the Board and Management.’12
A. The Board of Governors
The Board of Governors is the highest organ of the IMF, and includes repre-
sentatives from each IMF Member. The Board of Governors is authorized to
delegate some of its powers to the Executive Board, though the Articles of
Agreement regard some decisions as non-delegable, such as the allocation or
cancellation of special drawing rates, changes to the duration of the basic
period of allocation, alteration of the charges of allocation,13 and amendments
the Articles of Agreement and the By-laws.14
The Board of Governors is advised by two ministerial committees: the
Development Committee; and the International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee (IMFC). The former is a joint committee of the IMF and the Bank that
makes suggestions to each organization’s boards of governors concerning 
economic development in emerging countries.
The IMFC is responsible for advising the Board of Governors on inter alia
proposals made by the Executive Board to amend the Articles of Agreement,
and situations that put the international monetary and financial system at risk.
The IMFC is made up of 24 members, usually governors, and its membership
reflects the composition of the Executive Board. Each country and group of
countries that elect a member of the Executive Board also appoint members
to the IMFC. Its mandate is
supervising the management and adaptation of the international monetary 
system, including the continuing operation of the adjustment process, and in this
connection reviewing developments in global liquidity and the transfer of real
resources to developing countries.
… considering proposals by the executive directors to amend the Articles of
Agreement; and
… dealing with sudden disturbances that might threaten the [international 
monetary] system.15
The IMFC has played an important role in recent years in major Fund initiatives,
and its advisory character has transformed it into a body that, at the ministerial
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level, endorses decisions made by the Executive Board.16 At the time of this
writing, IMF Members are assessing the issue of putting into operation an
already existing council, provided for by the Articles of Agreement, as a polit-
ical decision-making body that would replace the IMFC. The composition
would be similar to that of the Group of 20 and would give some emerging
nations a say within the Fund in line with their current economic clout.17
B. The Executive Board: Its Structure and 
Decision-Making Process
The Executive Board allows IMF Members to exercise control over the 
day-to-day operation of the Fund.18 The mandate of the Executive Board is 
to conduct the business of the IMF. This means that the Executive Board is the
policy organ of the IMF, oversees all of the Fund’s lending operations,19 and
discusses at length all the issues related to the operation of the IMF, from 
periodic assessments of IMF Members’ economies to economic policy topics
of particular importance to the global economy. At its inaugural meeting,
the Board of Governors virtually delegated all of its powers to the Executive
Directors, except the discretion to admit new members and the power to 
change quotas.
The size of the Executive Board has increased as membership in the IMF
has grown.20 Initially made up of 12 members, the Executive Board now has
24 executive directors. Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, China, Russia, and the United States have representatives on the 
Executive Board. The other 16 executive directors represent various groupings
of IMF Members and vote on behalf of their groups.21
Under Section C of the Rules and Regulations of the IMF, the IMF Managing
Director has the power to call meetings of the Executive Board. If requested by
an executive director, the Managing Director must call a meeting. The agenda
of the Executive Board is set by the Managing Director, but any item requested
by an executive director must be placed on the agenda. New agenda items can
be included on condition of unanimity among executive directors present at
the meeting.22
The decision-making process at the Executive Board is complex. Decisions
by the Executive Board are taken on the basis of proposals tabled either by
executive directors or by the IMF Managing Director. The Board operates
through standing committees that the Executive Board can create on its own
initiative.23 These committees do not decide on behalf of the Executive Board,
but make recommendations to it. Committees and subcommittees of the Exec-
utive Board do not engage in formal voting.
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These committees allow executive directors to discuss issues in more detail
before placing them before the Executive Board as a whole, to deliberate and
make recommendations separately from those of IMF management, and to
allocate responsibilities with an aim to increasing the Board’s efficiency.24
In addition to standing committees, the Executive Board operates informally
through the creation of ad hoc committees. This practice of informal committees
has existed since the IMF’s earliest days.25 The purpose of informal committees
is to allow executive directors to express ideas without worrying about speaking
on behalf of their constituent Members. This also gives IMF staff the opportu-
nity to canvass the views of executive directors, resulting in the refinement of
proposals put to the Executive Board.26 The ad hoc committee process has proven
an invaluable tool in Executive Board decision-making.27 Moreover, informal
committees have also been used as a tool for deeper analysis and reflection when
there are major disagreements among Executive Board members.28 Ad hoc com-
mittees have also been set up to discuss particular issues between executive direc-
tors and staff when there have been different views between them.29
The foregoing discussion of the decision-making processes of the Executive
Board and the IMFC demonstrates that both have horizontal and vertical
dimensions. The horizontal dimension here refers to the Executive Board oper-
ating through standing and ad hoc committees of different composition, which
creates input for the Board’s deliberations and decisions. The horizontal dimen-
sion occurs among IMF Executive Board members, the IMFC, and management.
C. Voting in the IMF
The allocation of voting power has been one of the most criticized features of
the IMF governance in recent years. Voting at the Executive Board is weighted
according to quota contributions denominated in Special Drawing Rights
(SDR). Each member has 250 basic votes and receive an additional vote for
each SDR 100,000 of quota.30 The United States has 16.77 percent of the total
voting power in the IMF. Countries with more than 15 percent of the voting
power have a de facto veto within the IMF.31 This includes a veto over changes
in the number of members of the Executive Board and amendments to the
Articles of Agreement. Measured by the number of seats and compared to its
voting power, the European Union is overrepresented on the Executive Board.
Like the United States, the aggregated voting power of European Union coun-
tries at the IMF is sufficient to give the EU a veto.
The voting majority required to adopt a decision as the Executive Board
varies with the type of decision being considered. Generally speaking, a sim-
ple majority is required. However, amendments adopted in the 1970s brought
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about an increase in the number of decisions that require a special majority of
either 70 percent or, in some cases, 85 percent. Given that, as was mentioned,
the 1970 reforms gave more discretion to the IMF, Members created certain
safeguards to prevent abuse of discretion.32 It was expected that groups of Mem-
bers—developing countries, the European Members, and the United States—
would have enough voting capacity to block decisions affecting their interests.
Recent reforms have introduced changes to the voting rules in order to
respond to the significant criticism that the IMF has not given a sufficiently pow-
erful voice to either emerging economies or developing and least developed
countries. The process started in 2006, when the Fund increased the quota for
China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. Under the new formula for the allocation
of voting rights, 135 Members increased their voting power.33 The reforms also
included an increase in basic votes for low-income countries.34
Although executive directors have the right to call for a vote, current practice
considers such a call impolite. This rejection of formal voting is attributable,
in part, to the disproportionate voting power held by some Members.35
Normally, the level of consensus required to adopt a decision is determined by
the Managing Director, who ascertains the ‘sense of the meeting’.36 This sense
is determined once all executive directors have had the opportunity to speak
and to respond to the comments of other executive directors. Based on this
discussion, the Managing Director produces a written summary of views in
great detail, and the executive directors make comments, which are included
in the written summary.37 Even decisions that require a special majority are typ-
ically made by consensus, though Members’voting power does influence decision-
making. When adopting the decision, executive directors and the Managing
Director know what the final result would have been had a vote been called,
and the IMF ‘Secretariat keeps an informal record of the count of the vote’.38
Final decisions of the Board are carefully drafted and designed to reflect the
views of as many executive directors as possible, while achieving effective out-
comes.39 A practice in the summary has developed that enhances the executive
directors’ role. First, summaries of decisions reflect all views, including minor-
ity views;40 and second, summaries related to the Board’s consultations with
individual Members are disclosed as public information notices, subject to the
Member in question’s approval. Once approved, Executive Board decisions are
then implemented by IMF staff.41
D. The Role of the Managing Director42
The Articles of Agreement do not say much about the Managing Director,
other than to provide that he or she chairs the Executive Board, is to be selected
by the Executive Board, and ‘shall be chief of the operating staff of the Fund
96 Part II Decision-Making in the WTO
and shall conduct, under the direction of the Executive Board, the ordinary
business of the Fund…’.43 The Managing Director is in charge of the daily
operations of the Fund in the sense that he or she executes the general policies
approved by the Board, carries out economic surveillance of IMF Members, and
designs the lending operations to countries in difficulty.
IMF Managing Directors have sought to expand the scope of their work
beyond daily operations of the IMF. According to the first historian of the IMF,
J. Keith Horsefield, ‘The principal reason for the strengthening of the staff ’s posi-
tion was that it had opportunities for exercising initiative, and took them’44
during the first two decades of operation. In addition, Managing Directors
have been a key actor in ensuring the Fund’s effectiveness,45 and their role has
been adjusted in response to challenges in the world economy and to the 
particular personalities of those who have been appointed.46
E. Relations Between the Executive Board and Management
In 1948, the functions of the Executive Board and the Managing Directors
were clarified. The Executive Board retained the power to formulate policy
and to take decisions on major problems, and the Managing Director and the
IMF staff were charged with the duty to study major problems that had to be
resolved by the Board and to present conclusions and make recommendations
in this regard.47 The Managing Director and staff have also been responsible
for executing Fund policies and handling negotiations with IMF Members.48
Over time, the role of the IMF staff has expanded considerably. This has
been the result of a number of factors, including the provision of technical
assistance and advice to Members and enhanced consultations between Mem-
bers and the IMF staff in national capitals. Technical assistance has often pro-
vided outside of the scrutiny of the Executive Board, which allows IMF staff to
gather information that was not otherwise available to the Executive Board.49
As the relationship between IMF staff and Members evolved, executive direc-
tors increasingly found that issues were being resolved by the staff before the
Executive Board took action.50 Consultations between IMF staff and Mem-
bers provided the opportunity for staff to assist Members in resolving policy
difficulties on a regular basis.51 Often, high-ranking officials or Members would
consult in advance with staff about possible IMF reaction to proposed actions
at the national level.52
Although this has been the general trend, the increase in the relative influ-
ence of IMF management and staff has been nuanced and involves a number
of factors that must be properly understood. First, the importance of the role
of the Managing Director does not mean that the degree of influence held by
the Executive Board has not ebbed and flowed over time. Indeed, the relative
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clout of IMF management has not resulted in the Executive Board becoming
a little more than a rubber stamp. Instead, the Executive Board has debated
sometimes at great length suggestions by management53 and has rejected impor-
tant proposals by IMF staff.54 On other occasions, the Board has accepted
changes in policy recommended by staff, though the scope of the change has
not always matched staff recommendations.
In recent years, key activities of the Fund, such as surveillance, which seem
to be carried out by management exclusively in its interaction with local author-
ities, are in fact conducted under precise guidelines approved by the Executive
Board.55 The same can be said of decisions involving the use of Fund resources.
Although the negotiations of the program with national authorities are 
delegated by the Board to management, and the former’s involvement takes
place at the end of the process, the Board’s influence is felt because its adopted
policies must be met in order for the program to be approved by the Board.56
In sum, although the relations between the Executive Board and the Man-
aging Director are characterized by the pre-eminence of the latter, the former
is still an important actor within the Fund’s decision-making process.
F. The Steering of the IMF
Although the Managing Director plays a significant role in guiding the organ-
ization, the IMF remains an intergovernmental organization. Members play the
central role in decision-making within the IMF. In practice, the IMF has been
steered by the G10, led by the United States; then by the G5; and today by the
G7 (comprising France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy,
and the United States).57 The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF
has criticized the significant influence that large members have on the 
day-to-day operation of the IMF, with the Asian crisis of the 1990s highlighted
as a major example.58
The situation is different for borrowing countries. Not only do they not steer
the IMF, but the Fund has some degree of power to direct their economic poli-
cies. Borrowing countries depend on the Fund’s endorsement of their policies
to have access to capital markets.59
A review of each of the relevant organs of the Fund illustrates that the
Board of Governors is, due to its size, unable to provide meaningful political
guidance. However, it has addressed this deficiency by creating, first, the Interim
Committee and then the IMFC, which evolved from an advisory body to a
genuine locus of decision-making.60 As for the Executive Board, recent analy-
sis has shown that, although it has delegated much of its powers to management,
it has retained its character as a decision-making body, particularly in key 
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areas of the operation of the Fund, such as surveillance and the use of the 
IMF resources.61
A historical evaluation of the operation of the governance structure and
operation of the Fund reveals some of their shortcomings. The IMF has not
always been able to ensure that key Members observe prudent economic poli-
cies; voting rights have been slow to reflect contemporary economic realities;
and the Fund’s contingencies for grave financial crises, such as those of Latin
America in the 1980s and Russia and Asia in the 1990s, have been widely crit-
icized. The issue of a democratic deficit has arisen, associated with developing
countries’ lack of influence within the Fund’s decision-making process.62 Finally,
the IMF has been unable to anticipate systemic crises, such as the current 
crisis caused by the U.S. housing market.63
However, the current economic crisis has provided an opportunity for the
re-emergence of the IMF as an important actor in the international financial
system. In order to allow it to provide financial support to members affected,
Japan has loaned the IMF U.S. $100 billion.64 The IMF is seeking to double its
lending base to U.S. $500 billion.65 In addition, the ongoing crisis seems to
have finally added momentum to additional governance reform, including
addressing a democratic deficit. A realization within the Fund is emerging that
that developing country members and other emerging economies deserve
more of a say within the decision-making process and that the time has come
for Europe to accept that it is overrepresented in the IMF.66
Finally, a meaningful comparative analysis between the IMF and WTO
must take into account the ongoing reform process at the Fund and the main
criticisms that have been raised regarding the IMF’s governance structure and
operation. In the IEO’s views, the Executive Board should play a supervisory
role and should provide strategic guidance and focus less on an executive role
so as to enhance accountability within the organization.67 As for the IMFC,
the IEO has recommended its replacement with the council established under
the Articles of Agreement, which should decide by consensus and only 
exceptionally by voting.68 The IEO has also suggested that the Executive Board
focus on supervising management, restricting its executive functions to 
systemic issues,69 and that Board committees should always be chaired by an
Executive Director.70
The IEO has also made recommendations to the functioning of Executive
Board committees. In an attempt to enhance the role played by developing
country members, one recommendation is to have the council chair rotate, so
as to allow representatives from these countries to be appointed to this posi-
tion.71 In addition, the IEO is of the view that council members could split
their votes to reflect different views in their constituencies.72 Additionally, it has
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been suggested that Executive Directors should all be elected, eliminating the
current five appointed directors representing the five largest shareholders. Such
a move would open the possibility of reducing the representation problem
present in some constituencies with a significant number of Members, thereby
improving voice and representation.73 Put together, the IEO’s reform propos-
als seek to achieve a balance between effectiveness, accountability, and voice
within the IMF governance.74
Likewise, the High-Level Panel on IMF Board Accountability has made
important recommendations to improve the accountability of both the Exec-
utive Board and the Managing Director. One proposal that was advanced was
to create a committee to oversee the performance of the Executive Board. The
Executive Board should also create a process for assessing the Management
Director’s performance, overseen by a Board Committee.75
In addition to these reforms, others have emphasized the need for the IMF’s
to increase its legitimacy by engaging with legislatures. The Executive Board has
endorsed such an approach:
The Working Group encouraged Executive Directors and staff to continue their
outreach efforts to and emphasized the importance of an ongoing dialogue with
national legislators for the Fund’s work. The Working Group agreed that greater
interaction between the legislators and the Fund would be particularly beneficial
to the Fund, as it would help build understanding of economic reforms and IMF
programs, and could provide a useful avenue for informing and receiving comments
from legislators about the work of the Fund and its role in the international finan-
cial system in general. Directors emphasized that the Fund’s outreach should be
a two-way dialogue and that it was just as important to listen to legislators. They
considered that the focus should be on broader policy or regional issues instead
of country issues, given the Fund’s mandate to promote global financial stability
and growth. Directors recognized that the impact of our outreach will only be
evident over time, and will require a prolonged effort.76
The reform process and the overall strengthening of the IMF have been expedited
in recent months owing to the current financial crisis. The G20 agreed in 
London on 2 April 2009 to make available for the IMF substantial additional
resources to foster growth in developing country and emerging market
economies. These new resources are the following: (1) $250 billion immedi-
ately available and up to $500 billion; (2) further progress in the implementa-
tion of the IMF Flexible Credit Line and its amended lending and conditionality
requirements available to IMF members to cope with balance of payments
financing difficulties; (3) a new general SDR allocation of $250 billion aimed
at increasing global liquidity.77
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The G20 has also committed itself to press for reforms of both the IMF
and the Bank in their governance, mandate, and scope 
to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalization,
and … emerging and developing countries, including the poorest, must have
greater voice and representation. This must be accompanied by action to increase
the credibility and accountability of the institutions.78
As to the particular steps related to the reform process, the G20 has agreed to
ensure that the Board of Governors provides more strategic direction to the
Executive Board and IMF management and to increase the IMF’s accountability.79
Finally, the G20 has determined that the selection process of the IMF Managing
Director and senior IMF staff will be carried out in a more transparent way.
Having described the basic overall decision-making structure in the IMF,
illustrated some of its most significant weaknesses, and described some of the
suggested reforms, this chapter now looks at IMF decision-making in certain
specific contexts. This more detailed view will allow consideration of the 
decision-making processes employed to address specific types of issues.80
G. Decision-Making for the Adoption of Specific Decisions
1. Decisions Regarding Reforms to the Articles of Agreement 
Amending the Articles of Agreement requires the approval of the Board of
Governors. However, the Executive Board and IMF management have also
played a role in this process, which is far from surprising given their mandates
and their knowledge of both the organization and its Members.
For instance, the second amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement
was initially discussed by the ad hoc Committee of Twenty, an informal com-
mittee of the Board of Governors. The committee’s proposals were adopted
by the Board of Governors, which in 1974 established the specific areas of the
Articles to be amended and ordered the Executive Board to prepare a draft.81
It is important to mention that, despite the fact that the Committee of Twenty
was unable to agree, it kept the process moving by ordering the Executive Board
to present proposals. In other words, the Executive Board was used as a forum
to debate those issues upon which the Committee of Twenty did not reach
consensus.82 When the Executive Board was unable to achieve agreement, it
sought further advice from the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors.83
Management was also deeply involved in the decision-making process for the
second amendment of the Articles of Agreement. Once the Committee of Twenty
determined the issues that the second amendment should deal with, manage-
ment prepared a memorandum for discussion by the Executive Board, which
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was constantly redrafted during the course of these negotiations.84 Also worth men-
tioning is one of the ways in which management acted during these deliberations.
It sought to frame the scope of some of the issues to be amended according to the
instructions provided by the Committee of Twenty.85 Subsequently, management
acted as a broker by suggesting alternatives in light of deliberations within the 
Executive Board,86 which significantly contributed to generating consensus.
2. Decisions Concerning IMF General Policies87
Introducing new policies and amending those already in place at the IMF
begins with a Governor’s initiative or a set of Governors acting together at an
annual meeting.88 When a Governor takes the initiative, he or she has already
discussed the issue with his or her own government or group of governments,
and the given executive director follows up on the idea. Usually, proposals
made by Governors give the Managing Director the opportunity to press for
reforms that have already been discussed within the Fund.89 Once the 
need for a new policy is established, the work begins for the staff, Managing
Director, Executive Directors, and Board of Governors.90
Executive Directors can request revisions of any of the policies of the Fund
at any time. This is true even if there is no a mandatory review clause inserted
in the respective decision or policy,91 which gives executive directors significant
institutional power to shape the IMF’s policy. If the issue is raised during meet-
ings of the Executive Board, an informal committee of staff from different
departments is created to assess the topic.
If the need for a new policy is identified by staff as a result of the perform-
ance of their functions of surveillance or advice, the issue is first examined by
a small group of senior officials, usually the Managing Director, the Deputy
Managing Director, the General Counsel, the head of the Research Depart-
ment, and other staff members.92 If additional study is required, the issue is
assigned to a department, which prepares analytical papers that are sent to the
Board for informational purposes only.
At this stage of the process of the design of a new policy identified by staff,
the Executive Board starts getting involved through informal meetings in which
the general policy is discussed and alternatives evaluated. Staff participates in
such meetings. While this process is going on, the Managing Director may start
exploring the views and reactions of Governors, particularly those in the Group
of Ten. Once the Managing Director is sure of the Governors’ support, the new
policy is put before the Executive Board.93
In recent years, the preparation and discussion of policies have involved both
the Board and management over a period of several months. Policy proposals
are approved by Board consensus.94
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In sum, the policy amendment and formulation process at the IMF is both
top-down and bottom-up. The process is also flexible in the sense that, in the
case of bottom-up decision-making, management consults with the Executive
Board and the Group of Ten on alternatives to facilitate a decision. Further-
more, the decision-making process is intertwined at three levels of the Fund:
G10, Executive Board, and management. Finally, management has been involved
in the development of new policies, regardless of who identified the need.
3. Decisions Regarding Budgetary Issues
According to Section 20 of the By-Laws of the IMF, the IMF Managing 
Director sets the agenda with regard to the IMF budget and has to present the IMF
annual administrative budget to the IMF Executive Board for approval. How-
ever, the Executive Board analyzes the budget in detail prior to approving it.95
Budgetary issues are discussed by the Standing Committee on the Budget,
created in 1994 and chaired by the Managing Director.96 The creation of the
standing committee signalled the Executive Board’s desire to engage the budget
process at an early stage. There have been tensions between management and
the Executive Board regarding the precise role of the committee and its terms
of reference,97 with executive directors seeking a more active role and Manag-
ing Directors attempting to preserve their power by submitting the budget
proposal to the Executive Board for its approval at the final stages of the process
of elaboration.98 Management has ensured that it retains control over the com-
mittee not only by holding the chair, but by ensuring that committee member-
ship be restricted to a one-year term.99
As can be seen, the decision-making process for budgetary issues is signif-
icantly different than the process employed for policy development. Manage-
ment plays a lead, if not central role in the formulation of the IMF budget.
The Executive Board is struggling for a more decisive voice, but its contribu-
tion to the Fund’s budget-setting process remains marginal.
H. Summary Regarding Decision-Making Processes
From the foregoing discussion, a number of broad observations can be made
about IMF decision-making.
1. The Board of Governors, the Executive Board, and IMF management
play different roles, depending on the subject matter.
First, the Board of Governors does not decide in full and on its own, as expected,
and has delegated its powers to informal committees of the Board, the Interim
Committee, and even sometimes the Executive Board, providing it with 
specific instructions.
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Second, the Executive Board does not always play the same role in all decision-
making processes. There are occasions in which the Executive Board is the
dominant voice (decisions related to the Fund’s policies), others in which it
functions under the specific guidelines provided by the Board of Governors 
or the Steering Committee (determinations regarding amendments to the 
Articles), and finally, others in which the Executive Board has no meaningful
voice (budgetary issues).
Third, the Managing Director’s role in decision-making is variable.
Sometimes this involves following the instructions of G10 countries and at
other times this role equals that of the Executive Directors or is at least as 
influential (decisions regarding changes to the IMF’s policies). There are also
decision-making processes in which the Managing Director is the dominant
player (budgetary determinations and decisions related to Members’ policies,
among others).
2. IMF management is regularly involved in virtually all decision-making
processes and can trigger the adoption of political decisions, such as
determinations related to IMF policies.
3. The initiative to trigger decision-making processes resides with a 
number of actors: the Governor or group of Governors, the Executive
Director or a group of Executive Directors, and the Managing Director.
The subject matter of the decision has conditioned the nature of the actor that
can trigger the decision-making process. The greater the political character of
the decision to be made, the higher the increased involvement of IMF’s polit-
ical organs. The higher the technical nature of the decision, the lower the level
of the IMF hierarchy that—as a matter of reality—can trigger the decision-
making process.
In sum, IMF decision-making is context-specific. It is sufficiently flexible
to meet organizational needs and seems to acknowledge the need to involve dif-
ferent actors depending on the subject of the decision.
III. The Governance of the World Bank
The World Bank provides financial and technical assistance to developing and
least developed countries and loans at market interest rates to developing 
and least developed countries. Its main organs are the Board of Governors, the
Board of Directors, and its internal management, headed by the President.
Today, the World Bank has 185 Members, which can be divided into two basic
categories: non-borrowing Members, namely, industrialized states; and borrow-
ing Members, namely, developing and least developed countries.
104 Part II Decision-Making in the WTO
Pursuant to Article V(2) of the Articles of Agreement, all the powers of the
World Bank are vested in the Board of Governors. Each World Bank Member
appoints a representative to the Board of Governors for a five-year term.
Decisions by the Board are taken by majority vote. The Board of Governors 
has delegated most of its powers to the Board of Directors, though 
it retains the power to admit new members, increase or decrease the bank’s
capital stock, and to suspend members.100
A. The Board of Directors: Its Structure and 
Decision-Making Process
The World Bank’s Board of Directors has three main functions: to approve
funding projects for World Bank Members submitted by the Bank President,
to determine the general policies that must be followed in the operation of the
Bank, and to inform the Board of Governors of the World Bank’s activities.101
The Board of Directors, originally composed of 12 members, currently has
24 directors. Five members are appointed by the largest shareholders—France,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and Germany. The remaining
19 directors are elected by Members through the formation of constituencies
of Member States.102 The President of the World Bank is selected by the Board
of Directors103 and can attend Board meetings. The President votes at Board
meetings only in the event of a tie.
The Board of Directors operates through five standing committees: the
Audit Committee, Budget Committee, Personnel Committee, Committee on
Development Effectiveness (CODE), and Committee on Governance and Exec-
utive Directors’ Administrative Matters.104 Executive directors are members of
one of more of these committees in addition to being members of the Steer-
ing Committee.105 The Board’s work program is annually determined by the
Corporate Secretariat in consultation with the Steering Committee and man-
agement.106 Committees do not adopt decisions on behalf of the Board. How-
ever, contrary to IMF practice, they are always chaired by executive directors.107
In addition, the procedure for the operation of the Bank’s committees is more
elaborate than at the IMF. Once a committee end its deliberations, a detailed
summary identifying their views is prepared by staff. This summary is pre-
sented to committee members for comments and is not public. The summary
specifies those issues the committee has reached consensus on and those that
require further deliberation by the Board.108
Membership in committees is determined by the President, who nomi-
nates executive directors for the Board to appoint. Committee membership
usually comprises eight executive directors, four each from borrowing and
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non-borrowing bank members.109 This practice attenuates the voting power
within the Board’s decision-making process.110
Informality is a central feature of the World Bank’s decision-making
processes. The World Board’s unofficial meetings, referred to by various names,
help to provide the Board of Directors with advice and guidance.111
B. Voting in the World Bank
The World Bank has a system of decision-making based on weighted voting,
in which each member country possesses 250 votes plus one additional vote for
each share it has in the World Bank’s capital stock.112 North American and
European countries have always had significant voting power. In 1947, they
cast 74 percent of total votes; in 1971, they cast 61 percent. New members,
coming from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, have increased their voting
power from 15 percent in 1947 to 28 percent. Latin American voting power has
remained virtually unchanged, at approximately 8.3 percent.113 This means
that the G10, constituting the Bank’s major shareholders, has enough of a
majority (more than 50 percent of the votes) to adopt decisions within the
Board of Governors and has veto power regarding amendments to the Articles
of Agreement, although the group lacks the majority to push for such amend-
ments, which require 85 percent of the votes.114 Although all World Bank Mem-
bers possess the right to vote, as Foch states, ‘[n]ot all can make their voice
heard and weigh on the decision making’.115
Despite the fact that the Board of Directors has a system of weighted vot-
ing, the Board decides on the basis of consensus, and few decisions are put to
a vote. However, the composition of the Board does determine what issues are
brought to the Board and how they are decided.116 As Griffith-Jones notes,
‘[i]ndirectly, consensus does reflect the voting power of member countries’.117
In fact, former Bank officials have accepted that, when their five largest share-
holders agree on a particular issue, the Board adopts their position as a deci-
sion.118 Consequently, the G10 has a de facto power to influence the assignment
of funds and their conditionality clauses.119
C. The President and Management 
According to Article V(5) of the Articles of Agreement, the President acts under
the direction of the Board of Directors. In practice, however, the President is
in charge of the day-to-day operation of the Bank and is the head of manage-
ment, which, under the guidance of the Board of Directors, is in charge of
loans, guarantees, new policies, country assistance strategies, borrowing, and
financial determinations.120
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Given that the World Bank gets its resources from the financial community
and not from governments, the President enjoys broad discretion and 
less political supervision by members.121 Past Presidents have worked to expand
the role of their office, particularly during the Bank’s early years. During the
World Bank’s first 25 years, long-term and short-term borrowing increased
and expanded into new areas such as education, agriculture, water, and 
family planning. This was well beyond the initial conception of lending 
for electric power and transportation projects: a view still held by some 
Bank Members.122
D. Relations between the Board of Directors and the President 
Since its early years, the independence of management from the Board in the
day-to-day operations of the World Bank has been a pre-eminent institutional
characteristic.123 Among the factors that have contributed to this significant
independence are the expansion of the World Bank’s responsibilities and the
limited tenure in office of executive directors.124 As a result, the President has
significant power to steer the organization. It is the President who generally sets
the agenda for the meetings of Board of Directors and, therefore, determines
what issues the Board will decide on and when. Moreover, the President 
has broad discretion regarding budgetary procedures, procurement, and 
personnel.125 Importantly, the President is also vested with the power to make
recommendations on policy matters, which may or may not be adopted by
the executive directors.126
However, the President’s power is not without its limits. First, although the
President has some control over the Board of Executive Directors’ agenda, such
control faces some restrictions. When a proposed course of action faces signif-
icant opposition by influential executive directors, the President often delays
the inclusion of the topic on the agenda of the Board.127 In this circumstance,
it is the Board that has the power, as a matter of reality, to determine when
issues will be included on the agenda by the President.
Second, historians of the World Bank have noted that the role of the Board
has often been determined by the personality of the President. A strong 
President tends to result in Boards that feel they must act as a brake on the
President.128 Therefore, Presidents have not been able to reign at will over 
the Executive Board or Board of Directors.
In sum, the President is certainly the dominant voice in his relationship
with the Board, but that voice may be strong or weak depending on a number
of circumstances.
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E. The Steering of the World Bank
The fact that the President, not the Board of Directors, runs the World Bank
has not prevented large shareholders from having significant influence in the
day-to-day operations of the Bank.129 The influence of the United States is
important, despite the fact that its contributions and voting power have
declined.130 In total, non-borrowing members possess 62 percent of the votes
at the World Bank.131 On the other hand, developing and least developed coun-
tries lack influence because of their lack of collective action and their lack of
involvement in the management of the organization. Borrowing countries do
not vote against loans, fearing that the reasons justifying such refusals may
apply to them in the future.132
The functioning of the World Bank illustrates that one of its major insti-
tutional weaknesses is its inability to give borrowing countries a more promi-
nent voice in the decision-making process. The World Bank has received broad
criticism for this and is in the process of addressing it in its reform process.
There are two types of changes that have been suggested and/or already
implemented to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries
in the decision-making process of the World Bank: structural and non-
structural.133 The following are the non-structural options recommended by
the Development Committee (created by both the IMF and the World Bank):
1. Higher representation of staff from developing countries in the World
Bank’s senior management;
2. A communications dimension in projects funded by the World Bank;134
3. Enhanced Board effectiveness;135
4. An increased role in the appointment of the President;
5. Length of executive directors’ tenure;136 and
6. Capacity building in executive directors’ offices.
The recommended structural reforms include changing (1) the World Bank’s
voting structure, (2) the World Bank’s capital stock, (3) the composition of
the Board of Directors,137 and (4) special majorities.
Another recommendation that has been made is to establish particular
majorities regarding a set of decisions in which the substantial support of
developing and transition countries would be required.138 Also, there has been
discussion about certain decisions being taken only if approved by a majority
of developing and transition members (double majority).139
As with the IMF, the G20 has decided to directly involve the World Bank
in finding solutions to the ongoing financial crisis by speeding up the Bank’s
reform process under the same guiding principles of the reform of the IMF:
to update mandates and governance; to increase the voice of developing and
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emerging members; and to enhance the Bank’s accountability.140 In addition,
and to respond to the impact the crisis is having on developing countries, the
Bank, supported by the G20, has launched the Global Trade Liquidity 
Program to provide support to exporters and importers in countries of this
character. The initiative has $50 billion available to achieve its objective.141
Overall, a review of the history of the operation of the bank yields mixed
reviews. To some, the Bank has helped borrowing Members to develop through
an outward-looking policy. However, those opposing such a policy criticize
the Bank for a lack of results and for its lack of attention to equity and the
environment. The World Bank has also changed its focus over the years. Some-
times it had prioritized growth through trade and foreign investment. Today
its goal is to fight poverty in developing and the least developed countries. In
recent years, and until the current financial crisis, the World Bank has become
a less important player for Members. Many middle-income countries did not
need the World Bank since they could obtain funding in the financial 
markets; others simply no longer required its loans.142 However, the current 
crisis may well mean a revival of the World Bank, which is actively involved in
helping countries in difficult circumstances.143
F. Decision-Making for the Adoption of Specific Decisions
1. Decisions Regarding Bank Policies
A change in Bank policy may come from a management initiative. The change
is subject to a deep analysis followed by a report authored by a top official.
The report is then discussed internally within the Managing Committee. Once
the report has been fully debated, and even if there is no consensus on it, it is
sent to the Board of Directors for informal discussion at the Board’s semi-
nars.144 Generally, the Board discusses policy papers twice. First, it debates the
principles of the policy and then the policy itself.145
In recent years, the decision-making process for changes to the Bank’s poli-
cies has often been triggered by management, in particular by the Operations
Policy and Country Services vice-presidency. Management prepares a draft,
which is circulated for comments to internal and external experts, clients, and
stakeholders, such as NGOs. The outcome of this process is then submitted
for additional comments to the responsible units and then to managing directors
and ultimately to the Board of Directors.146
The Bank President has significant control over the agenda in respect of Bank
policies. By the time proposals have arrived for informal discussion before the
Board, they have been fully debated by management and have added legitimacy
as a result of consultations with outside stakeholders.
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2. Decision-Making for Loans to Members 
The decision-making process for loans starts when the Bank designs a Coun-
try Assistance Strategy (CAS) for a given Member. The strategy details the
financial and technical assistance the Bank is willing to grant a Member and
the projects that may be carried out to achieve the strategy’s objectives. Bank
Members participate in the elaboration of their CAS. Members are in charge
of preparing projects, but they are nonetheless assisted by the Bank. Once the
project is approved by the Member, negotiations about the conditions of the
loan start. Operational personnel from the Bank prepare Project Evaluation
Documents (PED) and Program Documents (PD), which are submitted to
the President, who decides when to submit them to the Board.147
Before making a loan, the executive directors, in particular the executive
director who was elected by the Member that is the borrower or guarantor of
the loan, approve all the documents. Such approvals are understood to mean
that the Board—which is the interpreter of the Articles of Agreement—regards
the transaction as falling within the sphere of the Articles.148
Loan approvals have certain dynamics, though. The Board is reluctant not
to approve a loan on the terms negotiated by the President and management,
since not approving could be seen as a vote of no confidence in the country seek-
ing the loan, and in management’s handling of the loan program. Nonetheless,
the Board has instruments to make its voice heard, such as requesting that the
President and management not include certain issues in a future loan149 or
requiring information early in the negotiating process between the Bank and
a Member seeking a loan.150 Generally speaking, the Board asks questions,
identifies problems, and discourages initiatives that members may not be ready
to adopt.151 But the role of some executive directors in loan approvals may go
well beyond this stage and include a role during the negotiations themselves—
for example, requiring management to speed up or give priority to certain
loans the directors are concerned about.152
G. Summary 
Some features of the World Bank’s decision-making process during its history
have been the following:
• A Governor or group of Governors may trigger the decision-making
process at the Board of Governors level.
• Some political decisions by the Board of Governors level include inter-
acting with Board of Directors, who, under the guidance of Governors,
analyze issues and develop proposals that are sent back to the Gover-
nors for deliberation and decision.
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• Some decision-making processes, particular those related to loans to
Member States, take place at various levels simultaneously: Management,
in consultation with the given elected executive director, negotiates with
the member concerned.
• Management is usually involved in all decisions and has the power to
take the initiative and trigger decision-making processes within the World
Bank. In addition, the President can be an important ally of Governors
in the political process, leading to the inclusion of their issues within
their Board of Governor’s agenda.
• Finally, the significance of the influence of the Board of Directors varies,
depending on the type of decision at hand. Sometimes, it plays an impor-
tant role (particularly when it approves an operation but asks that cer-
tain issues not be included in future loans). But in others, particularly in
cases where major World Bank Members deal directly with the Presi-
dent, it plays a limited role.
IV. Proposals for Reform of the WTO Internal Manage-
ment in Light of Those of the IMF and the World Bank153
Having described some features of the operation of the IMF and the World
Bank, this section seeks to use this experience to improve proposals already
made to enhance the WTO internal management and its decision-making
process. Any WTO Member that relies on the experience of the IMF or World
Bank must take account of the current trends in institutional design, charac-
terized not only by concerns for efficiency but also for proper representation
of developing and least developed countries.
A. Creation of a WTO Consultative Body
There has been a recommendation to create a consultative body within the
WTO decision-making process.154 Suggestions regarding the mandate and
composition vary among authors. On one hand, the Sutherland Report,
recommends the creation of a consultative body to be chaired and convened
by the WTO Director-General. Ministers or senior officials would participate 
in this body.155 Blackhurst and Hartridge share this view and suggest that the
body would lack decision-making power.156 However, Steger and Shpilkovskaya
go further and suggest that this body should have advisory, executive, and super-
visorial roles.157 Common ground among these authors is that membership
cannot be exclusive and that, on the contrary, it must be fully representative of
the whole WTO Membership.
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The experience of the IMF’s IMFC provides support for the creation of a
consultative body within the WTO to improve the effectiveness of its decision-
making process. Such experience can be valuable in two ways: first, it 
illustrates how the body could function to introduce new dynamics to trade
negotiations in order to break deadlocks; and, second, the IMFC’s experience
could guide WTO Members in determining the profile of those individuals
appointed to the body.
As to the first, the combination of delegation with instructions from the
IMFC to the Executive Board has sometimes made inter-state negotiations in
the IMF possible. The ability of the IMF Executive Board to go back to the
IMFC to assess progress and agree on new instructions for the former has
introduced new dynamism to decision-making processes within the Fund, and
it has been a valuable process in overcoming deadlock. A similar interaction
could take place between the WTO Ministerial Conference and a WTO con-
sultative body concerning the negotiation of new trade rounds, but also between
the consultative body and the Councils of Trade in Goods and Services, and the
Council for TRIPS.158 In effect, WTO councils or committees could also advance
issues for further negotiations before the consultative body regarding topics for
which consensus is elusive within the councils or committees.
Second, if the WTO body, either consultative or executive, is to play a mean-
ingful role in improving the efficiency of the operation of the WTO decision-
making process, the experience of the IMFC regarding its composition could
be relevant. The IMFC is made up of IMF governors, namely, finance ministers
or heads of central banks. It is the combination of the knowledge and domestic
political power of the IMFC’s members that has permitted it to become such
a significant actor within the IMF’s decision-making process. Consequently, the
WTO consultative body should be made up of trade ministers capable of making
their voices heard within the WTO and their national government. The body
would then provide ministerial-level advice to the Ministerial Conference, the
General Council, the WTO Director-General, and other WTO political bodies.159
As to the mandate, the consultative body could be asked to provide advice
regarding mainly issues in a round of negotiations and concerning the imple-
mentation of the existing covered agreements. Such a body should have 24 to
30 members and be truly representative of the WTO Membership. Finally,
to be able to play a meaningful role within the WTO, the consultative body or
its members should be allowed to trigger decision-making processes in partic-
ular circumstances.160 Or, at a minimum, the understanding in creating the body
should avoid constraints triggering more formal decision-making and allow the
body initiative to evolve through interactions with the Director-General.
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B. New Role for the Director-General and the Secretariat
The Sutherland Report, Steger and Shpilkovskaya, and others have proposed
enhancing the role of the WTO Director-General (DG) and the Secretariat.161
Perhaps the only insight that the history of the World Bank and the IMF can
offer to WTO Managing Directors is that IMF Managing Directors and World
Bank Presidents have been willing to take advantage of the opportunities they
have found to increase the institutional relevance of their positions. DGs should
behave in a similar way. They have done so recently. For instance, Director-
General Panitchpakdi set some precedents that, in addition to seeking the
achievement of important objectives of the Organization, had as a side effect
the enhancing of the Director-General. Examples of this include the establish-
ment of the consultative board that rendered the Sutherland Report and the
creation of an NGO advisory body. The Sutherland Report did not receive the
attention it deserved, nor was the NGO Advisory Body well received, even by
prominent NGOs, who decided not to participate in it.162 Nonetheless, these
two attempts constitute examples that may have some precedential value and
that add to past experiences that show that DGs have some margin of action.
Another potential and more effective way in which the DG and the Secre-
tariat’s institutional position within the Organization can be enhanced is by
identifying the type of decisions in which their role can be more prominent.163
This approach is directly drawn from the experience of the IMF and the World
Bank, in which the roles of both managements within decision-making
processes vary according to the type of decision in question.
However, before attempting to tackle this subject, it is important to link the
issue of the enhancement of the DG and the Secretariat to the context of the
ongoing reform of the Bretton Woods institutions: any enhancement must take
place on the condition that both the DG and the Secretariat act as neutral players
and do not openly or covertly favour positions adopted by developed country
Members, which has not always been the case. In effect, according to Nordström,
the Secretariat has sometimes been perceived by developing countries as advancing
developed countries’ positions.164 If the DG and the Secretariat are not seen as 
neutral players, any attempt to enhance their institutional position will be doomed
by developing and least developed countries’ opposition.165
The WTO Secretariat has the capacity to take make important contribu-
tions to the WTO decision-making process and to play a more important role.
Indeed, the Secretariat is present in all WTO spheres of action and, conse-
quently, possesses a wide and complete view of the Organization. In effect, the
Secretariat participates in all negotiations, in the implementation of each of
Improvements to WTO Decision-Making Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez 113
the covered agreements, and in dispute settlement proceedings at the panel
level. In addition, it carries out the trade review of all WTO Members and pro-
vides technical assistance to developing and least developed members. Undoubt-
edly, it is an actor with knowledge of the four corners of the WTO and is in a
position to identify needs for change at various levels of the Organization.
Having said this, this chapter turns to identify the type of decision-making
processes in which the Secretariat should be given a more active role: those
related to internal secondary normativity, secondary soft law, and binding 
decisions concerning technical issues.
1. The Secretariat and Internal Secondary Normativity
Footer defines this kind of norm as the rules and procedures for meetings 
of WTO political bodies or other matters of internal procedure.166 This legal
category, in principle, does not create rights and obligations for WTO 
Members, and therefore, there are factual differences for a distinct decision-
making process in which the Secretariat can seize the initiative and play a more
active role.
The practice of the Organization reveals that the role of the Secretariat in
the design of these rules has been at times more important. Footer specifically
refers to the 1995 Technical Note on the Accession Process,167 which contains
a practical guide for WTO Members to carry out accession negotiations as an
example of this situation.
2. The Secretariat and Its Initiative Regarding Secondary Soft Law
There should also be some room for the Secretariat to take the initiative regard-
ing non-binding secondary rules, or secondary soft law. As Footer states with
great precision, soft law may not be legally binding but may be legally rele-
vant.168 The notion of soft law requires certain clarification. In her words,
In the WTO context soft law may be addressed to the membership collectively, or
occasionally to individual Members. Primary soft law has a normative content
but where it differs from primary hard law is that it has not been adopted in treaty
form. It may declare new norms—sometimes intended as a precursor to the adop-
tion of a later hard treaty text—or it may elaborate or reaffirm norms previously
set forth in binding or non-binding instruments.169
This soft law is expressed in the issuing of recommendations and comments
by supervisory or monitoring bodies170 and has in fact already played differ-
ent roles in the WTO, such as supplementing hard rules or precursors to ‘hard
law’.171 The WTO Secretariat could go further in taking the initiative to produce
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external non-binding regulations, and it is in a privileged position to do so.172
Given that this kind of norm does not create new rights and obligations, the
Secretariat could well be in a position to exert initiative if it sees the need to do
so and to be an active participant in the decision-making process.
3. The Secretariat and Binding WTO Law Regarding Technical Issues
It was seen in the first two parts of this chapter that the more technical the
issue, the more initiative that managements at both the IMF and the Bank have
had to trigger decision-making processes related to the given subject matter.
As was illustrated, this situation has its roots in the fact that the Bank’s and
IMF’s staff gain important knowledge of members on the basis of the negoti-
ations for the selection, design, approval, and execution of the Bank’s projects
or by virtue of the consultations between IMF staff and country authorities
regarding their macroeconomic policies.
Could the Secretariat be in a position in which it had privileged access to
technical information that could allow it to identify technical issues that require
new rules, the fine-tuning of the existing ones, or outright changes? Yes, the 
Secretariat is usually involved in dealing with complex technical issues such
as discussion in relevant WTO political bodies at different levels, ongoing nego-
tiations, trade review reports carried out by the Secretariat,173 dispute settle-
ment, and implementation of the covered agreements. These channels give the
Secretariat privileged information regarding the identification of technical
issues that require adjustment, which offers the Secretariat the opportunity to
trigger decision-making processes aimed at this result. Thus the Secretariat
could start the process within the competent WTO political body and the given
process could move up into the hierarchical ladder to the General Council or
the Ministerial Conference.174
In sum, it can be said that there are areas in which the enhancing of the role
of the Secretariat may face less resistance by WTO Members, such as the issuing
of internal regulation and secondary soft law, and the fine-tuning or modifi-
cation of binding rules regarding certain technical issues. The DG and the 
Secretariat could draw on these gains in institutional relevance to expand their roles
to other areas of WTO hard law so as to contribute to increasing the efficiency of
the WTO decision-making process. However, there is a precondition for this
project to have a chance of success: the Secretariat’s neutrality, in the sense that
it must be perceived by Members to act in each particular occasion with due con-
sideration for the specific positions adopted by members of all kinds.
Although it is known that the Secretariat can informally take some initiative,175
the ultimate question is whether the Secretariat has the legal authorization to
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trigger WTO decision-making processes. To begin with, the functioning of
international organizations and their organs would be seriously impaired if
they could exclusively carry out those actions they have been explicitly author-
ized to do. Instead, the authorization can be implicit, and it can be found in 
Article III.1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, providing for the functions of the WTO to be read in the 
context of its objectives. Thus, as long as the Secretariat, as expected, is exert-
ing initiative within any of the functions of the WTO and to favour one of its
objectives, it is possible to state that the Secretariat has sufficient legal grounds
to do so. Obviously, any final determination will rest within the authority of
the WTO membership.
V. Conclusion
The chapter has shown that an assessment of the history of the World Bank and
the IMF regarding their operations and of the relations between their Boards
and managements can offer some lessons to improve on the recommenda-
tions to enhance the WTO decision-making process. Such lessons have not
been drawn on the basis of a mechanistic comparative approach. On the con-
trary, the analysis carried out in this chapter has taken into account, first, the
particularities of the World Bank’s and IMF’s mandates and goals; and 
second, the current trends in international institutional design, marked not
only by concerns for efficiency but also for the appropriate representation of
developing and least developed countries.
On these bases, this chapter has concluded that the IMF IMFC’s experience
provides further support for the creation of a consultative body in the WTO
as a potential valuable decision-making organ capable of breaking deadlocks
in trade negotiations. In addition, the above-mentioned experience also sug-
gests that to achieve this result, the WTO consultative body should be made up
of trade ministers.
Finally, the chapter has also illustrated that the IMF’s and World Bank’s
past operation can be useful to give content to the proposal for enhancing the
institutional position of the WTO Director-General and the Secretariat. In
particular, the experience of the World Bank’s and the Fund’s management—
which has defined their different roles, depending on the type of decision in
question—can guide the search for situations in which the strengthening of the
WTO Secretariat can take place. These situations are the decision-making
process for the adoption of internal procedural norms for some operations of
WTO political bodies, secondary non-binding rules, and exceptionally, for
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binding rules of a technical nature. Regarding this set of determinations, the
Secretariat should be recognized as able to exert certain initiatives in trigger-
ing decision-making processes within the WTO.
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Internal Management of the WTO: 
Room for Improvement
DEBRA STEGER AND 
NATALIA SHPILKOVSKAYA1
I. Introduction
The focus of this book is on the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an institution.
As we know, the WTO faces many challenges. Some commentators believe it
faces a legitimacy crisis.2 While the difficulties of the Uruguay Round and fail-
ures of the ministerial conferences in Seattle and Cancun have faded, new
obstacles to the effective functioning of the WTO as an institution have emerged.
In particular, the rapid rise in the economic and political power of some large
developing economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, is having a major
impact on the functioning of the WTO. The lack of progress in the Doha Round
of multilateral trade negotiations is a sign that all is not well with the deci-
sion-making and rule-making machinery of the WTO. The proliferation of
regional trade agreements, partly in response to the impasse in the multilateral
negotiations, is also diverting precious government resources and attention
from the WTO to regional negotiations. A major dilemma, as the Warwick
Commission has noted, is that while public support for trade liberalization
and trade agreements is waning significantly in developed countries, the devel-
oping world is becoming more convinced of the benefits of trade agreements
for their domestic economies.3
In June 2003, former WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi
appointed a distinguished group of experts to take a long-term view on the
future of the WTO as an institution. The report of the Consultative Board,
The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millen-
nium (the Sutherland Report) was released in 2005 on the 10th anniversary of
the WTO.4 Another independent commission, chaired by a former Canadian
trade minister, Pierre Pettigrew, was established in 2007 to examine the role of
the WTO in the multilateral trading system. The report of the First Warwick
Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (the
Warwick Report), was released in December 2007.5 Both reports identify key
institutional problems in the WTO and suggest practical recommendations
for reform. Their proposals were carefully chosen to ensure that they were
capable of being implemented without new rules or agreements having to be
negotiated. Despite the relevant and pragmatic conclusions of these two reports,
the Members of the WTO have to date shown no appetite for institutional
reform of the Organization.
This chapter focuses on issues related to the internal management of the
WTO and provides preliminary proposals for reform of the WTO. The efficiency
of an organization and its achievements depend, to a certain extent, on the
internal management of the organization. Relevant considerations include
whether the bodies of the organization possess enough authority to take the
necessary actions and decisions; whether these bodies are equipped to react
promptly and appropriately to changing situations; whether there are specific
procedures that provide clearly defined processes for rule-making proposals to
be considered and approved; and whether the rule-making procedures work
in practice, allowing the organization to respond to current realities and power
relationships. All these questions are relevant for the evaluation of the inter-
nal management of the WTO.
II. Different Visions of the Future of the WTO
The first question that might be asked is whether there is a need to reform the
institutional architecture of the WTO.
Where one stands on this question depends on what one believes is the
mandate of the WTO. Several experts see the mandate of the WTO as funda-
mentally focused on trade liberalization.6 For these people, not surprisingly, the
WTO is functioning effectively as it is, as a member-driven organization. In their
view, it does not need major institutional reform. It simply needs to get on
with the business of negotiating new trade rules. Most Members of the WTO
take this view. Other experts believe that the WTO should have a broader man-
date in the future as the organization responsible for international economic
regulation in the global economy.7 For these people, the WTO clearly requires
major institutional reform to improve its decision- and rule-making machin-
ery if it is to remain relevant and effective in the world of the future.
To those holding the former point of view, the WTO functions much like
the old GATT. It is a member-driven organization with trade liberalization as
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its key purpose and mandate. While there are no formal decision-making
structures in the WTO, the time-honoured practice of consensus decision-
making has worked effectively in the past, including in the Uruguay Round, and
is the only legitimate, effective, and fair means to take decisions in the future.
Recognizing the need for diplomacy and politics in rule-making in the WTO,
and noting, in particular, the concern with giving developing country Mem-
bers a greater voice and influence, the experts favouring the current system
are generally opposed to the idea of changing the consensus rule in decision-
making and tend not to favour the establishment of a management board or
other small committees made up of only some of the WTO Members.8
Other experts view the mandate of the WTO as extending to international
economic regulation generally and are concerned that the WTO does not have
the institutional capacity to allow it to function effectively. While not wanting
to turn the WTO into a ‘world government’, proponents of a broader mandate
for the WTO emphasize that there is currently an imbalance between the strong,
legally binding dispute settlement mechanism, on the one hand, and the 
comparatively weak, cumbersome, political rule-making and negotiating
machinery, on the other.9
Marco Bronckers observes that the rule-making and amendment procedures
in the WTO make it ‘practically impossible’ and ‘very cumbersome’ to clarify
or amend existing rules.10 He worries that
governments may too easily think that progress can be made in the WTO through
enforcement; that litigation in the WTO is a faster, more convenient way to resolve
difficult issues than an open exchange at the negotiating table. That is worrying
because it undermines democratic control over international co-operation and
rule-making, and it prevents a more broad-based participation of all stakeholders
in the formulation of international rules.11
John Jackson notes that there are advantages and disadvantages to the 
consensus-based decision-making process: ‘One downside of requiring full
consensus is that it may be a recipe for impasse, stalemate, and paralysis. In other
words, the result may be that things do not get done.12 Concern with the dif-
ficulties of decision-making by consensus has led Professor Jackson to pro-
pose a ‘critical mass’ approach, which has been endorsed by the Warwick
Commission. Jackson’s idea is ‘to develop a practice where countries refrain from
blocking consensus when a critical mass of countries support a proposed
change. This critical mass of countries could be expressed as an overwhelm-
ing majority of countries and an overwhelming amount of the trade weight in
the world, such as 90 percent of both of these factors. In addition, there could
be other factors’.13
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Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita go further and suggest supple-
menting the consensus rule with a weighted-voting system that Members may
use in situations when consensus cannot be reached. They take the view that
although the current system (one Member, one vote) represents the formal
equality of Members, it is imbalanced because it does not take into account the
real political and economic power of Members. They propose weighted-vot-
ing rules based on a formula with several variables, including contributions to
the WTO, gross domestic product, openness of markets, population, and/or
basic vote. They consider that this mechanism may be useful in helping to
overcome the major difficulties in trade negotiations, in talks between rounds,
and in the regular business affairs of the WTO.14
Gary Hufbauer has suggested even more radical changes to the voting system
in the WTO, favouring a weighted-voting formula. He argues that without this
surgical conversion of WTO voting procedures, there is no chance for a suc-
cessful conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations. He considers that obstruc-
tion in decision-making by Members who represent less than 10 percent of world
trade is dangerous.15
The Warwick Commission considered the idea of a weighted-voting 
system based on two thresholds: country size (established percentage of global
trade or global national income) and a minimum number of Members that
voted in support of a decision. While the commission stated that such a com-
bination of thresholds could protect the interests of both big and small coun-
tries, it nevertheless decided to refrain from recommending a weighted-voting
system. Instead, it decided to support the critical mass approach.16
At the root of these differing visions of the WTO are different views of its
essential purpose and mandate. For those who believe that the mandate of the
WTO is trade liberalization through reciprocal exchanges of concessions,
reform of the WTO is not needed. For those who consider that the mandate
of the WTO should extend to international economic regulation more gener-
ally, institutional reform is an urgent priority.
It is difficult to envision the future of the WTO as an institution without
speculating on its future mandate. However, Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, in his foreword to the Sutherland Report, emphasized that the
purpose of that report was ‘to examine the functioning of the institution—
the WTO—and to consider how well equipped it is to carry the weight of future
responsibilities and demands’.17
The assumptions of this chapter are that the WTO is in urgent need of
institutional reform.18 The mandate of the WTO is no longer clear, and ‘[t]he
WTO should be recognized for what it is—an international organization that
regulates trade as well as international economic relations generally.19 In fact,
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[t]he WTO needs major surgery in order to respond effectively to the new political
realities of the international economic system.… [M]embers should recognize
that the mandate of the WTO is not exclusively confined to the liberalization of
trade; it includes development as well as a host of other topics that relate to inter-
national economic regulation generally. Institutional reform of the WTO is needed
to provide it with the architecture and decision making machinery to make it a
vibrant, responsive and accountable international organization, relevant to gov-
ernments, companies and people in the 21st century.20
III. Is There a Structural Problem with the 
Decision-Making Rules in the WTO?
The second question that might be asked is whether the focus of WTO insti-
tutional reform should be on the decision-making rules themselves or on the
processes by which the rules are negotiated. The decision-making rules in the
WTO were negotiated in the Uruguay Round and are contained in the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO
Agreement).21 Many experts believe that the key problem with WTO decision-
making is that the consensus rule in Article IX:1 is too rigid and, therefore,
renders decision-making and rule-making in the WTO ‘difficult and suscep-
tible to paralysis’.22 Some alternative proposals to consensus decision-making
have been developed, for example, weighted-voting and different approval
methods depending on the types of decisions.23 More emphasis should be
placed on the processes by which decisions are made in the WTO. Additionally,
formal structures need to be developed within the WTO at the front end of the
decision- and rule-making system to allow for proposals to be presented to
WTO councils and committees for approval under the existing rules in the
WTO Agreement.
Before turning to this chapter’s proposals, it is worthwhile to describe
briefly the decision-making and rule-making framework in the WTO and how
the current system functions in practice.
A. Decision-Making Rules of the WTO
The WTO Agreement sets out two methods for decision-making in the WTO:
consensus (as the primary rule, continuing the practice under the GATT 1947)
and voting (as a secondary rule in circumstances when consensus cannot 
be reached or the rules specifically provide otherwise). Each Member of the
WTO is entitled to one vote, except for the European Community, which 
has the number of votes equal to the number of its member states that are
WTO Members.24
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The consensus principle emanated from practice under the GATT 1947,
although the formal rules in Article XXV:4 of the GATT 1947 called for decisions
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to be taken by majority vote, or in certain
cases, by a two-thirds majority of votes. However, as early as 1959, in practice,
most decisions were taken by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on the basis of
consensus (except for waivers, accessions, and certain amendments).25 The
shift from majority voting to the consensus rule can be explained partly by the
increasing number of contracting parties and by the emergence of coalitions
based on, for example, geopolitical or economic interests. In addition, there was
considerable influence from some other international organizations that 
preferred the principle of consensus decision-making.
The consensus requirement in the WTO does not require unanimity of all
Members. Article XI:1 of the WTO Agreement explicitly clarifies that “[t]he
body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus if no Member
present at the meeting when the decision is taken formally objects to the 
proposed decision.”Article IX provides that ‘where a decision cannot be arrived
at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting’. However,
in the history of the WTO, with the exception of the accession of Ecuador in
1995,26 no proposal has been made for a decision to be made by voting. For con-
sensus decisions, Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the 
Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council provides that ‘[a]
simple majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum’.27
Under Article IX, interpretations of the WTO Agreement and waivers of
WTO obligations are to be approved by a three-fourths majority of the Mem-
bers. Adoption of financial regulations and annual budgets by the General
Council, amendments of the Multilateral Trade Agreements contained in Annex
1A and C, and accessions to the WTO shall be taken by a two-thirds majority
of Members (respectively, Articles VII:3, X:4 and XII:2 of the WTO Agree-
ment). However, since 15 November 1995, the General Council has sought
decisions by consensus on matters related to requests for waivers or accession
to the WTO.28
There are also exceptional cases in which the majority vote rule does not
apply, notably decisions taken by the Dispute Settlement Body;29 decisions on
waivers regarding an ‘obligation subject to a transition period or a period for
staged implementation that the requesting Member has not performed by the end
of the relevant period’;30 and decisions on adding a new plurilateral trade agree-
ment to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. In these cases, Members are obliged
to follow the consensus rule or other rules set out in the relevant agreement.
The Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods31,
of the Council for Trade in Services,32 and of the Council for TRIPS33 guide
134 Part III Internal Management of the WTO
decision-making by these bodies. In particular, Rule 33 provides that ‘[w]here
a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be referred
to the General Council for decision’.34
Article X of the WTO Agreement establishes a complex set of amending pro-
cedures. Pursuant to Article X:1, the general amendment procedure consists of
three stages:
1. A WTO Member or a relevant council35 (within its authority) can propose
an amendment to the WTO Agreement or Multilateral Trade Agreements
in Annex 1 and submit that proposal to the Ministerial Conference;
2. The Ministerial Conference takes a decision, by consensus, on submitting
the proposed amendment to Members for acceptance (if consensus 
cannot be reached, the Ministerial Conference may take a decision by
two-thirds majority of all Members); and
3. Members may accept the proposed amendment by depositing an instru-
ment of acceptance with the Director-General of the WTO within a
specified period, after which the amendment will come into force.
There are several qualifications and exceptions to this general procedure, which
are specified in paragraphs 2-10 of Article X of the WTO Agreement. The impor-
tant point to note is that the amendment procedures in Article X make it very
difficult, if not impossible, to either amend existing WTO agreements or add new
ones. As a result, these rules have, thus far, not been used by Members.
B. Current Practices of Conducting Negotiations in the WTO
Although Articles II and III of the WTO Agreement contemplated new rules,
amendments, and even new agreements could be negotiated at any time, WTO
Members continue the GATT practice of negotiating new rules only in the
context of broad, multilateral trade rounds. Such rounds are formally com-
menced pursuant to specific terms of reference that are agreed by the Minis-
terial Conference on the basis of consensus. Under the authority of the General
Council, the Trade Negotiations Committee is responsible for supervision of
new negotiating rounds and ‘establishing appropriate negotiating mechanisms
as required and supervising the progress of the negotiations’,36 and is required
to report to regular meetings of the General Council.37 As was the practice
under the GATT 1947, informal consultations are a vital mechanism for reach-
ing mutually acceptable solutions among Members.
There is no standard procedure for conducting negotiations in the WTO.
Traditionally, the chairs of special sessions and negotiating groups have had the
leading role in facilitating negotiations. They facilitate negotiations through 
convening, as appropriate, meetings of the full negotiating groups or special 
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sessions, as well as informal smaller groups to deal with specific issues. Thus
meetings are conducted in several different formats: formal (short, filled with
Members’ statements that are mostly for the record); informal (more open and
sometimes emotional discussions); open-ended (where every Member may come
into the negotiation room); small group consultations (Members come by the
chair’s invitation); and confessionals (private meetings between Members and
the chair). Chairs may encourage interested Members to meet in small groups in
their individual capacities to work together to narrow issues of contention. Work
in small groups is seen as a productive way to build compromises that can lead
to consensus. After a common understanding on issues within a small group of
key players is found, the number of participants may gradually increase to the
level of all WTO Members. This is referred to as the ’concentric circles‘ approach.
The Director-General may play an active role in stimulating consultations
among key Members as a way to facilitate the search for a compromise, using
different occasions and variable forums and formats.
It is important to note that the practice of holding meetings in small groups,
specifically ‘Green Room’ meetings, has been criticized for lack of transparency
and inclusiveness of all Members in the negotiation process. Some developing
countries have complained that trade negotiations are conducted in secret and
have requested more ‘effective and real participation by all Members’.38 One of
the methods that developing countries have been actively using to get into
meetings with limited participation is through informal coalitions of their
own. Currently, there are several informal, coalition groups involved in the
Doha Round negotiations, including the Group of 20; the Group of 33; NAMA
11; the African Group; the Least-developed Countries Group; the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group; and the Association of South East Asian
Nations Group. In small group meetings, the interests of coalitions are repre-
sented by their country coordinators, who are expected to inform other mem-
bers of the coalitions on discussions that occurred at the negotiating table.
Thus coalitions of developing countries are a means of managing multilateral
trade negotiations and building consensus, as well as increasing transparency
and inclusiveness in decision-making. The practice and experience of these
informal groups should be taken into account in developing more formalized
mechanisms for rule-making and decision-making in the WTO.
C. Is There a Need for Reform of the Rules?
It is clear that the WTO rules on decision-making and amendments are complex.
However, they also provide flexibilities, including through fall-backs to 
majority or enhanced-majority voting, which Members have been reluctant
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to utilize. Despite all the difficulties, achievement of consensus is still possible.
Members have been able to adopt some key decisions based on consensus since
1995. Recent important decisions include the Decision of the General Coun-
cil on Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements;39 the Minis-
terial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products;40 the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health;41 and the Waiver
Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds.42
Is the problem with WTO decision-making and rule-making to be found
in the rules in Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement, or does it lie in the
lack of formal structures for decision-making and rule-making proposals to
move forward in the WTO system? The problem lies in the front end (input
process) of the WTO system, rather than in the back end (approval process).
IV. Improving the Management Processes of the WTO
While it may be very difficult or even impossible to change the decision-
making and amendment rules in the WTO, it is worth considering formaliz-
ing the informal decision-making processes to make them more effective and
inclusive. It is not necessary to modify the decision-making and amendment
provisions in Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement. As indicated previously,
these provisions allow for decisions to be made by consensus, but if that is 
not achievable, in most cases the rules provide for resort to different types of
majority voting.
While a great deal of attention has been paid in the academic literature to
voting rules, the difficulties with rule-making and decision-making in the
WTO may not lie in the rules themselves, but in the culture or attitudes of the
WTO Members. It is not the approval of proposals at the end of the process that
seems to be the problem but rather the lack of formal mechanisms and pro-
cedures at the beginning of and during the process that hampers decision-mak-
ing. The problems with the rule-making and decision-making apparatus in
the WTO lie in its internal governance structures as well as in the attitudes of
Members. In order to fulfil its mandate, the WTO must have the necessary
structures to enable it to function effectively, efficiently, and accountably.
In comparison to other international organizations or most national gov-
ernments, the WTO lacks many of the management structures that are taken
for granted in most other rule-making systems. For example, it does not have
an executive body, a parliament or a legislative body, or a bureaucracy that
plays a formative role in setting legislative priorities and in rule-making. Com-
pare, for illustrative purposes, the institutional structure of the European
Union, which has a council, a parliament, and a commission that all have 
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specific rule-making authority. The WTO need not emulate the European
Union, but it is useful to think of these general institutional functions in devel-
oping models for the governance of the WTO.
What reforms should be introduced to make the WTO stronger, more
effective, efficient, and accountable to its Members and the world at large? 
The notion of “good governance” must be the key guiding principle in any
reform of the WTO as an institution. Taking into account conventional 
wisdom from codes of good governance in the public and private sectors and
academic studies of international organizations, as well as the recent governance
assessment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the Independent 
Evaluation Office, the following four dimensions of good governance should be
taken into account: effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and representation.43
‘Effectiveness’ refers to the ability of the organization and its specific bodies
to fulfil their functions with quality results in a timely manner. Preconditions
for effective governance include clearly defined responsibilities for each element
in the organizational structure and coherence in the functioning of the differ-
ent bodies, including information sharing.44
‘Efficiency’ refers to the optimization of operational costs together with
maximum and appropriate utilization of personnel within the organization.
Any duplication in the responsibilities assigned to institutional bodies and
staff should be avoided.45
‘Accountability’ exists at two levels. First, the staff and management of the
organization must be responsible to the Members for carrying out their instructions.
Second, the organization must be responsible to the outside world in carrying
out its mandate. Accountability must be built into the very operational culture
of the organization and be based on clearly defined and established criteria so
that the process of assessing performance and results is as objective as possible.46
‘Representation’ refers to the ability of Members to have their views con-
sidered and to participate in the decision-making process. It also applies to
the ability of other stakeholders (civil society groups, non-governmental organ-
izations, business associations, and parliamentarians) to present their views
and to have them considered.47
The following proposals to improve and enhance WTO governance struc-
tures are made in the light of these four key elements of good governance.
A. A WTO Management Board
Many international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank), the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization,
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the United Nations Development Program, and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have a management board
and an executive body or its equivalent. The WTO does not have a formal body
analogous to these executive boards, although the idea of such a body was con-
templated by the drafters of the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization (the Havana Charter) and has been discussed at various points
in GATT/WTO history, including during the Uruguay Round.48
The drafters of the Havana Charter contemplated creating an executive
within the Organization that would have had specific functions. In fact, they
carefully developed the basic elements for establishing an executive board,
including its composition (18 Members selected by the conference), voting
rules, and rules of procedure, as well as its potential responsibilities. It is impor-
tant to note that the drafters planned to give the Executive Board both execu-
tive and supervisory functions. In particular, Article 81:1 of the Havana Charter
would have enabled the Executive Board to ‘be responsible for the execution
of the policies of the Organization and … exercise the powers and perform
the duties assigned to it by the Conference. It shall supervise the activities of
the Commissions and shall take such action upon their recommendations as
it may deem appropriate’.49
Later, following the creation of the Interim Committee in the IMF, the
CONTRACTING PARITES of the GATT 1947 established the Consultative
Group of 18, first on a provisional basis in 1975, and then on a permanent
basis in 1979.50 Importantly, the Consultative Group of 18 required rotation
of its membership, a process that was carefully followed by the contracting
parties. One of the problems in the operation of this group was that it was not
very transparent, and documents were not always distributed among all con-
tracting parties. At the same time, according to the reports of the Consultative
Group of 18 to the GATT Council, the group made a substantial contribution
to the operation of the GATT and the launching of the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations. It was the only forum for the discussion of agricultural policy in
1981–82 and the first to discuss new subjects such as trade in services,
intellectual property, and trade-related investment in the GATT 1947. In spite
of this, the group was discontinued after 1985.51
During the Uruguay Round, the idea of the establishment of a management
board was proposed by the United States in the Functioning of the GATT 
System (FOGS) Negotiating Group.52 Although this proposal was not ulti-
mately adopted, it is worthwhile to describe some of its elements. The United
States proposed the establishment of a management board that would meet at
the level of ministers between the biennial plenary meetings of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES at the ministerial level and would perform the
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same functions as what became, in fact, the Ministerial Conference. The man-
agement board would have consisted of 18 members whose seats would have
been distributed on the basis of the frequency of the Trade Policy Review Mech-
anism. The management board would have had limited decision-making pow-
ers delegated to it by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It was suggested also that
the CONTRACTING PARTIES might assign issues to the management board
when achieving consensus proved to be elusive. In addition to the powers
assigned to it by the Ministerial Conference, the management board was also 
• to serve as a forum for discussion of trade issues of common concern and
to resolve issues referred to it by the GATT Council or taken up by the
board on its own initiative;
• to assist in the preparation of agendas and other preparations for meetings
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES at the ministerial level (including decisions
to initiate trade negotiations);
• to take primary responsibility for developing an outline, for considera-
tion by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of a successor organization to
the GATT;
• to serve as a nominating committee for the selection of the Director-
General and Deputy Directors-General; and
• to guide continuing cooperation between the GATT and the interna-
tional financial institutions.53
In its proposal, the United States suggested creating a management board that
would possess delegated authority to take decisions, engage in agenda setting,
and carry out general administrative tasks. This proposal, however, was not
received positively by other Uruguay Round participants, mainly because of con-
cerns about the limited membership of the proposed management board and
its broad functions.
Today, looking at the list of functions of the management board proposed
by the United States in 1990, we are reminded of the recent history of the WTO,
including difficulties with the preparation of ministerial conferences and with
the launching of the Doha Round, as well as the long stalemate and paralysis
that occurred in the selection of a Director-General to replace Renato Ruggiero
in 1999.
Diversification of the membership and the growing number of different
informal groupings for seeking consensus in the WTO demonstrate the need
for a management board or an executive body of some type in the Organiza-
tion. While informal meetings, Green Room meetings, and consultations may
contribute, in the end, to positive outcomes, problems still exist with the lack
of transparency and legitimacy, especially for those Members that are not
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included in the small group meetings. The Doha Ministerial Declaration notes
Members’ recognition of the challenges resulting from the expanding member-
ship and confirms the ‘collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency
and the effective participation of all Members’.54
The idea of a management board has been around since 1947 and contin-
ues to be the subject of vigorous debate. While some commentators believe
that there is an urgent need for establishment of such a body,55 others
consider it unnecessary or even dangerous.56
The idea of a management board or a senior officials’ consultative body
resurfaced again recently as one of the recommendations in the Sutherland
Report. It recommended the establishment of a senior officials’ consultative
body whose main functions would be to discuss political and economic 
matters, provide some political guidance, and facilitate the transition of nego-
tiations taking place in the WTO to the Ministerial Conference.57 Importantly,
it would not be vested with executive or negotiating powers. It would be an 
advisory body to the Director-General without real decision-making power
or authority. The consultative body would consist of a maximum of 30 mem-
bers, who would be capital-based representatives at the level of senior officials
or ministers or both. Some Members (major trading nations) would partici-
pate in the work of the consultative body on a permanent basis, while others
would rotate in a manner similar to the procedure used in the executive boards
of the IMF and World Bank. The consultative body, chaired by the Director-
General, would meet two to four times per year, and the Director-General
would report the results of these meetings to all Members.58
The Sutherland Report stressed that the combination of frequency of meet-
ings and participation by countries on a rotating basis should provide the oppor-
tunity for all Members to be represented in the consultative body. When
necessary, the consultative body would meet wholly or partially at ministerial
meetings. Moreover, the Sutherland Report does not exclude the possibility that
the consultative body, if represented at the level of ministers, could replace infor-
mal ‘mini-ministerial’ meetings in the WTO. While the Sutherland Report would
formalize some senior officials’ groups, such as the Evian Group, it would not
go so far as to establish a formal limited-membership decision-making and pri-
ority-setting body similar to the executive boards of the IMF and the World
Bank or as contemplated by the U.S. proposal in the Uruguay Round.59
Richard Blackhurst suggests that a formal consultative body with manage-
ment and decision-making powers is needed in the WTO to deal with what he
characterizes as the ‘Green Room’ problem. He recommends a consultative
body that would be a steering committee with 24 members and considers that
the largest trading nations would have individual seats with the remaining
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Members being divided into groups. Each of these groups would have one seat
that would be rotated among the members of the group. Participants would be
Geneva-based ambassadors, rather than senior officials from capitals. Meetings of
the consultative body would take place only in situations in which the Green Room
could not accommodate all Members wishing to participate in the debate. Impor-
tantly, in contrast with the World Bank and IMF executive boards, a WTO consul-
tative body would not have authority to take decisions that bind all Members, but
it would have powers to consult, debate, and negotiate. The consultative body
would prepare recommendations and present them to Members for approval.60
A different vision of a management body has been promoted by Matsushita,
Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis. They suggest establishing an executive body of
the General Council that would have the authority to make decisions. This
executive body would comprise permanent members and members who would
serve fixed terms on a rotational basis. Selection of the members of the exec-
utive body would be based on objective criteria such as countries’ level of gross
domestic product, share of world trade, and population. In addition, other
criteria may be used in to order to ensure appropriate representation of devel-
oping countries and geographical balance. This system would provide every
Member with an opportunity to be on the executive body.61
What role should a management board play in the WTO? What responsi-
bilities should the Ministerial Conference or General Council delegate to a
management board? How would it be composed, ensuring representation by
all Members as well as accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency? 
The WTO would benefit most from a management board vested with con-
sultative, executive, and supervisory functions, similar to the executive board
contemplated in the Havana Charter and, to a lesser extent,62 the proposal of
the United States in the Uruguay Round. It would be accountable to the Gen-
eral Council and give instructions to the Director-General. Key principles of
good governance should be foremost in its design and functioning. In partic-
ular, such a board must be representative, accountable, and transparent in its
responsibilities and relations with Members as well as efficient, effective, and
transparent in its decision-making functions.
The difficulties encountered by Members in finding mutually acceptable
solutions in the Doha Development Round indicate that there is a need for a
formal, limited-membership management board that could contribute to find-
ing compromise positions in negotiations. A management board would also be
useful when WTO councils or committees fail to achieve consensus on specific
proposals. In addition, there is a need for a board that could engage in strategic
thinking and help to set priorities to further the mandate of the Organization.
The General Council could request the management board to consider specific
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issues and propose potential solutions. The management board could seek the
advice of the Director-General, the Secretariat, and the Members. At the same
time, the management board should be able, on its own initiative, to submit
advice or make recommendations to the General Council on international
economic and trade matters.
The direct involvement of all Members in dealing with administrative mat-
ters that relate to the internal functioning of the WTO (for example, budget and
planning for meetings) is time-consuming, ineffective, and inefficient. A man-
agement board could potentially supervise and work with the Secretariat through
the approval and monitoring of administrative guidelines governing staff, intro-
duction and maintenance of an accountability framework for the Director-
General and the Secretariat staff, control over expenditure of funds, and adop-
tion of rules concerning preparation by the Secretariat for ministerial conferences.
It could also have responsibilities for setting priorities and general direction for
the WTO, for example, by setting agendas for ministerial conferences, develop-
ing priorities for future negotiations, and assisting in the process of selecting
Directors-General, Deputy Directors-General, and Appellate Body Members.
In addition, the General Council could vest the management board with
other responsibilities as it deems appropriate. Importantly, the management
board should have decision-making powers on matters that fall within its com-
petence. In order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, its functions should
be clearly defined, and overlap in responsibilities with other WTO councils
and committees should be avoided to the greatest extent possible.
Composition of the management board would be the most difficult hur-
dle in establishing such a body. There are two major challenges: (1) determin-
ing the number of members on the board; and (2) designing the selection
process. The principles of good governance should be taken into account in
designing such a board. On the one hand, a smaller board would likely be more
effective and efficient in taking decisions and setting priorities than a larger
board.63 On the other hand, a larger board would be more accountable and rep-
resentative of the Members. The executive boards of the IMF, the World Bank,
the World Health Organization, and the United Nations Development Pro-
gram have 24, 24, 34, and 32 members respectively. Membership of a WTO
management board could be in the range of 25 to 30 members. Although it
would be difficult to decide how members should be selected to serve on this
body, a mechanism could be developed that does take into account the unique
history and experience of the WTO, rather than following any particular model.
The General Council should select management board members, and qual-
ification requirements such as knowledge and expertise in trade policy matters
should be a prerequisite. In the formula for the selection process for potential
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members of the management board, a number of principles could be taken into
account, including but not limited to equitable geographic representation, rep-
resentation of different levels of economic development, share of world trade,
and regional integration. Existing informal regional groups in the WTO could
be formalized and given official representatives on the board. At the same time,
representatives sitting on the board would be accountable to specific groups
within the Organization. In that way, formal accountability structures could be
established vis-à-vis the membership. Most importantly, a rotational scheme
would need to be devised so that all WTO Members could have an opportu-
nity to serve on the board at some point. Openness and transparency in all its
functions and activities would be required to ensure representativeness and
accountability to all the Members.
Establishment of a management board would be an important step toward
more effective, efficient, and transparent governance of the WTO. Such a board
could serve a number of useful functions, including supervising the general
administration of the budget and the Secretariat, planning for ministerial 
conferences and important meetings, agenda setting for future negotiations, and
assistance in the selection of Directors-General, Deputy Directors-General,
and Appellate Body Members.
B. Roles of the Director-General and the Secretariat
The roles of the Director-General and the Secretariat are central to the effec-
tive and efficient functioning of any international organization. One of the
mantras of Members is that the WTO is a ‘member-driven’ organization. How-
ever, as Professor Jackson has noted, this is also one of the reasons that the
WTO has not always been efficient and effective, especially in its negotiation
and rule-making functions.64 The Sutherland Report notes that while the Sec-
retariat continues to be highly regarded, ‘the mutual confidence between del-
egations and WTO staff has been less obvious than in the past’.65 Moreover,
Members view the Secretariat’s role as exclusively one of support for the Mem-
bers, and the Members do not usually welcome any demonstration of initia-
tive on the part of the Secretariat.66
The Sutherland Report recognizes the importance of enhancing the role of
the Director-General and giving the Secretariat the authority to defend the
multilateral trading system and to promote its principles. It emphasizes that
[t]he WTO needs a convincing and persistent institutional voice of its own. If
Members are not prepared to defend and promote the principles they subscribe
to, then the Secretariat must be free to do so. Indeed, it should be encouraged,
even required, to do so.67
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The report also stresses that ‘the membership should also encourage and
stimulate a greater intellectual output from the Secretariat’.68 It calls for the
Secretariat to take more of a lead on policy issues and in communicating 
the WTO’s message to the public.69
The Sutherland Report also advocates that only the best-qualified candi-
dates with technical competence and experience should be considered for the
post of the Director-General. It also suggests that the ‘powers and duties’ of the
Director-General be specifically defined, based on the advice of former Direc-
tors-General.70 Depending on the roles of the Director-General and the Secre-
tariat, the report suggests that proper adjustments may be necessary regarding
the number of Deputy Directors-General and the allocation of their responsi-
bilities. For example, if the Secretariat’s role is passive and the Director-General
is heavily engaged in regular contact with politicians in capitals, then it may be
appropriate to appoint a single deputy as a chief executive officer. If the approach
is the opposite, then more deputies (two or three) may be necessary.71
It is vitally important to strengthen the role and authority of the Director-
General and the Secretariat in the WTO. Unlike the secretariats of other inter-
national organizations, the WTO Secretariat has had limited capacity and
authority to conduct independent research and to make policy proposals to the
Members. It is interesting to compare the OECD Secretariat (30 members;
annual 340 million Euros budget; 2,500 staff, including about 700 economists,
lawyers, and other professionals who provide analysis and research) with the
WTO Secretariat (153 Members, 185 million Swiss Francs budget, 625 staff).72
Only recently have WTO Secretariat staff been allowed to put their names on
research papers or to publish independent analytical work. Compared with
other international organizations, WTO Members do not encourage serious
analytical research and do not generally welcome policy ideas or initiatives
from the Secretariat.
WTO Members should encourage and welcome serious research and policy
advice, including proposals for negotiations, from the high-quality Secretariat
staff. As recommended by the Sutherland Report, the Secretariat should also
be encouraged to be the public voice of the WTO to the outside world. How-
ever, Members also have an important responsibility to educate and convince
their publics of the virtues and values of the multilateral trading system. Steve
Charnovitz argues that ‘[s]elling the benefits of the WTO should be the role of
elected officials, cabinet ministers, advocacy organizations, journalists, educa-
tors, etc., not the role of international civil servants’.73
The WTO Secretariat is probably the leanest secretariat of any international
organization, certainly when one takes into consideration the broad respon-
sibilities and functions of the Organization. The total number of Secretariat staff
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is now approximately 625, which is an insignificant increase from the former
GATT Secretariat, which had approximately 500 staff. The number of agree-
ments administered by the Secretariat in the WTO is much larger than those
administered under the GATT regime, and the WTO agreements delve far
more extensively into areas of domestic regulation than the GATT system did.
Moreover, the Secretariat has serviced over 365 disputes that have been brought
to the WTO since 1995 and has devoted major resources to providing techni-
cal assistance and training for developing and least developed countries. It has
accomplished all of this with one of the smallest budgets of any international
organization. As Sylvia Ostry has emphasized, the WTO is ‘a Mercedes Benz
without gas’.74
WTO Members clearly need to put gas into the Mercedes, and maybe even
buy a newer model than the 1947 edition created for the GATT. More formal
powers and responsibilities should be given to the Director-General, includ-
ing authority to make proposals to the management board and General Coun-
cil. In order to support the Director-General effectively, the budget and authority
of the Secretariat should be enhanced to reflect the tremendous responsibili-
ties and excellent work the Secretariat carries out.
C. Parliamentary Dimension
The WTO is an intergovernmental organization that is driven by its member
governments. To enhance the legitimacy and accountability of the WTO, there
is a need to establish a parliamentary dimension to the WTO. Clearly, parlia-
ments and legislatures have an important oversight role to play in the national
processes of developing negotiating positions as well as approving new inter-
national rules. Often, the WTO has been criticized for its lack of transparency
and accountability to civil society.75 However, it is parliamentarians who are the
elected and legitimate representatives of their citizens. In order to enhance
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the WTO, it would be wise to
develop a formal parliamentary dimension to the Organization as well as to pro-
vide more structured, open relationships with non-governmental organiza-
tions and civil society.
Parliamentarians also have a major role in helping their constituents to better
understand the work of the WTO, building confidence and support among
domestic constituencies for the WTO, and bringing the concerns of their elec-
torates to the WTO. Julio Lacarte, former chair of the WTO Appellate Body and
chair of the institutional negotiations in the Uruguay Round has emphasized,
‘There is considerable lack of knowledge of the WTO in many parliaments, and
this works to the detriment of the Organization.’76 It is imperative, therefore,
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to maintain and further develop liaisons between the WTO and parliaments,
and to assist parliamentarians in enhancing their awareness and deepening
their understanding of the mandate, objectives, and benefits of the WTO.
The parliamentary dimension is addressed in the Sutherland Report. It
notes that while this issue is under debate, there is no common position among
Members in respect of inter-parliamentary meetings in the WTO. While the
European Union supports the idea of conducting such meetings, the United
States and some developing countries oppose it. On the basis of these obser-
vations, the Sutherland Report makes two recommendations: (1) Members
should promote transparency toward their parliamentarians at home; and 
(2) Parliamentarians should be able to adequately reflect the aim, objectives,
and results of WTO negotiations to their constituencies.77
The Sutherland Report’s modest discussion of the parliamentary dimen-
sion of the WTO is disappointing. Steve Charnovitz views it as a ‘missed oppor-
tunity’ either to ‘debunk’ the opposition to the idea of a parliamentary assembly
for the WTO or ‘to present a coherent argument against parliamentary involve-
ment’.78 The report does neither of these things.79 Unlike non-governmental
organizations, parliaments are duly elected by the citizens of their countries and
therefore should be viewed as having a legitimate and authoritative voice in
WTO affairs.
While the idea of inter-parliamentary meetings in the WTO is still under
discussion among Members, the reality is that a parliamentary dimension to
the WTO is emerging incrementally through the actions of parliaments of
some of its Members. Inspired by the ideas and efforts of William V. Roth (U.S.
Senate Finance Committee) and Carlos Westendorp Y Cabeza (head of the
Commission for Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, European Par-
liament), the first formal meeting of parliamentarians was held in conjunc-
tion with the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999. This group called
for the ‘establishment of a Standing Body of Parliamentarians whereby mem-
bers of parliaments can exchange views, be informed and monitor WTO nego-
tiations and activities’.80 The European Parliament supported this initiative:
first, in November 1999 and in October 2001, it adopted resolutions with
respect to the establishment of a WTO parliamentary assembly with consul-
tative power to achieve greater democratic accountability.81
A global parliamentary meeting on international trade took place on 8 and
9 June 2001 in Geneva. The Inter-Parliamentary Union organized it as part of
its activities to provide a parliamentary dimension to international coopera-
tion. This parliamentary meeting brought together 182 participants from 
71 national parliaments.82 In the Final Declaration of that meeting, the 
parliamentarians highlighted the necessity ‘to intensify activities in national
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parliaments to oversee and influence government policy in relation to trade
negotiations’ and ‘to build a parliamentary dimension to international 
trade negotiations and arrangements’.83 Significantly, in his speech to that meet-
ing, then WTO Director-General Mike Moore welcomed and supported the
initiative. He emphasized:
This meeting is an important opportunity for members of parliament to com-
mence bridging the gap between the institution like the WTO, which you own
and fund, and the people. You have the responsibility in your respective parliaments
to act as a relay between the government and the people, and to provide necessary
political oversight. To do this, parliamentarians and legislators need to know about
the institution they own.… I believe that your involvement can help us promote
greater openness, fairness, balance and predictability in international trade.84
The next parliamentary meeting, which was jointly organized by the European
Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, took place on 11 November
2001 in Doha, Qatar, on the margins of the fourth WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence. More than 100 parliamentarians attended this meeting and discussed
possible ways to organize and develop a parliamentary dimension to the WTO.85
Some legislators favoured a standing body of parliamentarians (formally linked
to the WTO or existing separately), while others supported a parliamentary
dimension for the WTO through the Inter-Parliamentary Union.86 Agreement
was found in a decision to create a steering group that would present options.87
Parliamentarians also called on governments to include in the final declaration
of the Ministerial Conference the following paragraph: ‘Transparency of the
WTO should be strengthened by associating Parliaments more closely with
the activities of the WTO.’88 However, this wording was not included in the
Ministerial Declaration.
After that meeting, the Post-Doha Steering Committee was established,
composed of parliamentarians from 22 countries and officials from 4 interna-
tional organizations.89 The Steering Committee met in May and October of
2002 in order to prepare for a parliamentary conference on 17–18 February 2003
in Geneva. This conference brought together more than 500 parliamentarians
from 77 countries to discuss multilateral trade issues. During that meeting,
legislators stressed the importance of the parliamentary dimension to the WTO
and decided to hold a parliamentary conference on the WTO once a year and
on the occasion of every WTO Ministerial Conference.90
Parliamentarians agreed that the purpose of these conferences would be ‘to
oversee and promote the effectiveness of WTO activities; maintain dialogue with
governmental negotiators and civil society; and facilitate information exchange,
sharing of experiences and capacity-building for national parliaments in matters
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of international trade, in particular, concerning the WTO, and to exert influ-
ence on the direction of discussions within the WTO’.91
The next Parliamentary Conference on the WTO took place on 9 and 12
September 2003 in Cancún at the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference. It was
organized jointly by the European Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union in cooperation with the Mexican Congress. More than 320 legislators
from 70 countries and 5 regional parliamentary assemblies attended the Par-
liamentary Conference. Importantly, the attention of parliamentarians was
focused not only on organizational issues, but on some of the key topics of
the Doha Round (agriculture negotiations, TRIPS, trade in services).92
In 2004, the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO was held from 24 to
26 November in Brussels. Three hundred parliamentarians attended this ses-
sion from nearly 80 countries. Participants obtained first-hand information on
recent developments in the Doha Round and exchanged views on possible 
parliamentary input to move the negotiation process forward. During this
conference, parliamentarians approved the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamen-
tary Conference on the WTO93 and adopted a declaration in which they ‘urge[d]
governments and parliaments to engage in a regular dialogue so that the lat-
ter can effectively exercise parliamentary oversight of the international trade
negotiations and their follow-up’.94
From 2005 to 2008, parliamentary conferences on the WTO took place in
December 2005 in Hong Kong, China (at the WTO Ministerial Conference),95
in December 2006,96 and in September 2008 in Geneva.97 The documents from
these meetings demonstrate parliamentarians’ ongoing interest and commit-
ment to the multilateral trading system as well as their intention to play a 
significant role in overseeing WTO activities and government actions in the field
of international trade. Moreover, parliamentarians noted that ‘[m]ore than
ever, the WTO is faced with organizational and institutional challenges. Before
long, it will need to engage in institutional reform aimed at improving its func-
tioning, and enhancing its accountability and democratic legitimacy’.98
This historical chain of events demonstrates the growing movement toward
involvement in the WTO initiated by parliamentarians themselves, aided and
abetted by the European Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Indeed,
the overwhelming success of the Parliamentary Conferences on the WTO
reflects the great interest of parliamentarians in the work of the WTO, as well
as the need for an international forum that will provide legislators from 
different countries with an opportunity to exchange views and contribute to
WTO decision-making. Adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamen-
tary Conference on the WTO represents a step toward a regulatory framework
for this movement.
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The WTO, through successive Directors-General, has also taken important
steps in building relationships with parliamentarians. Recent Directors-
General of the WTO (Renato Ruggiero, Mike Moore, and Supachai Panitch-
pakdi) as well as current Director-General, Pascal Lamy, have promoted 
relationships between parliamentarians and the WTO and have reached out to
organize meetings and workshops jointly with parliamentary groups and asso-
ciations. Among the initiatives that have been undertaken by the WTO are
publication of WTO Policy Issues for Parliamentarians: A Guide to Current Trade
Issues for Legislators; 99 discussions on parliaments and the WTO that took place
at the WTO Public Symposium ‘Challenges Ahead on the Road to Cancun’ on
17 June 2003; and regional and national workshops jointly presented by the
WTO and parliamentary associations.100 Moreover, as a member of the Steer-
ing Committee of the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, the WTO 
Secretariat is directly involved in the preparation of its conferences and brief-
ing its meetings. It is interesting to note the view of the 12th session of the
Conference Steering Committee held on 22–23 June 2006:
We observe that government negotiators and WTO officials alike show signs of
growing openness to the idea of using the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO
as a de facto parliamentary dimension of this important intergovernmental body.
With the constructive engagement of all parties, achievement of this objective de
jure should also be within reach.101
The time has come to build on the experience of the Parliamentary Conference
of the WTO, formalize already established relationships between the WTO and
parliamentarians, and bring the parliamentary dimension under the frame-
work of the WTO by creating a standing body of parliamentarians formally
linked to the WTO.
The main goal of this body would be to provide parliamentarians with a forum
in which they would be able to present their views and to have them considered.
Such a forum will allow legislators from different countries to exchange views,
information, and experience and build capacity in parliaments in the field of inter-
national trade; to improve dialogue between governments, parliaments, and civil
society; to facilitate parliamentary and civil society awareness on trade issues and
the interconnection between trade and sustainable development; to be informed
first-hand about negotiations taking place in the WTO and to provide the WTO
and its Members with an indication of collective parliamentary opinion.
The administrative and financial implications of the creation of a WTO
parliamentary conference are serious concerns. The External Relations Divi-
sion in the WTO Secretariat, which is currently responsible for relationships
with parliamentarians, civil society, and international organizations, is very
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small,102 and its budget does not provide the necessary resources for hosting
regular meetings of a parliamentary conference.103 Therefore the human and
financial resources needed for the WTO to perform this task would have to be
assessed. A parliamentary conference could be organized with the help of ad
hoc financial support and contributions from some WTO Members (as in case
of the Annual Public Symposium that is funded from extra-budgetary
sources),104 although more secure funding to ensure continuation of outreach
meetings with parliamentarians would be desirable. Members could also estab-
lish it by means of a new international agreement, along the lines of the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law.
When considering the anticipated operational costs of a parliamentary
conference, one should consider the tangible benefits from the establishment
of a formal relationship between the WTO and parliamentarians. A formal
mechanism would enhance dialogue and increase transparency and account-
ability, thereby improving decision-making effectiveness and efficiency and
strengthening overall governance in the WTO. A parliamentary body could
act as an appropriate, legitimate interface mechanism between the WTO and
civil society, NGOs, and other stakeholder groups. It could also assist in build-
ing greater public understanding and support for the multilateral trading 
system while at the same time conveying the views and interests of its 
constituents to the WTO.
D. Involvement of Non-State Stakeholders
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the WTO has increased
over the past decade. The Sutherland Report highlights the expanding role of
civil society in promoting more transparent and inclusive global governance,
together with the need for a more interactive and effective partnership between
state and non-state actors. Such partnerships demonstrate different dimensions.
One dimension has been the tension arising from demands of civil society for
more substantive participation, governments’ irritation about invasion in the
fields of governmental responsibilities, and the challenges of international organ-
izations in adjusting their operations to new realities.Another dimension has been
the benefits of NGO involvement, including improving public awareness105 of
the importance of trade and its relationship with sustainable development,
and the development of additional knowledge and expertise on trade issues.106
The Sutherland Report notes that the WTO has enjoyed noticeable progress
in building relationships with civil society and working with non-governmental
organizations.107 The General Council adopted special guidelines for the 
development of communications and improvement of transparency in 1996.108
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A decision on expedited de-restriction of WTO documents was taken in 2002.109
WTO documents and explanatory materials are now easily accessible on the
website of the Organization. The Director-General and the WTO Secretariat
meet on a regular basis with representatives of civil society. Civil society groups
and non-governmental organizations may attend plenary sessions of the Min-
isterial Conferences and public symposiums as well as communicate via online
forums on the WTO website.110
The Sutherland Report stresses that it is important for the WTO to review
its relationships with NGOs. At the same time, it mentions that there are lim-
its to such cooperation. For example, an initiative of NGOs to set up a system
of accreditation within the WTO was not approved. The WTO has established,
on an ad hoc basis, a registration system for participation in ministerial con-
ferences and public forums. The WTO also does not allow NGOs to participate
in meetings as ‘observers’, contrary to the practice of several other interna-
tional organizations.111
The issue of direct participation of non-governmental organizations 
in decision-making and meetings in the WTO has been considered, but the
Sutherland Report states that many governments believe that this is not in
keeping with the character of intergovernmental organizations, including the
WTO. The report notes, however, that it is in the interests of both the WTO and
individual Members to increase transparency and relationships with civil soci-
ety. It emphasizes that the primary responsibility lies with individual WTO
Members to communicate with their domestic constituencies, including NGOs
and civil society groups.112 On the other hand, the WTO may benefit from
additional knowledge and expertise from different stakeholders. Moreover,
civil society organizations may be helpful in their ability to influence govern-
ment positions in negotiations and facilitate implementation of accepted 
obligations, and this aspect should be taken into account.113
As a result of these observations, the Sutherland Report recommends periodic
review of the situation with transparency in the Organization and considera-
tion of whether it will be useful to fill the gaps and adopt a framework for
reviewing relationships of the WTO and non-governmental organizations and
civil society based on several principles:
• Members have primary responsibility for engaging with civil society;
• Members should develop a set of clear objectives for the relationship of
the WTO Secretariat with civil society and the public (the dialogue should
be constructive on both sides and mutually reinforcing); and
• The necessity of identifying the administrative capacity and financial
resources that are needed to support further enhancing external trans-
parency with regard to civil society.114
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The idea of developing more formal mechanisms for receiving input from
non-state stakeholders in the WTO should be explored.115 In particular, there
should be a forum for business and consumer organizations in the WTO as they
are key stakeholders in the multilateral trading system. If coherence of inter-
national economic policies is ever to be achieved or encouraged with the other
international organizations, it must be recognized that more formal mechanisms
for cooperation and participation in meetings must be established for other
international organizations to have input into the WTO. Moreover, the WTO
should open up more meetings to ‘observers’ as a first step in increasing the
openness of meetings to stakeholders and the public.
Other international organizations, such as the International Labour Orga-
nization, have included representatives of the private sector and unions in their
meetings and deliberations acknowledging their important role as stakehold-
ers in their systems. In the 1947–48 negotiations that led to the Havana Char-
ter and the GATT, representatives of business organizations and unions
participated in the meetings.
Comparative analysis of the practice of other international organizations
in this respect would be very helpful. The experience of the World Bank in its
relationships with NGOs and, in particular, the formation and experience of
the World Bank Inspection Panel should be examined to see if there are any use-
ful lessons or models for the WTO.
V. Conclusion
The premise of this chapter is that institutional reform of the decision-making
and rule-making processes of the WTO is needed, especially if the WTO is to
equip itself for the challenges of the future. Some of the academic commen-
tary to date on the political side of the WTO takes the position that major
reform is not needed, that it is working as a government-to-government organ-
ization as it should, and that any reform, especially of the consensus principle,
could lead to even greater disenfranchisement of the developing countries.
Some commentators believe that major institutional reform is needed and
focus, in particular, on the consensus principle as causing paralysis and stale-
mate in the system.
The major problem with rule-making and decision-making in the WTO is
not the consensus rule or the decision-making rules in the WTO Agreement.
It is not the final phase of adoption of a legislative proposal that causes 
the delays and blockage in the WTO system but rather the lack of formal 
mechanisms at the initial and intermediate stages of the legislative or rule-
making process and the absence of a management or executive body, analogous
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to the executive boards of the IMF and World Bank, that leads to the lack of
direction and drift in the Organization.
It is time to establish a formal, limited-membership management board
within the WTO. Such a board should be specifically designed to be represen-
tative of the membership of the WTO, as well as accountable and effective.
With a rotational, representative system for selecting members and trans-
parency mechanisms built in, a management board could improve signifi-
cantly the effectiveness of WTO decision-making.
It is also clear that the roles of the Director-General and the Secretariat of
the WTO should be enhanced. In particular, the Secretariat should be permit-
ted and encouraged to take a more proactive role in conducting research and
developing proposals for negotiations and rule-making, and the mandate and
powers of the Director-General should be formally delineated. The knowledge
and technical capacity of the Secretariat should be effectively used and wel-
comed by Members, as the Secretariat could play a much stronger research
and policy development role in negotiations and rule-making.
The WTO has been criticized for its lack of transparency and accountability
vis-à-vis NGOs and civil society. Developing a parliamentary dimension to
the WTO would go a long way to remedying these deficiencies. Parliaments play
an important oversight role before, during, and after negotiations have taken
place. Moreover, they are an important link to the domestic constituencies
that are stakeholders in a well-functioning WTO system. In order to do their
job effectively, parliamentarians need to be informed about the objectives,
rules, and procedures of the WTO. The time has come for the idea of a parlia-
mentary dimension to the WTO to be seriously considered.
Finally, the idea of developing more formal mechanisms for receiving input
from non-state stakeholders, with an emphasis on business and consumer
groups, should be fully explored. In the 1947–48 negotiations that led to the
GATT, business organizations, labour unions, and consumer groups had seats
in the meetings. They also participate in meetings and decision-making
processes of some international organizations, such as the International Labour
Organization. Formal relationships need to be built between the WTO and
key stakeholders, such as business and consumer interests.
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the problems with the
antiquated machinery of the Bretton Woods system. As originally conceived,
there were to be three international organizations responsible for the regula-
tion of the international economy. It is clear that the institutions that emerged
from the post–World War II era—the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT
(later the WTO)—were created for a very different time and purpose. The
three organizations need to be significantly reformed if they are to remain rel-
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evant in the rapidly changing global economy. The WTO is one of these key
organizations. Coherence of international economic policies remains a pri-
mary goal of the multilateral system, therefore, more effective, clear, coopera-
tive arrangements between the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank must be
established. The global financial crisis offers a unique opportunity for world
leaders to redesign and revitalize the international economic organizations,
including the WTO, to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
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From the Periphery to the Centre? 
The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on 
Transparency and Good Governance
PADIDEH ALA’I*
1. Introduction
This chapter traces the jurisprudence of Article X of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994.1 Article X is significant because it ‘goes to
the heart of a country’s legal infrastructure, and more precisely to the nature
and enforcement of its administrative law regime’.2 Article X was proposed by
the United States in 1947 and was influenced by the contemporaneous enact-
ment of the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act (APA).3 Article X requires that
trade-related measures be promptly published; administered in a uniform,
impartial, and reasonable manner; and provide for independent review of
administrative action that relates to customs matters.
During the GATT 1947 years,4 Article X was a silent provision dismissed by
panels as ‘subsidiary’ to other ‘substantive’ GATT provisions. Since the creation
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Article X has emerged from obscurity
and has developed into a provision of fundamental importance as the embod-
iment of the principles of transparency and due process.5 The relative prominence
of Article X in trade disputes in the WTO is a manifestation of the emerging
role of the WTO as a global (supranational) regulatory body.6 The increased
emphasis on Article X also highlights the potential role for the WTO in promot-
ing ‘good governance’ norms in both the transnational and domestic context.7
This chapter will show that WTO Members are increasingly relying on
good governance principles, such as transparency and due process in dispute
settlement proceedings. These good governance principles, as embodied in
Article X, are most often invoked in connection with contentious trade issues,
including the administration of anti-dumping or countervailing measures by
the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC).
The growing centrality of Article X also reflects (1) an emerging global
consensus regarding good governance values such as transparency, access to
information, and participation, which must inform both domestic and global
administrative systems; (2) the evolution of the GATT from a system based
on tariffs, reciprocal bargaining, and exchange of concessions to one concerned
with rule-making; and (3) an attempt by the dispute settlement system to
accommodate the emerging role of the WTO as a rule-making body by enforc-
ing its good governance mandate in a manner that avoids political controversy
and charges of overreaching by the Members. For example, as discussed below,
a panel may expansively interpret a provision of Article X, but then either
refuse to address the Article X claim in the name of judicial economy or find
that the measure in question does not in fact violate Article X requirements of
transparency or due process.8
This chapter will first define terms and explore the roots and scope of
Article X of GATT 1994. It will then discuss the application of Article X dur-
ing the GATT 1947 years (1947 to 1994) when, after being a dormant provi-
sion for almost 40 years, it was dismissed in the 1980s and early 1990s as merely
subsidiary to the more ‘substantive’ obligations contained in GATT 1947.
It will then explore the impact of WTO jurisprudence on the scope and appli-
cation of Article X’s requirements of transparency and due process by analyz-
ing the interpretation and application of Article X by the WTO panels and the
Appellate Body from 1995 to the present. This chapter will then review the
most prominent Article X cases brought under the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),9 culminating with
European Communities—Selected Customs Matters (EC—Selected Customs Mat-
ters), in which all of the claims were based on alleged violations of Article X.10
Finally, this chapter will make some observations about the importance of
acknowledging the WTO’s good governance mandate as we embark on reform-
ing our international economic institutions in light of the current global 
economic crisis.
II. History of Article X of GATT 1994
Article X was initially proposed by the United States as Article 15 of the draft
Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO),11 which was subse-
quently adopted by the GATT 1947 Contracting Parties. At the time of its adop-
tion, no other country expressed an interest in Article X, and it was adopted
without any discussion or amendment. The proposed text of Article X 
generally followed the text of the APA, which was enacted in 1946.12 At the
time of its adoption, the Contracting Parties viewed Article X as creating no
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new obligations.13 The text of Article X of GATT 1947 (which remains
unchanged under GATT 1994) states:
(1) Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of gen-
eral application … pertaining to the classification or the valuation of
products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges,
or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports,
or on the transfer or payments therefore, or affecting their sale, distri-
bution, transportation … or other use shall be published promptly in
such manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted
with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy … shall also
be published….
(2) No measure of general application … effecting an advance in a rate of
duty … or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restric-
tion or prohibition on imports … shall be enforced before such meas-
ure has been officially published.
(3) (a) Each [Member] shall administer in a uniform, impartial and rea-
sonable manner all its law, regulations, decisions and rulings of the
kind described in paragraph 1….
(b) Each [Member] shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable,
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the
purpose … of the prompt review and correction of administra-
tive action relating to custom matters…. Such tribunals or proce-
dures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with
administrative enforcement….14
It has been argued that the motivation of the United States for proposing 
Article X was to level the playing field for U.S. traders who faced opaque and
informal administrative structures in other countries, while U.S. administrative
processes had been made more transparent with the enactment of the APA.15
Article X may have been intended to assist U.S. exporters in the post–World War
II world, but its provisions may also be interpreted as expressing the values that
led to the enactment of the APA, such as imposing limitations on the exercise of
executive discretion through transparency and due process.16
From 1947 to 1984 there was no mention of Article X in any adopted GATT panel
decisions.17 By the mid-1980s, faced with diminished competitiveness, the United
States became increasingly concerned about the proliferation of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs), including non-transparent and ad hoc administration of customs regula-
tions.18 Early GATT 1947 cases involving Article X were filed by the United States
in respect of Japan’s non-transparent administration of import quota systems and
the extensive use of the informal system of ‘administrative guidance’ by Japan.19
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III. Article X and the GATT 1947
Article X was mentioned in only nine adopted GATT 1947 panel decisions.20
The United States was involved in all of these cases: six as complainant,21 one
as respondent,22 and two as interested third party.23 A review of these reports
shows that, although the United States and other Contracting Parties to the
GATT 1947 recognized that the administration of a measure could give rise to
a claim, they preferred to address a measure as being inconsistent with more
‘substantive’ provisions, such as Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947.24 Article XI:1
of the GATT 1947 prohibits quotas, import or export licences, or any other
measure that in any manner restricts trade. The term ‘other measure’ can be
interpreted broadly to cover a seemingly endless list of NTBs, including inter
alia import licensing requirements, anti-dumping measures, and health and
safety regulations. The breadth of the Article XI:1 obligation allowed GATT pan-
els to find any measure inconsistent with the GATT 1947 without having to refer
to the ‘administrative’ or ‘subordinate’ claim of Article X.
Three of the nine adopted GATT 1947 cases involving Article X were
brought by either the United States or the European Communities (EC) 
(formerly the European Economic Community) against Japan.25 At issue in
those three cases was the level of transparency required under Article X.26 In
Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (Japan—Leather II [US]), the United
States challenged the administration of the Japanese quota system on imported
leather.27 The United States argued that the Japanese import leather quota 
system violated Articles X:1 and X:3 of the GATT 1947 because Japan had
failed to publish the total import quotas and certain administrative rulings
related to them.28 Of particular concern was the fact that in administering the
leather quotas, Japan had allocated licences so as to channel import trade
through Japanese producers and distributors. The United States argued that
Japanese producers had ‘no incentive to fully utilize the quota amounts 
allocated to them.’29 The panel ruled that the Japanese quota system was in
violation of Article XI:1 and did not need to address the Article X issue.30
The second case involving Article X, Japan—Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Agricultural Products (Japan—Agricultural Products I), was decided in
1988. In that dispute, the United States argued that the Japanese quota system
for certain agricultural products, in addition to violating Article XI:1, also vio-
lated Articles X:1 and X:3. The United States alleged that, in administering the
agricultural quota system, Japan had failed to ‘publish adequate and timely
information on quota volume or value’ contrary to Article X:1, which consti-
tuted an unreasonable administration of the import quota system in violation
of Article X:3 (a).31 Japan responded that there was no requirement to publish
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information beyond the total amount of the quota to be issued and criteria
for application. Japan further argued that any additional disclosure of infor-
mation as to the identity of the quota holders and other related information
was not acceptable as it would only ‘cause unnecessary confusion’ and induce
‘anti-competitive intervention among importers.’32 The panel found Japan’s
import quota restrictions inconsistent with Article XI:1 and declined to rule
on the Article X claims.33
Finally, in Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors (Japan—Semi-Conductors),34
the EC invoked Article X in connection with the Third Country Monitoring
System that was created by Japan pursuant to a voluntary export restraint
arrangement with the United States. At issue was the use of ‘administrative
guidance’ by Japan in implementing the monitoring system, which recorded
both the cost and sale prices of semi-conductors that were exported to Europe
and ‘encouraged’ Japanese exporters not to dump in the European market.35
Although the panel decided that the case did not warrant a decision on the
Article X claim, it did recognize the important role ‘administrative guidance’
played in the promotion and enforcement of governmental policy in Japan.36
The panel, citing Japan—Agricultural Products I, stated that ‘the practice of
administrative guidance … was a traditional tool of Japanese government pol-
icy based on consensus and peer pressure,’37 implying that the workings of
Japan’s system of administrative guidance was not meant to be transparent.
Detailed discussion of Article X appears in only two GATT 1947 panel
decisions. First, in Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies (Canada—Provincial Liquor Boards
[US]),38 the panel concluded that Article X did not require Canadian provinces
to provide ‘information affecting trade available to domestic and foreign sup-
pliers at the same time, nor did it require Contracting Parties, to publish trade
regulations in advance of their entry into force’.39 Second, in European Economic
Community—Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples—Complaint by Chile
(EEC—Dessert Apples),40 the panel ruled that the specific act of back-dating
quotas on imports of dessert apples by the EEC was inconsistent with the 
publication requirement of Article X. This is the only adopted GATT 1947
decision to find a violation of Article X. However, the panel also held that the
EC’s administration of its quota system was not in violation of the ‘unifor-
mity’ requirement of Article X:3(a). The panel concluded that the requirement
of ‘uniformity’ in administration imposed by Article X:3(a) did not require
EC members to have identical administrative procedures with regards to the
import of dessert apples. In reaching its conclusion, the panel emphasized the
substantive provisions of GATT 1947 by first finding violations of Article XI:1
and Article XIII of GATT 1947 and then only found a violation of Article X with
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regards to the specific act of back-dating import restrictions from the date of
publication to have been a violation of Article X:1.41
In the remaining GATT 1947 cases, panels merely dismissed the Article X
claims as subsidiary issues that did not need to be addressed.42 The last adopted
GATT 1947 case involving an Article X claim was United States—Countervail-
ing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil (US—Non-Rubber Footwear).43
The panel dismissed the Article X:3(a) claim as not being within the terms of
reference of the panel.44 Interestingly, this case does foreshadow a line of cases
discussed below in which administration of trade remedies by the United States
DOC is challenged as being inconsistent, among other things, with the require-
ments of Article X:3(a).
IV. The Expansion of the WTO Trade Mandate 
and Its Impact on Article X
Upon creation of the WTO, Article X of the GATT 1947 became Article X of
the GATT 1994 and was included as part of Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement
without any amendment.45 Annex 1A also includes other trade agreements
that had been negotiated under the auspices of the GATT 1947 on trade in
goods.46 Article X is specifically mentioned in the following Annex 1A agree-
ments: Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 (Cus-
toms Valuation Agreement),47 Agreement on Rules of Origin,48 and Agreement
on Safeguards.49 The other Annex 1A agreements do not mention Article X
but do contain provisions addressing transparency and due process in the
administration of measures, including the Agreement on the Application of San-
itary and Physosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement);50 Agreement on Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement);51 Agreement on the Implementation
of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Antidumping Agreement);52 Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement);53 and the Agreement
on Import Licensing Procedures (Licensing Agreement).54 Outside of trade in
goods, the requirements of Article X are replicated throughout the Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS)55 and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS).56 In addition, the Trade Policy Review Mecha-
nism (TPRM) monitors ‘domestic transparency in government decision-mak-
ing in the trade policy-making area’.57 In view of the fact that Article X of GATT
is applicable only to trade in goods, this chapter will not discuss in detail the
scope of the transparency provisions of GATS, TRIPS, or the TPRM.
The relationship between the transparency and due process obligations of
Article X of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the other Annex 1A agreements
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is far from clear.58 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A (Interpretative
Note) states:
In the event of conflict between a provision of [GATT] 1994 and a provision of
another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the [WTO], the pro-
vision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.59
There is no agreement on the interpretation of the term ‘conflict’ except in
cases where provisions directly contradict one another. Such a direct substan-
tive conflict is unlikely to arise in the context of Article X as it is concerned with
transparency and due process in the administration of a measure. This absence
of clarity gives rise to a number of questions: What is the relationship between
Article X and the provisions of other Annex 1A agreements? When a measure
falls within the scope of an Annex 1A agreement is it still subject to the trans-
parency and due process requirements of Article X? Are Article X obligations
independent of the due process requirements of the other Annex 1A agree-
ments? How should the term ‘to the extent of the conflict’ as stated in the 
Interpretative Note be construed in relation to Article X? 
As the discussion below will show, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have
held that the Interpretative Note does not prohibit concurrent application of Arti-
cle X of GATT 1994 and provisions of other Annex 1A agreements. But, as a gen-
eral rule, panels and the Appellate Body have tended to focus on more specific
provisions of the other Annex 1A agreements. This focus on the relevant provi-
sions of Annex 1A agreements (as opposed to GATT 1994) has not resulted in com-
plete marginalization of Article X requirements of transparency and due process.
V. Interpretation of Article X GATT 1994: 
Emerging from Obscurity 
Since the founding of the WTO, there have been at least 20 cases involving
consideration of Article X of the GATT 1994,60 and almost half of these cases
have been brought against the United States and have concerned the admin-
istration of safeguard, anti-dumping, and countervailing duty laws. A wide
variety of countries at differing levels of economic development have invoked
Article X, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and
the United States. In contrast to the GATT 1947 days, no WTO Member has
referred to their Article X claim as a ‘subsidiary’ claim.
Some Article X claims brought before WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have continued the GATT 1947–era practice of deferring a discussion of the 
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provision in favour of other GATT 1994 violations. However, even in such
cases, panels and the Appellate Body have refrained from stating that an Arti-
cle X claim is a subsidiary issue. As the discussion below will show, even in
cases where the panels or the Appellate Body have not found a violation of
Article X, they have underscored the importance of Article X obligations and
engaged in extensive discussions on the scope and meaning of its provisions.
In addition, unlike the GATT 1947 years, WTO panels and the Appellate Body
have found national measures to be inconsistent with the provisions of Arti-
cle X, including Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and
the Import of Finished Leather (Argentina—Hides and Leather),61 Dominican
Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes
(Dominican Republic—Import and Sales of Cigarettes),62 EC—Selected Customs
Matters,63 and United States—Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject
to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties (US—Customs Bond Directive).64
In the WTO era, Article X of GATT 1994 was first analyzed in 1997 by the
Appellate Body in United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
Made Fibre Underwear (United States—Underwear), which stated:
Article X:2 … may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance—
that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and
private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The 
relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of transparency and has
obviously due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and
other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures impos-
ing restraints, requirements, and other burdens, should have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly 
to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of
such measures….65
The Appellate Body’s identification of the fundamental importance of Article X
lies in sharp contrast to earlier panel discussions of Article X under GATT
1947. The reference to transparency and due process values enshrined in Arti-
cle X has been widely quoted by subsequent WTO panels. Of particular signif-
icance is the Appellate Body’s view that Article X’s transparency and due process
protections extend to administrative actions taken by Members in relation to
their own citizens (i.e., internal governance, as well as in relation to foreign
traders). Another point highlighted by the Appellate Body in United States—
Underwear is that Article X, unlike other GATT provisions, is explicitly con-
cerned with the rights and expectations of traders. Finally, the Appellate Body
clarified that Article X allows challenges to the administration of measures
that are otherwise WTO consistent.
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The importance of Article X was also underscored by the Appellate Body
in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(US—Shrimp).66 In that case, the Appellate Body held that a U.S. measure pro-
hibiting importation of shrimp or shrimp products fell within the scope of
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 as a measure that was aimed primarily at the
conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, giving effect to restrictions
on domestic production or consumption.67 But the U.S. conservation measure
failed the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX because the United States
applied the measure in a manner that constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail.68 The
Appellate Body went on to state:
Provisions of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 bear upon this matter. In our view
Section 609 [the U.S. restriction on shrimp imports] fall within the [scope of]
Article X:1. Inasmuch as there are due process requirements generally for meas-
ures that are otherwise imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is only
reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due
process should be required in the application and administration of a measure
which purports to be an exception to the treaty obligations….69
The Appellate Body in US-Shrimp also goes on to state that the U.S. measure
at issue, Section 609, was applied in a manner that was ‘contrary to the spirit,
if not letter, of Article X:3 [of GATT 1994]’.70
A. The Scope of Measures Covered under 
Article X:1 of the GATT 1994
Article X requires that ‘laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings of general application’ (collectively ‘measures’) be promptly published
and administered ‘uniformly, impartially and reasonably’.71 Panels and the
Appellate Body, on the whole, have given the term ‘general application’ a gen-
erous interpretation so as not to limit the scope of measures covered under
Article X:1. In European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas (EC—Bananas III),72 the panel and the Appellate Body
stated that Article X applies to both internal measures and border measures.73
In Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan—
Film), the panel held that a measure qualifies under Article X:1 as an admin-
istrative ruling of general application even if it is addressed to only a specific
company or shipment if such a ruling establishes or revises principles appli-
cable in future cases.74 This reasoning was followed in Argentina—Hides and
Leather,75 in which the panel held that a resolution that permitted representatives
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of the domestic tanning industry to be present during the customs process of
export clearance was an administrative measure of general application under
Article X:1 even if only one company benefited from it.76
In anti-dumping cases, however, panels have been reluctant to find specific
dumping determinations ‘measures of general application’. In United States—
Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (United
States—Hot-Rolled Steel),77 the panel held that a specific anti-dumping ruling
in a particular case did not qualify as a measure of general application.
Nevertheless, the panel did state that in certain circumstances, the outcome of
a single anti-dumping investigation could have ‘significant impact on the over-
all administration of the law’ and therefore could be considered a measure of
general application within the scope of Article X:1.78 In 2004, in Dominican
Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the panel decided that a survey taken
by the Dominican Republic’s Central Bank on average prices of cigarettes was
an ‘administrative ruling of general application’ and should have been pub-
lished because it was ‘an essential element of an administrative ruling’ within
the scope of Article X:1.79
In sum, panels and the Appellate Body have adopted an expansive interpre-
tation of the term ‘measures of general application’, which includes any specific
act of administration that has a ‘significant impact’ on the overall administra-
tion of the law or any government action, including a survey, which subse-
quently forms a basis for an administrative ruling. At the same time, however,
panels and the Appellate Body have retained the flexibility to exclude a meas-
ure from the scope of Article X:1 if they determine that it does not have a 
significant impact on the overall administration of a measure.
B. The Scope of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994
Article X:3(a) requires WTO Members to ‘administer in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations … and administrative rulings
of the kind referred to in Article X:1.’ Article X:3(b) and (c) require independ-
ent or ‘objective and impartial review’ of all administrative actions that relate
to customs matters.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the term ‘applied
uniformly’ to mean that ‘customs laws should not vary, that every exporter
and importer should be able to expect treatment of the same kind, in the same
manner over time and in different places and with respect to the other persons’.80
Panels have also stated that ‘access to’ and ‘flow of information’ are essential to
meeting the due process requirements of Article X:3(a). The panel in
Argentina—Hides and Leather stated that ‘the requirement of reasonableness
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and impartiality … both relate to the question of information’ and that unless
‘access to information’ is uniform and reasonable the administration of a meas-
ure cannot be impartial.81 Panels have also emphasized that the three require-
ments of Article X:3(a) are not cumulative, and that a measure must satisfy
all three requirements separately.82 In Argentina—Hides and Leather, the panel
pointed out that Article X:3(a) applies to the substance of an administrative
measure.83 Panels have also held that the scope of Article X:3(a) is not limited
by the most-favoured-nation (MFN) requirement. There is no requirement
that Article X:3(a) be applied only in situations where the measure has been
applied in an inconsistent manner with respect to the imports from or exports
to two or more Members.84
There has been great reluctance in applying the provisions of Article X:3(a)
to specific anti-dumping actions. In United States—Anti-Dumping Duty on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit
or Above from Korea (US—DRAMS), Korea argued that the due process values
of Article X:3(a) renders every action taken by the DOC in administering 
anti-dumping measures susceptible to scrutiny.85 Similarly, in United States—
Hot-Rolled Steel, Japan argued that the scope of Article X:3(a) was broader
than the covered agreements because the standards contained in Article X:3
represent in one sense the notion of good faith and in another sense the ‘fun-
damental requirements of due process’, and that these principles should be
applied to the manner in which the DOC administered the anti-dumping laws.86
In Dominican Republic—Import and Sales of Cigarettes, the panel defined
the term ‘reasonable’ as ‘in accordance with reason, not irrational or absurd,
proportionate’.87 The panel ruled that the administration of the provisions of
the Selective Consumption Tax was ‘unreasonable’ and in violation of Article
X:3(a) because it used the ‘nearest similar product’ to determine the tax rate
on imported cigarettes while that was not the criteria that had been stated in
the regulation. The Dominican Republic acknowledged the problem with using
the nearest similar product and removed the measure while the case was before
the panel. Nevertheless, the panel engaged in a relatively extensive discussion
of the meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ in Article X:3(a) and ruled that 
the Selective Consumption Tax, as it was administered prior to the change,
was unreasonable.
C. Protecting the Expectations of Traders 
A distinguishing feature of WTO-era Article X jurisprudence has been that
the panels have looked toward the expectations of private individual traders who
operate in the market place. For example, in United States—Sunset Reviews of
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Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US—
Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) the panel concentrated on showing
the ‘real effect’ of the DOC’s sunset reviews on ‘foreign traders operating in the
commercial world’.88 This is unique within the context of the GATT and the
WTO where emphasis has been on ‘expectations of a competitive relationship’
between the Members based on a system of reciprocity and mutual concessions.
In Argentina—Hides and Leather, the panel addressed the issue of the 
expectation of traders as follows:
Article X:3(a) requires an examination of the real effect that a measure might have
on traders operating in a commercial world. This, of course, does not require a
showing of trade damage, as that is not generally a requirement with respect to vio-
lations of GATT 1994. But it can involve an examination of whether there is pos-
sible impact on the competitive situation due to alleged partiality, unreasonableness
or lack of uniformity in application of custom rules….89
The direct and explicit reference to ‘expectations of traders’ is significant in at
least two respects. First, it emphasizes the importance of Article X as private
traders ask their governments to focus on the lack of transparency and unifor-
mity in the application of internal or border measures. Second, it underscores
the good governance mandate of the WTO as an organization that is expected
to protect the expectations of private actors (not only governments) by safe-
guarding transparency, accountability, and other due process values. This, in
turn, demonstrates the evolution of the system away from one based on recip-
rocal bargaining and mutual concessions among Members to a system that
promotes rules of good governance.
D. Relationship of Article X of GATT 1994 
and the WTO Agreement 
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the relationship between the pro-
visions of GATT 1994, including Article X, and other Annex 1A agreements.
The Interpretative Note to Annex 1A does not solve this problem as it provides
only that, in cases of ‘conflict’ between the GATT 1994 and other Annex 1A
agreements, the provision of the other agreement prevails but only to the ‘extent
of the conflict’.90 What does ‘conflict’ mean when dealing with Article X’s rela-
tionship to another agreement? As might be expected, the answer to this ques-
tion is not clear and seems to vary depending on the other agreement at issue.
In United States—Underwear, Costa Rica argued that the United States
safeguard action against imports of cotton and man-made-fibre underwear
was inconsistent with both the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing91 and
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Article X:2 of the GATT 1994.92 The panel held that a transitional safeguard
measure was subject to the publication requirements of Article X:2 as well as
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. On appeal, the Appellate Body over-
turned the Article X:2 violation, but on the ground that Article X:2 does not
address whether a Member can give retroactive effect to a safeguard measure.
While it did not expressly address the relationship between the provisions of
the GATT 1994 and the text of other agreements, the Appellate Body in United
States—Underwear did clearly imply that both can apply.93
The relationship between Licensing Agreement and Article X was addressed
in EC—Bananas III, in which the panel interpreted the term ‘conflict’ in 
the Interpretative Note narrowly to include only those instances where a pro-
vision in one agreement prohibits what another agreement explicitly permits
or where a Member cannot comply with both the requirements of another
Annex 1A agreement and Article X.94 The Appellate Body agreed with the
panel that the Interpretative Note allows for the application of both Article X:3
and the Licensing Agreement, but ruled that the panel should have applied the
Licensing Agreement first, as it was the more specific and detailed agreement.95
If the panel had applied the Licensing Agreement first, the Appellate Body
reasoned, ‘then there would be no need for it to address … Article X:3(a) of
GATT 1994’.96
This GATT 1947–like approach of ignoring the requirements of Article
X:3 was challenged in European Communities—Measures Affecting Importa-
tion of Certain Poultry Products (EC—Poultry).97 The panel in EC—Poultry
found that, unlike the EC—Bananas III case, even after reviewing the Licens-
ing Agreement, it was obliged to look at Article X:3(a). The panel reasoned
that this was appropriate because the Licensing Agreement was relevant only
to a portion of the measure at issue, while the scope of Article X was broader.98
In contrast to the Licensing Agreement, panels have been reluctant to apply
Article X:3(a) to measures falling within the scope of the Antidumping Agree-
ment (AD Agreement). In United States—Hot-Rolled Steel the panel stated:
Where we have found a particular action or category of action is not inconsistent
with a specific provision of the AD Agreement, we are faced with the question
whether a Member can be found to have violated Article X:3 (a) … we have 
serious doubts as to whether such a finding would be appropriate.99
While this statement does not make Article X:3 explicitly inapplicable to the
Antidumping Agreement, it is clear the panel did not find it is appropriate to apply
the due process provisions of Article X:3 to the administration of anti-dumping
measures in addition to the due process requirements of the Antidumping 
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Agreement. The applicability of the terms of Article X:3(a) to the administra-
tion of U.S. anti-dumping laws was argued forcefully by Korea in US—DRAMS:
WTO Agreements are a unitary whole. The transparency and uniformity obliga-
tions of Article X apply to the WTO Agreements, including the [Anti-Dumping
Agreement] … the Member must administer each statute, regulation, and admin-
istrative ruling in a way that complies with Article X:3. Thus Article X applies to
each and every action of the [DOC]….100
In response, the panel expressed reluctance to apply Article X:3(a) to the DOC’s
actions:
[W]e have grave doubts as to whether Article X:3 (a) can or should be used in the
manner advocated by Korea.As the United States correctly points out … [Article X:3
(a)] was not intended to function as a mechanism to test the consistency of a Mem-
ber’s particular decision or rulings with the Member’s own domestic law and prac-
tice; that is a function reserved for each Member’s domestic judicial system….101
The discomfort of panels in reviewing the administrative structure of a Mem-
ber is understandable. However, that is what Article X:3(a) allows by giving
Members the right to challenge the administration of particular measures.
VI. The EC—Selected Customs Matters Dispute
Some 60 years after its inclusion in the GATT 1947, Article X was invoked as
the sole legal basis for a trade dispute. In EC—Selected Customs Matters,102 the
United States claimed that the EEC system of customs administration ‘as a
whole’ was not administered uniformly as required by Article X:3(a).103 In its
complaint, the United States also pointed to the specific non-uniform appli-
cation of valuation rules and the administration of customs regulations to
imports of liquid crystal display (LCD) monitors and blackout drapery. The
United States argued that the lack of any mechanism at the EEC level to address
divergences in customs administrations was a violation of the uniformity
requirement of Article X:3(a).104
The panel agreed that the EC’s system of custom administration as a whole
is ‘complicated and, at times, opaque and confusing’.105 In fact, the panel 
further stated:
We can imagine that the difficulties we encountered in our efforts to understand
the EC’s system of customs administration would be multiplied for traders in gen-
eral and small traders in particular who are trying to import into the European
Communities.106
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Nevertheless, the panel dismissed the ‘as a whole’ challenge as not within
the panel’s terms of reference.107 The panel did mention, however, that ‘there
is nothing in the DSU nor in other WTO agreements that would prevent a
complaining Member from challenging a Member’s system as a whole or over-
all’.108 The panel did find violations of Article X:3(a) due to non-uniform clas-
sification of LDC monitors and blackout drapery linings, and the non-uniform
administration of valuation rules by EC members.109
On appeal, the Appellate Body held that the EC’s system of customs 
administration could be challenged ‘as a whole or overall’ under Article X:3(a)
and that such a challenge was within the scope of the terms of reference.110 The
Appellate Body went on to hold that the administrative-substantive distinc-
tion maintained in EC—Bananas III and EC—Poultry did not exclude the
possibility of allowing challenges to the substance of a measure that leads 
to inconsistent administration. Specifically, the Appellate Body stated that
earlier rulings did ‘not exclude … the possibility of challenging under Article
X:3(a) the substantive content of a legal instrument that regulates the admin-
istration of a legal instrument of the kind described in Article X:1’.111 Thus 
a Member can challenge the substantive content of a legal instrument if such
content determines the administration of that regulation, so long as it can 
be shown that the substantive measure necessarily leads to lack of uniform,
impartial, or reasonable administration in violation of Article X:3(a).112
The Appellate Body held that mere differences in customs laws among 
EC member states did not necessarily breach the uniformity requirement in
Article X:3(a), unless such differences actually lead to non-uniform admin-
istration in specific cases.113
Having found that the EC system can, in principle, be challenged as a whole,
under Article X:3(a), the Appellate Body sidestepped the ‘as a whole’ challenge
by stating that the record did not provide the Appellate Body with enough
facts to decide such a claim. Furthermore, the Appellate Body reversed two
specific panel findings of inconsistency with Article X:3(a) relating to the
administration of customs penalty laws and audit procedures and the tariff
classification of blackout drapery, and upheld only the finding that the tariff
classification of certain LCD monitors amounted to non-uniform adminis-
tration in violation of Article X:3(a) and the panel’s dismissal of the claim
relating to Article X:3(b).114 In this landmark case, by further blurring the
administrative-substantive distinction, the Appellate Body sanctioned the wider
use of Article X and opened the door for future claims, including challenges
to the substance of laws as a whole.115
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VII. The ‘Culture’ of the WTO DSM and 
the Future of Article X 
The evolution of the jurisprudence of Article X under the WTO has expanded
the scope of Article X through interpretation of its provisions and blurring
the distinction relied on by earlier panels between a substantive and an admin-
istrative measure. The culture of the WTO DSM is such, however, that expan-
sive interpretations of Article X are not necessarily accompanied by application
of Article X requirements in specific cases. It is also unclear the extent to which
due process requirements of Article X:3(a) are applicable to measures that fall
within the scope of various Annex 1A agreements.
Article X:3(a) requirements have not been applied to the Antidumping
Agreement, but they have been found to be concurrently applicable with the
due process requirements of the Licensing Agreement. Some Members of the
WTO view the administration of U.S. trade remedy laws (specifically in the
anti-dumping context) to be inconsistent with Article X:3(a) requirements of
uniformity, impartiality, and reasonableness.116 It is, therefore, likely that 
Article X will continue to be asserted against the United States, the original
architect of Article X, as Members emphasize values of fundamental due process,
such as transparency and access to information. Panels and the Appellate Body
are unlikely to apply Article X to the administration of U.S. trade remedy laws.
Instead, panels will likely continue to focus on the specific procedural provi-
sions of the Antidumping Agreement, SCM Agreement, and the Agreement
on Safeguards.
Such an approach is consistent with the culture of the DSU. For example,
in EC—Selected Customs Matters, the Appellate Body expanded the scope of
measures that can be challenged under Article X:3(a), but at the same time
largely reversed the panel’s finding of inconsistency with Article X:3(a) and
only affirmed the panel’s finding that the non-uniform administration of the
tariff classification of LCD monitors by EU members was a violation of
Article X:3(a). Similarly, in Dominican Republic—Import and Sale of Cigarettes,
there is an extensive discussion of the meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ in Arti-
cle X:3, even though the measures at issue had already been withdrawn. In
US—DRAMS, the panel addressed Article X:3 only to conclude that the incon-
sistency of the measure with the Antidumping Agreement rendered examina-
tion of Korea’s claims under Article X unnecessary. The seeming discrepancy
between the relatively extensive discussions of the requirements of Article
X:3(a) and the refusal of the panels to rule on Article X claims is consistent with
the culture and practices of the DSM. The practice under the DSU is to 
avoid making controversial decisions, while incrementally developing the
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jurisprudence so that future panels and the Appellate Body can accommodate
the expansion of the WTO mandate into areas that go beyond the traditional
sphere of securing or promoting trade liberalization, and into promoting good
governance within Members.117
Recent interpretations of the scope of Articles X:1 and X:3(a) have expanded
the scope of those provisions. The ruling in EC—Selected Customs Matters,
that a system as a whole can be challenged under Article X:3(a), will likely
encourage Members to bring additional complaints. Specifically, Article X chal-
lenges to the EC’s system of customs administration are likely to continue
given the view expressed by the panel that the EC customs regulations can be
opaque and confusing. In addition, United States—Shrimp has made the
jurisprudence of Article X applicable ‘in spirit’ if not ‘in letter’ to the chapeau
of Article XX. It is therefore possible that the developing jurisprudence of
Article X, and specifically of Article X:3(a), may be used to interpret the appli-
cation of Article XX measures or to otherwise guide the interpretation of
the chapeau of Article XX.
VIII. Conclusion
Article X of the GATT 1994 is the oldest good governance provision at international
trade law, and a close study of its history and evolving jurisprudence con-
tributes to an understanding of the emerging role of the WTO as a potential
supra-national regulatory body and the final arbiter of appropriate adminis-
trative and regulatory structures.118 The broad language of Article X allows the
WTO to review domestic administrative legal regimes based on interpretation
of the terms: uniform, impartial, and reasonable. Applying those standards to
administrative acts and practices of WTO Members, particularly in the context
of claims against administrative systems as a whole, could raise serious concerns
if seen as interfering in the internal governance of Members. Although such
increased reference to fundamental values of transparency and due process may
be a sign of an emerging consensus on the elements for good governance, it also
has the potential to undermine the utility of such values if they are not addressed
or applied in an even-handed manner by panels and the Appellate Body.
The WTO is no longer a system simply based on consensus, reciprocity,
and a balancing of concessions. Rather, it is a system based on rules that reflect
the reality of the administrative state. The goal of the multilateral trading sys-
tem is no longer free trade (if it ever was) but rather trade that is regulated in
a WTO-consistent manner. As a result, the good governance provisions of the
WTO, those addressing transparency and due process, are increasingly central
to WTO disputes. Fortunately, the multilateral trading system is very adept at
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making incremental change. To date, the Appellate Body and panels have been,
in most cases, reluctant to find a measure inconsistent with the obligations of
Article X:3(a), but have continued to build the jurisprudence of Article X:3(a)
through interpretation of its provisions and applauding the values it enshrines.119
There is much at stake in how the DSM addresses future transparency
claims. There is great discrepancy among Members with regard to their admin-
istrative structures and institutional capacity, and the DSM may not be the
most appropriate forum to address such differences. It is possible that coun-
tries with advanced and complicated regulatory structures may feel more 
vulnerable to charges of inconsistency with transparency and due process obli-
gations of the WTO. It is therefore important that the WTO acknowledge its
good governance mandate through coordination between the transparency-
related works of its various committees and the TPRM’s mandate to monitor
domestic transparency in the trade decision-making area. This coordination
could also assist the DSM in interpreting and applying the transparency-related
obligations of the WTO Agreements.
In response to the recent financial crisis, there have been calls for reform
of the Bretton Woods Institutions, but predictably the focus has been on the
IMF and to some extent the World Bank, not on the WTO.120 This is a mistake.
As this article has attempted to show, the role of the WTO goes beyond that of
trade liberalization. In fact, the WTO is in a singular position to promote and uni-
versalize core values such as transparency and access to information with nation
states. For example, a recent study of the World Bank on the efficacy of its anti-
corruption efforts in the public sector reform area shows that direct approaches
to combatting corruption advocated by the World Bank have largely failed and
that the most successful examples of combatting corruption have been indirect
ones that the WTO promotes, such as the removal of ambiguity from laws and
regulations and making public announcements of hiring opportunities.121
The story of the evolution of Article X demonstrates not only the increas-
ingly prominent role of the WTO in promoting good governance but also the
emerging global consensus on core values of good governance, such as trans-
parency or access to information. It is imperative that the WTO’s good gover-
nance provisions be subjected to greater clarity as we embark on reforming
our international economic institutions to meet the enormous challenges posed
by the global economic downturn.122
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Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency
Norms and Local Practices in China and Japan
LJILJANA BIUKOVIÇ*
I. Introduction
This article discusses compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) trans-
parency measures in the context of China and Japan’s implementation of the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).1 In
brief, it focuses on the importance of Chinese and Japanese local practices,
regulatory infrastructure, and local cultural norms related to the principle of
transparency and food safety standards as factors in their selective adaptation
of WTO norms. It argues that international law can acquire a variety of local
meanings that require an understanding of the local history and culture in
addition to knowledge of the domestic economy and laws.
This chapter analyzes selective adaptation through an understanding of
the dynamics of internalization of international norms through the process
of localization.2 Part II explains the selective adaptation discourse. Part III dis-
cusses transparency-related developments at the WTO level, including recent
initiatives of the WTO Committee on SPS Measures (SPS Committee) and
disputes involving transparency requirements of the SPS Agreement. Parts IV
and V analyze China’s and Japan’s legislative and institutional attempts to com-
ply with Article X of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994)3
in the administration of their laws, regulations, and government orders 
governing trade in goods in the context of their local culture and practices.
The article also examines China’s and Japan’s efforts at both the WTO level
and domestically to enhance transparency by developing legislation, an 
institutional framework, and processes that govern food safety, animal health,
and protection. Part VI connects the conclusions drawn in Parts III, IV, and V
with a discussion on transparency within the WTO, focusing on the work of
the SPS Committee.
II. The Selective Adaptation Paradigm in the 
Context of Globalized Trade
Selective adaptation addresses the implementation of international legal norms
in the context of local cultural and legal traditions. Underlying selective adap-
tation is a belief that compliance with WTO rules and norms is dependent
inter alia on an people’s understanding of the international rules and the local
norms and practices (the perception factor), the degree of support that mem-
bers of the local community give to the reception of the international norms
(the legitimacy factor), and the extent to which the international norms and
the local norms are complementary or capable of coexisting and operating
together in non-conflicting and effective ways despite the fact that they might
substantively contradict each other (the complementarity factor). Selective
adaptation suggests that, due to the globalization of legal rules that regulate the
international market, national legal systems are distinguished more by local
institutional practices than by differences in the substantive legal norms. Thus
another factor, institutional capacity, also affects local implementation of inter-
national norms. The institutional capacity factor reveals that compliance with
international standards is also a matter of ‘structural relationships among reg-
ulatory institutions’ and 
a function of a particular institutional goal being affected by factors of institu-
tional purpose concerning the institutional goal; the effects of location on under-
standing of the institutional goal; the effects of institutional orientation as to how
the goal is to be pursued; and the extent of institutional cohesion in organiza-
tional structure and behavior.4
In sum, selective adaptation describes 
a process by which international standards and associated norms are adapted to
local conditions, and it invites questions as to whether such adaptation is unified,
in which case the international standards and associated norms are accepted rel-
atively conterminously, or is disconnected such that acceptance of international
standards is not accompanied by assimilation of the underlying norms.5
Thus selective adaptation reveals possibilities for flexible implementation of
international standards by identifying degrees of conformity among local and
non-local norms. Pitman Potter and Lesley Jacobs argue that the selective adap-
tation discourse helps to limit the scope of claims that cultural relativism is the
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cause of non-compliance with international norms, and that the discourse sup-
ports an acceptance of normative diversity only where there is an obvious lack
of consensus between the international rules and local norms.6 Selective adap-
tation does not deny that local legal culture, concepts, and vocabulary are pow-
erful filters applicable to the perception and interpretation of international law.7
However, it proposes that legal cultures are no longer so isolated as to make it
impossible for lawyers and persons educated in one legal tradition to learn and
interpret the norms of other legal systems and legal concepts.8
III. Development of Transparency Norms 
and the World Trade System
WTO membership and the acceptance of its rules and disciplines requires serious
commitment on the part of states and often leads to legal reforms involving
adoption of the Western system of law that is the foundation of the WTO
regime.9 As long as the WTO rules and disciplines are uniformly interpreted
and applied by each Member, their adoption certainly leads to the harmoniza-
tion of trade rules and brings predictability to the legal framework for business.
However, uniform interpretation and application of the WTO rules depends
not only on the political will of the Members to comply with rules but also on
the complexity and efficacy of their domestic legal and political systems, whether
they have the financial resources to introduce the reforms necessary to support
application of WTO rules, and the ability of the local legal culture to absorb
the Western ideas of trade liberalization and the rule of law.10 One of the ideas
central to liberalism and the rule of law is transparency.
Transparency is usually cited as the core principle underpinning the rule
of law. It is also cited as a key element of good governance.11 Businesses con-
sidering or involved in commerce abroad embrace the principle of transparency
that is embedded in the world trading system. WTO Members accept obliga-
tions to comply with its transparency provisions in order to increase compet-
itiveness in the world economy. Undoubtedly, transparent laws, administrative
decisions, and procedures encourage foreign investment whereas non-transparent
laws and regulations can create barriers to trade, particularly to imports.
Many international organizations emphasize the importance of trans-
parency for the development of a market economy and of society in general and
define the principle in terms similar to the provisions of Article X of the GATT
1994. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD)
definition of transparency is two-pronged. The first prong is defined as regu-
latory transparency or ‘the capacity of regulated entities to express views on,
identify and understand their obligations under the rule of law’.12 The second
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prong of the OECD’s definition of transparency requires governments to
enhance ‘information transparency’. Regulatory transparency protects the rights
of private parties to be informed of laws, advised of decisions that concern
their rights and interests, and provided with reasoned decisions, and to seek
reviews of such decisions.13 Thus legal reform that leads to regulatory trans-
parency increases openness of the market and reduces business transaction
costs. Information transparency includes consultations with interested par-
ties, the electronic dissemination of regulatory materials, the use of plain 
language in drafting laws and regulations, the exercise of controls on regula-
tory discretion through transparent procedures, and the establishment of
appeal processes.14
Robert Wolfe points out that the principle of transparency is relevant to the
WTO system in the context of external, internal, and regulatory transparency.15
External transparency is related to the ability of civil society to see the work of
the WTO, while internal transparency reflects the ability of WTO Members, par-
ticularly smaller and developing countries, to participate in the work of the
Organization.16 Finally, the principle is relevant in the context of regulatory
transparency, or as a tool of good governance, which constitutes ‘an impor-
tant aspect of national administrative law’.17
A. WTO and Transparency Provisions
As one of the main pillars of the world trading system, the transparency 
principle articulated in Article X of the GATT 1994 imposes an obligation on
all Members of the WTO to publish all applicable laws and regulations and to
administer them as follows:
1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general appli-
cation, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification
or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or
other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or
exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distri-
bution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, pro-
cessing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements
affecting international trade policy which are in force between the government
or a governmental agency of any contracting party and the government or gov-
ernmental agency of any other contracting party shall also be published….
This far-reaching provision includes the obligation for Members to establish
processes for the judicial review of government acts.18 As Sylvia Ostry explains,
this provision puts limits on what Members’ bureaucrats can do and how they
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can do it, and therefore has the capacity for direct impact on the field of admin-
istrative law.19 Ostry traces an interesting evolution from the vaguely defined
yet non-controversial principle of Article 38 of the Havana Charter of the
International Trade Organization, based on what was primarily the U.S.
approach to transparency,20 to the current far-reaching feature of the WTO’s
expanded and more integrated world trade system, which requires all acced-
ing Members to undergo deep reforms of domestic administrative or regula-
tory regimes and institutional infrastructures.21 The creation of the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)22 as a means of monitoring compliance
with the Article X requirements has signalled the increasing importance of
transparency in the context of deeper economic integration.
It has been argued that the above-mentioned concepts underpinning trans-
parency are at the core of liberal democracies and open market economies,
but not traditional Asian societies.23 Many authors, including Wolfe, Ostry,
and Potter, have questioned the capability of developing countries, especially
China, to comply with their transparency obligations due to a lack of institu-
tional capacity, and to the complexity of their constitutional, administrative,
and legal systems.24 Some authors like Potter, Mayeda, and Stein, argue that
China’s historical and cultural traditions may clash with WTO transparency
norms, either because China’s local regulatory culture emphasizes the sover-
eignty of government bureaucracy and the Party rather than the rights of indi-
viduals and society to be informed of government decisions and to challenge
these decisions25 or because in China, personal connections rather than trans-
parent, formal administrative processes have been the primary means of secur-
ing access to information, including information related to government
activities.26 Consequently, Potter explains, the WTO principle is selectively
interpreted and implemented in China.27 Nevertheless, in order to increase
both regulatory and information transparency, many Asian countries have
undergone, with varied success, the administrative reforms discussed below.
B. SPS Agreement and Transparency Provisions
Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement incorporate the transparency
principle in recognition of the importance of public control of governmen-
tal policies related to public health protection and in order to prevent ‘arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members’ and ‘a disguised
restriction on international trade’. The SPS Agreement fosters intergovern-
mental regulatory coordination and harmonization of standards and pre-
vents hidden protectionism.28 This is achieved by allowing governments to
impose measures necessary to protect public health in keeping with scientific
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principles29 and established international standards,30 while at the same time
requiring that such measures be notified publicly in accordance with the pro-
visions of Annex B.31 In addition to the transparency principle articulated in
Annex B, Article 7 of the SPS Agreement mandates the publication and mon-
itoring of national SPS measures, be they laws, decrees, or general ordinances.
Members are required to publish their SPS measures promptly32 and to estab-
lish central enquiry points for answering other Members’ questions on their SPS
measures.33 The SPS Agreement has facilitated the establishment of a special
body, the SPS Committee, to monitor and coordinate the functioning of the
various national SPS regulatory authorities, improve their transparency, and
serve as a forum at which disagreements among trading partners might be
resolved without formal WTO dispute settlement procedures.34 Also, Article 4
of Annex B mandates that a Member imposing an SPS measure for which there
is no international standard must publish such a measure at an ‘early stage’,
notify other Members through the WTO Secretariat of the products to be 
covered by the regulation, and allow the other Members to comment on such
a measure.
Although the SPS Agreement in general, and its transparency provisions in
particular, facilitate the expansion of international regulation at the expense of
the regulatory sovereignty of states, only a small portion of WTO case law deals
with non-compliance of transparency requirements.35 However, the relatively
limited case law on this subject, as well as the absence of SPS Agreement-related
issues in the Doha Round, should not be taken as an indicator that there are
no compliance problems with the transparency principle.
Many Members find the SPS Agreement transparency requirements to be
burdensome and costly, more so for developing than developed countries.36
It is easier for developed, liberal market economies than for developing coun-
tries to translate the already existing concept of regulatory transparency from
administrative law to SPS standard-setting and monitoring procedures. In
addition, increased participation by developed countries in international stan-
dard setting and in the SPS Committee allows them to exert greater influence
in setting these standards and protecting their economic interests. Thus not
only transparency standards but also risk assessment standards are culturally
influenced, with international standards largely mirroring those of developed
countries.37 Finally, due to their level of economic development, developing
countries lack the institutional capacity to establish efficient enquiry points
and notification procedures. Article 9 of the SPS Agreement, dealing with
technical assistance for developing countries, does little to remedy this prob-
lem as it does not impose any obligations on the developed countries to assist
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the developing ones. In sum, local conditions and practices in developing coun-
tries seem to differ significantly from international standards and practices
and such differences affect compliance with international standards.
In October 2007, the SPS Committee gave favourable consideration to a pro-
posal by New Zealand for the establishment of a ‘mentoring’ system aimed at
assisting developing country Members in the operation of their SPS National
Notification Authorities (NNA) and their National Enquiry Points (NEP).38
Mentoring involves the development of an informal ad hoc supportive relation-
ship between officials with similar responsibilities so as to provide the oppor-
tunity for officials to seek advice and assistance from their counterparts in the
NNA and/or NEP. However, this system is voluntary and is not meant to replace
other forms of technical assistance.39 Additional recommendations to improve
transparency related to the information that Members share with each other
on food safety and animal and plant health were approved on 30 May 2008.40
These recommendations on transparency include new forms and procedures
for countries to submit information and details regarding new on-line data-
bases, where notices filed and other relevant information will be compiled.
The recommendations, which took in the latter part of 2008, also encourage
Members to notify relevant parties when they adopt international standards.41
This is a voluntary measure as mandatory notification is required only when
a Member’s measures do not conform with international standards.
Finally, it is important to note that despite the importance given to the
principle of transparency, WTO case law on SPS-related transparency is very
limited.42 China has not yet been involved in any SPS case either as a com-
plainant or a defendant, but Japan’s involvement as a defendant has been thor-
oughly reviewed by legal scholars.43 The rest of this article analyzes Chinese and
Japanese attempts to comply with the WTO and SPS Agreement transparency
requirements and recommendations.44
It has been often suggested that it is more difficult for developing countries
to comply with the SPS Agreement due to their lack of financial resources 
and expertise.45 The selective adaptation discourse attempts to explain and
predict how local institutions interpret international norms by modifying them
to local conditions. Selective adaptation suggests that such modification 
happens in both developing and developed countries, but that it occurs more
often and to a greater degree where there is increased disparity between inter-
national and local norms. Japanese and Chinese administrative reforms 
illustrate this point.
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IV. Japan’s Selective Adaptation of the WTO and 
SPS Agreement Transparency Provisions
Until recently, many Japanese government documents and files were not sub-
ject to legal scrutiny. Frank Upham argues that Japan should not be considered
as a model for the rule of law in the sense of Western (especially U.S.) legal
tradition, but rather as a society governed by harmony and consensus in which
disputes are resolved often through informal mechanisms.46 Japanese admin-
istrative culture is rooted in the tradition of the 19th-century Prussian law.
Thus Japanese perceptions of regulatory transparency and accountability of
government should be examined against a historical background in which the
basic principle was one of the uncontested political authority of the Emperor’s
servants.47 Matsui argues that, as a result of that tradition, many of the Japan-
ese statutes authorizing governmental regulations delegate very broad discre-
tion to administrative agencies.48 Judicial review is rare. Another marked feature
of Japanese administrative culture is that administrative agencies tend to 
control business activities through administrative guidance, an informal method
of control that is not legally binding, hard for the public to ignore, and diffi-
cult for the courts to control.49 For these reasons, very few administrative law
cases have been filed in Japan.50
In the face of the expanding WTO requirements, and because of the pressure
exercised by Japan’s major trading partners, this tradition is slowly being altered.
Japan’s trading partners frequently use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
to deal with issues involving Japanese foreign trade regulations.51 These com-
plaints have triggered far-reaching political and legal reforms that have affected
Japan’s internal legal processes and its foreign trade diplomacy.
Invoking the factors of selective adaptation of international treaties and
an analysis of local practices and norms reveals important reasons for 
non-compliance with the WTO transparency rules. Initially, Japan’s evolution
into a major trading power took place because of its unique legal and politi-
cal culture of bureaucratic administration of economic activities, utilizing tra-
ditional informal mechanisms of economic order rather than formal legal
institutions and administrative processes.52 WTO norms, dispute settlement
mechanisms, and its Members’ negative attitudes toward Japan’s traditional
trade diplomacy first caused the Japanese government and important Japan-
ese industries to change their perception of the rule-based WTO trade sys-
tem.53 Therefore, in the mid-1990s, Japan made a shift toward the rules-based
system of the WTO as a proactive means of advancing its own economic inter-
ests.54 Japan made it a priority to strengthen its position as the second-largest
trading power in the WTO and initiated a series of reforms focused on 
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confirming Japan’s legitimacy as an important trading partner capable of
meeting its WTO obligations.
As discussed above, Japanese non-compliance with the WTO norms was
due, in part, to cultural particularities that have played a significant role in the
process of the selective adaptation of transparency rules. Japan launched its
administrative and regulatory reform process in the late 1990s. The reforms
included changes to civil procedures and legal education.55 As part of this
process, the Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative
Organs was adopted in 1999 and came into effect in 2001. The law strength-
ens the regime of rights and obligations relating to the disclosure of informa-
tion by government administrative agencies with the aim of achieving greater
transparency, but remains careful to adapt transparency to Japanese local 
circumstances (the factor of complementarity). The development of internal
regulatory transparency is complementary not only to the goal of compliance
with the WTO provisions, but also with what Pekkanen calls the development
of Japanese aggressive legalism and enhancement of the country’s competi-
tiveness in the world trading system.56 The statute was patterned on the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act.57 It elaborates rights and obligations with respect
to the release of corporate documents and disclosure of information on the
operations of the incorporated administrative agencies as a means of ensuring
their accountability.58 However, the statute does not require government agen-
cies to take proactive steps to publish or otherwise make documents publicly
available. It only provides the right to request disclosure of information and
a corresponding government obligation to respond. Adoption of an informa-
tion disclosure system does not per se guarantee a more open government.59
As a result of the above mentioned reforms, the Office of the Trade and
Investment Ombudsperson (OTO)60 has instituted publication of complaints
about government regulations. OTO serves as an administrative mechanism to
resolve commercial complaints filed by domestic and foreign companies. The
reform was intended to address complaints that Japanese government regula-
tions create obstacles to market access and investment. OTO now systemati-
cally publishes statistics on commercial complaints filed in Japan by domestic
and foreign individuals, associations, and firms.
In sum, the 2001 statute and the publication of complaints on government
regulations and related institutional reforms are steps that have been taken at
the administrative level to improve transparency. However, it is clear that full
compliance with transparency norms in Japan is still hindered by a number of
factors. The WTO Trade Policy Review Body noted in 2002 that some sectors
of the Japanese economy, such as agriculture, remained overly protected from
foreign competition as a result of a lack of transparency and the country’s
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complex standards, tariff structure, and SPS measures, including quarantine
measures.61 This is particularly relevant considering the fact that Japan is one
of the world’s largest importers of agricultural goods62 and that the SPS Agree-
ment’s transparency provisions attempt to balance the principles of market
access and non-discrimination against the principle of regulatory sovereignty
of states and their legitimate concerns about food safety.
In response to its obligations under the SPS Agreement, Japan undertook
a number of regulatory reforms and created central institutions required by
Annex B of that agreement. For example, Japan’s national enquiry point is
located at the International Trade Division Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).63 However, while detailed information on govern-
ment institutions, legislation, and procedures dealing with food safety, animal
heath, and plant protection is easily accessible in Japanese, the information in
English is less complete and must be improved in order to provide foreign
governments and businesses with access to information.
The major domestic institutions that have the power to establish sanitary
measures in Japan are the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)
and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The MHLW
also oversees food safety administration, while the MAFF oversees animal
health. Legislation on food safety—the Food Sanitation Law64 and the Food
Safety Basic Law65—is accompanied by relevant ordinances, regulations, pro-
cedures, and information and also includes general provisions related to the
responsibilities of the state and local governments, businesses, and consumers.66
It also defines the jurisdiction and responsibilities of the Food Safety Com-
mission (FSC), an independent administrative body responsible for perform-
ing risk assessments and responding to food-borne accidents and emergencies.67
As in the case of food safety, responsibility for animal and plant protection is
centralized institutionally,68 but access by foreign governments and businesses
to information remains difficult since the majority of documents are available
in only Japanese.
Since the adoption of WTO norms became a priority for the Japanese 
government and the country’s important industries, their internalization has
included building an adequate institutional infrastructure and implementing
administrative reforms in addition to making very significant changes to legal
education. The new approach to legal education is intended to change the atti-
tudes of government bureaucrats, business people, legal practitioners, and
scholars, as well as the public, thereby reducing the conflict between interna-
tional and local norms.69 In other words, Japan’s lack of full compliance and
its selective adaptation were the result of a lack of normative consensus, which
has now been remedied through far-reaching administrative reforms and
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reforms in legal education implemented in a system once dominated by a 
protectionist foreign trade policy. The ambition of the Japanese government
and key industries to improve the country’s relative economic strength in the
global market has led to Japan’s improved compliance with international norms
and internalization of international norms, such as regulatory transparency.
V. China’s Selective Adaptation of the WTO and 
SPS Agreement Transparency Provisions
It has been argued that China’s accession to the WTO triggered significant
changes to China’s legal system, in particular to its regulatory transparency
and administrative law.70 First, Paragraph I.2.A.1-3 specifies that the WTO
Agreement and the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China
is applicable to the entire customs territory of China.71 Moreover, it mandates
the uniform application and administration of all its laws, regulations and
other measures at both the national and sub-national levels.72 Paragraph I.2.C.1-2
of the protocol requires China to comply with Article X of GATT 1994 by pub-
lishing all of its laws, regulations, and government orders governing trade and
goods services, trade related aspects of intellectual property rights, and for-
eign exchange in a designated official journal; providing a reasonable period
for comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures are imple-
mented; and enforcing only those laws, regulations, and measures affecting
trade that are published and readily available to other WTO Members, individ-
uals and enterprises. In addition, China must translate ‘into one or more of the
official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and other measures per-
taining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of forex’.73
The protocol also requires China to establish mechanisms for administrative
and judicial review (Section I.2.D). In other words, the protocol required China
to undertake significant administrative and legal reforms in order to bring its
regulatory practice into compliance with the WTO norms. Compliance at the
sub-national level remains a problem, particularly where regional governments
are more independent from the central government.74
Ostry identifies at least four new features of the protocol that go beyond
the requirements of Article X of GATT: (1) an extension of the coverage (in the
Chinese case it includes goods, trade in services, TRIPS, and foreign exchange
controls); (2) publication before implementation, including the right to com-
ment on proposed regulations; (3) enforcement of only those laws and regu-
lations that have been published (in contrast to Article X, which requires
publication of only those laws and regulations that increase barriers to trade);
and (4) creation of a single enquiry point with a time limit for response.75
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Moreover, Ostry argues, the protocol’s judicial review section went beyond the
Article X specification when it required China to create independent institu-
tions for the ‘prompt review’ of ‘all administrative actions’.76
Many scholars questioned China’s capacity to adopt these elaborate trans-
parency and good governance requirements due to its political culture rooted
in Confucianism. China’s ‘patrimonial sovereignty’—which evolved from the
idea that the state (or the Party) is a patrimonial sovereign and the adminis-
trative agencies and regulators are responsible for society but not accountable
to it—was viewed as a further impediment to compliance with the WTO Agree-
ment.77 The concept of governance in China had been based on the idea that
administrative agencies and regulators are accountable only to their political
(and bureaucratic) superiors.78 There was little room for convergence of the
Western ideas of the rule of law and transparency with the culture of a Chinese
legal system dominated by the Chinese Communist Party and characterized by
a lack of separation of powers among different state institutions.79 As a con-
sequence, WTO, World Bank, and OECD reports consistently criticized 
Chinese administrative law for its lack of regulatory transparency and for over-
regulating business and insisted on the implementation of broad administra-
tive reforms prior to China’s accession to the WTO.80
In the course of applying for WTO membership, China embarked on a
series of in-depth administrative law reforms. These reforms sought to estab-
lish competent and accountable governments at the central, provincial, and
municipal levels. Furthermore, the reforms sought to bring about transpar-
ent, simplified, and consistent procedures that would enable legal persons to
challenge laws, regulations, and decisions, and to enforce their legal rights
before administrative agencies. These enforceable rights would include the
right to receive remedies for losses caused by incompetent or unlawful admin-
istrative actions of various state agencies.81 In general, these reforms were seen
as a positive departure from the Chinese governments’ practices of interven-
tion in private business toward reduced supervision of economic activities in
general, better governance, and prevention of corruption.82
The 2003 Administrative License Law of the People’s Republic of China83
was another measure to improve public access to administrative agencies. This
law requires that all government departments publish information relating to
laws, regulations, licences, procedures, and complaints via the Internet.84
Websites of various government departments and agencies multiplied, but the
quality of services and depth of the information offered online has proved to be
inconsistent, indicating divergent local implementation of the statute.85 China’s
Regulations on Government Disclosure of Information approved by the State
Council on 17 January 2007 were the first national regulations concerning the
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government’s duty of public disclosure.86 These important provisions impose
a duty on all levels of government (central and local) to inform the public of
any rules and decisions made (on health care, education, public finances, etc.),
within 20 days of their enactment. However, the regulations confer broad dis-
cretion on the government and its agencies to limit access to information when
necessary to prevent ‘social instability and protect the safety of the state, the pub-
lic and the economy’. Moreover, the regulations do not apply to Party com-
mittees that continue to make decisions with important legal implications in
China. Finally, the regulations do not stipulate concrete sanctions for the gov-
ernment officials who fail to comply with the provisions even though there is
an indication that such infringements will be investigated and prosecuted.
Bath notes that none of the new administrative statutes adequately address
the issue of a private party’s right to a remedy for losses caused by unlawful
administrative actions or sufficiently simplify the administrative system. Rather,
these new administrative statutes focus on a supervisory structure that rein-
forces the importance of the central government.87 The priority given by the
Chinese government to the regulation of institutional capacity, particularly to
its purpose and orientation,88 may reveal different levels of support for the
process of internalization of international norms and standards of transparency.
There is little doubt that the Chinese government is concerned about its legit-
imacy as an important Member of the WTO. Local governments, on the other
hand, might question the legitimacy of the international norms that ground
local economic and administrative reforms since internalization of such norms
ultimately limits the role of local authorities in the making of rules and norms.
Implementation of the SPS Agreement and its related transparency provisions
has revealed that the problem with internalization of international norms remains
linked to the scope of authority of the central and local authorities.89 It is note-
worthy that food safety, animal health, and plant health in China are overseen
by a single ministerial, administrative organ—the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ).90 AQSIQ falls directly
under the State Council, the highest executive state organ of the PRC chaired by
the Premier. It is the main legislative, administrative, and supervisory body in this
area91 and is in charge of national quality; metrology; entry-exit commodity
inspection; entry-exit health quarantine; entry-exit animal and plant quaran-
tine; import-export food safety, certification, accreditation, and standardization;
as well as the enforcement of administrative law.92 AQSIQ’s laws and implement-
ing regulations are available on its website in Chinese and, for the most part, in
English,93 while its ordinances and notices are available only in Chinese.
At present, the AQSIQ website is the only source of information on the 
Chinese SPS measures available to foreigners.94 AQSIQ also oversees China’s
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National Enquiry Point, established in response to paragraph 3 of Annex B of
the SPS Agreement,95 while China’s National Notification Authority (NNA),96
established in response to paragraph 10 of Annex B, is located at the WTO
Notification and Enquiry Center of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).
The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the
ministries and agencies charged with implementation of SPS measures and,
together with AQSIQ, drafts and adopts guidelines on notification with respect
to SPS measures.97
Formulation of national standards for food hygiene is the mandate of the
highest central government body, the State Council, and its competent depart-
ments.98 The Standardization Law places food hygiene standards in the cate-
gory of ‘compulsory’ national and trade standards.99 Compulsory standards
are standards ‘for safeguarding human health and ensuring the safety of the per-
son and of property and those for compulsory executions as prescribed by the
laws and administrative rules and regulations’. 100 However, ‘local standards for-
mulated by standardization administration departments of provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government
for the safety and sanitary requirements of industrial products’ are also com-
pulsory standards within their respective administrative areas.101 In other words,
local governments are still responsible for standards of locally produced goods.
It can be difficult to access Chinese legislation, procedures, and regulations
related to SPS measures and safeguarding food, human, animal, and plant
health through government web pages other than AQSIQ. For example, the
MOFCOM web page contains links entitled ‘E-Government’ and ‘Your Com-
ment’. However, these links contain no additional information.102 Another
problem is that regulatory measures are sometimes spread over several pieces
of legislation, making the legal framework less coherent and transparent. For
example, while the main legislation on food safety is the Food Hygiene Law
(PRC),103 provisions governing food control and food hygiene, including pro-
visions related to the import and export of food, can be found in other legis-
lation, such as the Law on Product Quality.104 The Law on the Entry and Exit
of Animals and Plant Quarantine (PRC), with its Implementing Regulations,105
deals with animal and plant health, but provisions governing animal and plant
health can also be found in the Frontier Health and Quarantine Law (PRC),106
(including its Specific Rules),107 which governs the prevention of infectious
diseases from spreading into and out of the country, the execution of frontier
health and quarantine inspections, and the protection of human health.108
Finally, in order to enhance transparency and facilitate public access to
information related to SPS measures, the MOFCOM website allows the gen-
eral public to submit enquiries and comments relating to import and export
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procedures in China online and allows public access online to these enquiries
and comments.109
In sum, China has made considerable efforts to comply with the SPS 
Agreement transparency requirements, including publishing regulations and
establishing the SPS Notification Authority and enquiry points, and has 
created a legal framework for the development of SPS measures and standards,
the establishment of legal responsibility, including penal provisions for non-
compliance, and creation of a network of monitoring and implementing agen-
cies. Although no claims under the SPS Agreement have been brought against
China to date, WTO Members have complained about the inadequate compli-
ance by China with international standards, often citing China’s non-
transparent regulatory measures110 and problems with its administration of
SPS measures at the national and local levels.111
Overall, China’s implementation of WTO transparency norms caused a
major shift in perspective by state elites, with legislative and regulatory reforms
accompanying that shift. However, this shift has not yet resulted in full norma-
tive consensus or consistency between international and local practices.112 Ana-
lyzed in the context of the factor of complementarity, implementation of the
WTO provisions on regulatory transparency might have been seen as desirable
not because of an overwhelming acceptance of the underlying values of good
governance and the accountability of government to society, but as a means of
exercising central government control over local governments and their agen-
cies, since the administrative reforms give the latter the role of implementation
only and not that of enactment or interpretation of the relevant administra-
tive rules and standards.113
VI. Conclusion
Compliance with WTO provisions on regulatory transparency has become
increasingly important as international trade integration has widened and
deepened. A number of countries, both developed and developing, face numer-
ous difficulties in complying with the far-reaching WTO requirements. The
selective adaptation discourse helps to explain the process of localization of
international norms in Japan and China. The selective adaptation paradigm
allows us determine the extent to which non-compliance, or less than full com-
pliance, can be attributed to the cultural particularities of states and to what
extent other factors, such as lack of political will or institutional shortcom-
ings, are relevant to non-compliance. Non-compliance due to cultural differ-
ences could be remedied either by allowing for more flexible compliance, that
is, by allowing for the selective localization of international norms or by building
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normative consensus through broad political, administrative, and cultural
reforms. This analysis illustrates that shifts in perception of regulatory trans-
parency norms in China and Japan have had important economic and politi-
cal consequences internally and externally. Moreover, these shifts have brought
about significant administrative law reforms and have contributed to their
improved compliance with international norms. Such shifts in perception take
place over a relatively long period of time, require a serious commitment on
the part of all levels of government, and utilize significant financial resources
to build the required institutional capacity. In the meantime, better under-
standing of local conditions is needed in order to reach normative consensus
and to accommodate more flexible approaches to compliance.
The transformation of the world trading system is at the centre of debate
between international scholars and national governments. Interdependence
of national economies and conflicts of national regulatory policies require
greater cooperation and coordination in the creation of, and compliance with,
regulatory norms. A selective adaptation paradigm distinguishes a variety of
factors of compliance with international treaties and explains compliance with
WTO rules as a complex process of implementation of WTO rules through
the reference to local conditions.
Selective adaptation calls for an examination of the impact of international
norms on local practices. Reference to the factors of perception, complemen-
tarity, and legitimacy, in addition to factoring in institutional capacity, enable
us to determine the reasons for non-compliance. While cultural relativism
could be one of the reasons of non-compliance, it is neither the only one nor
the one that justifies non-compliance. Developing an adequate educational
program and training interpretative agents could close the cultural gap between
international norms and local practices. As selective adaptation analysis applied
to China and Japan in this article reveals, factors other than normative consen-
sus, such as lack of political will and institutional capacity, should be taken
into consideration when a Member State’s capacity to consistently comply with
the WTO principles is examined. As argued in this paper, on one hand, China
and Japan revised their legislation and administrative regulations to accommo-
date reception of the WTO transparency rules. However, on the other hand,
problems with non-transparent practices of local administrative bodies keep
reappearing in both countries, making the complete compliance and incor-
poration of the WTO standards uncertain in practice.
If the assessment of current Members’ performance of their WTO obligations
is the starting point of the reform of the world trading system, then selective
adaptation offers a valuable insight into the reality of the compliance process.
The underlying point of selective adaptation is that normative tensions lead to
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conflicting and non-uniform reception of international standards by local
communities and administrative bodies. This discourse signals that progres-
sive compliance with international regulatory norms is a complex process that
takes on a variety of ways in different countries. It is thus increasingly impor-
tant to understand this process—from the acceptance of the WTO obligations
by state parties to their translation into local rules and practices—especially
when the WTO membership increases and becomes even more diverse in the
socio-historical, economic, and political development of acceding states.
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Domestic Politics and the Search for a New Social
Purpose of Governance for the WTO: A Proposal
for a Declaration on Domestic Consultation
SEEMA SAPRA*
I. Introduction
Clarification and enlargement of the role of non-state actors has been a recurring
theme in discussions on World Trade Organization (WTO) institutional reform.
The usual emphasis is on an enhanced role for civil society actors, including
both value-based international NGOs and private interests, in WTO activities
in Geneva.1 Departing from this focus on Geneva-based participation and on
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), this chapter examines whether and
why the WTO institutional reform project should also concern itself with the
role of non-state actors at the domestic level of trade policy-making.2
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part II discusses why a project on
WTO institutional reform should be concerned with domestic transparency and
participation issues in respect of how trade policy is formulated and imple-
mented. The WTO displays a dysfunction in a lack of congruence between the
power structure and the ‘social purpose’ of the regime. The resulting divergence
between power and social purpose leads to current difficulties in negotiating
the Doha Round, which are a manifestation of the struggle over defining the
social purpose of the WTO. The new social purpose of the global trade regime
must derive its content from the social purpose of governance at the domes-
tic level. A new embedded liberal compromise must emerge from within the
domestic politics of WTO Members.
Part III of this chapter highlights the reflexive and dynamic linkages between
the domestic and the international in the functioning of the WTO. It argues that
conceptualizing the WTO as a system of multi-level governance, which includes
the domestic sphere as a site of governance, can be useful in designing reform
proposals. Reform-oriented changes to processes and institutions at the inter-
national level should not have undesirable effects on participation at the domes-
tic level. More proactively, WTO reform proposals must address the domestic
origins of the WTO crisis and recommend changes in WTO rules and processes
that will stimulate reform of domestic trade policy-making toward more broad-
based and inclusive stakeholder participation. Efforts to reform the WTO, and
in particular institutional reform proposals that target the role of non-state
actors and external transparency, must be based on a holistic understanding of
how the WTO works as a multi-level system of trade governance. The central-
ity of domestic political processes to the WTO’s functioning necessitates more
transparency and participation by non-state actors in engagement with the
WTO at the domestic level.
Part IV discusses potential reform proposals that could lead to improved
stakeholder participation at the domestic level. In particular, it is recommended
that the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) of the WTO include review
of a Member’s consultation mechanisms for trade policy-making at the domes-
tic level. A declaration on domestic consultation should be adopted by the
WTO General Council to provide guidance to the Trade Policy Review Body,
as well as to Members in designing domestic consultation procedures. The
WTO should also engage in capacity building in domestic consultation pro-
cedures for trade policy-making. Some ideas for conceptualizing and evaluating
non-state actor capacity, preparedness, and engagement at the domestic level
are also discussed.
Before proceeding, a distinction must be drawn between the terms ‘non-state
actor’ and ‘NGO’ in the sense in which these are used in this chapter. The term
‘NGO’ is narrower than the term ‘non-state actor’. There are two essential char-
acteristics in which NGOs (being a particular type of non-state actor them-
selves) differ from other non-state actors. First, organizations usually categorized
as NGOs have a non-profit or voluntary character. And second, unlike other
non-state actors NGOs must have a basic organizational structure and not be
ad hoc or spontaneous entities. A useful definition of NGOs offered by Martens
is that these are ‘formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations
whose primary aim is to promote common goods at the national or the inter-
national level’.3 NGOs do not have an international legal personality and are
governed (if at all) by relevant national regulation of the state where they are
located. Archer points out that the phrase NGO was originally ‘an awkwardly
negative title coined by the United Nations’ and that it described ‘a vast range
of international and national citizens organizations, trade unions, voluntary
associations, research institutes, public policy centers, private government agen-
cies, business and trade associations, foundations and charitable endeavors’.4
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The term ‘non-state actor’ is a residual catch-all category that can include
all private non-governmental or societal actors and can accommodate the
diversity deriving from ‘differences in size, duration, range and scope of activ-
ities, ideologies, cultural background, organizational culture and legal status’.5
Thus profit-oriented private actors like businesses are also non-state actors.
Similarly, political parties are also non-state actors as their pursuit of political
power would disqualify them from being classified as NGOs.6 The term ‘non-
state actor’ is broad enough to encompass ad hoc movements; individual citizens
(whether natural or corporate); parliamentarians; components of the state like
parliaments, judges, bureaucrats, journalists, academics, lawyers, and individ-
ual producers and consumers who are directly affected by trade policy decisions.
This chapter discusses the appropriate role for non-state actors in the global
governance of international trade.
II. The Domestic Origins of the WTO Crisis 
Any account of the contemporary institutional challenges facing the World
Trade Organization cannot help but emphasize the evolving nature of the rela-
tionship between the world trade regime and its developing country member-
ship. The difficulties in concluding the Doha Round of trade talks underline the
serious crisis that threatens the future relevance of the organization. There is how-
ever, no consensus among trade law scholars on how to problematize the WTO.7
It is suggested that disagreements about what is going wrong at the WTO
and consequentially about what kinds of reforms are required stem in large part
from the significant dissonance on the fundamental premises regarding the
role, purpose, and objectives of the WTO.8 Drawing on the theoretical framework
of John Ruggie’s article on embedded liberalism, this chapter suggests that the
‘crisis’ at the WTO raises questions about the institution’s proper role, purpose,
and objective in the globalized political economy.9 Ruggie’s article is famous for
having described the post–Bretton Woods global economic regime until the
early eighties as a period of ‘embedded liberalism’.10 According to Ruggie, this idea
signified ‘a grand social bargain whereby all sectors of society agreed to open
markets, … but also to contain and share the social adjustment costs that open
markets inevitably produce’.11 The embedded liberalism compromise ensured
that economic liberalization was embedded in social community.12
At its core, Ruggie’s 1982 article is about ‘governance’ and its roots (embed-
dedness) in a particular political, social, and economic context. Ruggie’s cen-
tral idea is his interpretation of what he terms the ‘structure of international
authority’ or his model explaining regime formation and transformation. This
chapter focuses on this aspect of Ruggie’s analysis that explores how ‘governance’
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via an international regime acquires ‘purpose’ and thereby ‘legitimacy’ by virtue
of its embeddedness in the political, social, and economic fabric at the level of
states, which are traditionally the default and original sites for governance. These
ideas about governance, legitimacy, and the emergence of regimes are useful in
identifying the reasons that the WTO needs reform. They also call attention to
the domestic origins of the WTO’s difficulties and the need for creating a new
consensus on trade liberalization and regulation within WTO Members.
A. The Theoretical Framework of Embedded Liberalism 
The idea of embedded liberalism in Ruggie’s article can be conceptualized at
two different levels of analysis. First, Ruggie used the term to describe the actual
normative substantive bargain that was struck in the Bretton Woods negotia-
tions and that found expression in the rules in the GATT. Thus the phrase
‘embedded liberalism’ conveys the substance of the agreement about how trade
liberalization would be balanced by attention to domestic economic security
and stability by governments. The second sense in which Ruggie’s article uses
the phrase ‘embedded liberalism’ is to describe the political and social struc-
tural origins of the political authority that was projected into the international
sphere after the interwar period to set up the international economic regime,
and which was based on a particular understanding of ‘state-society relations’
relevant to the time’s social context. Thus the nature of the regime that emerged
after World War II was determined by and was rooted in the ‘collective reality’
of that time concerning the proper scope of political authority in economic 
relations. In this sense, all viable regimes must necessarily be embedded within
a particular social and political context. The failure to establish a particular
regime or the disintegration of an existing regime can be explained on account
of the incompatibility of its social purpose with the ‘collective reality’ of its
times as to the proper scope of governmental authority.
Ruggie begins with the proposition that the formation and transformation of
international regimes represents a ‘concrete manifestation of the internationaliza-
tion of political authority’.13 He then moves on to consider how the internation-
alization of political authority takes place. What is the appropriate ‘generative
grammar’ or model that can explain regime formation? Ruggie rejects the expla-
nation provided by the hegemonic stability model on account of its focus on
power alone and its failure to consider the social purpose of a regime. The hege-
monic stability model is inadequate in that it does not offer any guidance on the
‘content’ of a particular regime.14 As Ruggie further explains: ‘Whatever its insti-
tutional manifestations, internationalized political authority in an international
regime represents a fusion of power with legitimate social purpose.’15
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It is through this combination of power and legitimate social purpose that
political authority is manifested as well as legitimated in a regime. Thus Ruggie
accepts the role of power in the establishment of an international regime. How-
ever, such exercise of power by itself cannot explain why a regime is estab-
lished in the sense of being unable to explain what purpose or objectives the
regime is expected to serve. How does a regime arrive at its social purpose? In
asking this question, Ruggie directs our attention to the original source of legit-
imized power—domestic politics within states—and to domestic definitions
and purposes of state power. Since the original source of power employed by
powerful states is located in their domestic politics, it is there we must look to
understand the constraints on and the ends of such power and the purposes
for which it can be deployed, legitimately or otherwise.16
We must examine the contours of political authority within states, for it is
there that the social purpose for the deployment of political authority is forged
initially. Within the domestic environment of a state, domestic politics (rooted
in social and economic structures) determines ‘state-society relations’ in the eco-
nomic sphere by a balancing between ‘authority’ and ‘market’.17 Such balancing
defines the ‘legitimate social purposes’, in pursuit of which state power can be
employed in the domestic economy.18 These understandings of ‘state-society
relations’ at state level form the building blocks for the formulation of social
purpose at the international level.
With the internationalization of political authority, the distribution of
power between actors in the international system becomes relevant. Depend-
ing on the prevailing distribution of power between states, the social purpose
of a regime or its ‘collective reality’ can either be provided by a hegemon uni-
laterally or arise from a compromise between leading economic powers. Which
states get to participate in the internationalization of political authority and in
the negotiations about an international regime’s social purpose is determined
by the extent of power and influence that they enjoy in the given context.
Using this theoretical framework, Ruggie explains the emergence of the
post-1945 regime citing three causal factors: (1) a strong U.S. hegemony;
(2) a quest for domestic stability shared by all influential states; and (3) the
legitimacy resulting from a set of social objectives shared by the leading eco-
nomic powers. In describing the substantive nature of this regime, Ruggie char-
acterizes it as a new and different kind of liberalism. This ‘embedded’ liberalism
provided a framework that would ‘safeguard and even aid the quest for domes-
tic stability without, at the same time, triggering the mutually destructive exter-
nal consequences that had plagued the interwar period’.19
Ruggie’s embedded liberalism is multilateral but with its multilateralism
‘predicated upon domestic intervention’.20 The embedded liberalism bargain
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had both an international and a domestic side. The social purpose of this
regime was ultimately derived from the social purpose for governance forged
in domestic politics over appropriate state-society relations in the regime-
giving states.21 It is in this sense, that for Ruggie ‘economic liberalization was
embedded in social community’.
Ruggie’s interpretation of the internationalization of political authority in
a regime is relevant for the topic of WTO institutional reform in several ways.
First, it provides an explanation for when regimes are likely to form. Regimes
are most likely to form when the concentration of power internationally 
co-varies positively with the purpose that the regime would advance. This
could occur during a period of hegemony, when a single state chooses to
advance its preferred social purpose through an international regime. Or it
could occur when international power is not concentrated in a single state but
is shared by a group of states. This group acting cooperatively and exhibiting
a convergence of social purpose can deploy its collective power to establish a
regime that advances the common social purpose of governance. Congruence
between power and social purpose facilitates and might even be essential for
a regime to be established.
Second, Ruggie’s analysis provides information on what kinds of regimes
are likely to emerge and be sustained. Regimes that advance ‘social purposes’
considered as ‘legitimate’ for the exercise of the power that is instrumental in
establishing the regime are more likely to exist and subsist.
Third, Ruggie’s model can be applied to changes within regimes and to
changes of regimes. Regimes are likely to weaken on account of growing diver-
gence between the distribution of power within or surrounding a regime and
the social purpose of a regime. However, challenges to the hegemonic exercise
of power by the emergence of other powerful states might not threaten a regime
if the emerging powers have a shared preference for the social purpose of the
regime and continue to support the regime to further that social purpose.
Fourth and most crucially, the above theoretical framework tells us that
the social purpose of a regime, which we can call its ‘social purpose of gover-
nance’, must derive its meaning, content, and therefore legitimacy from the
social purpose of governance at the domestic level. This congruence between
the social purpose of governance for a regime and the social purpose of gov-
ernance for states (who participate in the regime) is an important determi-
nant of ‘legitimacy’ perceptions about a regime. Because the transfer of
legitimate power or political authority to a regime takes place from the domes-
tic site for governance (the state) to a new site for governance (the interna-
tional regime), the exercise of such authority at the international level must be
responsive to the needs of governance as defined at the domestic level. In the
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absence of such responsiveness, the regime is likely to face challenges to its
legitimacy. This responsiveness is of course a political requirement only in
respect of the domestic politics of regime-givers (and especially if their domes-
tic politics is democratic). Regimes need not reflect the aspirations of the
regime-takers, who lack power to reject a regime and are thus excluded from
negotiating its social purpose.
B. Historical Externalization of Costs to 
Developing Countries 
To understand the present-day WTO crisis, account must be taken of where
developing countries were placed under the embedded liberalism of the GATT.
Scholarship on embedded liberalism under the GATT has generally been silent
about the terms of participation of developing countries. In the main, Ruggie
approaches his topic from the perspective of the developed countries, whom
he called the ‘regime-makers’. In the final section of his article, under the sub-
heading ‘Stress, contradiction, and the future’, Ruggie asks, ‘How enduring is
embedded liberalism?’22
The future of embedded liberalism, Ruggie argues, depends on stresses in
the world political economy produced by the three major modes through
which the costs of maintaining the embedded liberalism compromise had,
until 1982, been successfully externalized by the regime-makers. These three
modes for externalization of adjustment costs were (1) the intertemporal mode,
via inflation; (2) the intersectoral mode, ‘whereby pressure on domestic and
international public authorities is vented into the realm of private markets’;23
and (3) the interstratum mode, whereby ‘regime-makers’ shift a dispropor-
tionate share of adjustment costs onto those who are ‘regime-takers’.24 In his
later work, Ruggie elaborated on the externalization of adjustment costs to the
developing countries under embedded liberalism:
The developing countries, of course, never enjoyed the privilege of cushioning
the adverse domestic effects of market exposure in the first place. The majority lack
the resources, institutional capacity, international support, and, in some instances,
the political interest on the part of their ruling elites.25
Ruggie has himself declared that the compromise of embedded liberalism has
never fully extended to the developing countries.26
Ruggie thought it inevitable that the stresses underlying the GATT’s embed-
ded liberalism would require ‘some manner of renegotiating the forms of
domestic and international social accommodation reflected in embedded lib-
eralism’.27 He regarded inflation as the most serious threat to the future of the
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post-1945 embedded liberalism regime and as being most ‘likely to lead to a
direct renegotiation of the modus vivendi that has characterised embedded
liberalism’.28 The exclusion of developing countries from the embedded liber-
alism compromise by the externalization of its adjustment costs did not, in
1982, strike Ruggie as potentially proving ‘fatal’ for the future of embedded
liberalism.29 However, as the Doha Round difficulties demonstrate, the future
of the WTO regime is today perhaps most seriously threatened by the refusal
of the developing countries to continue to bear the adjustment costs of the
rapidly unravelling embedded liberalism compromise. Writing in 1982,
Ruggie did not foresee the immense structural changes to the international
political economy that have occurred in this and the previous decade and the
accompanying power shifts in the transition from the GATT to the WTO.
C. Power Shifts at the WTO 
In order to describe the unravelling of the embedded liberalism compromise,
one must return to the transformations unleashed by the Uruguay Round in
the WTO’s power structure. The Uruguay Round has been described as a grand
North-South bargain: a deal negotiated among the regime-makers later offered
to the developing countries with the option to take it or leave it. The regime-
makers during the Uruguay Round were essentially the United States, the Euro-
pean Community, Japan, and Canada. Lacking expertise, resources, and
influence, developing countries were unable to participate in the Uruguay
Round negotiations that lasted nearly a decade and were often conducted
through inaccessible informal bilateral processes between the United States
and the European Union.30 However, the Uruguay Round represents a water-
shed in the evolution of the multilateral trading system. It will be remembered
as the round after which developing countries could no longer be ignored in
international trade negotiations. In the new regime that the round heralded,
developing countries began to move to the centre stage of global trade nego-
tiations, and that process has only further accelerated.
The WTO functions very differently from the GATT. Developing countries
are now politically integrated in the WTO regime. The old group of regime-
makers has expanded to form the core group in the recently concluded July 2008
mini-ministerial.31 The old GATT-era power centres have been joined by new
power centres in the WTO, especially the emerging economies. Organized
coalitions of developing countries have become effective players with signifi-
cant success in blocking bad deals and in agenda setting. China’s accession to
the WTO has further shifted the WTO’s power structure.
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There are many reasons for the power shifts within the WTO. While partly
the result of globalization and the geographical diversification of economic
growth and prosperity, the power shifts in the WTO have also been facilitated
and encouraged by the WTO regime itself.32 The WTO Agreements have
changed the negotiating rules and practices in the global trade regime. The
WTO is more democratic. The ‘single undertaking’ approach and de facto con-
sensus decision-making have worked to empower developing countries in
talks. New negotiating practices are more inclusive, with a greater emphasis
on transparency, input-legitimacy, and participation by less developed coun-
tries. The dispute settlement mechanism, with the reverse consensus rule,
allows less powerful WTO Members to enforce compliance by stronger trad-
ing partners. The Internet has played an important role in empowering less
developed states by significantly improving availability of information and
creating greater global connectedness.33 Internet-enabled transparency in nego-
tiations empowers developing countries and many non-state actors who were
excluded from participation in earlier trade rounds.34
Increased involvement of civil society and global movements in global
trade governance along with other facets of globalization are changing iden-
tities and interests. Yet another reason for the empowerment of developing
countries in the WTO is a growth in confidence, ability, and expertise among
diplomats and officials from developing countries on the substantive and 
procedural aspects of international trade negotiations. All this has resulted in
dramatic changes to the power distribution in the WTO regime. Today, devel-
oping countries are certainly no longer mere regime-takers. Indeed, some emerg-
ing economies can now be considered part of the regime-givers category. Other
developing countries could probably play the role of regime-makers if they are
able to cooperate with other countries through effective issue-based coalitions.
At the very least, most of the active developing country participants in the Doha
Round are now capable of playing the part of regime-blockers.
Another important change that became visible during the Uruguay Round
was the growing influence of private power in determining the agenda and
outcomes of trade negotiations. The new issues of the Uruguay Round (serv-
ices, investment, and intellectual property) became central to the U.S. negoti-
ating agenda because of the influence of American business and industry.35
The influence of private power on government trade policy-making has con-
tinued to increase in developed as well as in developing countries. This new shift
toward public-private partnership in trade governance has further changed
the politics of international trade governance at both the domestic and the
international levels.36
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D. The Unravelling of Embedded Liberalism and the 
Need for a New Social Purpose of Governance 
Recent scholarship has focused on how globalization is putting the embedded
liberalism compromise under severe stress in the developed economies. This
stress has resulted in increasing opposition to trade liberalization in the domes-
tic politics of these countries. Howse has argued that the agenda that drove
the Uruguay Round and then went on to form the core of the WTO treaties
‘would prove to be the greatest threat so far to the sustainability of embedded
liberalism’.37 He adds that the WTO rules have had much more ambiguous
welfare effects than the GATT rules, and ‘the issue of who gains and who loses
within a given society rears its head and cannot be avoided…’.38
Embedded liberalism in developed economies is in trouble. In recent work
on embedded liberalism, Ruggie sheds more light on the problem. The prob-
lem today for the industrialized countries is that 
embedded liberalism presupposed an international world. It presupposed the exis-
tence of national economies, engaged in external transactions, conducted at arm’s
length, which governments could mediate at the border by tariffs and exchange
rates, among other tools. The globalization of financial markets and production
chains, however, challenges each of these premises and threatens to leave behind
merely national social bargains.39
Howse also quite clearly differentiates between the distinct domestic and inter-
national parts to the GATT-era embedded liberalism bargain.40 He explains
that under embedded liberalism 
the function of assuring that trade liberalization commitments worked with, not
against, the needs of the domestic polity was understood as in the first instance
domestic; … the law of trade was essentially designed to be permissive toward the
domestic polity performing those functions (safeguards, etc.).41
As both Ruggie and Howse explain, globalization and an expanding trade
agenda have encroached on and disturbed the domestic promise of embedded
liberalism. Trade liberalization is today increasingly concerned with positive
obligations (non-tariff barriers and across-the-border measures instead of tar-
iff reductions), and the autonomy that states enjoyed under the GATT in their
domestic regulation is coming under challenge in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. The slide of policy issues and choices, which were previously
defined as domestic, into the international arena decreases the potential for
input legitimacy and accountability in domestic politics.42
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The integration of developing economies into the global trade regime has
also affected the maintenance of the embedded liberalism compromise in
developed economies. As mentioned earlier, Ruggie did not believe that devel-
oping countries gained from the old embedded liberalism compromise.43
Further, as developing countries were excluded from participation in negoti-
ations on the social purpose of the regime, the international component of
the embedded liberalism bargain itself externalized the adjustment costs 
of developed countries to developing countries. Many commentators have
pointed out that the trade regime under the GATT exhibited a structural bias
toward the industrialized Members.44
The power shifts at the WTO mean that developing countries are no longer
willing to bear the costs of the old embedded liberalism bargain. Rapidly grow-
ing emerging economies are in fact exporting the costs of their own growth to
other countries, including developed countries. Having gained significant influ-
ence at the WTO, developing countries now need to be included in any new
compromise. The Doha Round battles over dismantling the old structural
imbalances in the global trading regime and the rising protectionist sentiment
in the developed world all point to the demands emanating from capitals for
a new embedded liberalism bargain, one that this time includes both the devel-
oped and the developing world. Trade policy has entered the mainstream
domestic political dialogue, and until a new compromise of embedded liber-
alism is found, trade policy will continue to remain politicized. 45
The unravelling of the embedded liberalism compromise at the domestic
level is at the heart of the crisis facing the WTO. A new compromise, one 
better suited to contemporary globalization and the changed global political
economy, is needed. Ruggie’s work points the way forward. The search for a new
compromise to sustain the global trade regime is nothing less than a search
for a new social purpose of governance. However, existing differences in the eco-
nomic, political, and social development levels between industrialized and
developing countries make it difficult for the WTO membership to arrive at a
consensus on what the social purpose of the WTO ought to be.
Ruggie’s question—how does a regime arrive at its social purpose?—
is extremely important in today’s context. This social purpose of governance
is initially forged within the domestic political context of states and involves
reaching a balance between ‘authority’ and ‘market’. The domestic determina-
tion of the appropriate role for government defines the ‘legitimate social 
purposes’, in pursuit of which state power can be employed in the domestic
economy.46 In other words, it is through the domestic political process that
social compacts are formed or consensus is reached on how far the state ought
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to interfere with the market in the domestic economy and for what reasons.
These domestic understandings of ‘state-society relations’ then go on to deter-
mine the social purpose that an international regime advances. Once the social
purpose of governance is forged within individual states, the preferences of
different regime-giving states, which could diverge or converge, form the build-
ing blocks for determining the social purpose of an international regime.
The challenge for the WTO is to arrive at substantive bargains that help
embed trade liberalization in both developed and developing countries. An
international regime that fails to align its social purpose with the social pur-
pose of governance as forged in the domestic social and political economies of
its influential members runs the risk of dysfunctionality. Such a regime is likely
to encounter challenges to its legitimacy and to the legitimacy of the domes-
tic political authority that enforces it. Ruggie’s theoretical framework provides
that the social purpose of economic governance must first be forged within the
domestic context of a state. And this social purpose may differ among states
depending on their particular individual circumstances and developmental
status. WTO institutional reform, therefore, must include within its scope
reform of domestic trade policy-making and capacity building. If a new global
compromise of embedded liberalism is going to emerge, it must do so with
domestic consensus on trade policy.
III. The WTO System of Multi-level Trade Governance 
This section explores how unpacking the governance structure of the WTO
takes us back into domestic decision-making and to the importance of part-
nerships between the private, non-profit, and public sectors if the gains from
trade are to be realized. Given the WTO’s basic character as a Geneva-based
international organization, discussions on its institutional reform, with some
justification, tend to dwell on the organizational aspects of the WTO in Geneva.
The themes that are usually considered include the role of the Secretariat and
the Director-General; adequacy of financial and other resources available in
Geneva to carry on WTO activities; the rules of conduct of WTO business
including negotiations, ministerial meetings, dispute settlement activities, and
regular meetings of various WTO committees and sub-committees; issues of
transparency with regard to making documents public; issues of access to the
WTO’s Geneva-based activities for non-state actors; and the reform of proce-
dural rules for decision-making and the organization of other WTO activi-
ties. The focus of the debate on WTO institutional reform has remained its
activities, staff, and resources based in Geneva.47 This, however, neglects the
more complex character of the WTO.
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The WTO website attempts to answer for the general public the fundamental
question—what is the WTO? The answer suggests that the WTO is first and
foremost a negotiating forum. This idea is useful in emphasizing the intergov-
ernmental and member-driven nature of the organization. The WTO is, of
course, much more than just a negotiating forum. It includes a dispute settle-
ment mechanism, and treaty rules (both substantive and procedural), and a 
Secretariat with staff and a statesman for a Director-General. The WTO also
includes Member delegations convening collectively in their multiple avatars,
whether as the Ministerial Conference, the General Council, the Trade Nego-
tiating Committee, the DSB, the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for
Trade in Services, the Council for TRIPS, or as subsidiary committees report-
ing to the General Council.48 The WTO is also an international organization
with a building in Geneva, its own budget, and full legal personality and capac-
ity necessary to discharge its functions.49
The need for greater attention to the domestic context becomes evident
once the WTO as a governance system is unpacked. The discussion on WTO
institutional reform requires clarity as to how the WTO governs trade. Much
has been written about the WTO and its role in global governance.50 The ‘global
governance’ dilemmas arising from the substantive content of WTO law both
in the treaties and in DSU jurisprudence have received considerable atten-
tion.51 However, the structure of the WTO, including the processes through
which it makes trade rules, has not been adequately analyzed from the per-
spective of ‘governance’.52 The Sutherland Report advised that reform efforts
should be based on the structure and mandate of the WTO. Understanding
the WTO’s political structure of trade governance could lead to more appropri-
ate suggestions on the role for non-state actors within the WTO. The reform
debates need to start their inquiry from the basic theoretical question: how is
the WTO system supposed to work?53
A useful way of conceptualizing WTO is to understand the procedural,
institutional, or political structure of the processes through which the WTO 
governs trade. The global governance of trade takes place through a series of
complex interactions between various actors and processes in what is broadly
a two-tier system of decision-making and participation. The member-driven
intergovernmental organization that it is, the WTO fits well into the framework
of Robert Putnam’s logic of two-level games where rule formulation takes
place at two levels—first at the national level, where domestic trade policy gets
formulated, then at the international level, where global rules are negotiated,
and finally again at the domestic level, where internationally agreed rules are
implemented and enforced.54 Instead of a narrow conception of the WTO as
an international organization created by treaty rules and based in Geneva with
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its premises, Secretariat staff and interactions with and among Member State
delegations, this chapter adopts a broad conception of the WTO as a member-
driven intergovernmental organization with a system of global trade gover-
nance that operates at two levels—the international and the domestic. Viewed
in this manner, the WTO system of trade governance encompasses a much
broader range of actors and processes of participation at both the interna-
tional and the domestic levels.55 Conceptualized as a system of multi-level 
governance, the WTO’s structure and design itself make the argument for
inclusive non-state stakeholder participation at the domestic level.
The domestic political space of WTO Members is where inter-linkages
between governance, development, and trade are negotiated by domestic actors.
These inter-linkages lead to the formulation of the national interest in inter-
national trade. The conception of international trade negotiations as a two-level
game allows recognition of the presence of domestic conflict over identifying
the ‘national interest’. Assuming an ideal WTO, where the political processes
work perfectly in the sense of involving all stakeholders, both at the domestic
level and at the intergovernmental level, the law emanating from such a process
would be expected to be optimal. This will happen only if domestic politics is
robust and inclusive. Getting the politics right at the first level is essential
because international trade politics presupposes independent sovereign sym-
metrical states.
Participation patterns at the domestic level determine negotiation gains
for a country at the international level. Similarly, how the WTO functions at
the international level can influence domestic processes of participation in
trade governance and policy-making. The linkages between the international
and domestic levels in two-level negotiating games like the WTO system are
complex, dynamic, and reflexive. The interaction works both ways. The dynamic
of participation and negotiations at the international level directly feeds into
how processes and institutions of participation get structured at the domestic
level. And processes at the domestic level significantly determine the interna-
tional outcome. Ostry has noted that the domestic political processes of the
European Union and United States have been the major determinant of
the agenda and dynamics of the international process and of outcomes under
the GATT and the WTO.56
Theories and definitions of modern governance provide more support for
the argument that the role of non-state actors in domestic governance of trade
is a relevant theme in the project of WTO institutional reform. Modern gov-
ernance debates have moved away from the idea of government to the idea of
governance, and away from the idea of ruling and to the idea of steering.57
Governance now involves non-hierarchical steering and management of
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networks of public and private actors. Writing about trade policy consultation
processes in Canada, Robert Wolfe comments that, in newer areas of trade 
policy, it is no longer possible to assume the ‘centralized bureaucratic state’.58
Regulators no longer ‘command and control’; instead they ‘negotiate and per-
suade’.59 According to Wolfe, the unit for policy analysis in trade governance
today is no longer the bureaucracy positioned in a hierarchical relationship
with respect to other actors. Instead, contemporary trade policy-making involves
collaborative horizontal relationships between government agents and non-state
actors. Economic actors are often implementation agents for the state. And
sometimes economic agents are in the position of principals instructing the 
government on policy goals.60
In his work on governance, Jan Kooiman captures the role for ‘governing’
interactions between state and non-state actors in modern governance.
Governing, according to Kooiman, includes all activities of social, political,
and administrative actors that amount to purposeful efforts to guide, steer,
control, or manage societies. The patterns that emerge from the governing
activities of these actors become governance.61 Similarly, Yanacopulos empha-
sizes interactions between state and non-state actors as part and parcel of
governance. She describes governance as ‘a purposive activity’ where state and
non-state actors ‘attempt to influence other political actors by ways in which
they frame and steer issues’.62 Governance as an ‘explanatory framework’
explains the ‘changing strategic relationship between state and non-state actors
in world politics.’63 A similar emphasis on state and non-state actor interaction
is found in the definition of governance adopted by the Commission on Global
Governance. According to the commission, governance is 
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, man-
age their common affairs…. It includes formal institutions and regimes empow-
ered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.64
The WTO system of trade governance includes space at both the international
and domestic levels for state and non-state actors to engage in trade gover-
nance through their interactions, struggles, and negotiations.65 Governance
results from the sum total of the interactions between all actors at all levels.
Interactions and the rules regulating them are as important as institutions and
the actors who participate. Global trade governance extends beyond the WTO’s
formal structure to all activities and interactions between state and non-state
actors that have the governing effect of steering trade policy.66
The state still remains relevant, though with a shifting role. Governing
activity is diffused over various social actors with the state increasingly in the
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role of facilitator and cooperating partner.67 Networks of societal actors work
in cooperation with and often under the direction of the state.68 Competition
between the public and the private sector is replaced by collaboration.69
Governance becomes a balancing process.70 It is no longer static but involves
constant coming to grips with governing needs and governing capacities. It
needs adaptive capacity.71 Governance outcomes depend on the quality of gov-
erning interactions.72 The challenge is to make governing interactions produc-
tive.73 Good global trade governance must, therefore, encourage processes and
rules that have a positive influence on the context and substance of interactions
between state and non-state actors at both the international and domestic 
levels. The good governance principles of transparency and participation should
define the appropriate role for non-state actors within the WTO system.74
A deconstruction of how the WTO governs international trade shows that
the roadblocks in Geneva often arise on account of imperfect governance at the
domestic level.75 This is yet another reason for the project on WTO institu-
tional reform to discuss institutional changes that would have positive effects
for how domestic trade policy gets made. The Sutherland Report notes that
Members’ objective, long-term interests reside in the development of national
capacity and policy ownership.76 The next section identifies the existence of a
capability or governance deficit in domestic trade policy-making.
IV. A Proposal for a Declaration on 
Domestic Consultation 
Thus far, this chapter highlighted the important role of domestic politics in the
ongoing WTO crisis. The domestic origins of the WTO crisis, the unravelling
of the embedded liberalism compromise, the search for a new social purpose
of governance for the WTO regime, an understanding of the WTO’s multi-
level structure of governance and the changing nature of modern governance
all underline the important role for non-state actors in trade policy-making at
the domestic level. This chapter recommends that the project on WTO insti-
tutional reform adopt as one of its objectives reform of domestic trade policy-
making and encouragement of greater transparency and stakeholder
participation in domestic engagement with the WTO. Sylvia Ostry and Robert
Wolfe have made tentative suggestions that the WTO’s Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (the TPRM) be expanded to review domestic trade policy consul-
tation processes.77 This chapter builds on this idea and develops a specific pro-
posal for a WTO declaration on domestic consultation. The proposal is made
with the expectation that it will invite discussion and advance the debate 
on WTO reform. The objective of the declaration will be to invite review of
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domestic consultation mechanisms in the trade policy reviews undertaken by
the WTO and to thereby stimulate reform of domestic trade policy-making.
The General Council of the WTO (or the Ministerial Conference) should
adopt a ‘Declaration on Domestic Consultation’. This document should call on
the Trade Policy Review Body (the TPRB) to undertake, as part of the existing
trade policy reviews, the review of Members’ consultation procedures in the
development and/or implementation of trade policy.78 The declaration should
set out the necessity and benefits of appropriate domestic consultation proce-
dures. It should also include a statement that WTO Members understand the
benefits of domestic consultation. Such a declaration will help promote a better
understanding of how the WTO works and of how states as well as domestic
non-state actors can benefit from the provisions of the WTO agreements.
The declaration should include a broad framework of guidelines on how
to design and evaluate domestic stakeholder consultation procedures and insti-
tutions. These guidelines should encourage transparency and participation by
non-state actors in domestic trade policy matters. The declaration would not
create any additional enforceable obligations for Members. The only manda-
tory feature of the declaration would be the direction to the TPRB to exam-
ine domestic consultation procedures in the trade policy reviews it undertakes.
The declaration would help promote an understanding among government
officials and non-state actors of how to engage the domestic political environ-
ment in order to obtain greater benefits from WTO membership. Regular 
discussion of Members’ consultation procedures in trade policy reviews will 
promote ‘social learning’ about the challenges of WTO participation among
institutions and actors (state and non-state) in developing and developed coun-
tries. It is likely that this will lead to the development of improved consulta-
tion mechanisms in WTO Member States.
An appraisal of how the TPRM functions demonstrates the potential benefits
from more rigorous reviews of the domestic policy-making environment. The
TPRM was established on an interim basis in 1989 under the GATT. Its orig-
inal purpose was to complement reviews that were being regularly produced
by the United States Trade Representative (USTR). It is now a permanent part
of the WTO, having been incorporated in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement.
The reviews are carried out by the TPRB based on inputs received from WTO
Secretariat officials, the Member undergoing review, and other discussants
selected and acting in their personal capacity.79 The reviews examine the 
policy statement submitted by the Member under review and the report pre-
pared by the WTO Secretariat’s Trade Policy Review Division. Secretariat reports
typically include detailed chapters that examine the macroeconomic situation
and trade policies and practices, as well as trade policy-making institutions.80
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All this information is published on the WTO website once the review is com-
plete. The TPRM consumes approximately 5 percent of the WTO annual budget.81
Trade policy reviews undertaken by the WTO are more in the nature of
positive reporting than normative reporting.82 The reports provide little more
than a description of the domestic policy landscape.83 According to Annex 3,
the TPRM is expected to help achieve ‘greater transparency in, and under-
standing of, the trade policies and practices of Members’.84 This enables collective
appreciation and evaluation of Members’ policies but is not intended for use
in enforcement of commitments and dispute settlement or to impose new policy
commitments. Assessments under the TPRM are expected to take into account
‘wider economic and developmental needs, policies and objectives’ and the exter-
nal environment of the Member under review, albeit only to the extent relevant.85
The primary function of the TPRM is to examine the impact of domestic
policies on the multilateral trading system.86 Therefore, trade policy reviews are
not an evaluation of how Members make and implement trade policy. Rather,
the reviews describe the trade policy of the Member under review. The pro-
posed declaration would introduce this new dimension of evaluation of the 
policy-making context and process into the trade policy reviews. Members
would be encouraged to examine and evaluate whether their consultation pro-
cedures are satisfactory, and other Members will have the opportunity to learn
about effective consultation and the benefits and downsides of consultation.87
Currently, Clause B of Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement titled ‘Domestic
transparency’ recognizes the value of domestic transparency in trade policy-
making and the need promote greater domestic transparency. The text clari-
fies that implementation of any initiatives to further domestic transparency
would be voluntary and ‘take account of each Member’s legal and political 
systems’. However, the declaration would go much further than this limited
recognition and would encourage reform of domestic trade politics by encour-
aging social learning on designing stakeholder consultations.
The potential for social learning stemming from the declaration is evident
from the current effects of the TPRM. The WTO website describes the TPRM
process as peer reviews that enable outsiders to understand a country’s poli-
cies but also provide feedback to the Member under review. Francois has found
that the TPRM helps promote the credibility of domestic policy reform and an
understanding of how such reform is perceived by domestic actors.88
The TPRM has the potential to assist in generating political support for domes-
tic trade-related reforms. It helps keep policy-making transparent and 
democratic by exposing policies to domestic actors. These non-state actors
include legislators, academics, business media, and the electorate.89 The 1999
Appraisal Report submitted to the Ministerial Conference by the Trade Policy
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Review Body noted the TPRM’s contribution to transparency, its role as a 
catalyst in reconsideration of policies by Members, and its input into policy for-
mulation and identification of technical assistance needs.90 The report recom-
mended that more attention be given to transparency in government
decision-making on trade policy matters in accordance with Paragraph B of
Annex 3.91 While noting that reports submitted under the TPRM often com-
plement one another, the Appraisal Report encourages governments to keep
their reports short, WTO-focused, forward-looking, and limited to highlight-
ing ‘recent trade policy development, future policy directions and their impact
on trade’.92 This recommendation demonstrates that the scope of the TPRM
is circumscribed, no doubt on account of WTO staff and funding scarcities.
However, limiting the scope of the TPRM wastes potential opportunities that
a more expansive exercise would provide and the benefits of social learning
that more detailed Member reports would offer.
A. Designing Domestic Consultations
The proposed declaration could potentially help address the domestic origins
of the WTO crisis and enable the creation of a domestic consensus on the new
social purpose of governance. The declaration should emphasize the importance
of non-state actor participation in trade policy-making and implementation.
As stated before, it should include a broad framework to provide guidance both
for the design and evaluation of domestic stakeholder consultation procedures
and institutions. This framework would enable Members to evaluate their own
consultation mechanisms and engage in social learning from others. Some ideas
for such a framework are considered here and are based on a review of some
recent literature on reform of domestic trade policy-making processes.93
The framework should be developed around three basic questions about
domestic consultation processes. First, what are or should be the objectives
for involving non-state actors in trade policy-making at the domestic level?
Second, what kinds of non-state actors should be included in domestic policy-
making processes? And third, how should the consultations with non-state
actors be structured or what would be appropriate mechanisms for such 
engagement? Finding answers to these questions will help move the debate
from its early ‘one-size fits all’ mould to a more nuanced discussion based on
differentiation between various objectives of engagement, types of non-state
actors, and the different roles that these actors perform within the multilevel
WTO system of trade governance. Some general comments on consultation as
a part of governmental policy-making processes are considered before turning
to these questions.
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Consultation is a learning process and governments can learn from each
other on how to design their own systems. However, models of trade consul-
tation are not necessarily exportable and must be conditioned to particular
national conditions.94 The determinants of consultation characteristics include
the constitutional, political, and social circumstances of a state. Thus, the polit-
ical culture of a state (its democratic character), the territorial distribution of
governmental authority (its federal or unitary character), its bureaucratic cul-
ture and politics, the characteristics of the national economy, and the partic-
ular requirements of trade policy are all factors that determine the appropriate
model of trade consultation suited to a state.95 Domestic capacity among non-
state and governmental actors also determines what kinds of consultation
processes are feasible and likely. Developed states, with more governmental
capacity, are likely to engage in more consultation. Thus the disadvantages that
accrue from inadequate consultation arise more often in less developed states.
B. Objectives of Consultations 
What are or should be the objectives for involving non-state actors in trade
policy-making? The discussion on objectives for non-state actor participation
needs to move on from the somewhat abstract values of legitimacy, accounta-
bility, and democratic deficit toward formulating more concrete objectives and
proposals for WTO institutional reform. The Sutherland Report has also called
for greater clarity with respect to the objectives for the WTO’s engagement
with civil society.96 The report states: ‘[T]here need to be explicit objectives, with
the gains and risks properly assessed….’97 It clarifies that the objectives for civil
society engagement must depend on the WTO’s mandate and structure.98 The
objectives for domestic consultation are important because the choice of objec-
tives will determine the selection of which non-state actors with whom to
engage. The objectives will also determine the appropriate mechanisms of
engagement. The objectives of domestic consultation can be divided into four
issue categories addressing various deficits: (1) legitimacy deficit; (2) access
deficit; (3) knowledge deficit; and (4) capability or governance deficit.99
1. The Legitimacy Deficit
This chapter has discussed how the consensus underpinning trade liberalization
has been undermined on account of an expanding and encroaching trade
agenda. This is responsible for the reduced political support for the WTO 
in domestic politics.100 The legitimacy deficit facing trade policy demands fun-
damental rethinking of assumptions underlying the purposes of trade diplo-
macy.101 The slide of domestic policy into the international sphere, calls for
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participatory democracy by empowered non-state actors, a decrease in public
trust of government institutions, and diminishing capacity of governments to
respond to increasingly complex governance problems all create serious legit-
imacy challenges. Zahrnt notes that actors’ preferences are a result of compe-
tition between interests and norms. While the logic of consequences dictates
interests, the logic of appropriateness makes the norm of participatory gover-
nance attractive to domestic actors.102 A sense of policy ownership among
stakeholders is essential to obtain support for implementation of controver-
sial policies.103
A key objective for including non-state actors in trade-policy consultations
must be to foster a sense of ownership of policy outcomes through participa-
tory processes. In a recent panel discussion at the World Economic Forum 
in Davos, the panellists emphasized that it is crucial to communicate with
domestic constituents on challenges of trade policy if current protectionist
sentiments are to be defeated. Consultations can help create a common vocab-
ulary and language for state and non-state actors to discuss important trade 
policy issues. Consensus-building in the domestic sphere is now an integral
part of the job description of domestic trade policy officials. Ostry points 
out how stronger domestic capability in policy formulation can help legitimize
the policy process.104 Stronger domestic capability requires public-private 
partnerships to meet trade policy governance needs. Trade policy now 
needs trade diplomacy directed as much at domestic constituents as at inter-
national audiences.105
2. The Access Deficit
There is an increasing demand for greater access to domestic trade policy
processes by non-state actors. The slide of domestic issues into the interna-
tional sphere coupled with restricted access at the international level makes
access at the national level even more important. Empowerment of non-state
actors further feeds demands for access. The Internet has made knowledge
more widely available and simultaneously made it easier for actors to network,
organize, and lobby. Hocking has recognized the need for a level playing field
in consultation processes.106 If denied adequate access at home, non-state actors
can attempt to gain influence through another state’s consultation processes
using NGO and other community networks. An expanding and encroaching
trade agenda increases the range of affected participants. Disaffected domes-
tic constituents have increased pressure for a voice in the decision-making
process. Major meetings or negotiations also act as a catalyst for non-state
actor demands for consultation.107
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3. The Knowledge Deficit
Governments rely on the business community for knowledge about how trade
policy will affect industry and the economy. Government actors in both the leg-
islative and executive branches have information needs that include evalua-
tion of the effects of WTO agreements, evaluation of domestic regulation
needed, evaluation of the effects of the interaction between domestic regula-
tion and international commitments, information on foreign trade barriers, and
information on defensive and offensive interests of domestic producers.108
Effective and beneficial participation in the WTO depends on high-quality
research and analysis.109
WTO rules and disciplines might not always prescribe the right diagnosis
and solutions to development problems. Research is needed on whether 
proposed WTO rules are consistent with national priorities. Research can iden-
tify complementary policies required to address potential negative effects of
WTO disciplines. Non-state actors like business can supply relevant informa-
tion to assess the domestic gains or losses from potential policies. Academics
can undertake research while NGOs can provide valuable information on 
contextual issues such as the impact of trade policies on non-economic 
interests and values.
4. The Capacity Deficit
In many less developed countries, the domestic processes for preparing policy
positions for multilateral trade negotiations are almost non-existent. Engage-
ment with non-state actors at the domestic level, particularly in developing
countries, will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the WTO. Efficiency-
directed engagement requires strategies and objectives designed to encourage
deeper participation, facilitate negotiations through development of capacity,
help identify interests, build new coalitions, and overcome informational asym-
metries and agency costs. Efficiency-directed strategies can target information
failures, enable domestic issue linkages and trade-offs, enable international
negotiations to alter domestic perceptions of costs/benefits and pay-offs, and
facilitate direct communication and ties between domestic level participants
across national boundaries.110
Both human and institutional capacity is necessary to gain from trade.111
As this chapter has already noted, diminishing government capacity and increas-
ing complexity of policy choices are leading to a less hierarchical trade diplo-
macy aimed at managing horizontal public-private networks or coalitions as
part of governance processes. The implementation of WTO agreements in
developing countries is institution-intensive and creates new governance needs.
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Government institutions and capabilities need to be upgraded as a result of new
WTO commitments.112 Implementation of WTO rules requires complemen-
tary policies and the adaptation of WTO flexibilities to suit local conditions.113
The capacity to implement and benefit from WTO agreements is determined
by the domestic policy reform agenda.114 The sequence and consistency between
domestic reforms and implementation of WTO commitments is an impor-
tant ingredient of successful development strategies.115
All this makes it necessary to involve the private sector in implementing and
managing new WTO commitments. Furthermore, benefits from engagement
with the WTO need not be limited to economic gains but could deliver gov-
ernance benefits. Engagement with the WTO could contribute to institution
building and improve decision-making in domestic governance. Greater stake-
holder participation can improve the quality of trade policy as a component
of good development policy by ensuring that other values besides producer
interests get their due.116 Trade policy consultations are a step toward democ-
ratization of political systems. Consultations can prevent governments from
using trade barriers as a vote-seeking strategy.117 Consensus building among
non-state actors is also important because, in international negotiations,
governments are concerned about the capacity of their negotiating partners to
deliver domestically on promises made. Therefore, the fourth reason for involve-
ment of non-state actors in domestic trade policy-making is to supply 
the capacity and governance deficits that all countries face in today’s complex
policy environment.
C. Selection of Non-State Actors 
With what kinds of non-state actors should the domestic trade policy-making
process engage? The WTO’s multi-level governance system calls for participation
by a variety of state and non-state actors at both the international and domes-
tic levels. Since governance must continually adapt to needs and capacities,
it would be difficult to identify in advance those non-state actors who should
participate in domestic trade policy-making. There is diversity among Mem-
bers’ governance institutions, trade needs, and capacities. Thus, conceptually,
the definition of relevant non-state actors should remain open-ended.
The criteria for selecting actors to engage with must be prescribed. All those
stakeholders who stand to gain or lose through WTO regulation or whose rights
and responsibilities are affected have a legitimate interest in participation.118 In
addition, actors who can contribute to the system also need to be involved.
Consultations should also include all relevant actors, because limiting partici-
pation can amplify certain interests and voices and lead to policy distortions.119
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Before turning to modes of engagement, it might be useful to draw up a
typology of non-state actors to provide greater clarity and specificity to engage-
ment efforts. Relevant actors include components of the state such as sub-
national government units; the branches of governments, including individual
Members therein; and government officials and bureaucrats from trade and
other ministries and regulatory agencies. Actors with egocentric, concentrated,
and distributional interests include producers, import-competing and export-
oriented special interest groups, business and industry organizations, labour
unions, farmers’ groups, and individual companies.120 Actors with dispersed
interests include consumers, legislators, political parties, and the general pub-
lic. Actors with cosmopolitan or idealistic interests include transformational
coalitions, value-based NGOs, and civil society organizations and movements.
Actors who facilitate trade policy-making are also needed. These include knowl-
edge-oriented actors like universities, academics, research institutes, and think-
tanks. Other facilitators include trade practitioners, lawyers, and public opinion
shapers like the media. All these actors play important roles within the trade
governance system at the domestic level.121
A typology of the different kinds of non-state actors can help to under-
stand the different functions and roles they play in the trade policy-making
system. The objectives and structure of engagement with a particular variety
of non-state actor must be defined with respect to the role that such an actor
plays. Different kinds of non-state actors enjoy differentiated access to resources
and have their own distinct objectives. A typology of non-state actors can also
assist in appreciating the interplay between different domestic constituents.122
This can help craft more appropriate consultation mechanisms. Thus we need
to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach and pay attention to categoriz-
ing non-state actors properly so that consultation mechanisms can be crafted
with more precision.
D. Choice of Engagement Mechanisms 
How should non-state actors be engaged in the domestic trade policy process
and what would be appropriate mechanisms or structures? The literature on
domestic consultation has articulated a number of approaches to consulta-
tion. The choice of a particular mechanism or structure depends on various fac-
tors that include the objective of consultation and the type of non-state actors
involved. Thus consultations need to be tailored not only to local conditions
but also to the target audience. The nature of the issue at stake can also deter-
mine what kind of consultation is needed.
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1. The ‘Wolfe’ Model
In his study on domestic trade policy-making in Canada, Wolfe distinguishes
between different approaches to engagement with non-state actors.123 These dif-
ferent approaches, which exhibit different levels of involvement by non-state
actors in government policy-making, are canvassed here.
a. The Information Approach
The most superficial approach is the information approach. Under this
approach government does little more than make publicly available informa-
tion on its negotiating positions and the likely direction of policy choices.
Wolfe notes that for such a limited interaction, the amount and quality of
information provided, and opportunities to use the information become highly
relevant.124 Issues such as to whom information is provided, and how it is made
available require greater attention be Members. Websites are a good medium
to publish information related to trade policy. Information needs to include
trade statistics, discussion papers, briefing papers, newsletters, legislation and
negotiation updates, and information about disputes.125 Information-oriented
mechanisms raise normative questions about transparency. Transparency
requirements can include prescribed processes for enacting regulations; using
plain language in drafting, publication, and codification obligations; ease of
access in locating the law; predictability and consistency in implementation;
and remedies such as an appeal process.
b. The Basic Consultation Approach
Basic consultations are technical in nature and seek new ideas and views of
affected parties. They are useful for providing information, framing issues,
and identifying and assessing options, including the acceptability of options to
stakeholders. Feedback to participants on consultations is an important factor
in determining participant satisfaction about the process. In its domestic consul-
tations on trade policy, Canada has used advisory committees, policy conferences,
public meetings, telephone hotlines, websites, and polling and focus groups.126
c. The Citizen Engagement Approach
Another step up can be called citizen engagement in trade policy-making.127
This goes further than consultations and involves in-depth deliberations at
policy formulation stages. Its objectives are the determination of goals, values,
and principles. Processes of citizen engagement in Canada have included study
circles, deliberative polling, citizen juries, public conventions, correspondence,
and public debates and dialogue.128
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d. The Private-Public Partnership Approach
A deeper form of engagement can be described as public-private partnerships
with shared decision-making.129 Such broad multi-stakeholder consultations
are useful in exploring compromises on policy issues that are controversial or
have asymmetric distributional effects.
e. Political Consultations
Wolfe also identifies political consultation as a distinctive mode of engage-
ment. Political consultation is more about consensus building than about tech-
nical detail. It targets groups that reject the premises of free trade and
globalization and groups that seek transformational changes in governance
models. The need for political consultation points to a role for national 
parliaments in the oversight of trade policy. Parliamentary committees and
hearings are examples of political consultations. Such hearings can also satisfy
the information and access needs of parliamentarians.130
f. The ‘Room-Next-Door’ Approach
Another model identified by Wolfe is the room-next-door model, which involves
inducting business and other non-state actors including NGOs as part of
official delegations to the WTO meetings and conferences.131
2. The Need to Tailor Engagement Mechanisms
As stated above, consultation mechanisms need to be tailored to objectives,
issues, and actors. Therefore, while ordinary consultations led by government
officials can serve technical needs, political issues require a political forum.
Mechanisms for gathering commercial intelligence should be kept separate
from consultations for other purposes.132 Consultations can be designed as a
manipulative process with the objective of persuading non-state actors to sup-
port the government-favoured policy choice. In other cases, consultations can
be designed as an argumentative process that attempts to change entrenched
understandings of cause and effect.133 Such consultations are more concerned
about framing and defining the problem than in resolving it.
Consultations on some issues and in some situations require only expert
participation. The exclusion of the general public in such situations may be jus-
tified as a distraction. Detailed technical consultations are an example where
access ought to be restricted to knowledge-oriented actors. Consultations on
issues like tariff negotiations require engagement structures that are different
from those required for negotiations on new trade issues. New trade issues can
involve inadequately defined interests or call for social or economic trade-offs.
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Therefore, consultations on such unfamiliar issues might require wider citizen
engagement and even shared decision-making by state and non-state actors.
Consultations also need to be tailored to the relative size of affected 
constituencies. Canadian policy-makers have attempted to introduce a flexible
consultation system that selects participants according to whether the consulta-
tion is aimed at meeting strategic, tactical, or technical needs. Participation at the
strategic level of consultation is carried out with ministers and industry CEOs,
the tactical level involves senior officials and vice-presidents, and at the techni-
cal level the target audience is working-level officials. Horizontal business asso-
ciations are involved at all three levels. However, academics and NGOs are involved
only at the tactical and technical levels, and not at the strategic levels.134
Another consideration in tailoring consultations is the choice between formal-
ity and informality. Both these approaches can be viewed as complementary,
with different situations calling for either formality or informality.135 While
informality can lead to abuses of administrative discretion, it can be useful
when sensitive information needs to be communicated or obtained by gov-
ernment officials. Formality has the advantage of transparency and would
restrict possible abuse of discretion.
3. The Hocking Approach to Engagement
While Wolfe has highlighted the spectrum of approaches for engagement with
non-state actors and the need for flexibility and tailoring, Brian Hocking has
described the evolution of domestic trade policy-making in a more structured
manner and has identified three different evolutionary models.136
a. The Club Model of Domestic Consultation
Domestic consultation involves internal bureaucratic and inter-agency con-
sultation led by the foreign or trade ministries. Sectoral ministries are included
in sectoral-specific issues. The objective of this model is policy coordination
in a situation of increasing complexity of trade agendas. Bureaucratic and exec-
utive consultation can take place either as horizontal or vertical consultation
in federal bureaucracies. Hocking has found that such a model essentially oper-
ates as a closed bureaucratic system, often marked by turf conflicts. It also
demonstrates a tendency to assume a pro-liberalization stance or to view freer
trade policy as legitimate.
b. The Adaptive Club Model 
The adaptive club model is an intermediate, business-focused model. The
objective of consultations is advice and other contributions from the private
sector to trade policy making.137 The principal resource made available is
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knowledge. This model also partially serves to bring business on board and to
ensure acceptance of trade policy at the domestic level.138 The model is charac-
terized by ‘controlled’ openness operating within established rules. It is not
designed to question free trade goals but does engender debate on relative gains
from specific trade policies. Consultation is relatively closed and limited to con-
stituencies most affected by trade policy. The debate is also a limited one with
the government still controlling the scope of the discussions and the agenda.
c. The Multi-Stakeholder Approach
The third and most advanced model in Hocking’s scale is the multi-stakeholder
model with a mix of consultation structures. Participants vary, but civil 
society representatives are involved. Objectives include generating consensus
in favour of trade liberalization in the face of increased public opposition to
globalization. The multi-stakeholder model is linked to broader patterns of
public diplomacy and includes debate on the objectives and legitimacy of trade
liberalization. The multi-stakeholder model is the most advanced, and con-
sultations in Canada and the European Union approximate this model.
The diverse goals and ambitions of participants in the multi-stakeholder
consultation process can on occasion create institutional tensions and crises of
expectations.139 NGOs are likely to introduce new issues into the room (pri-
marily legitimacy and ‘trade and’ issues), while business is more interested in
supporting government by providing knowledge, advice, and connections to
business interests in other states. This model requires careful management so
as to ensure that participants do not get disaffected with the process or intro-
duce into the process conflicting and incompatible expectations.
There is a range of mechanisms for involving non-state actors in domes-
tic trade policy-making. These range from uni-directional information-pro-
viding structures to deep public-private partnerships. The mechanisms need
to be tailored to objectives, actors, situations, and issues. Hocking’s models
provide an evolutionary perspective on how policy-makers need to continu-
ally respond to new demands of trade policy-making through engagement
with non-state actors. The design of domestic consultations mechanisms can
be a tricky exercise. However, modern trade policy cannot do without domes-
tic consultations.
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V. Conclusion 
This chapter has called for the project on WTO institutional reform to extend
its scope to reform of the domestic trade policy-making processes. At least two
objections to this proposal can be anticipated. First, it could be argued that
the WTO institutional reform agenda is already over-crowded with issues and
that extending the discussion to the domestic sphere would further burden
the project and also dilute its focus. Second, some may argue that any attempt
to influence domestic trade policy processes through institutional reform of the
WTO would encroach on the sovereignty of Members and, in any event, the
WTO can do little to influence domestic political processes and outcomes.
This chapter has advocated for a conceptual inclusion of the domestic
sphere into the discussions of WTO institutional reform. The rationale for
including the domestic sphere (hopefully) addresses these concerns. This chap-
ter has argued that the domestic context is important because of the domes-
tic origins of the WTO crisis. WTO reform requires a new compromise of
embedded liberalism or a new social purpose for governance of the WTO
regime. Arriving at this new compromise/purpose will require domestic polit-
ical engagement. Ruggie’s theory of regime formation demonstrates that the
legitimacy problems of the WTO arise from a growing discontent in domes-
tic politics. Further, this chapter has shown that how the WTO makes trade pol-
icy can be useful in thinking about how to address domestic discontent with
the WTO’s functioning. The multi-level system of governance at the WTO
requires participation by state and non-state actors at both the international
and domestic levels. The making of good domestic trade policy is indispensa-
ble to the functioning of the WTO. Furthermore, governance is becoming more
horizontal and is no longer the exclusive domain of the state. Non-state actors
are now part of the governance process.
With the importance of domestic trade policy-making and the importance
of non-state actor participation firmly in mind, solutions must be found to
the WTO crisis. A declaration on domestic consultation would urge the review
of domestic consultation systems by the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mecha-
nism and contribute to social learning on the design and evaluation of consul-
tation systems. Such systems must take account of a number of issues, including
the objectives and targets of domestic consultation. The selection of actors for
consultation must cater to diversity and need. It should be based on the actors’
legitimate interest in trade policy. A typology of non-state actors can help design
better mechanisms. And the choice of mechanisms must be tailored to objectives,
actors, issues, and national circumstances. A spectrum of approaches is possible.
Consultation design can also be viewed from an evolutionary perspective.
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Enhancing Business Participation in 
Trade Policy-Making: Lessons from China
HENG WANG 
I. Introduction
Transparency not only helps to dispel unfounded fears and counter misinfor-
mation, it constitutes a principal and vital element of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). Transparency obligations on WTO Members can be found in
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),1 Arti-
cle III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);2 and the accession
protocols and working party reports of the recently acceded Members, includ-
ing those of China, Ukraine, and Viet Nam. Transparency obligations require
inter alia notification, comment, and publication. In the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, WTO Members confirmed collective responsibility for ensuring
internal transparency and the effective engagement with all Members. The Doha
Declaration also undertook to make WTO operations more transparent by dis-
seminating information more effectively and promptly, as well as improving dia-
logue with the public.3 Although there is no commonly accepted definition of
transparency, and there is dispute as to whether transparency constitutes a norm
of international law, transparency is an important element of world trade law.4
Significant progress with respect to institutional transparency has been
made by the WTO, particularly with non-state actors, which include but are not
limited to the following:
• The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement) states that the General Council may take appropri-
ate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) concerned with matters related to those
of the WTO.5
• In the Annex on Telecommunications included in the GATS, Members
recognize the role played by NGOs in ensuring the operations of telecom-
munications services and commit to making appropriate arrangements
for consultations with NGOs on matters arising from the implementa-
tion of the annex.6
• In 1996, the General Council adopted Guidelines for Arrangements on
Relations with Non-governmental Organizations,7 allowing for the pub-
lication of more documents and elaborating on the Secretariat’s active
role with the NGOs. However, NGOs are prohibited from being directly
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.8
• Every year since 2001, the WTO has hosted a two-day public forum at its
headquarters in Geneva,9 where members of civil society may express
their views.
• In 2002, the General Council decided to expedite the de-restriction of
WTO documents, and passed the ‘Decision of the General Council on the
Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents’.10
Many documents are now simultaneously available to the public and to
WTO Members.
• The Director-General and staff of the WTO Secretariat now meet with
NGO representatives regularly. There are briefings for Geneva-based
civil society groups on the meetings of WTO councils and committees,
and a good cross-section of NGOs attend plenary sessions of ministerial
conferences as well as symposia on WTO issues in Geneva.11
It is widely believed that the transparency of the WTO should be further
improved. Civil society has been critical of the lack of transparency at the
WTO, particularly with respect to negotiations and dispute settlement. Mem-
bers, other international organizations, and NGOs have criticized the legitimacy
and transparency of opaque and informal consensus-building negotiations in
working groups, the ‘Green Room’, and mini-ministerial meetings.12 A num-
ber of developed country Members have submitted views to the General Coun-
cil on how to improve transparency.13
Greater transparency would help to ensure consistency and predictability
within the WTO system and would increase public confidence in the WTO. The
WTO is not merely the sum of its parts; it has its own image and personality
that should be seen to be transparent.14 Further steps to enhance WTO trans-
parency are still needed. However, greater transparency may have negative con-
sequences, including diminished efficiency and higher costs. Therefore, any
push for greater transparency should include efforts to avoid such negative
externalities.
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The focus on WTO transparency deals with institutional issues, whereas
transparency obligations imposed on Members are of critical importance.
Without the Members’ transparency obligations, the WTO can hardly be suf-
ficiently transparent. This chapter analyzes transparency issues from China’s
perspective, both as a developing country and a recently acceded WTO Mem-
ber. The notice-and-comment obligations imposed on China and how these
affect or can encourage the involvement of business interests in trade policy 
will be canvassed. Furthermore, this chapter argues that the extension of
WTO-plus comment obligations could be a possible way of enhancing busi-
ness participation in the world trade system. The notice-and-comment require-
ments and the participation of businesses in trade policy formulation should
be coordinated to enhance public confidence in the WTO.
Part II examines WTO-plus transparency requirements that have been
imposed on China. Particular attention will be paid to the public consultation
and comment requirements imposed on China in the context of domestic
trade measures. China’s experience with these requirements, which are not
imposed on the WTO’s original Members, will be used as a basis of analysis.
This part also reviews how businesses participate in China’s trade matters. Part
III further addresses the involvement of business in the formation of domes-
tic trade policy. After a brief overview of the practices of business participation
in trade policy, it discusses why and how businesses participate in trade matters.
Businesses can play an important role in the formulation of trade measures.
If properly managed, business participation may help to enhance the legiti-
macy of trade policy-making, tap the expertise and knowledge of the business
community, improve debate, balance broader interests, and bring about more
equitable decisions. Finally, this chapter puts forward suggestions on enhancing
business participation in the trade system.
II. China’s Comment Obligations: Rules and Practice
A. Review of China’s WTO-Extra Transparency Obligations
China’s transparency obligations are set by the WTO Agreement and in the
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (the Accession
Protocol).15 As a condition to its accession, China agreed to strict transparency
requirements, many of which do not apply to other WTO Members:
(a) Only published or readily available laws, regulations, and other meas-
ures pertaining to or affecting goods, services, trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights, and the control of foreign exchange (collec-
tively referred to as ‘measures’) shall be enforced.16 China also undertook
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to make available to Members on request these measures before imple-
mentation.17 In emergency situations, trade rules must be made avail-
able no later than their entry into force or implementation at the latest
when they are implemented or enforced.18
(b) The publication of all measures must include the effective date of meas-
ures and the products and services affected by the measure, identified
by appropriate tariff line and Central Product Classification (CPC)
classification.19
(c) China is required to publish by classification and service a list of organ-
izations responsible for authorizing, approving, or regulating services
activities through the granting of licences or other approvals. Proce-
dures and the conditions for obtaining such licences or approvals must
be published.20
(d) Measures are to be published in an official journal and all issues of this
journal are readily available to individuals and enterprises.21
(e) A reasonable period is to be provided for comment to the authorities
before implementation of a measure, except for those measures involv-
ing national security, specific measures setting foreign exchange rates
or monetary policy, and other measures the publication of which would
impede law enforcement.22
(f) China must afford an opportunity for public consultation and com-
ment on proposed technical standards and regulations, and ‘comments
[must] be given due consideration regardless of origin’.23
(g) One or more enquiry point(s) are to be established where individuals,
enterprises, or Members may obtain information about the measures.24
(h) The information provided by the enquiry point(s) must include the
names of national or sub-national authorities in charge of a measure’s
implementation.25 Replies to requests for information are usually to be
provided within 30 days following receipt of a request.26
(i) Relevant measures are to be translated into one or more of the official
WTO languages.27
Additional transparency requirements include the following:
(j) The provision of judicial review for measures;28
(k) The creation of a mechanism for individuals and enterprises to bring
to the attention of national authorities non-uniform implementation
of trade regimes.29 Under China’s Regulations on Record-keeping of
Regulations and Rules, state administrations, social groups, enterprises,
or individuals who believe that a measure is inconsistent with China’s
WTO obligations can put forward reform suggestions in written 
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form to agencies including the Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council;30 and
(l) For an eight-year period following accession, China was required to 
provide additional information to the General Council concerning
transparency as part of the WTO’s monitoring of China’s WTO 
implementation.31
A substantial number of China’s transparency obligations impose additional
burdens on China in comparison with original Members. The requirements
described in (b), (c), (e), (f), (h), (i), (k), and (l) are not or were not applied
to original WTO Members. Some of China’s transparency obligations resem-
ble those of other Members. Transparency requirements indicated in (a), (d),
(g), and (j) above are generally applicable to all Members. However, even these
general transparency obligations apply to China more strictly because of the
scope of their application: measures relating to or affecting goods, services, trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights, and even foreign exchange control.
In addition, unlike original WTO Members, China was required to construct
enquiry points to provide information about measures on goods, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights, and foreign exchange control.
These additional transparency requirements may help others to better under-
stand China’s trade policy and to bring predictability to trade with China. They
could also lay the foundation for development of broader WTO transparency
requirements. These requirements are good for the functioning of the trade
regime. Among the WTO-extra transparency obligations listed above, the notice-
and-comment obligation is perhaps the most challenging and is representative
of the challenges posed in implementing additional transparency obligations.
B. China’s Notice and Comment Obligations and 
Business Participation in China
China’s WTO Accession Protocol required it to provide a comment period
prior to the adoption of any measure affecting trade in goods and services,
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, or foreign exchange con-
trol.32 Reference to this general comment obligation is also contained in the
Working Party Report on China’s WTO accession.33 The Working Party Report
also noted that, on accession, China would need to set minimum time frames
for allowing public comment on proposed technical regulations, standards
and conformity assessment procedures as provided in the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and relevant decisions and 
recommendations adopted by the TBT committee.34 These statements from the
Working Party Report created legal obligations for China.35
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More detailed notice-and-comment requirements can be found in the TBT
Agreement and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). These comment obligations arise in respect of
proposed technical regulations,36 conformity assessment procedures,37 and
proposed sanitary or phytosanitary regulations.38 Members must notify other
Members of the products to be covered by the proposed measure, together
with a brief indication of its objective and rationale.39 Such notifications must
take place at an appropriately early stage, ‘when amendments can still be intro-
duced and comments taken into account’.40 Moreover, Members shall allow
‘reasonable time’ for other Members to comment, discuss the comments on
request, and consider these comments and the discussions results.41 In case of
urgent problems, Members are required to allow other Members to comment,
discuss their comments on request, and take these comments and the discus-
sions results into account.42 However, in urgent situations, a reasonable time
frame for comments is not required.
The combined effect of the Accession Protocol and the SPS and TBT agree-
ments require China to allow both other WTO Members and other non-
governmental actors to comment on proposed measures. Thus, while some WTO
Members are required to take the comments of other Members into account,
China is required to do more. China has undertaken to allow a broader array of
actors to comment on proposed measures. Additionally, the scope of measures
subject to comment is broader for China than for some WTO Members.
The particular requirements of the notice and comment obligations 
discussed above, and China’s implementation of these obligations, are briefly
canvassed here.
1. Notice
Notification of TBT and SPS measures in China is made via the websites of the
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
of China and the Ministry of Commerce.43 To obtain information relating to
the measures required to be published under paragraph 2(C)1 of the Accession
Protocol, individuals, enterprises, and WTO Members may also contact enquiry
points and enquiry websites at the Ministry of Commerce and Administration
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China.44 As for the 
general comment obligation, an official journal has been appointed for pub-
lication. The MOFCOM Gazette has been designated as the official journal,
and all the major trade-related competent authorities send copies of their
newly published documents or drafts to this publication.45
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Functioning as the MOFCOM Gazette, the China Foreign Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation Gazette collects and publishes all laws, regulations, and other
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods and services, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights, or the control of foreign exchange by
China’s National People’s Congress, State Council, local governments, and gov-
ernment departments. It is the official journal by which the Chinese government
makes notification and responds to enquiries by the WTO and its Members,
and it is used in WTO trade policy reviews. The texts of regulations pertaining
to domestic and foreign trade and international economic cooperation issued
by the Ministry of Commerce are the standard texts that have legal effect.
The Gazette is edited by General Office of the Ministry of Commerce and
is the official journal for understanding China’s rules and measures concern-
ing trade and international economic cooperation. One or two issues of the
Gazette are issued per week, and no more than 80 issues are published annu-
ally.46 An electronic version of the Gazette is available at the Ministry of Com-
merce website.47 As of 5 May 2008, 426 issues of the Gazette have been
published.48 A digital version of the Gazette is e-mailed to domestic and over-
seas users free of charge.49 The Gazette is in Chinese, with the table of contents
in English. The published measures in the Gazette consist of the following 
categories: laws and explanation of laws, administrative regulations and other
measures of the State Council, and rules and other measures of the Ministry
of Commerce, as well as department rules and other measures of government
departments and local governments. One important factor in determining
what is published is whether a particular measure is trade-related. Pursuant to
China’s WTO commitment, only trade related measures are to be published in
the Gazette. How trade related measures and non-trade related measures are
distinguished remains an open question.
To better understand Chinese measures, the Legal Affairs Office of the State
Council publishes a Chinese-English version of the collection of laws and reg-
ulations annually.50 Some local governments and ministries under the State
Council also translate their rules and measures into English.51 Moreover, a
number of websites provide an English version of many Chinese trade rules.
These websites are sponsored by different government agencies, including 
(1) the China Legislative Information Network System Full Text Search System
of Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council52 (including categories of laws
and regulations, summary of laws, administrative regulations, legal documents,
department rules, and judicial interpretations); (2) the ‘Invest in China’ web-
site, organized by the Foreign Investment Administration of the Ministry of
Commerce and operated by the Investment Promotion Agency of the 
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ministry;53 and (3) the websites of relevant government departments, such as
the website of the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine of China.54 The website of the Chinese Central People’s Govern-
ment also provides some official publications in English.55
2. Comment
As noted earlier, China has undertaken two distinct comment obligations. One
is the general comment obligation, under which China must allow for a cer-
tain period of comment between promulgation and entry into force of trade
regulations.56 The other is the TBT/SPS comment obligation, which requires
China to provide a comment period on proposed measures, including standards
and technical regulations.
The extent of China’s general comment obligation merits analysis. First,
China is not required to solicit comments in the process of drafting its trade-
related measures. Rather, China’s Accession Protocol requires it only to accept
comments prior to the implementation of a measure. The relevant authorities
have usually passed the measures published in the Gazette. Issues concerning
laws can be raised through the legal section of the State Council.57
The Chinese government appears to have taken into account the notice-and-
comment obligation when it drafted the Regulations on Procedures for For-
mulation of Administrative Regulations,58 and the Regulations on Procedures
of the Rules Formulating.59 It states that ‘pursuant to the notice-and-comment
obligation undertaken in the Accession Protocol, the laws, regulations, rules and
other measures could not be effective on the publication. Usually there should
be a period of time for the public to comment, and for the preparation of
implementation.’60 Therefore, the effective date of administrative regulations
is to be specified in the State Council decree that promulgates these regula-
tions.61 Administrative regulations usually take effect after 30 days from the
date of promulgation. However, the following categories of administrative reg-
ulations may take effect on the dates of promulgation: (1) administrative reg-
ulations that involve national security, the determination of foreign exchange
rates, or monetary policies, and (2) those that the implementation of which will
be impeded if they are not implemented promptly.62 Nearly the same require-
ments exist for rules.63 Generally, China has confirmed that ‘a 30-day period
for comment between promulgation and entry into force of all laws, regulations
and rules is provided to any individual, enterprise and other WTO Member’.64
In contrast, the TBT/SPS Agreement comment obligations require China to
accept comments of businesses and other interested parties in the process of
drafting measures, before their adoption and promulgation. The Regulations on
Procedures for Formulation of Administrative Regulations and the Regulations
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on Procedures of the Rules Formulating make clear that comments on proposed
measures are based on the following: (1) compliance with the TBT Agreement
and SPS Agreement requirements that the draft of standards and technical
measures shall be published for comments; and (2) the Law on Legislation,
which requires that important bills be published for public comment.65
An issue that arises is the manner in which comments shall be obtained from
businesses and other interested parties. From the Chinese government’s per-
spective, ‘China did not make any commitment specifically on ways to solicit
public opinions’, and that ‘[p]romulgating drafts of laws, regulations for public
comments before implementation is not a necessary process according to China’s
WTO Commitments or domestic regulations’.66 No specific stipulation can be
found in China’s Accession Protocol or Working Party Report with regard to the
ways to seek public comment. The manner in which comments are solicited has
been stipulated in China’s domestic law rather than in the WTO rules. A num-
ber of rules in Chinese law govern how interested parties submit their comments
on proposed measures. These rules can be found in the Law on Legislation
(dealing with the making of laws, administrative regulations, local regulations,
autonomous regulations, or special rules),67 the Regulations on Procedures for
Formulation of Administrative Regulations (governing the making of administra-
tive regulations),68 and the Regulations on Procedures of the Rules Formulating
(dealing with the making of rules).69 The methods by which comments are 
collected under these provisions are briefly canvassed here.
For laws, comments are collected in various ways in China. The Law on
Legislation contains clear provisions for public comment. Article 35 of the
Law on Legislation requires that ‘an important bill which has been put on 
the agenda of the Standing Committee may, upon decision of the Caucus of
Chairpersons, be presented to the public for comments’ and that ‘the com-
ments presented by various agencies, organizations and citizens are to be sub-
mitted to the working office of the Standing Committee’. When a bill has been
placed on the agenda of a session of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, relevant special committees and the working office of the
Standing Committee may collect comments via inter alia symposia and hear-
ings.70 In addition, the working office of the Standing Committee distributes
draft laws to relevant organizations and experts for comments.71 Comments are
sent to the Legislative Committee, other relevant special committees and, where
necessary, distributed among the participants of the current session of the
Standing Committee.72 For local regulations, autonomous regulations, and
special rules, comment opportunities exist since the procedure for considera-
tion of such measures is done with reference to the above practices of the
National People’s Congress.73
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For administrative regulations, the Law on Legislation provides comment
opportunities generally, with detailed provisions articulated by the Regula-
tions on Procedures for Formulation of Administrative Regulations and the 
Regulations on Procedures of the Rules Formulating. When drafting an admin-
istrative regulation, the drafting body shall hear the opinions of relevant agencies,
organizations, and citizens through panel discussions, feasibility studies, and
hearings.74 On completion of drafting, the drafting body shall submit opinions
from all sides concerning the key issues of the draft regulation to the legisla-
tive affairs organization of the State Council for review.75 The procedures for
enacting administrative rules by the State Council and rules of local govern-
ments are formulated by the State Council by reference to Chapter Three
(‘Administrative Regulations’) of the Law on Legislation.76
The Regulations on Procedures for Formulation of Administrative Regu-
lations and Regulations on Procedures of the Rules Formulating provide for
comment opportunities with respect to the formulation of administrative reg-
ulations and rules. These comment opportunities are available during the
preparation of drafts for examination and during the subsequent review of
such drafts. The drafting of administrative regulations is based on ‘in-depth
investigation and research, summarization of practical experiences, and exten-
sive consultations with organs, organizations and citizens’.77 Soliciting comments
may take place through forums, appraisal meetings, and hearings.78 Nearly the
same procedure exists for the drafting of rules.79 In the case of rules, written
comments may be submitted, as opposed to meetings or hearings.80 Neither the
Regulations on Procedures for Formulation of Administrative Regulations nor
Regulations on Procedures of the Rules Formulating contain an exhaustive list
of how comments may be received.81 If government agencies, organizations, or
citizens differ on draft rules that have ‘direct bearing on the immediate inter-
ests’ of citizens and legal persons as well as other organizations, the draft should
be made open to public and opinions solicited.82 A public hearing can also be
held, with notice of the time and location being provided no less than 30 days
before the hearing.83 Persons participating in a hearing are entitled to raise
questions and express their own opinions during the hearing.84 A written
record of comments made at a hearing is required, including the main points
and concerns advanced.85 Drafting authorities are required to take into con-
sideration the opinions provided at a hearing.
When draft rules are submitted for approval, they must include an intro-
ductory note that explains how comments were solicited, as well as the under-
lying rationale of the comments that were provided.86 Moreover, the
explanations of draft regulations for examination shall state, inter alia,
the differing opinions from various circles on the main issues in the draft and 
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the circumstances in which comments were solicited from the relevant organs,
organizations and citizens.87
Drafts for examination are reviewed by the legislative affairs department
of the State Council (for draft regulations for examination)88 and legislative
affairs institutions (for draft rules for examination).89 The opportunity to make
comments also exists during this review. The treatment of comments is a review
factor for the drafts for examination. When reviewing drafts measures, the 
legislative affairs department is required to consider whether the drafts have 
‘correctly handled the opinions’ of relevant organs, organizations, and citizens
on the drafts for examination.90 Following the receipt of drafts for examina-
tion, the legislative affairs department sends drafts for examination or the main
issues that the drafts for examination involve to, inter alia, relevant organiza-
tions and experts for comments.91 On approval of the State Council, drafts for
review may be made public for comments.92 Similar to the aforementioned
requirement for drafters of administrative regulations, the department that
reviews drafts for examination is also required to solicit comments from the
relevant organs, organizations, and citizens at the grassroots level.93 If draft
administrative regulations for examination involve ‘major or difficult issues’,
the legislative affairs department will sponsor forums or appraisal meetings
attended by the relevant units and experts to solicit comments and to conduct
evaluations.94 The same requirement applies to draft rules for examination if
they involve ‘major issues’.95 In the case of draft administrative regulations for
examination having ‘direct bearing on the immediate interests’ of citizens, legal
persons, or other organizations, the legislative affairs department in question
may hold hearings to collect comments from relevant departments, organiza-
tions, and citizens.96 If the approval of relevant governments is obtained and
certain conditions are met,97 the draft rules for examination can be made pub-
lic and hearings may be held.98 The legislative affairs department studies all
comments and, after consulting with the drafting departments, revises the
drafts for examination and prepares the drafts of administrative regulations or
rules and explanations thereof.99 In the Regulations on Procedures for For-
mulation of Administrative Regulations and Regulations on Procedures of the
Rules Formulating, there are no clear definitions of terms, including ‘major
issues’, ‘major or difficult issues’, and ‘direct bearing on the immediate interests’.
Thus, in some instances the decision to obtain comments may be discretionary.
Under the aforementioned rule-making procedures, ministries or agen-
cies under the State Council are required to solicit comments either in writ-
ing or through public means such as symposia or workshops in order to provide
an opportunity for interested parties to provide their comments on draft laws
and regulations.100 In recent years, the drafting of over 30 laws and regulations
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has undergone public scrutiny, particularly through comments made by the
media through websites, newspapers, and television.101 In the first several
months of 2008, the standing committee of the National People’s Congress
and the State Council worked to obtain public comments on the drafting of at
least two laws and fifteen regulations.102
Businesses may post their comments on government websites. Some measures
are pre-published in Chinese. This pre-publication is one of the mechanisms
used to disseminate draft rules for consultation with interested parties. Vari-
ous governmental websites provide the platform of collecting comments, such
as the websites of the Central People’s Government of China103 and of the
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of China,
where a special section for public comments is available.104 Another example
is the China Legislative Information Network System of Legislative Affairs
Office of the State Council. It contains two sections where comments for drafted
administrative regulations and department rules are solicited.105 Interested
parties may express their opinion as to whether they agree with a specific arti-
cle of proposed rules and fill in their suggestions for each and every article.
Alternatively, they can also provide general comments on the measure.
Another important way for enterprises in China to express their comments
on draft bills is through industrial associations. Industrial associations are
actively involved in China’s trade policy implementation. For example, several
industry associations collect and share information, identify and deal with
industry problems, discuss trade policy issues affecting their industries, and rep-
resent their sectors in relation to the government.106 These associations include
the China Coal Industry Association, China Iron and Steel Association, China
National Textiles and Clothing Association, China Machine Industry Federation,
China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association, China Light Industry
Federation, China Building Material Industry Association, and the China Non-
ferrous Metals Society.107 Recently the draft amendment to Postal Law received
2,395 comments within the first week of being made available for comment.108
Some international and domestic courier services providers made their sugges-
tions on the earlier draft amendments to the Postal Law to the Office of
Legislative Affairs of the State Council. These businesses have expressed their
opinions by various means, including contacting the government via Confer-
ence of Asia Pacific Express Carriers and China International Freight 
Forwarders Association.109
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III. Business Participation in Trade Policy Matters
A. Practices of Business Participation in Trade Policy:
A Brief Overview
Businesses can participate in trade policy formulation and implementation
either internationally or domestically. Business groups have long advocated
for greater access to international trade negotiations. For example, in 1946 the
International Chamber of Commerce complained bitterly about the lack of
consultation with non-government organizations at the London Preparatory
Conference for negotiations on what eventually would become the GATT.
The World Federation of Trade Unions protested the prevalence of the ‘neo-
liberalism’ in the draft texts considered at the London Conference.110
Businesses actively participate in the formulation of trade policy and rules
in developed countries and entities such as the United States, the European
Union, and Japan. Multilateral rule-making also attracts the participation of
business interests, notably multinational enterprises. Professor Ostry notes
that the inclusion of new issues in the Uruguay Round was a U.S. initiative
and this policy agenda was largely driven by multinational enterprises in the
services and high-technology sectors.111 These corporations indicated to 
the United States that without a fundamental rebalancing of the GATT, they
would not continue to support a multilateral policy, and would prefer a bilateral
or regional track. They also organized business coalitions in support of services
and intellectual property in Europe and Japan, as well as some smaller developed
countries. This activism paid off, and U.S. multinationals played a key role—
perhaps even the key role—in establishing the new global trading system.112
Multinational enterprises also played a major role in lobbying for China’s
membership in the WTO. One important and unintended consequence of the
Uruguay Round has been the rise in profile of multinational enterprises, in
part due to their role in the Uruguay Round. For skeptics, the Uruguay Round
was simply a conspiratorial collusion between U.S. corporations and the U.S.
government.113 U.S. multinationals were conspicuous in their absence in both
Seattle and Doha and in supporting fast-track trade bills in Congress. This
apathy has profound implications since there is no effective counterbalance
to well-developed protectionist lobbies. Trade policy is the most domestic of
all policies.114 Meanwhile, the prominent role of businesses in defining the new
trade agenda provided an easy and attractive target as public concern over the
growing power of corporations began to mount.115
Large firms have interests that extend well beyond the domestic sphere.
For example, where a developing country is short of legal and financial resources
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to pursue a WTO lawsuit, multinational firms may pay a U.S. or European law
firm to represent the developing country.116 Moreover, another open issue is
the relationship between NGOs, small and medium-sized enterprises, and
multinational enterprises. Multinationals, human rights groups, labour move-
ments, and environmental NGOs have seen trade liberalization and policing
of international treaties as an important vehicle for bringing change in 
certain countries.117 Some NGOs and multinational enterprises act as enforcers
of global regulation and increasingly cooperate to agree on collectively for-
mulated norms (i.e., the United Nations [UN] Global Compact, a partnership
between the UN and private companies, or semi-private standardization bod-
ies such as the International Standardisation Organization or the International
Accounting Standards Board).118 The governments of some developing Mem-
bers have sought assistance from Oxfam in trade negotiations and trade 
policy development. Oxfam is now supporting cotton producers by helping
to establish national and regional producers’ organizations and by strengthen-
ing their capacity for advocacy and negotiation.119 In the view of many WTO
Members, collaboration with NGOs is a choice to be made by Members,
particularly with regard to policy-making.120 NGOs play an active role in multi-
lateral regulation,121 but have faced criticism for a lack of accountability in the
wake of their growing influence.122
B. Business Participation in the World Trade System: 
Comment Obligations as a Way Forward?
1. Why and How Business Participates in the Trade Matters:
Formal Mechanisms in the WTO vs. Domestic Level Mechanisms
Two questions need to be addressed when discussing the participation of business
interests in trade policy matters. First, should business interests be allowed to
participate in trade policy-making? Second, assuming their participation should
be allowed, how should business interests participate in trade policy formulation? 
The first question seems largely academic. Businesses have been active players
in the world trade regime and are entitled to participate in trade policy formu-
lation in a constructive way. The real challenge of today’s international gover-
nance is to create the conditions where public and private actors are able to work
together, notwithstanding their different constituencies, objectives, cultures,
and expertise.123
There is a case for businesses to participate in trade policy. First, business
participation can help to enhance the legitimacy of trade policy-making.
The trade rule-maker should listen to the opinions of those parties who are 
subject to trade rules. Such participation would in turn increase support for
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the implementation of trade rules. Second, business participation can help to
tap the expertise and knowledge of the business community. Governments may
not have or cannot afford to access business expertise, particularly developing
Members. Third, business participation can help to improve debate, balance
broader interests, and bring about more equitable decisions. Public participation
is believed to have good effects on rule-making. Fourth, businesses may help to
reach convergence in difficult areas of policy. Businesses would have more 
confidence and trust in the trading regime if they are involved in its development.
The business community knows the economy very well and therefore can be
helpful in reaching effective solutions. There are some suggestions that the role
and responsibilities of multinational corporations in the trading system are issues
that clearly must become part of the new negotiation agenda.124
Participation by business interests in trade policy-making is not unprob-
lematic. Businesses may speak only for their own narrow interests and could
fail to represent the interests of the general public. The participation of busi-
nesses may slow down the process of decision-making. There may be frag-
mented viewpoints from businesses, a situation that could cost a considerable
amount of time and energy to address. However, these disadvantages should
not prevent the participation of businesses. To sum up, there is a need for 
business participation in trade matters. WTO rules affect businesses both
directly and indirectly, so the WTO must find effective ways to work with 
business interests.
To effectively engage businesses, it is necessary to understand the ways 
in which firms participate in trade matters. Notice-and-comment obligations
provide business one avenue of engagement in trade policy. Other avenues
include direct input at the WTO level, or consultation mechanisms at 
the domestic level with WTO Members. But which participation mechanism
is better for businesses, including those from developing Members? The 
primary responsibility for engaging the business community in trade 
policy matters should rest with the Members at the domestic level for the 
following reasons:
1. As yet, there is no formalized WTO-level mechanism for direct input by
private firms in trade negotiations. The real decision-making activity
of the WTO takes place in negotiations and WTO Councils and com-
mittees. Businesses and NGOs are not allowed into those meetings.
Since the WTO is an intergovernmental organization, it is not easy to find
legal authority for direct participation by businesses in WTO decision-
making. It is unclear that direct participation by businesses in the WTO
could be accomplished without harming the conduct of negotiations.
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2. Many developing Members oppose direct involvement by businesses in
WTO decision-making. In the view of developing Members, direct 
participation by businesses would likely be dominated by multinational
enterprises from developed Members. The high cost of direct participa-
tion in Geneva-based decision-making excludes businesses from the
developing world. There is a serious imbalance in the capacities, fund-
ing, and expertise of businesses between developing and developed
Members. It follows that multinational enterprises from developed
Members would lead participation by business interests. Additionally,
collaboration between businesses and governments among developing
Members tends to be much looser than in similar collaborations among
developed Members. This would further disadvantage business in 
developing Members.
3. It is not clear with whom business would speak in Geneva. Currently,
few formally organized meetings provide an opportunity for business
interests to address WTO officials and delegations. The WTO Forum,
for example, is only a two-day conference for academics and NGOs to
present their views. In fact, not many WTO delegations show up at the
forum. As a public conference, the WTO Public Forum is not part of
the WTO’s daily working agenda, and it does not have much to do with
the day-to-day workings of the WTO. Businesses have not actively 
participated in this public forum. Some of them may think that it is not
easy to influence WTO decisions in this way. Outside of the WTO pub-
lic forum, it would also prove difficult to determine how the views of
business would be introduced into WTO decision-making. There are
insufficient channels for directly influencing the WTO decisions by busi-
nesses. Because of this, businesses could not likely participate effectively
in the WTO and may prefer instead to observe WTO meetings and 
other activities. However, with an increasing number of WTO meetings
being broadcast online, attending meetings in Geneva is becoming 
less important.
4. Allowing participation by businesses would create significant logistical
challenges. It would be difficult to accommodate 153 Members and a
large number of businesses in WTO negotiations. In addition, partici-
pation by businesses in WTO decision-making would potentially expand
the array of economic, political, social, and other policy areas related
to trade, thereby making the negotiations increasingly difficult. It would
also be difficult to fairly select qualified, legitimate, accountable, and
representative businesses to directly participate in the WTO.
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For these reasons, the primary avenue of business participation in trade 
policy formulation should be at the domestic level. To this end, WTO 
Members shoulder the primary responsibility for engaging with businesses,
while the WTO should make some effort to facilitate such engagement.
2. Extension of WTO-plus Comment Obligations: A Possible Way of
Enhancing Business Participation in the World Trade System
Extending the WTO-plus notice and comment obligations to all Members
presents a mechanism to enhance business participation in trade matters at
the domestic level. As analyzed above, China’s notice-and-comment obliga-
tions have greatly helped foreign and local businesses participate in trade pol-
icy-making. Non-state actors, including foreign businesses, can get directly
involved in the drafting of measures concerning or affecting goods, services,
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, and foreign exchange con-
trol in China. This section analyzes how other WTO Members approach notice-
and-comment obligations and studies some potential problems that need to
be addressed in the extension of the WTO-plus comment obligations.
Aside from China, other countries and regions have adopted comment
procedures as a result of or in conformity with WTO commitments, free trade
agreements, and domestic laws. Certain recently acceded WTO Members have
implemented WTO-plus transparency obligations similar to China or have
enacted rules providing public comment procedures on TBT/SPS measures.
Generally speaking, recently acceded Members (i.e., Viet Nam and Ukraine)
have already implemented more rigorous notice-and-comment rules because
of their commitments on WTO accession.
Viet Nam’s transparency obligations are similar to those of China. With
respect to proposed measures issued by Viet Nam pertaining to or affecting
trade in goods, services, and intellectual property, a minimum comment period
of 60 days is provided for associations, enterprises, and others to provide com-
ments to appropriate authorities before measures are adopted. Comments
received must be taken into account.125 Viet Nam’s new framework Law on
Standards and Technical Regulations provides 60 days from the date of noti-
fication for public comment, a period that may be shortened in urgent cases,
such as risks to public health, safety, environment, or national security.126
Ukraine’s WTO accession commitments require a minimum comment
period of 30 days before all regulations and other measures pertaining to or
affecting trade in goods and services and trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights are implemented, except for those involving national emergency
or security, or for which the publication would impede law enforcement.127
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Ukraine’s Law on Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assess-
ment Procedures provides an opportunity for public comment.128 In compar-
ison with Viet Nam and Ukraine, there is no express stipulation for the
minimum length of comment period in China’s WTO accession agreement.
Comment practices are common among some of the WTO’s original Mem-
bers. Furthermore, notice-and-comment obligations can be found in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).129 NAFTA countries must publish
proposed measures (laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings)
of general application respecting any matter covered by NAFTA in advance
and provide a reasonable opportunity for comment for interested persons,
including other NAFTA party states.130 Article 1803(1) requires each NAFTA
country to notify other NAFTA parties of actual or proposed measures that
might materially affect the operation of NAFTA or affect that other party’s
interests. NAFTA countries must, on request, provide other NAFTA countries
with information respecting their actual or proposed measures.131
Beyond these general notice and comment obligations, NAFTA contains 
sector- or issue-specific notice-and-comment obligations. These include 
Article 718 (sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and Article 909 (standards-
related measures). There is a notice-and-comment obligation when a party
proposes to adopt or modify a technical regulation or a sanitary or phytosan-
itary measure of general application at the federal level. While similar to the
SPS Agreement, NAFTA’s notice-and-comment requirements impose greater
obligations on NAFTA parties. For example, NAFTA requires a longer notice
and comment period, 60 days, than the SPS Agreement.132 In the case of a tech-
nical measure concerning perishable goods, each NAFTA party must endeav-
our to provide notification at least 30 days prior to the adoption or modification
of the measure, but no later than when notification is provided to domestic pro-
ducers.133 NAFTA also requires that parties publish and provide the full text of
the proposed sanitary or phytosanitary measure.134 A final difference is that
interested persons are allowed to comment, and NAFTA parties must discuss
the comments on request and consider the comments and results of discus-
sions.135 However, these obligations apply only to the state parties to NAFTA.
In general, laws and regulations in Canada (at the federal level and in most
provinces) are published in advance with a period provided for interested per-
sons to comment. Since NAFTA, Canada routinely includes at least the general
notice-and-comment provisions in its trade agreements (e.g., the free trade
agreement between Canada and Peru).136 The United States has taken a simi-
lar approach in its bilateral trade agreements. For instance, Chapter 19 of the
United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement provides an opportunity for
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comments. To the extent possible, the parties must provide interested persons
and other parties ‘a reasonable opportunity’ to comment on proposed meas-
ures.137 At the administrative level, U.S. federal agencies are required to com-
ply with the notice-and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act when engaged in the promulgation of rules and regulations of general
application. Every state of the United States appears to have a parallel state
statute governing state-level agencies. These practices run throughout the U.S.
rule-making process.
Notice-and-comment obligations are found outside of the NAFTA zone.
In Germany, public discussion of laws and regulations is not only general
practice, it is a constitutional imperative. In Japan, there is a ‘public comment
procedure’ available to all natural or juridical persons regardless of national-
ity.138 These procedures do not apply to acts of local governments. However,
in Japan, most municipalities have established their own public comment pro-
cedures modelled after national government rules. Public comment gathering
in Japan is conducted largely via the Internet. An e-government portal site has
a special column of ‘comments’ where comments can be posted and reviewed.139
However, the business community has not always been particularly respon-
sive to these governmental initiatives. For example, a recent request for com-
ments concerning Japan’s procedures in dealing with unfair foreign trade
practices generated a single response.140
While the foregoing demonstrates that notice-and-comment procedures
exist at the domestic level among WTO Members, greater work at consistent
and uniform comment obligations is required. Existing comment procedures
are limited since they are not general international obligations applicable to
WTO Members except for those set forth by the TBT and SPS Agreement.
Only multilateral obligations can ensure that comment requirements are imple-
mented widely and cannot be withdrawn unilaterally. There is a case for such
extension. Such obligations would implement the WTO non-discrimination
principle and would avoid dismantling the uniformity of WTO rules. Fair and
non-discriminatory trade rules could help to establish more confidence in the
WTO. The extension of notice-and-comment requirements may assist in reduc-
ing disputes. The fact that notice-and-comment requirements are being
imposed on newly acceding WTO Members lends further support to expand-
ing similar obligations to all WTO Members.
If comment obligations are to be extended, certain potential problems 
arising from the implementation must be addressed. One example of the 
negative side effects of such requirements is that if a huge number of measures
are subject to comment, governments could become overwhelmed by the 
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workload. The comment obligations may delay the response of governments
in emergent situations. To minimize the negative effects accompanying the exten-
sion of comment requirements, efforts may be needed in the following areas:
1. Exceptions to comment requirements must be provided. These excep-
tions ought to include emergency situations or times when advanced
publication of a measure would impede law enforcement. Generally
speaking, these are the exceptions to the notice-and-comment obliga-
tions already found in the WTO-plus transparency obligation undertaken
by recently acceded Members.
2. The scope of measures subject to comment obligations should be lim-
ited. China’s notice-and-comment obligations extend to all laws, regu-
lations, and other measures concerning or affecting goods, services,
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, and foreign exchange
controls. Viet Nam’s obligation extends to all laws, regulations, decrees,
judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application 
pertaining to or affecting customs issues, trade in goods, services, and
intellectual property.141 For Ukraine, all laws, regulations, decrees, judi-
cial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application related
to trade are subject to the commitment on advance notice-and-comment
for trade regulations.142 Requiring that notice-and-comment obliga-
tions be extended to measures at all governmental levels could be too
demanding. To avoid such a burden on Members, measures under the
comment obligation should be more restricted to measures at the cen-
tral/federal and provincial/state level. Measures below the provincial/state
level have a smaller scope of application and comparatively lower influ-
ence. The negative effect would be comparatively limited, if these meas-
ures were to be exempt from the comment requirement. Alternatively,
lower-level measures (e.g., at the county and city level) could be subject
to a simpler or more lenient comment procedure. This issue may be
relevant with regard to WTO-extra transparency requirements.
3. There needs to be consistency in notice-and-comment requirements.
For instance, although beyond the requirements on existing WTO Mem-
bers, the transparency requirements imposed on recently acceded Mem-
bers is far from uniform. One example is the length of the
notice-and-comment period. There is no clear definition of a reason-
able time frame for comments.143 For China, no minimum notice-
and-comment period was specified on its accession to the WTO. For
Viet Nam, a ‘reasonable period’ is no less than 60 days,144 whereas for
Ukraine it is no less than 30 days.145 Shall a minimum length of
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comment period be provided? Leaving the term ‘reasonable period’ in
the hands of WTO Members could create room for abuse. While this
chapter does not advocate for a particular length of time, it is important
that a uniform obligation be imposed on all WTO Members. A minimum
comment period of 30 days may help to reduce the potential abuse of
rights and guarantee necessary time for comments. Since draft measures
for comments are usually written in the language of the Member who
proposes it, some time is needed for foreign interested parties to under-
stand it and the proposal and make comments. Another issue is how to
determine who should be entitled to offer comments. It is advisable to
stipulate that Members, individuals, associations, and enterprises are
entitled to provide comments to the appropriate authorities before
measures are adopted and implemented.
IV. Conclusion
Businesses could, if rightly engaged, make a positive contribution in enhanc-
ing transparency and confidence in the WTO by sharing their expertise and
knowledge. Such a process would accommodate a broader array of interests and
could assist in helping to achieve consensus in challenging policy issues. There
is a real need to promote business participation in formation of trade policy
by WTO Members. The question is not whether business participation is
needed, but how businesses shall participate. The direct participation of busi-
ness in the sensitive WTO decision-making may not be compatible with the
intergovernmental character of the WTO and may generate objections from
developing Members. Currently it is not desirable to have formal mechanisms
for business interests to participate in the WTO. Therefore, the primary respon-
sibility for engaging the business community in trade policy matters rest with
the Members.
The focus on WTO transparency pertains to institutional issues, whereas
transparency obligations imposed on Members are of vital importance. WTO
Members generally consider that their efforts at enhancing external trans-
parency will bear little fruit unless they themselves are transparent at home
with domestic stakeholders.146 Extending notice and comment obligations to
all WTO Members is a vehicle to achieve greater domestic transparency. It may
bring changes as in China’s domestic law. On accession, China undertook strin-
gent comment obligations consisting of general and TBT/SPS comment obli-
gations. These obligations have also brought about changes to China’s domestic
law. Although transparency is regarded as a basic principle for all legislative
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activities in China since the promulgation of the Law on Legislation in 2000,147
compliance with China’s transparency obligations under the WTO is one of the
major reasons for the enactment of the Regulations on Procedures for For-
mulation of Administrative Regulations and the Regulations on Procedures
of the Rules Formulating.148 Under these domestic laws, foreign and domes-
tic businesses and other interested parties are allowed the chance to comment
on certain draft measures and on promulgated trade measures prior to their
implementation. Moreover, certain recently acceded Members and developed
countries have already adopted advance notice and comment requirements,
which have laid a foundation for their extension. Extending a more general-
ized notice-and-comment requirement to all WTO Members is a logical 
progression in the movement for greater transparency.
As indicated in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, the needs and concerns
at different levels of economic development shall be respected. If there is to be
an extension of the comment obligation, certain exceptions or transitional
periods for implementing such comment requirements may be necessary.
Certain potential problems in implementing such comment obligations must
also be addressed. They include clear exceptions to the comment requirements
and limiting the scope of measures subject to comment obligations. A more
interactive mechanism for business interests, both domestic and foreign, to
participate in trade policy-making could be developed. Enhancing trade 
policy formulation at the domestic level cannot help but enhance the trans-
parency of the WTO.
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Options for Public Participation in the WTO:
Experience from Regional Trade Agreements
YVES BONZON
I. Introduction
Since the early days of the World Trade Organization (WTO), numerous com-
mentators in the political and legal fields have challenged the traditional view
according to which inputs from civil society actors in the decision-making
process are to be managed at the domestic level and channelled through Members’
delegations exclusively.1 With this in mind, this chapter refers to the concept
of public participation as including all institutionalized forms of interaction
in the decision-making process between organs of an institution and actors
that are independent from any government (non-state actors). This approach
must be distinguished from other participatory approaches that have been
advocated in the WTO context, such as the adoption of international provisions
that would regulate public participation at the domestic level,2 or the creation
of a parliamentary body at the WTO level.3
Public participation includes two interrelated dimensions that are considered
jointly: the transparency of an institution’s decision-making process and the
engagement of non-states actors in that process (or actual participation).4 Trans-
parency is a prerequisite for active participation. In cases where the public is
entitled to some forms of direct participation, rules must ensure that relevant
and timely information is made available in a fair manner in order for active
participation to be meaningful. In cases where public participation is more
indirect and involves representation, information must allow that representa-
tives are held accountable to the people they represent.5 Inversely, active par-
ticipation may be a prerequisite for access to information. Indeed, a dialectic
interaction between organs of public authority and the public might sometimes
be required to identify the relevant information to be requested.
Current mechanisms of public participation in the WTO are institutionalized
by two documents: the Decision of the General Council on the Procedures for
the Circulation and De-restriction of WTO Documents,6 and the Guidelines
for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.7 The
decision on de-restriction regulates the transparency aspect of public partici-
pation, setting the general principle that ‘all WTO official documents shall 
be unrestricted’, with some limited exceptions.8 The guidelines address the
WTO’s relationship with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and serve
as the basis for current arrangements with civil society. These arrangements
include the possibility for non-profit NGOs to attend the plenary 
meetings of the biannual ministerial conferences; the organization by the WTO
Secretariat of symposia, public forums, and other informal meetings where
NGOs make presentations to chairpersons of WTO bodies and officials of the
WTO Secretariat; and an NGO page on the WTO website where a monthly
list of position papers posted by NGOs is compiled.9
On the dispute settlement side, panels and the Appellate Body have taken
steps of their own to enhance public participation by receiving inputs from
non-state actors through the submission of amicus curiae briefs.10 However,
under political pressure from a majority of Members, panels have regularly
accepted amicus briefs, stressing their discretionary right to accept, consider,
or reject any unsolicited submissions but have usually refused to consider them.
Finally, with respect to the transparency of the dispute settlement process,
some Members have taken the initiative to open to the public sessions of
disputes they were involved in.11
It can be said in the light of the above that mechanisms of public partici-
pation in the WTO are of a rudimentary nature. Indeed, the guidelines are
consistent with the strong state-centred nature of the WTO by providing that
closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs shall occur first and foremost
at the national level, and by giving the Secretariat, which is not granted any 
formal decision-making power in the organization’s institutional setting, the
primary role in interacting with NGOs.
Many reform proposals in recent years have been calling for the adoption
of more structured and formalized mechanisms that would allow for more
direct public participation in a fair and effective way. Conceptual models of such
mechanisms are to be found at the domestic level of states that have integrated
public participation mechanisms in their administrative process, such as provided
for in the U.S. Federal Administrative Procedural Act (US FAPA). These mech-
anisms are usually structured along four parameters (implementation parame-
ters): the goal of participation (normative function), the object of participation
(decisions at stake), the actual mechanisms of participation (forms of involvement,
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which specify in particular whether public participation can be judicially
enforced and reviewed), and the actors involved (circles of participants).12
This chapter compares public participation mechanisms adopted by other
international regimes and assesses to what extent these mechanisms could be
transposed to the WTO. Since it is argued that all four implementation param-
eters are interrelated, the goal and the object of public participation are first
briefly addressed by focusing on the relationship between the democratic prin-
ciple and the WTO. Doing so, Part II sets a framework for assessing mechanisms
of public participation in other international regimes. Part III turns to the
comparative analysis and focuses on public participation mechanisms in
selected free trade regimes (the Common Southern Market [Mercado Común
del Sur] [MERCOSUR]), the Association of Southern Eastern Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and the European Union (EU), and other international regimes.
On the basis of the comparative analysis, Part IV considers the further formal-
ization of public participation mechanisms in WTO decision-making and
focuses on the possibility of the WTO Panels and Appellate Body performing
administrative review of the decision-making processes of those international
standard-setting organizations whose rules they may refer to, drawing insights
from the Sardines case.13
II. Public Participation and Democratic Legitimacy
Most proposals for enhancing mechanisms of public participation in the WTO
refer to the existence of a ‘democratic deficit’ in the organization’s decision-mak-
ing process. Focusing on this issue, some commentators argue that as a result
of increasingly dealing with the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade,
certain WTO decisions are exerting an impact on individuals that is similar to
the impact of decisions reached at the domestic level of states.14 On this basis,
some commentators further argue that traditional ‘inter-governmental’ deci-
sion-making processes no longer provide for sufficient ‘legitimization’ of such
international decisions.15 In addition, as a consequence of economic globaliza-
tion, some are drawing attention to the emergence of transnational interests
that cannot be sufficiently taken into account in the context of a state-centred
system of decision-making at the international level.16
In contrast, some authors have denied the existence of a legitimacy deficit
in the WTO. These denials are based on arguments that view existing condi-
tions of representation as satisfactory,17 contest the impact of the regulatory
shift,18 or emphasize the so-called output dimension of legitimacy (result-
oriented legitimacy), according to which gains of multilateral cooperation
compensate for the lack of citizens’ representation at the international level.19
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Regardless of one’s stance on the question of a legitimacy deficit in the
WTO, two preliminary questions must be addressed when considering 
the implementation of public participation mechanisms as a means of improv-
ing the democratic quality of decision-making. The first question regards the
relevance of taking democratic concerns into account at the WTO level 
(is democratic legitimacy a relevant goal for the WTO?), while the second 
question relates to the appropriateness of public participation mechanisms to
address such democratic concerns.
As regards the first question, an affirmative answer presupposes the exis-
tence of convergent democratic values among Members and the recognition
that the WTO is meant to perform the constitutional function of promoting
and implementing values of democracy at the national as well as the interna-
tional levels. Some authors have argued that the WTO is implicitly meant to
perform such a constitutional function. They take a human rights approach,
observing that all WTO Members are parties to treaties and have adopted
United Nations resolutions promoting democratic governance and a democratic
international order.20 In addition, others have argued that the procedural
requirements imposed on Members by Article X of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947),21 Article III of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS),22 and Article 63 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)23 relating to their domestic decision-
making procedures, should be imposed on international decision-making,
which would amount to recognizing the existence of constitutional principles
at the WTO level.24
As regards the appropriateness of public participation mechanisms in
enhancing the democratic quality of the WTO decision-making process, pro-
ponents of such mechanisms view them as a complement to other sources of
democratic legitimization (elections and traditional representative channels)
in circumstances where those traditional input mechanisms are weak, thus
making them particularly appealing at the international level.25 Some others
argue, however, that the deliberative function of public participation can only
have a legitimizing effect when a homogenous polity, which is missing at the
international level, supports such a process.26 In response, proponents argue
that public participation can contribute to the emergence of such a polity and
should be established to compensate for its absence.27
Adopting a constitutional perspective as proponents of enhanced public par-
ticipation does imply that some decisions, because of their impact, must be
reached according to appropriate procedures that have the potential to legit-
imize them. In other words, a specific degree-of-legitimization requirement is
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attached to a given type of decision depending on its impact.28 The normative
link between the type of decision and the procedure (institutional setting) for
achieving it has been conveniently described by the ‘substance-structure pair-
ing’ concept,29 and should be kept in mind when comparing participatory
mechanisms in various regimes. From such a ‘substance-structure pairing’
perspective, the impact of a decision is a combination of its substance and its
enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the following comparative analysis must
take into account both elements in order to be meaningful.
III. Comparative Analysis
A. Framework of Analysis
As some commentators have stressed, any comparative analysis of public 
participation mechanisms runs the risk of proving irrelevant in the light of
the dissimilarities between international regimes with regard to their mem-
bership, type of goals, and qualities.30 With this in mind, the following com-
parative analysis focuses on regimes whose types of decisions (object of public
participation) are to some degree similar to those of the WTO from a substan-
tive point of view. Therefore, emphasis is placed on public participation mech-
anisms in other free trade regimes. In addition, public participation mechanisms
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) are considered, since the 
output of this organization is relevant to the WTO by virtue of the WTO rule-
referencing practice, as will be explained.31 Furthermore, public participation
mechanisms in selected multilateral environmental agreements are briefly 
surveyed because of the well-elaborated models they provide.
Moreover, public participation mechanisms in the selected free trade regimes
are compared from a normative substance-structure pairing perspective, which
means that the degree-of-legitimization requirement of a regime’s decisions
(focus on substance, or impact) as well as existing institutional features of that
regime (focus on structure) are taken into account. On the substance side, the
degree-of-legitimization requirement of decisions is assessed by reference to the
existence of binding dispute settlement mechanisms at the international level
or to domestic courts enforcing them (which would mean that the provisions
have direct effect). On the structural side, emphasis is placed on institutional
features that might contribute to the legitimization of a regime’s decisions,
and on which the requirement for enhanced public participation mechanisms
might further depend. For instance, public participation will be less required
if a regime’s decision-making organs include legitimizing bodies like a parlia-
mentary assembly or involve high-ranking political officials.
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1. MERCOSUR
On the substantive side, the impact of MERCOSUR law is similar to WTO law.
According to the constitutional rules of states parties, MERCOSUR’s decisions
have no direct effect and must be incorporated into national law before attain-
ing any legal force. As regards dispute settlement mechanisms at the interna-
tional level, the Article 9 of Olivos Protocol provides for ad hoc arbitration
proceedings that can be initiated by any state party involved in a dispute, and
Article 17 establishes a review procedure by a permanent review court.32 The
awards of the Permanent Review Court are binding (Article 26), and compen-
satory measures can be applied to a state party that does not comply with 
them (Article 31).
On the structural side, MERCOSUR displays a number of peculiarities
that, in comparison to the WTO, provide enhanced legitimization of MER-
COSUR law.33 First, meetings of the highest decision-making organ, the Com-
mon Market Council, (Consejo del Mercado Comun) are more frequent (twice
a year) and the Members’ heads of state meet once a year.34 Second, a MER-
COSUR parliament, until 2006 the Joint Parliamentary Group (Comision 
Parlamentaria Conjunta), has been established to facilitate the integration of
MERCOSUR law into the national legal orders of Members (though it is
acknowledged that the accomplishments of the parliament have been 
relatively modest).
Turning to mechanisms of public participation, exchange of information
with non-state actors takes place within a social and economic forum estab-
lished by the organization. This forum is made up of national sections, whose
composition is decided autonomously by each state party.35 The forum serves
as a consulting body to the Common Market Council and issues non-binding
recommendations that in practice, as noted by some authors, ‘[have] been
reduced to an exchange of opinions on the development of the main aspects
of the negotiating agenda’.36 In addition, institutionalized channels of public
participation exist through the MERCOSUR parliament. The parliament’s
constitutive protocol sets out the general goal of ‘guaranteeing the participation
of civil society actors in the integration process’ and recognizes as a general
principle the ‘transparency of information and decisions in order to foster trust
and enhance the participation of citizens’. Further, the competence of the par-
liament includes the ‘organization of public meetings with civil society and
business organizations to address issues relating to the integration process’, as
well as the possibility to ‘receive, examine, and, if appropriate, transmit to the
decision-making organs petitions of any individual of the States Parties, natu-
ral or juridical person, relating to acts or omissions of MERCOSUR organs’.37
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2. ASEAN
On the substantive side, the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism establishes binding procedures, creates a standing Appellate Body,
and allows the use of retaliatory measures (suspension of concessions) in cases
of non-compliance with its rulings.38 The dispute settlement process is driven
by the reverse consensus principle and is thus very similar to that of the WTO.
On the structural side, although ASEAN is the framework for a broader
integration project calling for the development of a community built on three
pillars (political, economic, and socio-cultural), it has not yet established any
type of parliament or separate forum for civil society representation. ASEAN’s
institutions are built on the same hierarchical structure as most other free
trade regimes. Its structure can be divided into a ‘Track One’ and a ‘Track Two’
approach.39 Track One is made of the actual decision-making organs, which
consist of the ASEAN Summit (where heads of states meet annually) and var-
ious ministerial councils. Track Two is made up of the numerous committees
and working groups that have powers delegated from Track One organs.
ASEAN has established some formalized patterns of interaction with non-
state actors. Meetings organized by Track Two bodies include discussions with
think-tank experts, representatives from technical organizations, and other
specialists. These meetings ensure the participation of the private sector, which
is represented through the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ASEAN-CCI) and other sectoral committees.40 As one example of formalized
mechanisms of interaction with the private sector, the agenda of the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting is circulated to the ASEAN-CCI in advance in
order to latter’s input.41
Interaction with some civil society organizations is formalized by a system
of accreditation regulated in the ‘Guidelines on ASEAN’s Relations with Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs)’.42 Its legal basis has been reinforced with the
adoption of the ‘Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’, which
provides in Article 16 that ‘associated entities’ are to be listed in its Annex.43
The ASEAN guidelines set criteria for accreditation and detail the privileges that
accreditation entails. Criteria for accreditation mostly relate to the composi-
tion of an organization’s membership (representation of ASEAN nationals), the
compatibility of its goals with those of ASEAN, and its positive contribution
to the realization of ASEAN goals. Accreditation entails the privilege of sub-
mitting documents to the ASEAN Standing Committee via the ASEAN Secre-
tariat. In addition, accredited organizations can also submit proposals to initiate
programs or activities to any appropriate body and attend meetings, at the dis-
cretion of the chairman, of any body that deals with matters of direct concern
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to them. Finally, accredited civil society organizations are allowed access 
to ASEAN documents on a selective basis, in consultation with the ASEAN
Secretariat. Moreover, since 2001, ASEAN has organized the annual ASEAN 
People’s Assembly. It is convened several days ahead of ASEAN summits and
adopts a common statement of civil society organizations, which is then read
to the heads of state during their summit. This practice was inaugurated in
2005 at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur.44
More recently, ASEAN Members adopted at their 2007 Summit the ‘Blue
Print for the ASEAN Economic Community’, which devotes a paragraph to
the ‘involvement of stakeholders’ in identifying measures to deepen economic
integration in the ASEAN.45 This paragraph sets the goal of ‘creating public
awareness’ and details a set of actions, including the creation of a regional 
platform to ‘share information in implementing the Community’.
3. European Union
Launched as an economic community, the European integration process has
progressively evolved into a political union, thus achieving a high degree of inte-
gration in a wide range of policy areas. This explains why the EU institutional
structure is elaborate compared to the regimes discussed above. Most impor-
tantly, the decision-making structure of the EU goes beyond the strictly member-
driven character of other free trade regimes and comprises common institutions
with powers independent from the member states: the European Commis-
sion, European Council, and the European Parliament. The European Com-
mission initiates the law-making process, whereas the council and the
parliament actually pass the laws. In addition, the commission is in charge of
implementing EU law on behalf of the European Council. It does so through
the ‘Comitology’ procedure, which must be distinguished from the commis-
sion’s regular decision-making process, and for which specific rules of trans-
parency and public participation rules apply.46 Regarding enforcement, rulings
of the European Court of Justice have progressively endowed EU law with
supranational character, thus granting it direct effect.47
The as yet unimplemented European Constitutional Treaty will provide a
constitutional basis for transparency and public participation in the European
Union. A general ‘Right to Transparency’ is provided in Article 42, whereas
Articles I-50, II-102, and III-399 further specify rights to access documents. In
addition, a ‘Right to Civil Society Participation’ is provided at Article I-47,
whose implementation, as authors have noted, would leave many questions
open.48 In practice, most mechanisms of public participation in the European
Union relate to the European Commission, which consults interest groups
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through its directorates-general, the subdivisions that actually draft legislation.
Among these mechanisms, EU Members have adopted a legal framework for
access to information that grants enforceable rights to individuals.49 Other
institutionalized forms of public participation include the European Economic
and Social Committee, which is composed of representatives of various civil
society organizations that are nominated by EU member states and must be
consulted before decisions are taken on economic and social policies.
In addition to this institutionalized framework of public participation, the
European Commission has taken a number of steps to enhance transparency
and public participation through soft law initiatives. In 2001, it adopted the
‘White Paper on European Governance’, which articulates principles of good
governance relating to transparency (openness, participation, and accounta-
bility).50 On this basis, the commission adopted in 2002 some principles and
minimum standards for consulting external parties, which sought to create a
common framework to the otherwise decentralized organization of its consul-
tation with non-state actors.51 As discussed above, these standards address the
nature of documents to be provided, ‘target groups’ to be consulted, time
frames for participation, requirements for feedback, and requirements that
the results of consultations be published.52 In practice, dialogue between the
directorates-general and interested parties takes many forms, including the
release of consultation papers (Green and White Papers), establishment of
advisory committees and expert groups, organization of workshops, open
hearings and forums, and combinations of these different tools at various
phases of policy development. Moreover, online consultation is commonly
used. As for the Comitology procedure, it is subject to a specific regime of
document disclosure, which involves the ‘Register of Comitology’, where com-
mittees’ agendas, draft implementing measures, records of committee meetings,
and voting results of opinions delivered by committees are stored.53 Further,
the commission has created the ‘Public Register of Commission Expert Groups’,
which lists both formal and informal groups, providing key information on
them, including mention of the lead directorate-general to which they relate, the
groups’ tasks, and categories of participants. Finally, in 2008, the commission
created a voluntary register for interest group representatives.
4. The Codex Alimentarius Commission
Established by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1963, the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion (Codex Commission) and its subsidiary bodies are pursuing the adoption
of international standards on food safety with the goal of ‘protecting the health
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of the consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade’,54 thus 
contributing to the harmonization of the regulations of its 120 member states
on the matter.
The elaboration process of standards takes place through several steps that
involve two main bodies: the Codex Commission itself, where all member
states are officially represented by their delegation, and the Executive Com-
mittee.55 The latter is an organ of limited composition that acts on behalf of
the Codex Commission between its sessions.56 It may make proposals to the
commission regarding general orientation, strategic planning, and program-
ming of the work of the commission, and monitors the progress of standards
development.
The standards adopted by the Codex Commission are of a voluntary
nature.57 However, the entry into force of the WTO SPS and TBT agreements,
with their provisions on rule-referencing, has conferred a particular status on
these standards, thereby increasing their authority.58 This resulted in height-
ened scrutiny of their elaboration process and in the adoption by the Codex
Commission in 1999 of a set of formal principles called the ‘Principles Con-
cerning the Participation of International Non-Governmental Organizations
in the Work of the Codex Alimentarius Commission’ (Principles on NGOs
Participation).59
These principles provide for an observer status, granted to all international
NGOs that have official status at either the FAO or the WHO, or that fulfil a
number of criteria. Among these criteria, NGOs must have an international
character, be ‘representative of the specialized field of interest in which they
operate’, ‘have aims and purposes in conformity with the Statutes of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission’, and ‘have a permanent directing body and Secre-
tariat, authorized representatives and systematic procedures and machinery
for communicating with its membership in various countries. Its members
shall exercise voting rights in relation to its policies or action or shall have
other appropriate mechanisms to express their views.’60
NGOs with observer status are granted some privileges and are under 
certain obligations. Their privileges include an entitlement to send observers
to sessions of the Codex Commission, to receive all its working documents
and discussion papers in advance of the sessions, to circulate to the commis-
sion its views in writing, and to participate in discussions when invited by the
chairperson. Among their obligations, NGOs shall ‘contribute, as far as possi-
ble, and at the request of the Directors-General, to the promotion of a better
knowledge and understanding of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and
the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme’, and ‘send to the Secretary
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of the Commission on an exchange basis, its reports and publications concerned
with matters covering all or part of the Commission’s field of activity’.61
Whereas meetings of all Codex subsidiary bodies are open to the public,62
it is important to note that no observer status is provided for meetings of the
Codex Commission Executive Committee. A Codex Evaluation recommends
filling this gap.63 However member states, fearing that it would compromise the
efficiency of the Executive Committee’s proceedings, currently favour solu-
tions that would increase transparency by webcasting the Executive Commit-
tee’s proceedings.64
5. Transparency and Participation Mechanisms in Non-Trade Regimes—
Examples of Multilateral Environment Agreements
NGOs’ participation in the institutions established under multilateral envi-
ronment agreements is fairly developed and regulated. As a general matter,
most agreements adopted since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in Rio contain a provision prescribing that the
Conference of the Parties should ‘seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services
and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international
organizations and non-governmental bodies’ for the implementation of the
relevant agreement.65
NGOs are usually granted observer status in the meetings of governing
bodies under multilateral environment agreements after going through a
process of accreditation. This process generally requires fulfilling two condi-
tions.66 First, NGOs must be ‘qualified’ in the subject matter of a particular
treaty, which means that they either have specific competence or represent a
broad constituency with an interest in the matter of the agreement. Second,
accreditation must not be objected to by more than one-third of the states
party to the convention. Some multilateral environment agreements set addi-
tional conditions. For example, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) requires national NGOs
to receive approval from their home government before being accredited and
imposes a registration fee on them in order to address capacity problems (with
a possibility of waiving the fee).
Some environment agreements allow NGOs to be granted enhanced status,
which may entail additional benefits such as permanent observer and adviser
status, as well as unconditional and unlimited access to meetings.67 NGOs with
preferential status are usually under enhanced obligations, such as having a
global program of activities, a track record of project experience, a positive
reputation, and contributing on a regular basis to the further development
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and application of the policies and technical and scientific tools of the convention
at issue. Some NGOs are also charged with Secretariat functions, as in the case
of CITES and the Ramsar Convention.
Rules of procedure governing NGOs participation under multilateral 
environment agreements usually apply to all subsidiary bodies of a regime’s
institutional structure. Regarding active participation in meetings, NGOs 
may, upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to vote in the
proceedings of any meeting in matters of direct concern to the body or agency
they represent unless at least one third of the Parties present at the meeting object.68
Usually, NGOs can make oral statement at the discretion of the chairman.
Regarding the sharing of information, some rules allow NGOs to submit
documents to delegates by means of distribution by the Secretariat. This pos-
sibility doesn’t imply, however, any formal rights that would create a proce-
dural obligation for states to consider the documents. In addition, the Rules of
Procedures of the Ramsar Convention allow the Secretariat to decide whether
to issue as official documents those documents submitted by NGOs. The Rules
of Procedures under CITES provide for the same possibility under more detailed
conditions. As a general matter, secretariats usually have some discretion in
synthesizing and integrating reports submitted to them by NGOs.
IV. Conclusion: Comments on the Comparative 
Analysis and Insights for the WTO 
The comparative analysis above provides an overview of existing types of
participatory mechanisms in international free trade and other international
regimes. First, it can be observed that participation can occur through formal
institutions that stand separate from a regime’s actual decision-making proce-
dures (the Economic and Social Councils in MERCOSUR and the European
Union), or through direct links to decision-makers (access to committees).
With respect to the former, it is generally acknowledged that the advisory
function of these councils has little influence on the final outcome of an orga-
nization’s decisions. In the WTO context, if such an economic and social coun-
cil were to be created as some commentators have proposed,69 its Members
would have to be entities with an international or regional character. Indeed,
it appears that a system of membership based on nominations by each Mem-
ber State at the national level, as it exists in MERCOSUR and the European
Union, would not be achievable in a context that involves 150 Member States.
This makes sense from the perspective of implementing mechanisms of
public participation as a means to assert interests of a transnational nature.
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Attendance by non-state actors at meetings where the substance of decisions
is shaped (lower-level bodies) as well as the ability to submit information at
these meetings appears to be more effective mechanisms for ensuring trans-
parency and engagement in the decision-making process. In the WTO 
context, some have advocated for access by non-state actors to meetings of
lower-level bodies.70 In this respect, it can be noted that several WTO bodies
have adopted provisions that regulate the granting of observer status to 
other international organizations.71 These provisions could serve as templates
if Members were to take the step of granting non-state actors access to 
WTO committees.
It can be observed that participatory opportunities in committees of the
regimes surveyed above are often granted on a case-by-case basis at the discre-
tion of the Members or a body’s chairman. This leads to focus on one specific
type of mechanism: judicial review. The comparative analysis shows that trans-
parency and participation mechanisms are often based on soft law commit-
ments, with no judicial review of their enforcement, with the exception of the
EU legal framework for access to information.72
In the WTO context, judicial review could emerge as a mechanism of pub-
lic participation in connection with the rule-referencing practice.73 Reference
in some cases to rules adopted by external organizations gives rise to a ‘global
separation of powers’ model, under which WTO Panels and the Appellate Body
have the possibility of performing a kind of judicial review, potentially involv-
ing requirements of public participation.74
Some authors have argued that the absence of such procedural review,
which would parallel the one they can perform in relation to national regula-
tory processes under Article X of the GATT 1994, Article III of the GATS, or
Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement, creates a legitimacy issue.75 Furthermore,
some have argued that by performing such a review, dispute settlement organs,
which are mindful of this legitimacy issue, would overcome their present reluc-
tance to apply international standards, which in turn would give rise to increased
policy coordination at the WTO that could be beneficial for the protection of
social values.76
Such patterns of judicial review are discernable in the European Commu-
nities—Trade Description of Sardines (Sardines), which offers a glimpse on how
this mechanism could be further consolidated.77 In this case, considering
whether the international standard referred to by the claimant was a ‘relevant
international standard’ according to Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the
panel held that ‘relevance refers to the subject matter at issue, i.e., preserved 
sardines, and not to the temporal aspect of the international standard or pro-
cedural aspect of the adoption of the international standard’.78 The panel went
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on, however, to consider the procedural arguments of the defendant. First, it
responded to the argument that international standards must be based on con-
sensus according to paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement and its
explanatory note, concluding that consensus need not be achieved.79 Second,
it dismisses as a mere ‘policy statement of preference’ a decision of the TBT
Committee relied on by the respondent that sets procedural requirements for
the international standard-setting process.80 Finally, it considered the argu-
ment of the respondent that the adoption of the standard at issue had violated
the standard-setting organization’s (in this case the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission) internal rules of procedure.81
It can be observed that the panel in Sardines is not impervious to the idea
of reviewing the procedural aspects of international standards, since it did
consider the procedural arguments of the respondent defendant. It simply
concluded that these arguments were ill-founded in facts of the case. Indeed,
the panel did take into account the Codex Commission’s internal rules of pro-
cedure in concluding that they were not violated. As well, the panel seems to con-
ceive that procedural requirements could be set by a committee decision but
found that in this particular case the decision at issue does not formally con-
stitute a legal basis. And finally, it considered the standard-setting process in
the light of paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement but argues that this
provision does not require consensus. Therefore, it appears that for dispute set-
tlement bodies to perform a form of judicial review of the standard-setting
process that could include requirements of public participation, some criteria
would have to be adopted. The Appellate Body, for its part, seems unwilling to
go down that path, having relied on the panel’s interpretation of the TBT Agree-
ment.82 Therefore, Members would have to adopt such criteria, possibly in the
form of a committee decision that would clearly state its binding character.
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for the adoption of standards within their respective operations. In other words, the
fact that we find that the TBT Agreement does not require approval by consensus for
standards adopted by the international standardization community should not be
interpreted to mean that we believe an international standardization body should not
require consensus for the adoption of its standards. That is not for us to decide.’
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Non-Governmental Organizations and 
the WTO: Limits to Involvement? 
PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE*
I. Introduction
The importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as international
actors has increased sharply over the last decades. Since 1945, when NGOs were
explicitly recognized as actors on the international scene by Article 71 of the
United Nations Charter, NGOs have become an ever stronger and more vocal
force in international policy-making, policy implementation, compliance mon-
itoring, and dispute settlement. The interest and involvement of NGOs in 
the activities of international organizations have especially intensified since the
early 1990s. Currently, a continuously growing number of NGOs participate
or aspire to participate in the work of international organizations. Many
observers would agree with K. Raustiala that ‘this growth of NGO activity may
indicate an emerging transformation of the international legal and political
system—a decline in the importance of the sovereign state and the state system
and an accompanying rise of governance by a dynamic global civil society’.1
The most important reason for the empowerment of NGOs on the inter-
national plane is the phenomenon of globalization and the growing need to find
global solutions for global problems. This has led governments to engage in
more negotiation, policy formation, and decision-making at the international
level. More often than not, these activities at the international level have 
significant effects on domestic policy and legislation. In a number of fields,
there has, in fact, been a shift in regulatory activity from the national to the inter-
national level. Consequently, many NGOs, which were formerly national in
focus and organizational structure, have ‘internationalized’ in order to main-
tain their ability to participate in the policy debate and affect policy decisions.2
The Cardoso Report of 2004, on the relationship between the United Nations
and civil society, reports, ‘Representative democracy, in which citizens period-
ically elect their representatives across the full spectrum of political issues, is
now supplemented by participatory democracy, in which anyone can enter the
debates that most interest them, through advocacy, protest and in other ways.’3
People are using internationally operating NGOs to express their political views
and/or promote their interests. Effective involvement in—and influence over—
the policy-making, policy implementation, compliance monitoring, and dis-
pute settlement activities of international organizations is a chief objective—if
not the raison d’être—of international NGOs.
International NGOs have been keen to be involved in the activities of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). As the primary international organization
concerned with trans-border trade, the WTO is at the forefront of the multi-
lateral effort to manage and regulate economic globalization. The law of the
WTO governs the trade relations between its 153 Members and plays a crucial
role in resolving trade disputes between these Members. Not surprisingly,
the WTO has emerged as a prime target for anti-globalization protests. When
Mike Moore arrived at the headquarters of the World Trade Organization in
the summer 1999 to begin his first day of work as the WTO’s new Director-
General, he was welcomed by a small but noisy group of demonstrators. One
of the demonstrators waved a sign saying, ‘Dieu est mort, l’OMC l’a remplacé!’
(‘God is dead; the WTO has replaced him!’). Another sign said, ‘Qui sème la
misère récolte la colère!’ (‘He who sows misery will reap anger’), and a third
sign said, ‘WTO = World Terror Organization.’ This small demonstration was
a sign of things to come. A few months later, the WTO Ministerial Conference
in Seattle triggered large-scale demonstrations that degenerated into street
battles between the police and protestors. Since Seattle, there have been several
other mass demonstrations against the WTO, in particular on the occasions of
the biannual sessions of the WTO Ministerial Conference. As Guy de 
Jonquières observed, this ‘interest’ in the WTO reflects ‘growing public aware-
ness—but often imperfect understanding—of its role in promoting, and 
formulating rules for, global economic integration’.4
This chapter examines the nature and the extent of the involvement of
NGOs in the activities of the WTO. First, it looks at the arguments for and
against NGO involvement in WTO activities. Next, the article discusses the
legal basis for the involvement of NGOs in WTO activities and the various
forms of involvement provided for. It compares the position of NGOs in the
WTO with their position in other international organizations, in particular, the
United Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Subsequently, the article explores the
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practice of WTO engagement with NGOs. Finally, it examines and compares
the rules and procedures of the WTO, the United Nations, WIPO, and the IMF
for the selection/accreditation of the NGOs with which they engage.
II. Arguments For and Against NGO Involvement
While not always wholeheartedly, international organizations have responded
positively to the call of NGOs for more involvement and currently allow—to dif-
ferent degrees and in different ways—NGOs to participate in their activities. This
has also been the case for the WTO. However, the debate on the desirability of
(greater) involvement of NGOs in the work of the WTO is far from settled.
There are four main arguments in favour of (greater) NGO involvement in
WTO activities (as well as in the activities of most other international organizations).
First, NGO participation will enhance the WTO decision-making process because
NGOs will provide information, arguments, and perspectives that governments do
not bring forward. Many NGOs have a wealth of specialized knowledge, resources,
and analytical capacity. As Daniel Esty noted, NGOs can and should function as
‘intellectual competitors’ to governments in the quest for optimal policies.5 In fact,
governments often lack the resources and very specific expertise necessary to inves-
tigate certain issues. NGOs may frequently be able to assist, enhancing the resources
and expertise available and enriching the policy debate.
Second, NGO participation will increase the legitimacy of the WTO. In the
eyes of many, the WTO is currently a secretive organization in which the gov-
ernments (of a few major trading nations), unsupervised by parliaments or
civil society, set the agenda and push through rules that affect the welfare of peo-
ple worldwide. WTO decision-making has been described as undemocratic
and lacking in transparency. For decision-making to be democratic, it must
involve either directly, or through representation, those who will be affected by
the decisions taken. Furthermore, decisions must be reached as a result of an
open and transparent exchange of rational arguments, which allows those rep-
resented to ‘watch-dog’ the representatives.6 The legitimacy of the WTO and
public confidence in the WTO will increase when NGOs have the opportu-
nity to be heard and to observe the decision-making process. NGOs will con-
tribute to ensuring that decisions result from an open exchange of rational
arguments rather than from shady bargaining. Moreover, NGOs can play an
important role in disseminating information at the national level, ensuring
broader public support and understanding.
Third, transnational interests and concerns may not be adequately represented
by any national government. By allowing NGO involvement in WTO discussions,
the WTO would hear about important issues that are international in nature.
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Finally, civil society participation in the debate at the national level is an
option only in those WTO Members with open and democratic processes at
the national level. This is not the case for all WTO Members. Hearing NGOs
at the WTO can thus compensate for the fact that NGOs are not always heard
at the national level in every country.
There are equally four main arguments against (greater) involvement of
NGOs in the work of the WTO. First, NGO involvement may lead the decision-
making process to be captured by special interests.7 Trade liberalization pro-
duces diffuse and hard-to-quantify benefits for the general public, while producing
visible harm to specific and well-organized interests. The NGOs seeking access
to the WTO are often entities representing special interests, not the interests of
the general public. Thus special interests may gain undue influence.
Second, many NGOs lack legitimacy. They are neither accountable to an
electorate nor representative in a general way. NGOs typically advocate rela-
tively narrow interests. Unlike governments, they do not balance all of society’s
interests. It is legitimate to ask questions regarding the actual constituency of
an NGO and its financial backing.
Third, most developing-country Members object to greater involvement of
NGOs in the WTO because they view most NGOs, and in particular NGOs
focusing on environmental or labour issues, as inimical to their interests at their
current level of economic development. Moreover, NGOs of industrialized
Members tend to be well organized and well financed. It is feared that allowing
NGOs a bigger role may therefore further marginalize developing-country
Members within the WTO decision-making process. In other words, it may tilt
the negotiating balance further to the disadvantage of developing countries.
Finally, WTO decision-making, with its consensus requirement, is already
very difficult. NGO involvement will make negotiations and decision-making
even more difficult. Further transparency will enable private interest groups to
frustrate the negotiating powers of governments in WTO forums. Gary Sampson
noted, in this respect, that ‘national representatives must on occasion subor-
dinate certain national interests in order to achieve marginally acceptable or
sub-optimal compromises that, by definition, require trade-offs. Doubt is
expressed whether such a system could continue to work effectively if these
trade-offs were open to scrutiny by precisely those special interest groups that
would have opposed them’.8
The essence of the debate over (greater) NGO involvement in international
organizations was captured well by the authors of the Background Paper for
the Cardoso Report when they concluded that ‘well handled’ involvement of
NGOs in the policy-deliberation and decision-making processes of international
organizations ‘enhances the quality of decision-making, increases ownership
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of the decisions, improves accountability and transparency of the process and
enriches outcomes through a variety of views and experiences’.9 However,
‘handled badly, it can confuse choices, hamper the intergovernmental search
for common ground, erode the privacy needed for sensitive discussions, over-
crowd agendas and present distractions at important meetings’.10
The remainder of this chapter will examine how the WTO ‘handles’ the
involvement of NGOs in its activities and will compare this ‘handling’ with
that of other international organizations.
III. Legal Basis for and Forms of NGO Involvement
A. Involvement in the WTO
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement)11 explicitly empowers the WTO to engage with NGOs. Article V:2
of the WTO Agreement provides:
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultations and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related
to those of the WTO.
Such explicit authority to engage with NGOs can also be found in the UN
Charter. Article 71 of the UN Charter states:
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consulta-
tion with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence.
The constituent instruments of other international organizations, such as WIPO,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) explicitly provide for engagement
with NGOs. However, the constituent instruments of two international organ-
izations with which the WTO has particularly close links and a shared respon-
sibility for coherence in global economic policy-making,12 namely the IMF and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
do not provide an explicit legal basis for NGO involvement. While this has not
prevented the World Bank and the IMF from engaging with NGOs,13 it is to be
applauded that the WTO was explicitly empowered to engage with NGOs.
The 1948 Havana Charter on the International Trade Organization (ITO) con-
tained a provision with wording similar to Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement.14
The ITO, however, never became operational, and the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) filled the gap left by the ITO for almost 50 years. The
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GATT, by contrast, did not have any provision on cooperation with NGOs. Under
the GATT, informal and ad hoc contact existed with NGOs.15 However, NGOs
were denied access to meetings and conferences. That was also the case for the
Marrakesh Conference in April 1994, at which the WTO Agreement was signed.16
Pursuant to the mandate given to it in Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement,
the General Council of the WTO adopted in 1996 the ‘Guidelines for Arrange-
ments on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations’ (the 1996 Guide-
lines).17 In this one-page document, Members recognized that NGOs can play
a role in increasing ‘the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities’
and that NGOs are a ‘valuable resource’ that can ‘contribute to the accuracy and
richness of the public debate’.18 In the 1996 Guidelines, it was agreed that inter-
action with NGOs should be developed through the organization of symposia
for NGOs on specific WTO-related issues; informal arrangements to circulate
among interested Members’ position papers and information that NGOs may
wish to make available; the continuation of the practice of the WTO Secre-
tariat of responding to requests for general information and briefings about the
WTO; and participation of chairpersons of WTO councils and committees,
in their personal capacity, in discussions and meetings with NGOs.19
The 1996 Guidelines also made the limits of NGO involvement clear. In the
concluding paragraph, the General Council referred to the special character 
of the WTO, which is both an intergovernmental organization based on a 
binding treaty of rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for
negotiations. The General Council then concluded:
As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it
would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO
or its meetings.
20
To this, the General Council added:
Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively
through appropriate processes at the national level where lies primary responsi-
bility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are
brought to bear on trade policy-making.
21
While Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement allows the General Council to pro-
vide for full-fledged involvement of NGOs in WTO activities, the General
Council opted in 1996 to direct the main responsibility for engaging with civil
society to the national level. Furthermore, the General Council instructed only
the WTO Secretariat to engage with NGOs and effectively barred NGOs from
participation in the activities of WTO bodies. While the legal basis in the WTO
Agreement is broad enough to allow for this, NGOs do not have consultative
status in any WTO bodies.
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B. Involvement in the UN ECOSOC
Although Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement and Article 71 of the UN Charter
are similarly worded,22 there is a significant difference in how the United
Nations and the WTO approach engagement with NGOs. Unlike the WTO,
the United Nations, and in particular the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), has seized the opportunity to provide for forms of significant
involvement of NGOs. Pursuant to the mandate given to ECOSOC in Article 71
of the UN Charter, on 25 July 1996 it adopted Resolution 1996/31 on the 
‘Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations’.23 This instrument is much more elaborate and provides for
notably broader NGO involvement than the 1996 Guidelines. Resolution
1996/31 provides for the granting of ‘consultative status’ to NGOs. There are
three types of such status: general consultative status, special consultative 
status, and inclusion on the roster.24 Each type of status corresponds with a 
different bundle of rights. An NGO in general consultative status
• is informed of the provisional agenda of the Economic and Social Council
and may propose to the Council Committee on Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGO committee) that the committee request the UN
secretary-general to place items of special interest on the provisional
agenda of the council;25
• may orally present to the council introductory statements of an expos-
itory nature on items included on the council’s agenda at the proposal
of the NGO;26
• may sit as an observer at public meetings of the council and its sub-
sidiary bodies;27
• may submit written statements with a maximum of 2,000 words for 
circulation to the Members of the council;
28
and
• may make oral statements to the council (at the recommendation of the
NGO committee and subject to the approval of the council).29
NGOs in special consultative status enjoy some of the same rights granted to
NGOs in general consultative status.30 However, they cannot propose items for
the agenda of the council, nor can they make oral statements at meetings of
the council.31 They may, however, speak at meetings of the council’s subsidiary
bodies that deal with subject matters of specific interest to them.32 Lastly, NGOs
on the roster are informed of the provisional agenda of the council and may
attend the meetings of the council and its subsidiary bodies concerned with mat-
ters within their field of competence.33 NGOs on the roster are consulted at the
request of the council or its subsidiary bodies.34 Resolution 1996/31 authorizes
NGOs in any type of consultative status to confer with officers of the UN Secretariat,
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and vice versa.35 Additionally, the Secretary-General is authorized to offer facilities
to NGOs in any type of consultative status, including access to UN grounds;
facilities (including conference space) and UN press documentation services; and
arrangements for informal discussion on topics of special interest.36 Even the
least-privileged category of NGOs interacting with the council (the category of
‘NGOs on the roster’) has significantly more ‘participation’ rights than are granted
to NGOs under the 1996 Guidelines of the WTO General Council.
C. Involvement in WIPO
As mentioned above, the constituent instrument of the WIPO explicitly 
provides—as do the UN Charter and the WTO Agreement—for engagement
with NGOs. Article 13(2) of the Convention Establishing the World Intellec-
tual Property Organization, 1967 provides that
[t]he Organization may, on matters within its competence, make suitable arrange-
ments for consultations and cooperation with international non-governmental
organizations and, with the consent of the Governments concerned, with national
organizations, governmental or non-governmental.37
Article 13(2) of the WIPO Convention provides moreover that the arrange-
ments for consultation and cooperation with NGOs shall be made by the 
WIPO Director-General after approval by the Coordination Committee,
WIPO’s executive organ.
NGOs may be involved in WIPO policy deliberations by taking part in
meetings of WIPO bodies. To enable NGOs to attend and participate in meet-
ings of WIPO bodies, WIPO may grant to NGOs permanent observer status
or may accredit them, on an ad hoc basis, to a particular WIPO body or for a
particular event or series of meetings.38 Other forms of WIPO–NGO relations
include NGO meetings with WIPO staff to exchange views and information on
particular issues of interest to NGOs. Such meetings are not regular but they
take place at least once a year and are usually organized at the request of NGOs.39
In 2005 WIPO also organized, for the first time, a large interactive meeting
with NGOs where more than 500 organizations were invited (permanent and
ad hoc observers). The purpose of the meeting was to debrief NGOs about
WIPO activities in the preceding year, as well as to listen to the concerns of
NGOs and their proposals for further cooperation. However, the meeting did
not arouse a lot of interest in the NGO community, with only about 25 organ-
izations actually attending.40
WIPO can grant to NGOs an observer status of two types. First, NGOs can
become permanent observers. Second, they can be accredited as ad hoc
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observers to a particular WIPO body (for example, a standing committee) or
for an event or series of meetings (for example, for intersessional intergovern-
mental meetings). There is no difference, with regard to participatory rights,
between permanent and ad hoc NGO observers when they are present at a
particular meeting. The difference lies only in the scope of meetings they can
attend. Naturally, ad hoc observers can attend only those meetings, or meet-
ings of those WIPO bodies, to which they are accredited. By contrast, perma-
nent NGO observers enjoy a standing invitation to many more—although not
all—WIPO meetings.41
To date, 202 international and 31 national NGOs enjoy permanent observer
status with WIPO.42 To give some examples, international NGOs include the
Afro-Asian Book Council, the Association of Commercial Television in Europe,
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, Inc., International Association
for the Protection of Industrial Property, International Federation of Industrial
Property Attorneys, and the International Trademark Association. The national
NGOs with permanent observer status include, for example, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the South African Institute of
Intellectual Property Law.43
As a matter of practice, NGOs with permanent observer status, whether
national or international, are admitted to the following meetings without an
additional invitation:
• All WIPO assemblies;
• Diplomatic conferences convened under the auspices of WIPO;
• Intersessional intergovernmental meetings;
• The annual WIPO conference;
• Standing and other committees;
• Working groups.44
As reflected in the above list, once an international NGO is admitted to attend,
as an observer, the meetings of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO,
it is also invited to attend, as an observer, meetings of committees, working
groups, or other bodies subsidiary to the assemblies,‘if their subject matter seems
to be of direct interest to that organization’.45 For all meetings that NGOs are
eligible to attend, WIPO sends out invitations to each and every NGO by mail.
Meetings that remain closed to NGOs with permanent observer status are
meetings of the WIPO Coordination Committee and of Executive Committees
for Paris and Berne Conventions. Neither can NGOs be accredited to these
meetings on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, regarding NGOs without perma-
nent observer status, ad hoc accreditation is not possible for sessions of the
assemblies, for diplomatic conferences, or meetings of the WIPO Conference.46
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WIPO General Rules of Procedure do not contain detailed norms on 
modalities of NGO participation in WIPO meetings. Its only relevant provi-
sion, Rule 24, states:
(1) Observers may take part in debates at the invitation of the Chairman.
(2) They may not submit proposals, amendments or motions.
Rule 24(2) has been interpreted as not precluding NGOs from circulating any
other written statements to delegates of Member States. Thus, admitted NGOs
have the following rights:
• To attend the meeting;
• To make oral statements (at the invitation of the chairman). Oral state-
ments can also be made on behalf of groups of NGOs. Requests for 
permission to make an oral statement are usually forwarded to the chair-
person in advance of the meeting, and;
• To circulate written statements to representatives of the Member States,
before or after the meeting (directly to delegates and not through the
Secretariat).47
D. Involvement in the IMF
As mentioned above, the constituent instrument of the IMF—the 1944 Arti-
cles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund—does not provide for
cooperation with NGOs. Article X of the IMF Articles of Agreement, entitled
‘Relations with Other International Organizations’, only refers to ‘general’ and
‘public’ international organizations. It does not refer to non-governmental
organizations. While relations with NGOs are not explicitly provided for in
its constituent instrument and the IMF has moreover no biding secondary
rules on engagement with NGOs, the IMF does maintain relations with NGOs
or—in IMF parlance—civil society organizations.48 A non-binding policy doc-
ument—the Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organizations (the
Guide)49—offers a general framework of good practices.50
The IMF started to engage with civil society in the 1980s in response to
advocacy at the global level by groups concerned with economic and social
justice. Such engagement remains central in IMF–NGO relations.51 However,
until the mid-1990s, the IMF attracted only limited and sporadic attention
from NGOs, most prominently in countries implementing adjustment policies
with IMF support. The civil society opposition to the IMF intensified in the lat-
ter half of the 1990s, particularly in the context of structural adjustment poli-
cies, multilateral debt problems, and financial market crises in Asia, Latin America,
and Russia.52 Still, the overall extent of IMF engagement of civil society remains
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modest today, much less developed than, for example, in the World Bank, as
discussed below. Generally, the IMF’s position is that it is accountable primarily
to the governments of its member countries (as opposed to society at large). For
this reason, as explained in the Guide, the IMF sees its member governments as
primarily responsible for dialogue with civil society organizations. IMF contacts
with civil society organizations are deemed a supplement to, and not a substi-
tute for, government dialogue with citizen groups.53 The IMF does not have a per-
manent institutional arrangement for consultations with NGOs. All interactions
with civil society organizations occur on an ad hoc basis. This entails a consid-
erable difference in practices across countries, departments, and policy settings.54
The IMF asserts that it seeks to engage with civil society organizations
through information sharing, dialogue, and consultation at both global and
national levels.55 The majority of contacts take place at the IMF headquarters
in Washington, D.C., thus Washington-based organizations find themselves in
a privileged position.56 According to the Guide, the IMF engages with civil soci-
ety because such engagement can correct misunderstandings, improve policy
content, and enhance the political viability of IMF advice.57 The IMF acknowl-
edges that although the dialogue with civil society organizations has gradually
improved, there remains dissatisfaction on both sides, possibly even a degree
of mutual mistrust.58 Some civil society organizations tend to think that the IMF
preaches, does not listen, and does not integrate civil society organization input
from the dialogue into its policy-making.59 As reported in 2001, civil society
organizations have frequently characterized the IMF as an unapproachable,
secretive, and undemocratic organization that is resistant to public opinion
and participation.60 At the same time, some IMF staff may perceive civil soci-
ety organizations as generally being interested mainly in pushing their own
agenda, often imprecisely defined, and believe that civil society organizations
often lack broad support, legitimacy, and accountability.61
Principal organs of the IMF are closed to civil society participation. NGOs
are not allowed to attend the meetings of the Executive Board, the Interna-
tional Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC), or the joint IMF–World
Bank Development Committee. Only the Board of Governors is a little more
open to civil society. Ad hoc accredited civil society organizations can attend
and observe the plenary session of the IMF and World Bank Boards of
Governors during the IMF–World Bank Annual Meetings. However, as the 
participatory rights of civil society organizations are very limited at these ses-
sions—they cannot make oral statements, submit written statements, or com-
ment on draft documents—most civil society organizations find little use in
attending these sessions. They benefit more from participating in the activities
running parallel, and in connection with, these meetings and the IMF–World
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Bank spring meetings. For example, in connection with both the annual and
the spring meetings, the World Bank and the IMF organize dialogues with civil
society. The dialogues serve as a forum for discussion of topical issues by the
Bank/IMF officials, government representatives, and civil society. These 
dialogues provide a place for the many attendees to share information, forge
personal relationships, follow up previous information distribution, and return
monitoring reports and anecdotal narratives ‘from the ground’.62 During the
week of the annual meetings, accredited civil society organizations can addi-
tionally participate in the program of seminars. The program includes round-
table discussions, seminars, and regional briefings with the participation 
of senior Bank and IMF officials, private sector representatives, government 
delegates, and representatives of civil society.
Generally speaking, the IMF meets and consults with civil society organi-
zations on the following occasions:
• during IFM–World Bank annual and spring meetings;
• at ad hoc meetings, conferences, seminars, briefings, and workshops;
• during various IMF missions: Article IV missions, Use of IMF Resources
(UFR) missions (especially as they concern longer-term programs of struc-
tural reform), External Relations missions, Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) missions, and some technical assistance missions; and
• on invitations extended by the IMF to contribute to reviews of its poli-
cies, by attending seminars or by providing comments to papers posted
on its website.
Moreover, the resident representative, an IMF staff member based in the mem-
ber country, can consult with civil society organizations ahead of a mission
and feed their information and views into the mission’s preparation.
Reportedly, contacts between the IMF and civil society organizations have
become, in recent years, more frequent and the discussions more substantive.63
From 2001 to 2005, the overall number of meetings with civil society organi-
zations ranged between 45 and 75 a year, with an average of 330 civil society
organizations involved in these meetings annually.64 A substantial part of Fund
interactions with civil society organizations occur during the IMF–World Bank
annual and spring meetings—they account for around 20 percent of all meet-
ings with civil society organizations and involve many civil society organiza-
tions. In 2008, the global financial crisis drew as many as 350 civil society
organization representatives from over 50 countries to Washington during the
IMF–World Bank Annual Meeting.65
Most of the remaining interactions take the form of (typically bilateral)
meetings organized at the requests of civil society organizations with relevant
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IMF headquarters staff and, by far less frequently, with resident representa-
tives.66 The Guide instructs IMF staff to reply promptly to such requests but at
the same time states that, in practice, IMF staff cannot meet all civil society
organizations that have an interest in IMF activities.67
As for the type of civil society organizations that the IMF mostly engages
with, on the whole the IMF has maintained the greatest number and intensity
of direct civil society contacts with economic research bodies. Next to univer-
sity departments, think-tanks, and consultants in the area of economics, the IMF
has pursued its most substantial contacts in civil society with business associ-
ations.68 The number of involved public interest NGOs has remained quite
small. The activity has mainly come from a handful of specialised bureaux,
the debt campaigns, and certain development and environmental NGOs.69
General coordination of IMF relations with civil society organizations
occurs through the IMF’s External Relations Department. External Relations
gathers information relating to IMF activities and summarizes events, papers,
and discussions relevant to civil society organizations in a quarterly newslet-
ter, which is sent (by e-mail and mail) to subscribers and published on the
IMF website.70
IV. Practice of WTO Engagement with NGOs
There is often a marked difference between, on the one hand, the forms of
NGO involvement provided for in the constituent and/or secondary legal
instruments of an international organization and, on the other hand, the prac-
tice of NGO involvement in the activities of that international organization or
the engagement of that organization with NGOs. As discussed above, a prime
example of such difference is the engagement of the IMF with NGOs. As noted
above, this engagement is not provided for in any legal instrument, and yet
this engagement is—albeit limited—a reality. Additionally, the involvement of
NGOs in the activities of the United Nations goes beyond what is provided
for in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 and as a practice has evolved to allow for
a certain degree of informal participation by NGOs in the work of the General
Assembly’s main committees and several of its subsidiary bodies, as well as in
special sessions of the Assembly.71
In practice, the principal forms of WTO engagement with NGOs at present
are attendance of the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference;
public symposia and forums on WTO-related issues; access to WTO informa-
tion; regular informal briefings of NGOs; opportunities for information
exchange; informal meetings with NGO; the Informal NGO Advisory Body; and
involvement in dispute settlement.
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A. Attendance of the Plenary Meetings of the 
Ministerial Conference
While its 1996 Guidelines did not provide for this, the General Council decided
in the run-up to the first session of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in 
Singapore in December 1996 that NGOs would be invited to attend the formal
plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference. It was also decided that an
NGO Centre with facilities for organizing meetings and workshops would be
set up alongside the official Conference Centre in Singapore. The 108 NGOs
that attended the first session of the Ministerial Conference, did, however, not
have observer or consultative status; they were not allowed to make any oral
statements at, or submit written statements to, the meetings they could attend.
Since the Singapore Session, the number of NGOs attending the formal ple-
nary meetings of the Ministerial Conference has increased with each session,
with the exception of the Doha Session in 2001, when limited local facilities (and
other restrictions) did not allow a large number of NGOs to participate. For
the Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial Conference in 2005, the number of
‘accredited’ NGOs had reached 1,065, of which 836 actually attended.
Although the attendance of the formal plenary meetings of the Minister-
ial Conference has now become a well-established practice, there is currently
no standing legal arrangement for the participation of NGOs in these meet-
ings. For each session of the Ministerial Conference, the General Council has
to agree on NGO attendance and determine the modalities of this attendance.73
As for the previous sessions, attendance by NGOs of meetings of the Ministe-
rial Conference at the Hong Kong Session in December 2005—the last session
to date—was limited to the formal plenary meeting of the Ministerial Confer-
ence. However, these meetings involve little more than the reading of prepared
remarks by heads of government or trade ministers, which are often of a gen-
eral nature. As already noted, NGOs have not been allowed to make any state-
ments, whether orally or in writing, to the Ministerial Conference. The fact that
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Trend in NGO Representation at Sessions of the Ministerial Conference72
Number of ‘accredited’ NGOs NGOs attended
Singapore 1996 159 108
Geneva 1998 153 128
Seattle 1999 776 686
Doha 2001 651 370
Cancún 2003 961 795
Hong Kong 2005 1,065 836
the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference were web-cast makes
the right of NGOs to attend them even less meaningful. Access to all other meet-
ings, including negotiating sessions, has been denied. As at previous sessions,
NGOs at the Hong Kong Session were provided with an NGO Centre, equipped
with office and media facilities, and briefed about the conference developments
by WTO Secretariat officials. In Hong Kong, for the first time in WTO history,
with the aim of improving transparency and inclusiveness, NGOs were accom-
modated under the same roof as the delegates of the WTO Members.74
B. Public Symposia and Forums
As provided for by the 1996 Guidelines, a number of symposia for NGOs and
delegations of Members on specific issues was organized by the WTO Secre-
tariat in the late 1990s. Three of these symposia concerned the issue of trade
and the environment, one the issue of trade and development, and one the
issue of trade facilitation.75 These first symposia were organized in the form 
of plenary sessions with hundreds of participants gathered in one room.
This format was criticized as ineffective because it resulted in poorly focused
discussions and overly general conclusions.76
In reaction to this criticism, in 2000, the WTO changed the format of sym-
posia and turned them into annual two- or three-day events featuring a vari-
ety of separate workshops and seminars in which panellists and interested
participants discuss a broad range of topical WTO-related issues. These annual
symposia are financed from extra-budgetary sources, in particular from 
voluntary contributions of individual WTO Members.
As of 2005, the WTO no longer exercises control over the issues to be 
discussed or the selection of speakers, panellists, or other participants.
The symposia—or forums (as they are now called)—are organized through a
“bottom-up” or—as WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, calls it—a ‘grass-
roots’ process.77 The WTO’s role in the organization of the symposia is now con-
fined to matters such as arranging for rooms, interpretation, and financial
support to speakers from developing countries. Themes of seminars and work-
shops are suggested by NGOs themselves (and other organizers such as 
academic institutions). Any NGO may approach the WTO Secretariat with a
suggestion to organize a workshop on a particular issue of interest to it. The
NGO itself then determines the speaker(s) and/or the panellists. The WTO
does not interfere with this process. As up to five or six workshops can take place
simultaneously, this setup creates a refreshing competitive atmosphere between
NGOs (and other organizers), who are all competing for the attention of the
participants at the symposium.
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At the WTO Public Symposium of May 2004 called ‘Multilateralism at the
Crossroads’, there were almost 1,200 registered participants and 150 speakers.
This three-day event featured a total of 29 workshops on the agricultural nego-
tiations; prospects for developing countries after the failure of the Cancún 
Session of the Ministerial Conference; trade liberalization and sustainable
development; the environment and biodiversity; South-South cooperation;
and the challenges presented by regional trade agreements.78
At the WTO Public Symposium of April 2005, ‘WTO After 10 Years: Global
Problems and Multilateral Solutions’, most of the discussions focused on the
Doha Development Round negotiations, with much attention devoted to agri-
cultural trade. Twenty-three workshops were held on a wide variety of themes,
with between five and six concurrent sessions held each morning or afternoon.
At the WTO Public Forum of September 2006, ‘What WTO for the XXIst Cen-
tury?’, there were 1,532 registered participants, among which were many NGO
representatives but also academics, business representatives, and officials of
international organizations.
The 2007 WTO Public Forum titled ‘How Can the WTO Help Harness 
Globalization?’ was held at the WTO in Geneva on 4 and 5 October 2007.80
In his opening remarks, Director-General Pascal Lamy stated:
Today, I am proud to announce that 1750 participants from across the globe have
registered for this Forum—in and of itself an indicator of the extent of globaliza-
tion! This number testifies to the relevance of the WTO to the wider world, and
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it is precisely for this reason that the WTO must continue to consult that wider
world on how best it can meet its needs and aspirations. Registered today are var-
ious types of non-governmental organizations—from environmental, to human
rights, to labour rights groups; numerous parliamentarians; various academic
institutions; members of the business community; journalists; lawyers; represen-
tatives of other international organizations; and students. It is precisely this very
broad spectrum of society that the WTO was hoping to tap into. So thank you all
for coming in such record numbers, and thank you for helping us make this year’s
event successful.
81
The topics on the agenda of the 2007 Public Forum that civil society selected
(the grassroots approach) fell into four broad categories: (1) global gover-
nance; (2) coherence between the national and international levels of policy-
making and between different multilateral institutions; (3) economic growth
and the role of trade as a vehicle for development; and (4) sustainable devel-
opment. The 2008 WTO Public Forum, ‘Trading into the Future’, was held on
24 and 25 September 2008.82
The public symposia or—as they have been re-baptized in 2006—‘public
forums’ do not lead to any specific outcomes, such as, for example, a civil soci-
ety statement to the WTO Ministerial Conference or General Council. While
in the context of other international organizations, similar meetings of repre-
sentatives of NGOs have in the past led to civil society statements, this is not
the ambition of the WTO public symposia and forums. Their aims have been
more modest, namely to facilitate the exchange of views and perspectives on
WTO issues in a frank and open way and to allow participants to network and
establish contacts. In view of these aims, the lukewarm participation of diplo-
mats and other government officials of WTO Members has been a source of
frustration for NGOs as well as the organizers.
C. Access to WTO Information
In the absence of a right to attend meetings of WTO bodies, the right to access
documents produced in the course of, and in relation to, these meetings
becomes essential for NGOs that wish to keep WTO activities under scrutiny.
In parallel with the 1996 Guidelines, the General Council adopted procedures
for the de-restriction and circulation of WTO documents, establishing the
basic principle that most documents would be immediately circulated as unre-
stricted. However, this principle was, at the time, still subject to important
exceptions. In particular, working documents, minutes of WTO meetings,
WTO Secretariat background papers, and Ministerial Conference summary
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records were commonly only de-restricted, and thus made available to the
public, eight to nine months after circulation. In 2002, after years of discussion,
the General Council reached a decision to accelerate de-restriction of official
WTO documents, cutting the time period in which most documents are made
publicly available to six to twelve weeks.83 The General Council also significantly
reduced the number of exceptions to the principle of public availability of
WTO documents.84 Therefore, today, most WTO documents are immediately
made available to NGOs and the public at large, and those documents that are
initially restricted are de-restricted much faster. All unrestricted WTO docu-
ments are made available online, in all three official WTO languages (English,
French, and Spanish).
Further, since 1998, the External Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat—
now the Information and External Relations Division—has been organizing
briefings for NGOs on meetings of WTO bodies. Normally, NGO briefings are
held after meetings of the General Council and of the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee. Usually between twenty and thirty NGOs attend these briefings. They
are mostly NGOs with offices in Geneva.85 The WTO Secretariat informs
Geneva-based NGOs about the briefings by e-mail. If there are other NGOs that
would like to attend, they have to send a request to the Information and Exter-
nal Relations Division.86 During the meeting of ministers in Geneva in July
2008, the WTO Secretariat briefed both visiting and Geneva-based NGOs on
a daily basis. Briefings were held in the building of the World Meteorological
Organization across the road from the WTO building. Over 300 representatives
from business and non-business groups were in Geneva at the end of July.
Approximately 100 attended the daily briefings.
On the access for civil society to online information about the WTO, One
World Trust, a British NGO, reported in its Global Accountability Report 2003:
Information on the WTO’s trade activities is excellent. The WTO provides access
to the legal texts of its agreements by topic, alongside a full, non-technical descrip-
tion of the law. This is very important given the technical nature of much of the
work it covers. The public are able to review the extent to which members have
implemented agreements and view the process and documentation surrounding
any decisions taken by the disputes panel. The information available from the
committees is standardized. Each committee produces an annual report of its
work for the General Council outlining its activities.87
However, in its Global Accountability Report 2006, One World Trust noted
that the WTO’s ‘transparency capabilities are the weakest’ in its accountability
dimension.88
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D. Opportunities for Information Exchange
Since 1998, the WTO website has included an NGO page.89 This page contains
specific information on NGO-related WTO activities (such as the public 
symposia and forums) and on NGO participation in past (and future) 
sessions of the Ministerial Conference (including announcements of registra-
tion procedures and deadlines).
Furthermore, the WTO Secretariat, and in particular the Information and
External Relations Division, has, since 1998, compiled a monthly list of posi-
tion papers it receives from NGOs. This list is circulated to WTO Members. A
copy of any of these NGO position papers can be obtained from the WTO
Secretariat. All NGO position papers received are also posted on the NGO page
of the WTO website and can be easily downloaded. The WTO Secretariat
includes in the monthly list, and posts on the NGO page, only position papers
relating to WTO issues and activities.90 The 2008 list includes position papers
on subjects such as fisheries subsidies and the Information Technology Agree-
ment (ITA).91 The WTO Secretariat reserves the full right not to include on the
list material that, in its opinion, does not relate to WTO issues or activities.
E. Informal Meetings with NGOs
The 1996 Guidelines envisaged the possibility for chairpersons of WTO councils
and committees to meet with NGOs. There are no written procedures that 
govern such meetings. They take place at the initiative of either NGOs or the
relevant chairperson. The information about upcoming meetings is rarely pub-
lished; it is circulated within NGO networks informally. In practice, the NGOs
invited and attending are the Geneva-based NGOs that are also invited to and
attend the regular briefings organized by the Secretariat. Usually during the
informal meetings with the chairpersons of relevant WTO councils or commit-
tees NGOs and chairpersons exchange information and views, mostly in relation
to ongoing negotiations. Not surprisingly, the interest of NGOs in such meetings
is considerable when negotiations enter a crucial phase and/or important new
proposals are tabled and discussed for the first time. Due to the informal nature
of the meetings, it is uncommon for reports on these meetings to be issued.
Similar informal meetings take place between NGOs and WTO Secretariat
staff from various divisions. These may be devoted to negotiations or cover
technical issues of interest to NGOs. There is no schedule for these meetings; they
are organized on an ad hoc basis, but normally some WTO–NGO interaction of
this nature occurs almost every week.
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Additionally, three to four times a year, the WTO Secretariat organizes 
presentations of NGO studies or publications. These presentations are primarily
organized for the benefit of delegates of WTO Members. However, whether
due to the busy agenda of these delegates or other factors, they have aroused
limited interest to date.
Building on its efforts to have regular briefings for NGOs on specific issues,
in 2007, the WTO Secretariat started a series of issue-specific dialogues with civil
society. These dialogues offer an opportunity to Geneva-based NGOs, WTO
Members , and Secretariat staff to exchange—in an informal manner and off the
record—information and views on specific issues. The first dialogue in this series
took place in April 2007 and related to the development component of the Doha
Development Round.92 To date, the second dialogue has not yet taken place.
Finally, while not specifically aimed at NGOs, the WTO Secretariat will,
during and at the end of important meetings, hold briefings to keep the press
and the public at large abreast of the progress made in the negotiations. Dur-
ing the meeting of Ministers in Geneva from 21 to 29 July 2008 to achieve a
breakthrough in the Doha Development Round negotiations, Keith Rockwell,
the WTO spokesperson, briefed the press daily on the progress made. These
press briefings were also web-cast.
F. Informal NGO Advisory Body
Unlike some other international organizations, such as the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, the WTO does not have
a permanent body through which a formal ‘dialogue’ between the WTO Mem-
bers and civil society, including NGOs, can take place. Suggestions to establish
such consultative bodies have received little support from WTO Members. How-
ever, in 2003, the then WTO Director-General, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, took
a personal initiative to establish the Informal NGO Advisory Body and the Infor-
mal Business Advisory Body. Both advisory bodies were established as informal
bodies because under the 1996 Guidelines, the Director-General does not have
a mandate to formally institutionalize relations with NGOs in such a manner.
The Informal NGO Advisory Body, made up of ten high-level representatives
from NGOs, was designed to provide a platform for dialogue between the WTO
Director-General (not the WTO Members) and NGOs from around the world.93
The main function of the Informal NGO Advisory Body was to advise the WTO
Director-General on WTO-related matters and to channel the positions and
concerns of civil society on international trade to the WTO membership. The
Informal NGO Advisory Body last met in January 2004. The Informal NGO
Advisory Body in fact existed only during the term in office of Supachai
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Panitchpakdi. Supachai’s successor, Pascal Lamy, decided to discontinue the
Informal NGO Advisory Body (as well as the Informal Business Advisory Body).
G. Involvement in WTO Dispute Settlement
The settlement of trade disputes between WTO Members is one of the most
important and successful functions of the WTO. Both developed and develop-
ing Members make extensive use of the WTO dispute settlement system. A 
significant number of the disputes dealt with to date by the WTO dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body concerned national environmental
legislation (US—Gasoline; US—Shrimp; Brazil—Retreaded Tyres), public health
legislation (EC—Hormones; EC—Asbestos; EC—Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products; Canada—Continued Suspension and US—Continued Suspen-
sion) and other legislation of particular interest to NGOs (EC—Bananas III and
EC—Tariff Preferences).94 Not surprisingly, NGOs have looked for ways to
make their voices heard by panels and the Appellate Body. This is not self-
evident since WTO proceedings are usually closed to the public. Consulta-
tions, panel proceedings, and appellate review proceedings are—as a rule—
confidential. WTO proceedings differ sharply in this respect from the
proceedings before the International Court of Justice and other international
courts and tribunals such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.95
The 2004 Sutherland Report noted that ‘the degree of confidentiality of
the current [WTO] dispute settlement proceedings can be seen as damaging
to the WTO as an institution’.96 The Sutherland Report therefore recommended
that, as a matter of course, panel meetings and Appellate Body hearings should
generally be open to the public.97 Certain WTO Members share this view, as evi-
denced by the recent opening to the general public of a few panel meetings
and one oral hearing of the Appellate Body in disputes involving the Euro-
pean Communities, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.98
For the first time in September and October 2006, the panel in Canada—
Continued Suspension and US-Continued Suspension99 authorized—at the
request of the parties (the United States, Canada, and the European Commu-
nities)—the simultaneous closed-circuit television broadcast of its meeting
with experts and its second meeting with the parties.100 These meetings were
broadcast to a separate viewing room at WTO Headquarters in Geneva with
about 200 places, which were allocated on a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis (on
receipt of an application form).101 However, despite the frequent calls by NGOs
for increased transparency of dispute settlement proceedings, few actually
‘attended’ and the enthusiasm of those attending waned considerably after the
first few hours (after the novelty had worn off).102
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In July 2007, the panel in EC and Certain Member States—Large Civil Aircraft
was more cautious than the panel in US/Canada—Continued Suspension
(because of concerns regarding the protection of confidential business infor-
mation) and merely allowed its second meeting with the parties to be video-
taped and broadcast in an edited version two days later in Geneva.103 In
November 2007, the panel in EC—Bananas III (Article 21.5—United States)
decided to allow the delegates of WTO Members and the general public to
actually observe the panel’s meeting with the parties from the public gallery
above the meeting room. As only a limited number of places were available,
prior registration with the WTO Secretariat or either party in this dispute, the
United States or the European Communities, was required to secure a seat.104
Most recently, in August 2008, the panel in Australia—Apples decided at the
request of the parties (New Zealand and Australia) to open its first meeting with
the parties to the public.105 This meeting was held in September 2008, and del-
egates of WTO Members and members of general public were able to attend
the hearing from the public gallery.
While controversial and objected to by most developing country Members,
the decision of the panels in Canada—Continued Suspension and US—Continued
Suspension, EC and Certain Member States—Large Civil Aircraft, EC—Bananas
III (Article 21.5—United States), and Australia—Apples to ‘open’ up (to different
degrees) their meetings to the public is on solid legal ground. The provision con-
cerning the confidentiality of panel meetings is contained in the Working Pro-
cedures for the panel set out in Appendix 3 of the WTO Understanding on the
Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU). Article 12.1 of
the DSU explicitly authorizes panels to deviate, after consulting the parties, from
the rules set out in Appendix 3.106 This is what the panels in the above-men-
tioned cases have done.107 In July 2008, in the appeals in Canada—Continued Sus-
pension and US—Continued Suspension, the Appellate Body for the first time
opened up its oral hearing. This was a less obvious step for the Appellate Body
than it had been for panels. Article 17.10 of the DSU states that the proceedings
of the Appellate Body are confidential, and in adopting additional procedural rules
in a specific appeal pursuant to Rule 16.1 of the Working Procedures for Appel-
late Review, the Appellate Body cannot deviate from procedural rules set out in
the DSU (such as Article 17.10). In support of its decision to allow the simulta-
neous closed-circuit television broadcast of its oral hearing in Canada—Con-
tinued Suspension and US—Continued Suspension, the Appellate Body argued that
the DSU does not specifically provide for an oral hearing at the appellate stage. The
oral hearing was instituted by the Appellate Body in its Working Procedures, which
were drawn up pursuant to Article 17.9 of the DSU. The conduct and organization
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of the oral hearing falls within the authority of the Appellate Body (compétence de
la compétence) pursuant to Rule 27 of the Working Procedures. Thus, the Appellate
Body has the power to exercise control over the conduct of the oral hearing, includ-
ing authorizing the lifting of confidentiality at the joint request of the partici-
pants as long as this does not adversely affect the rights and interests of the third
participants or the integrity of the appellate process.108
The Appellate Body was satisfied that the lifting of the confidentiality of the oral
hearing would not adversely affect the integrity of the appellate process. To
avoid the rights and interests of the third participants being adversely affected,
the oral statements and responses to questions by those third participants that
objected to the lifting of the confidentiality (Brazil, India, China, and Mexico)
were not subject to observation by the public. The broadcast of the oral hear-
ing was interrupted when these third participants contributed to the oral hear-
ing. A total of 80 individuals registered to observe the oral hearing in
Canada—Continued Suspension and US—Continued Suspension.
At the request of Ecuador, the European Communities, and the United
States, the oral hearing of the Appellate Body in the appeals EC—Bananas III
(Second Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador) and EC—Bananas III (Recourse to
Article 21.5 by the United States) on 16 and 17 October 2008 were also opened
up to the public. Again, public observation took place via simultaneous closed
circuit television broadcast to a separate room.109 In December 2008, the Appel-
late Body opened up its oral hearing in US—Continued Suspension. It is clear
that by opening up its oral hearings to the public, albeit via closed-circuit tel-
evision broadcast, the Appellate Body is aligning itself more to the practice of
the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals
regarding access by the general public to hearings.
In a number of disputes, environmental and human rights NGOs, labour
unions, and industry associations have attempted to make themselves heard and
influence the outcome of disputes by submitting unsolicited written briefs,
commonly referred to as amicus curiae briefs (‘friend of the court’ briefs) to pan-
els or the Appellate Body.110 Such briefs have either been attached to parties’
or third parties’ submissions or have been submitted independently. They can
serve at least three different functions: (1) providing legal analysis and inter-
pretation; (2) providing factual analysis as well as evidence; and (3) placing
the trade dispute into a broader political and social context.111 NGOs can
advance arguments WTO Members fear using because they are concerned that
later, in other disputes, those arguments may be used against them.112 The
acceptance by panels and the Appellate Body of amicus curiae briefs, and, in par-
ticular, those that are submitted independently from parties or third parties,
has been very controversial and criticised by most WTO Members.
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In US—Shrimp, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion—on the basis
of Articles 13, 12, and 11 of the DSU113—that panels have the authority to accept
and consider amicus curiae briefs.114 While NGOs or other friends of the court
do not have a right to have their briefs accepted or considered, it is the right of
a panel to accept such briefs if it considers it useful to decide a case. A few pan-
els in later disputes did, on the basis of this ruling of the Appellate Body in
US—Shrimp, accept and consider amicus curiae briefs. However, in most
instances, panels have refused to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs sub-
mitted to them.115 In US—Lead and Bismuth II, the Appellate Body ruled with
respect to its own authority to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs sub-
mitted in appellate review proceedings. It concluded—on the basis of Article 17.9
of the DSU and Rule 16.1 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review116—
that it had the legal authority to accept and consider any information that it
believed to be pertinent and useful in rendering its decision. However, in this
particular case, the Appellate Body did not find the two amicus curiae briefs filed
by industry associations (American Iron and Steel Institute and the Specialty
Steel Industry of North America) to be useful.117 In October 2000, the Appellate
Body Division hearing the appeal in EC—Asbestos adopted an additional pro-
cedure, to deal with the ‘avalanche’ of amicus curiae briefs that the Appellate
Body expected to receive in that dispute.118 It adopted this additional procedure
in the ‘interests of fairness and orderly procedure’.119 The procedure required
applicants to file for leave to submit a brief. The application had to respond to
a set of questions, including questions on the objectives and financing of the
applicant and on how the proposed brief would make a contribution that is not
likely to be repetitive of what the parties in the dispute have already said. While
eventually the Appellate Body did not grant any applicant leave to submit its
amicus curiae briefs,120 most WTO Members were infuriated by the Appellate
Body’s adoption of the additional procedure and its apparent willingness to
accept and consider amicus curiae briefs. At a tumultuous Special Meeting of
the General Council in November 2000, most Members expressed the opinion
that since there was no specific provision in WTO law allowing for the accept-
ance and consideration of amicus curiae briefs, such briefs should not be accepted
and considered. In his concluding remarks, the chair of the General Council
stated that ‘in the light of the views expressed and in the absence of clear rules,
[he] believed that the Appellate Body should exercise extreme caution in future
cases until Members had considered what rules were needed’.121 To date, WTO
Members have been unable to adopt any rules on amicus curiae briefs. The Appel-
late Body has repeatedly confirmed its case law on the authority of panels and
the Appellate Body to accept and consider such briefs. However, in no proceed-
ings to date has the Appellate Body accepted and considered amicus curiae briefs.
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The Warwick Commission in its 2007 Report, ‘The Multilateral Trade
Regime: Which Way Forward?’, urged panels and the Appellate Body to be
more open to the consideration of amicus curiae briefs submitted by NGOs.
According to the Warwick Commission, permitting NGOs to participate in
this way has
the benefit of enriching the nature and quality of information that panelists have
when considering disputes and of contributing to the transparency of dispute res-
olution processes.122
This is, according to the Warwick Commission, particularly true in disputes that
involve conflicts between economic and non-economic values.With regard to the
fear of some WTO Members that the dispute settlement process could be ‘over-
whelmed by amicus submissions’, the Warwick Commission pointed out that
‘experience over the past decade suggests that this fear can be easily overstated’.123
It is useful to note that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also does
not have rules on the formal acceptance and consideration of amicus curiae
briefs submitted by individuals or non-governmental organizations.124 How-
ever, a practice direction adopted by the ICJ in 2001 deals specifically with ‘a
document or written statement’ submitted by an ‘international non-govern-
mental organization’ on its own initiative, but it is limited to advisory opinion
cases. Practice Direction XII provides that ‘such statement and/or document
is not to be considered as part of the case file’. At the same time, the practice
direction stipulates that ‘such statements and/or documents shall be treated as
publications readily available and may accordingly be referred to by States and
intergovernmental organizations presenting written and/or oral statements in
the case in the same manner as publications in the public domain.’ Practice
Direction XII also requires the ICJ to make those written statements and/or doc-
uments available to the states and intergovernmental organizations that are
involved in the same advisory proceeding.125
Other international courts and tribunals, such as the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea and the European Court of Justice, have been equally 
hesitant to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals
and NGOs in interstate disputes.126 However, international criminal courts
and regional human rights courts are generally empowered to invite or grant
leave to any state, organization, or person to appear before them and to make
submissions on any issue specified by the court.127
Two additional observations with regard to a possible involvement of NGOs
in WTO dispute settlement should be made. First, pursuant to Article 13 of the
DSU, a panel has the right to seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body it deems appropriate. Panels could thus call on NGOs for
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information and technical advice. However, the requirements of the Rules of
Conduct for WTO dispute settlement and, in particular, the requirements of
independence and impartiality also apply to all those a panel calls on for expert
information and advice.128 Second, it has been accepted since the Appellate
Body ruling in EC—Bananas III, that parties and third parties are free to deter-
mine for themselves the composition of their delegation at hearings of panels
and the Appellate Body.129 It is, therefore, possible for a party or a third party
to include NGO representatives in its delegation. The panel in Korea—
Certain Paper thus rejected the objections of Korea against the presence of
representatives of the Indonesian paper industry in the delegation of Indonesia
at the panel meetings.130
V. Rules and Procedures for the Accreditation of NGOs
Ever more NGOs wish to be involved in the policy-making, policy implemen-
tation, compliance monitoring, and dispute settlement activities of interna-
tional organizations. For good reason, international organizations want to
keep the number of NGOs involved in their activities ‘manageable’ and also want
to avoid the involvement of NGOs that could potentially harm them in their
efforts to achieve their objectives. Therefore, selecting among various NGOs
is a necessity. Selection is needed to ensure that only NGOs that ‘add value’ to
the policy-making, policy implementation, compliance monitoring, and dis-
pute settlement activities ‘enjoy’ specific forms of involvement and associated
rights. To this end, a number of international organizations, and most promi-
nently the United Nations, have elaborated rules on NGO accreditation. These
rules include substantive rules setting out the requirements that a NGO must
meet to be accredited and procedural rules for taking decisions regarding
accreditation and the subsequent monitoring of accredited NGOs.
A. NGO Accreditation by the UN ECOSOC
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, the ‘Consultative Relationship between the
United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations’, already discussed
above, is quite specific about the requirements that NGOs must meet in order
to be accredited and thus conferred consultative status. Pursuant to Resolution
1996/31, the NGO must, first, be concerned with matters falling within the
(very broad) competence of the council and its subsidiary bodies.131 It must be
able to demonstrate that its program of work is of direct relevance and can
contribute to the mission of the United Nations.132 The aims and purposes of
the NGO must be in conformity with the spirit, purposes, and principles of the
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UN Charter.133 Second, the NGO must also have recognized standing within
its field of competence.134 Third, the NGO must have an established headquar-
ters with an executive officer;135 a democratically adopted constitution;136 a
representative and accountable inner structure;137 and the authority to speak
for its members.138 Fourth, as regards the funding of the NGO, the basic
resources must be derived from either national affiliates or from individual
members.139 Finally, the NGO must attest that it has been in existence for at least
two years at the date of receipt of its application for consultative status.140
As explicitly stated in Resolution 1996/31, decisions regarding arrange-
ments for consultation should be guided by the principle that they are made,
on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the council or one of its 
subsidiary bodies to secure expert information or advice from NGOs having
special competence in the relevant subjects, and on the other hand, to enable
international, regional, sub-regional, and national NGOs that represent impor-
tant elements of public opinion to express their views.141 Therefore, the arrange-
ments for consultation made with each NGO should relate to the subjects in
which that NGO has special competence and in which it has a special interest.142
Consequently, the decisive factor in which form of consultative status will be
granted (general, special, or roster) is the scope of the NGO’s activities and
competence. For the general status, it must be as broad as, or at least compa-
rable to, that of ECOSOC; for special status, the NGO’s scope must cover a
few relevant fields; for roster status, a narrower scope is permitted. Finally,
in selecting NGOs, ECOSOC must to the extent possible encourage the 
participation of NGOs from developing countries, in order to help achieve a
just, balanced, effective, and genuine involvement of NGOs from all regions and
areas of the world.143
As set out in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, an NGO must submit an appli-
cation to obtain consultative status with ECOSOC and/or its subsidiary bod-
ies, which is then reviewed by ECOSOC’s Committee on NGOs (NGO
Committee). The NGO Committee consists of 19 UN Member States that are
elected every four years by the council on the basis of equitable geographical rep-
resentation.144 The committee, which meets twice each year, in practice dis-
cusses all new applications during informal meetings prior to its formal sessions.
NGO applications are grouped into two lists. List 1 includes ‘unproblematic’
NGOs; List 2 features those NGOs that gave rise to questions from one or more
delegations.145 These questions are sent to the NGO concerned so that it may
respond before the beginning of the formal session of the NGO Committee at
which its application will be discussed.146 If Member States are not satisfied
with answers received from a particular NGO, its application is deferred and addi-
tional questions are posed. After deliberations on each NGO, the chairperson of
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the committee usually suggests recommending special consultative status, and
if there are no objections or proposals to change the type of status (into gen-
eral or roster) from Member States, this recommendation will be transmitted
to ECOSOC for final approval. In difficult cases, the NGO Committee may
turn to voting before submitting its recommendation. The final decision on
granting consultative status is taken by ECOSOC itself.
An NGO granted general or special consultative status by ECOSOC is
under an obligation to submit a report on its activities every four years.147
This report, commonly referred to as the quadrennial report, allows the NGO
Committee to review whether the NGO concerned continues to satisfy the
substantive criteria of consultative status as set out above. If the committee is
of the opinion that this is not the case, it can recommend to ECOSOC the
reclassification, the suspension (for up to three years), or withdrawal of
the NGO’s consultative status.148 To date, ECOSOC has suspended or 
withdrawn the consultative status of only a few NGOs.
B. NGO Accreditation by WIPO
With regard to the rules on NGO accreditation applied by WIPO, it should be
noted that Article 13(2) of the WIPO Constitution does not contain any guid-
ance as to which NGOs can be accredited to WIPO. It only provides that both
international and national organizations may be granted observer status. In
fact, accreditation criteria have been explicitly established—in 2002—only for
national NGOs applying for permanent observer status.149 As for international
NGOs, the WIPO website lists only the documents and information that it
requires applicant NGOs to submit but does not spell out the criteria against
which it will assess whether international NGOs will be granted permanent
observer status. However, such criteria for granting international NGOs perma-
nent observer status do exist; they have been developed through actual practice
and the experience of the WIPO Secretariat since the 1970s, but have not been
officially formalised.150 In particular, these criteria include the following:151
• The NGO must be international. In determining, whether a particular
NGO is international, WIPO pays attention to whether the NGO has
offices in more than one country, whether it has national NGOs as mem-
bers, and whether there are persons of different nationalities among the
NGO’s officers.
• The competence and activities of the NGO must be relevant to those of
WIPO. This does not mean that the NGO’s competence has to cover all
intellectual property rights; one or two aspects (for example, copyright
issues or industrial property alone) are sufficient. The proof of relevant
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activities usually includes studies, position papers, newsletters, and other
publications produced by the NGO, as well as workshops, seminars, and
other events organized by the NGO.
• The NGO must be non-profit, which follows from the generally recog-
nized definition of an NGO.
• The NGO must be independent from the government, including financially,
which also follows from its nature as a non-governmental organization.
• The NGO must have a statute or bylaw on the basis of which it 
functions and must be duly registered in the country where it has its
headquarters.
International NGOs are required to provide the WIPO Secretariat with the
following documents or information:
• a text of its constituent instrument (articles of incorporation, bylaws, etc.);
• the date and place where it was established;
• a list of its officers (showing their nationality);
• a complete list of its national groups or members (showing their coun-
try of origin);
• a description of the composition of the members of its governing body
or bodies (including their geographical distribution);
• a statement of its objectives; and 
• an indication of the field or fields of intellectual property (e.g., copy-
right and related rights) of interest to it.152
This information helps to establish that applicant NGOs meet the accredita-
tion criteria applied by WIPO. The Secretariat may employ additional tools to
ensure that the criteria are satisfied; in particular, it may do Internet-based
research and consult NGO databases.153
In relation to national NGOs applying for a permanent observer status,
the WIPO website lists a number of criteria (‘principles’) that have to be 
satisfied.154 They are these:
• The NGO shall be essentially concerned with intellectual property mat-
ters falling within the competence of WIPO and shall, in the view of the
Director General, be able to offer constructive, substantive contributions
to the deliberations of the assemblies of WIPO.
• The aims and purposes of the NGO shall be in conformity with the spirit,
purposes, and principles of WIPO and the United Nations.
• The NGO shall have an established headquarters. It shall have demo-
cratically adopted statutes, adopted in conformity with the legislation
of the Member State from which the NGO originates.
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• The NGO shall have authority to speak for its members through its
authorized representatives and in accordance with the rules governing
observer status.
• The admission of national NGOs to observer status shall be the subject
of prior consultations between Member States and the Secretariat.155
These criteria are quite typical for international organizations that have a 
system of NGO accreditation. They ensure the relevance of accredited NGOs
to the WIPO’s matters of competence, exclude NGOs of extremist or violent
character, and ascertain the legality and observance of basic democratic 
principles by NGOs.156
The criteria for ad hoc accreditation have also not been formalized. How-
ever, the criteria applied by the WIPO in practice are essentially the same 
criteria as those for the permanent observer status but are applied in a ‘less
strict manner’.157 The principal criterion for obtaining ad hoc accreditation is
the relevance of the concerned NGO’s activities to the subject matter of a
WIPO body or of an event that accreditation is requested for.158
The power to accredit NGOs lies with WIPO’s intergovernmental bodies.
It is provided in Rule 8(2) of the WIPO General Rules of Procedure that ‘each
body shall decide, in a general way or for any particular session or meeting,
which … organizations shall be invited to be represented by observers’. Perma-
nent observer status is granted by WIPO assemblies. Ad hoc observer status
admitting NGOs to meetings of particular WIPO bodies is granted by the
WIPO bodies concerned.
The procedure for obtaining permanent observer status is not described
on the WIPO website or in any other public source. In practice, it follows the
principal steps described below.159
• An NGO mails to the WIPO Director-General its request for permanent
observer status. In this request the NGO briefly describes its interna-
tional or national character, objectives, and activities, and indicates the
place and date of its establishment.
• NGO requests are forwarded to the WIPO Office of Legal Counsel for
consideration. The latter informs the applicant NGO about the docu-
ments that it must provide for its application to be considered.
• The NGO submits the documents required by the Office of Legal Counsel.
If the NGO fails to do this, its application remains pending for two to
three years, with the Secretariat sending occasional reminders to the
NGO, and then it is dropped from the list of applicants.
• On the basis of the complete set of documents received from the NGO, the
Office of Legal Counsel verifies whether the NGO satisfies the criteria for
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accreditation reviewed above. The application is rejected at this stage only
if there is a ‘manifest inconsistency’ with one or more of the criteria.
• The Office of Legal Counsel prepares a ‘resumé’ of the NGO, which fea-
tures its date of establishment and headquarters, objectives, governance
structure, and membership. The NGO’s name is then included in the
memorandum of the Director-General for consideration of the upcom-
ing WIPO assemblies, and the NGO’s resumé is included in an annex to
the said memorandum.160 This memorandum usually lists several NGOs
that have applied during the year preceding the session of the assem-
blies. The Office of Legal Counsel does not make a recommendation to
the assemblies as to whether particular NGOs should or should not be
accredited. NGOs are notified that their candidature has been submit-
ted to the consideration of the WIPO assemblies.
• Admission of observers is one of the agenda items of the WIPO assem-
blies. The assemblies consider all listed NGOs together, and unless there
is an objection to a particular NGO, they are passed en bloc. In the case
of objections, the matter can be decided by voting. So far, there has been
no case when a government objected to the admission of a particular
NGO. NGOs whose applications are being considered cannot attend the
meeting, as they have yet to gain observer status.
• The WIPO assemblies’ decisions on whether to grant permanent observer
status to particular NGOs are contained in the General Report.161 The
WIPO Director-General sends accredited NGOs an official letter in which
it confirms the grant of permanent observer status and states that, from
now on, they will receive invitations to all WIPO meetings where NGO
attendance is possible.
The deadline for submission of requests from NGOs is usually set in May,
whereas the WIPO assemblies are convened from late September to early 
October. Thus the whole procedure takes no less than six months. There is no
possibility of appeal in case the NGO request for permanent observer status is
declined, but the NGO can re-apply later.
As is the case with the procedure for obtaining permanent observer status,
the procedure applicable in requesting ad hoc observer status is not set out on
the WIPO website or any publicly available document. However, this procedure
follows the basic steps of the procedure for obtaining permanent observer 
status, with two ‘deviations’:
• It is not the WIPO Office of Legal Counsel that reviews the NGO appli-
cation for ad hoc accreditation. This is a task of a secretarial unit serv-
ing a WIPO body to which the ad hoc accreditation is being requested.
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• It is not the WIPO assemblies that grant accreditation but a particular
WIPO body to which the ad hoc accreditation is being requested.162
As with permanent observer status, so far there has not been a case where
admission of ad hoc observer NGOs was blocked by a government. In case of
a refusal, there is no appeal procedure but the NGO can re-apply later.
Unlike the ECOSOC, WIPO does not have rules for monitoring of accred-
ited NGOs, such as requiring them to submit annual or other reports. Also, there
is no rule that would empower WIPO, or prevent it from, withdrawing or 
suspending permanent or ad hoc observer status from an NGO. So far, no such
problems have arisen.163 As a matter of practice, NGOs can be deleted from the
list of permanent observers if they cease to exist as a result of dissolution or
merger with another NGO. In most instances, NGOs themselves inform WIPO
that they are closing down or merging. Exclusion from the list of permanent
observers can also happen if the WIPO Secretariat loses contact with the
NGO—in particular, when all invitations for WIPO meetings are returned to
WIPO with a note that the addressee has moved out.164
C. NGO Accreditation by the IMF
With regard to the accreditation rules and procedures applied by the IMF, a 
distinction should be made between accreditation to the IMF-World Bank annual
and spring meetings and other IMF meetings with civil society. In order to attend
the IMF-World Bank annual and spring meetings as well as the activities run-
ning parallel, and in connection with, these meetings, civil society organizations
must be accredited.165 This accreditation is ad hoc—a particular civil society
organization has to request accreditation for each particular meeting. Accredita-
tion criteria and procedures applied by the IMF and the World Bank have not
been legally established but exist rather as a matter of practice of both institutions.
According to the World Bank website, to be accredited NGOs have to engage 
with the World Bank and the IMF on a broad range of development operations
and in policy dialogue at the local, national, and global levels.166 As a matter of prac-
tice, the World Bank and the IMF do not require that civil society organizations
engage with either of the institutions but only satisfy themselves that the civil
society organizations’ activities concern development policy or other issues rele-
vant to either of the two institutions.167 There are no requirements concerning the
organizational or governance structure of civil society organizations, their deci-
sion-making processes, funding, length of existence, or other criteria applied by
other international organizations. These lax requirements of the World Bank and
IMF can perhaps be explained by the fact that NGOs are not able to influence the
course of the meetings as they do not enjoy any important participatory rights.
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Since 2005, requests for accreditation are submitted online. NGOs may
also check the status of their applications through the World Bank’s or IMF’s
website. All requests are reviewed by the External Affairs Department of the
Bank and the External Relations Department of the IMF. Working in coordi-
nation, these two departments make an assessment of whether applying civil
society organizations are bona fide (not fictitious) and whether they meet the
accreditation criterion. As no documents are required from NGOs for accred-
itation, this assessment is made on the basis of previous contacts and knowl-
edge about the organization and the individuals concerned; in case of doubt,
World Bank and IMF officials may conduct Internet searches, contact the World
Bank’s relevant country office, or contact the organization directly. The Exter-
nal Affairs Department and the External Relations Department automatically
recommend accreditation for those civil society organization representatives
that were accredited to previous annual or spring meetings.168 Accreditation is
denied for individuals or organizations whom the External Affairs Depart-
ment and the External Relations Department are unable to identify and/or
contact and to those who do not meet the accreditation criterion.
The External Affairs Department and the External Relations Department
make a joint decision on each of the applicants and e-mail, on a weekly basis,
the names and organizations of individuals who have applied to the executive
director’s office that represents the country from which the request originated,
with the proposed action (clearance or denial) on each particular application.
In the absence of any objection from the executive director, the decision is
deemed approved on a lapse-of-time basis after eight working days. If the exec-
utive director objects to the accreditation of a particular civil society organi-
zation, he/she is expected to give reasons for his/her opinion. This opinion is
not subject to review or appeal, although it may be subject to negotiations.169
For the 2005 annual meetings, the number of accredited civil society organ-
izations equalled 274 (1 refusal), out of which 180 representatives actually attended.
For the 2004 annual meetings, 328 civil society organizations were accredited 
(5 refusals of accreditation), out of which only 151 civil society organization rep-
resentatives were present. Spring meetings attract less attention, with only 80 civil
society organizations accredited for the 2005 spring meetings (no refusals).170
With respect to other IMF meetings with civil society, the rules on the
selection criteria for civil society organizations and relevant procedures remain
to a large degree not formalized. The IMF’s broad policy as to which civil soci-
ety organizations to engage with is built on the following points:
• Engage with different sectors of civil society;
• Aim to alternate the IMF’s contacts between different civil society organ-
izations, rather than always and only meeting the same organizations;
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• Contact locally based associations as well as the local offices of transna-
tional civil society organizations (in particular, staff should not rely on
North-based groups to speak on behalf of South-based stakeholders);
• Meet with civil society organizations across the political spectrum
(include critics as well as supporters of the IMF and/or of the current 
government of a country); and
• Reach out beyond civil society circles that look familiar.171
These points do not serve as criteria determining which civil society organi-
zations can be consulted and which cannot. Rather, they help to divide the
multitude of civil society actors into groups that should be represented and
given a voice in the IMF’s outreach to civil society. To engage with the IMF, civil
society organizations can be international, regional, national, or local. As men-
tioned above, civil society organizations with offices in Washington find them-
selves in a privileged position.
Additionally, the Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organizations
sets out another set of (non-binding) guidelines for selection of civil society
organizations for cooperation. The offered criteria are designed to ensure that
selected civil society organizations have the necessary legitimacy. The Guide 
suggests considering the following features of civil society organizations:
(a) Legality—i.e., whether they are officially recognized and registered;
(b) Morality—i.e., whether they pursue a noble and right cause;
(c) Efficacy—i.e., whether they perform competently;
(d) Membership base; and 
(e) Governance—i.e., whether they operate in a participatory, tolerant,
transparent, and accountable manner.
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According to competent IMF officials, they do not check whether NGOs that
apply for meetings with the IMF staff satisfy each of these criteria. The crite-
ria serve as very general guidelines, rather than as a mandatory checklist applied
in every situation. Relevant IMF officials already know most of the NGOs that
have an interest in the Fund activities, so these do not require any additional
verification.173 Additionally, most of these criteria are quite imprecise and leave
it to relevant IMF officials to determine, for example, which cause is ‘right and
noble’, whether the civil society organization membership base is sufficiently
broad, or whether the civil society organization performs competently enough.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that IMF officials use their discretion
to limit the number of NGOs that they interact with, or to close access to NGOs
considered ‘undesirable’. On the contrary, according to IMF officials, the flex-
ibility of the selection criteria allows the IMF to avoid the long and cumber-
some bureaucratic accreditation/selection procedures that exist in some other
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international organizations, and to maintain an ‘open door policy’ in relation
to NGOs.174 However, the negative side of the loose legal regulation and 
the broad discretion is that they may one day lead to an easy substitution of the
‘open door policy’ by a ‘closed door policy’. Possibly to prevent this, the Guide
suggests that, in general, the IMF should seek to apply an inclusive approach
to civil society organization involvement and should deny a civil society organ-
ization access only with good reason (for example, if the organization has mali-
cious intent or presents a seriously distorted account of itself).175 However,
this provision can hardly be an effective safeguard because of the non-binding
nature of the Guide.
The Guide does not enumerate documents or information that civil society
organizations are required to submit to demonstrate that they meet the set
requirements (for example, proof of registration, statutes, by-laws, annual
reports, etc.). The Guide only names the sources that could be consulted in
order to assess whether a particular civil society organization meets the set
standards. These sources include the following:
• the IMF’s own records of civil society contacts;
• government officials;
• bilateral donor agencies;
• embassies;
• local staff in IMF resident representative offices;
• staff of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions (especially
their civil society specialists where these exist);
• apex civil society bodies;
• relevant academic specialists; and 
• other professional consultants.
176
To request a meeting, NGOs may contact the IMF External Relations Depart-
ment, a relevant geographic area, or functional department or the IMF resident
representative in a particular country. Although a relevant geographic area/func-
tional department does not need an authorization from the External Relations
Department to hold meetings with civil society organizations, in most cases,
it is the External Relations Department that will be involved in organizing a
meeting, at least as far as logistics is concerned.177
The Guide also makes clear that the IMF should be sensitive to the opinions
of national governments in relation to particular civil society organizations. It
provides that if a government raises objections to IMF relations with certain,
or all, civil society organizations, staff should first try to explain the rationale
for such contacts. If the difference of views persists, staff should refrain from
the contacts and refer the disagreement to headquarters for possible follow-up
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with the government concerned.178 However, in practice, at least at the head-
quarter level, governments (represented by executive directors) do not exercise
any control over meetings held by IMF staff with civil society organizations.179
In sum, the (non-binding) rules concerning the criteria and procedures
for selection of civil society organizations that are common to all interactions
with civil society organizations leave a large number of matters unsettled—for
example, which organ makes a decision on civil society organization selection,
which documents and information it can request from civil society organiza-
tions, whether it considers civil society organizations aside from the one that
has shown interest in a particular meeting, what are the time limits, what may
be grounds for refusal, etc. Thus the relevant rules and practices cannot be
uniform and consistent; they vary across the institution and depend on the
context of particular meetings.
D. NGO Accreditation by the WTO
In sharp contrast with the elaborate substantive and procedural rules on accred-
itation applied by ECOSOC and to the lesser extent WIPO, the WTO, much like
the IMF, is subject to virtually no explicit, legally binding rules to ensure that
it engages only with NGOs that ‘add value’ to its policy-making, policy imple-
mentation, compliance monitoring, and dispute settlement activities. Article V:2
of the WTO Agreement merely states that the WTO should restrict its engage-
ment to NGOs ‘concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’. The 1996
Guidelines do not provide for any further accreditation requirements or 
selection criteria. There are also no specific procedural rules for the decisions
on accreditation.
When the WTO was first confronted with the problem of accrediting NGOs
on the occasion of the first session of the Ministerial Conference in Singapore
in December 1996, the WTO Secretariat accredited all non-profit NGOs that
could point to activities related to those of the WTO. The applicant-NGOs
were not submitted to any further examination of their objectives, member-
ship, institutional structure, or financing.180 Apart from the criterion of
‘WTO-related activities’, the only additional accreditation criterion applied at
the time was the ‘non-profit character’ of the NGO. Private companies and law
firms were refused accreditation on this basis.
This practice continued at subsequent sessions of the Ministerial Confer-
ence. The WTO Secretariat merely checked the WTO-related nature of the
activities of the applicant NGO and its non-profit character.181 Rather than a
system of selection and accreditation of NGOs, the WTO applies a simple 
system of ad hoc registration for one event, namely the biannual session of the
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Ministerial Conference. This registration/accreditation system of NGOs for
the biannual sessions of the Ministerial Conference is left to the discretion of
the WTO Secretariat, although the WTO General Council can address any
issue concerning accreditation/registration that may arise in the run-up to a
session of the Ministerial Conference.182 Despite these rather lax criteria for
accreditation/registration, only 1,065 NGOs out of roughly 1,630 applicants
were accredited for the 2005 Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial Confer-
ence. Of those not accredited, about 220 requests for accreditation were not
processed because of lack of further response or information from the NGOs
concerned. The remaining requests were refused because of insufficient evidence
of WTO-related activities or of the non-profit character. Due to the high num-
ber of requests for registration for the Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial
Conference, the WTO was stricter in screening applications than was custom-
ary for earlier sessions. Reportedly, applications from purely research institu-
tions or student associations, which do not have any advocacy functions, or
similar features that usually characterize NGOs, were refused.
While the general absence of WTO rules and procedures for the selection
of NGOs should be noted with concern, it could be argued that as long as NGO
involvement in WTO activities remains as modest as it currently is, there is lit-
tle use for elaborate accreditation rules and procedures. The 2004 Sutherland
Report, ‘The Future of the World Trade Organization’, noted in this respect that
while a formal system of accreditation might have ‘attractions’ (for example,
ensuring that ‘responsible NGOs get the advantage of a closer relationship with
the WTO’), it would impose a continuing bureaucratic burden to receive, sieve,
and make judgments about candidate NGOs.183 As long as NGOs have no con-
sultative status with the WTO (i.e., not allowed to participate in the meetings
of WTO bodies), it is indeed doubtful whether a formal system of accreditation
is ‘a worthy investment for a small organization with a limited budget’.184
VI. Conclusion
When one compares the extent of current WTO engagement with NGOs to that
of the GATT or early WTO engagement with NGOs, it is clear that significant
strides have been made. Largely due to the efforts of the WTO Secretariat, the
relations between the WTO and NGOs are currently more meaningful, more
constructive, and less antagonistic than ever before. The involvement of NGOs
in the policy-making, policy implementation, compliance monitoring, and
dispute settlement activities of the WTO remains, however, quite modest. The
potential of Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement has definitely not been exploited
by WTO Members to date. As stated in the 1996 Guidelines, it was and still is
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not ‘possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its
meetings’.185 With the exception of the formal plenary meeting of the Minis-
terial Conference and the limited exception (when all parties agree) of WTO
panels meetings and Appellate Body oral hearings, NGOs are not allowed to
attend—let alone actively participate in—any meetings of WTO bodies.
When addressing the question of whether there is a need and/or scope for
more NGO involvement in the activities of the WTO, the 2004 Sutherland
Report, ‘The Future of the World Trade Organization’, first noted (in line with
the view held by most—if not all—WTO Members) that the primary respon-
sibility for engaging civil society in trade policy matters rests not with the
WTO, but with its Members.186 The Sutherland Report also noted that while
all international organizations share common objectives in the pursuit of trans-
parency, each organization’s particular mandate and structure might call for
specific objectives, forms of involvement, and the choice of civil society organ-
izations with whom to collaborate.187 The Sutherland Report pointed out that
the WTO is founded on contractual commitments negotiated among govern-
ments, and for that reason there are limits to how much further the WTO can
go in involving NGOs in its deliberations and processes.188 The Sutherland
Report called on WTO Members to develop a new set of clearer guidelines for
the relations of the WTO Secretariat with NGOs and to scale up the adminis-
trative capacity and financial resources of the WTO Secretariat.189 The Suther-
land Report referred to new ‘systematic and in-depth relations’ between the
WTO Secretariat and NGOs but was silent about the types of activities that such
relations could comprise.190 In fact, the Sutherland Report did not suggest any
substantial improvements in the degree of the WTO’s engagement with NGOs.
Rather, it called for streamlining and further developing the existing forms of
engagement, with an emphasis on the Secretariat’s (as opposed to WTO Mem-
bers’) relations with NGOs.
While appreciating the wisdom of the authors of the Sutherland Report
of limiting proposals for reform to ‘realizable’ reforms, the Sutherland Report
shows a regrettable lack of ambition in the area of dialogue with civil society.
It could be argued that the WTO can, and should, engage with NGOs, and
allow for NGO involvement, more than it currently does. Why can (selected)
NGOs not have observer/consultative status in WTO bodies? In the United
Nations, UNCTAD, the ILO, WIPO, and other international organizations that
deal with economic matters, NGOs have such status and participate in the
meetings of the bodies of these organizations. Why is this not possible in the
WTO? Does the intergovernmental character of the WTO prevent granting
NGOs observer/consultative status? Would further engagement with NGOs, in
particular, by allowing (selected) NGOs to participate in formal meetings of its
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bodies, be counterproductive to the conduct of negotiations within the WTO?
A more open and engaged dialogue with civil society will make the WTO a
more transparent and responsive organization, enjoying greater support among
the general public in developed as well as developing country Members. Jus-
tified concerns about the legitimacy, the accountability, and the ‘politics’ of
NGOs can be eliminated, or at least mitigated, by introducing a system of
accreditation in the WTO, modelled on the system applied by the UN ECOSOC.
While NGO involvement in the WTO definitely has its limits, the involvement
of NGOs in other international organizations, in particular in the United
Nations and WIPO, suggests that these limits have not yet been reached.
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Accommodating Developing Countries 
in the WTO: From Mega-Debates to 
Economic Partnership Agreements 
GERHARD ERASMUS
I. Introduction 
The debate about accommodating developing countries in international organ-
izations is an old one. International trade arrangements have achieved some
success in this regard, such as the recognition of least developed countries
(LDCs) as a special category and the adoption of the Everything but Arms
program. Developing countries also enjoy flexibility when it comes to compli-
ance with many of the standard rules applicable to Members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).1
The concept of special and differential treatment has been built into many
provisions of WTO law. During the Kennedy Round, Part IV of the GATT
1947 was adopted, requiring developed countries to accord high priority to the
reduction of trade barriers to products exported from developing countries. It
also introduced the concept of non-reciprocity for less developed contracting par-
ties. The special efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) resulted in the launching of the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) in 1968. It has been observed that the ‘single undertaking’
approach of the Uruguay Round did not put an end to the granting of special
and differential treatment and that there are no fewer than 145 such provisions.2
There remain a number of unresolved issues and new complications with
respect to the accommodation of LDCs. The special preferences have not
worked as intended. Specifically, they have not solved the problem of the mar-
ginalization of developing countries. Special preferences have produced some
negative economic consequences, and certain economists argue that ‘little ben-
efit has in fact accrued to developing countries’ through preferential schemes.3
Many developing countries have become trapped by preferential schemes,
often resulting in failures to implement domestic reforms. In addition, GSP
schemes are unilateral, grantor states determine the product coverage (devel-
oped country lobby groups are not inactive), and preferences have become
dependent on other conditions. The Sutherland Report makes the valid point
that ‘recipient countries have been burdened with obligations unrelated to
trade, which are expressed as conditions to receiving preferences. Thus, it can
be argued, that preferences are no longer unreciprocated’.4
Preferential treatment has also caused or contributed to structural condi-
tions and legal arrangements that work against the integration of many devel-
oping countries into the global economy. The African, Caribbean, and Pacific
(ACP) countries are an obvious example. Practically all ACP countries have con-
tinued to trade with their main trading partner, the European Union (EU),
outside of normal rules. The special arrangements concluded for this purpose
(the Cotonou Agreement and its predecessors) required WTO waivers. These
waivers have now expired, and the majority of these states are not prepared
for the ‘normal’ rules-based system. Catching up becomes tougher. The rules
of the game introduced by the establishment of the WTO can fully apply only
to the players inside the system. The ACP countries have largely traded in
arrangements outside this system. Although most of them are Members of the
WTO, they have also been ‘outsiders’.5
This chapter endeavours to contribute to the discussion by making three
points. The first is that the mega debates about trade and development have
produced limited success. It would be more constructive to address smaller or
more focused sets of problems. The WTO could, for example, allow the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), currently being negotiated between
the European Union and the ACP countries, to include a development-promoting
dimension by applying less strict rules regarding WTO compatibility of regional
trade arrangements. The EPAs have to comply with Article XXIV GATT and
Article V GATS. This challenges the WTO to link development aims to regional
integration issues. Will the WTO allow these free trade agreements (which will
not be based on the Enabling Clause)6 enough flexibility when they have to com-
ply with the rules for regional trade arrangements? 
The second point made in this chapter is that technical assistance and
‘implementation assistance’ are not necessarily the same thing. The latter allows
for technical assistance directed at the needs of a specific developing country
(or groups of them) with regard to the implementation of particular obliga-
tions or specific regional arrangement. This approach should focus on domes-
tic requirements, including legal and institutional reforms and capacity building
aimed at specific outcomes. International assistance programs will show better
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results if undertaken in smaller, focused contexts. It is not practical to attempt
to reform a whole state or groups of states at once or to build capacity across
the whole range of public needs.
Many international organizations implement specialized development
assistance programs and claim that success depends on domestic responses
and local absorption capacity. Problems with delivery continue. Were the EPAs
to have well-designed implementation chapters, which run in tandem with
what other international organizations do, the results would be better. New
regional integration arrangements foreseen under the EPAs will be launched
on a firmer footing if accompanied by a proper focus on implementation.
The third and final point is related to the previous one and maintains that
regional integration initiatives have the potential to serve as development and
capacity-advancing mechanisms. This point must be qualified. The track record
of existing regional trade arrangements among ACP countries, and in Africa
in particular, is not reassuring. They tend to be over-ambitious and with a
focus on grand schemes.7 The EPAs should be more realistic and focus on local
capacity needs for promoting regional trade and should develop technical
expertise in that context. Ineffective institutions and weak enforcement mech-
anisms in developing countries are a sign of deeper institutional deficiencies
that hamper development and integration into the multilateral trade system.
And it is not getting better. Thus far, obligations in trade agreements and tech-
nical assistance programs have had limited success in developing sustainable
remedies for these institutional weaknesses.8 The EPAs should do better if they
are to accomplish what they have taken on.
II. Why Focus on the Economic Partnership 
Agreements?
The focus on the EPAs is justified because these agreements can directly assist
in the belated introduction of the ACP countries into the rules-based system
of multilateral trade. Notwithstanding the creation of the WTO in 1995, ACP
countries remain largely outside the global trading system. Furthermore, these
countries are still not fully prepared for WTO membership. The EPAs have, by
implication, a deeper agenda: to be platforms for reform and assistance meas-
ures to equip the ACP countries for meaningful WTO membership. Integra-
tion into the global economy, one of the expressly stated objectives of the EPA
negotiations, is not possible without attention to this aspect.
The EPAs will have implications for how ACP states will trade with the
European Union and with each other, how they will pursue their plans for
regional integration, and how the challenges of development, technical capacity
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deficits, and domestic implementation of international obligations will be
tackled. The implementation of the EPAs will require follow-up measures and
focused technical assistance, as well as new domestic and regional institutions
and laws. The necessary technical and institutional capacity is still lacking and
undermines efforts to comply with WTO obligations.
The EPAs should target domestic reforms and assist these countries gen-
erally in coping with the legal and technical demands of trade under the mul-
tilateral system. This becomes more urgent as the preferences of the WTO
waivers have fallen away and WTO compatibility of regional trade arrange-
ments becomes unavoidable.
The current chapter uses the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) EPA as a basis for discussion. It is a poignant illustration of how dif-
ficult it has become to gain trade concessions from the developed world, despite
promises by the developed world under WTO law to act in a pro-development
manner. The issues and the outcomes of the negotiations of the SADC EPA to
date will be discussed in order to determine the general direction of the debate.
Are there indications that the EPAs will live up to the hopes and expectations
stated above? Will the ACP countries subsequently be better positioned with
regard to WTO participation?
The SADC EPA also provides a realistic context. Trade between the European
Union and Southern Africa displays areas of competition. These offensive inter-
ests make for tough negotiations. There are additional complications in the form
of challenges to square the EPA for this region with an existing customs union.
This will especially test the resolve of the European Union to support the pursuit
of deeper regional integration in the developing world. The SADC EPA includes
the oldest African regional trade arrangement: the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU).9 It will be very difficult to manage the common external tariff of
SACU and to protect the union’s integrity if this EPA excludes South Africa (which
is not a member of the ACP group). The present EU position is to exclude South
Africa from the market access benefits offered to the other SADC members. South
Africa is the strongest economy in SACU (and in sub-Saharan Africa), and if it
has to trade with the European Union in a separate bilateral arrangement there
will be several negative consequences for SACU and for Southern Africa’s own plans
for deeper integration. Regional as well as global integration will become tougher,
and the very existence of SACU could be jeopardized.
The consequences could be more far-reaching in light of the fact that SACU
has a unique arrangement in the form of a common revenue pool. Customs
and excise duties (of which more than 90 percent are generated by South
African duties) are paid into this common pool and later shared. The sharing
occurs by means of a formula based on the value of intra-SACU trade, not the
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source of the duties.10 This is highly beneficial to the other four SACU mem-
bers. South Africa, however, claims that it is actually transferring large amounts
of its own resources to the other members, a transfer they object to.11 If SACU
ceases to exist and the common revenue pool disappears, the consequences
for SACU members, especially Lesotho and Swaziland, would be calamitous.12
III. EPAs In the Context of the Global Trading System
The negotiations to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements are taking
place against the background of a bigger debate. This debate is contemplat-
ing changes in the architecture of the multilateral trade system and the impli-
cations of the increase in regional trade arrangements.13 How does this context
affect the EPA negotiation process?
Developing countries see the EPAs as a sui generis form of regional trade agree-
ment, with a development objective and purpose. What are the prospects of their
being recognized as a special category of ‘development’ free trade agreements? The
Doha Round has, by implication, this issue on its agenda in the context of discus-
sions with respect to the implementation of GATT Article XXIV. A failed Doha
Round might mean a lost opportunity for changing and updating those rules.
When and if the Doha talks meaningfully resume, the world will be a 
different place. This is true not only because of the growing muscle of the
emerging economies. There will be many more regional agreements, and it is
into this environment that the EPAs will have to fit. The mushrooming of
regional agreements may make it more difficult to accept the EPAs as falling
into a special category of development-promoting trade agreements.
Another matter to consider is the recent efforts by African governments to
adopt an all-Africa approach to EPA negotiations and to link the process to their
own schemes for regional integration in the continent.14 The development of an
African template for these negotiations may have the benefit of elucidating com-
plicated issues but comes too late to redirect the EPA outcomes in a fundamen-
tally different way. Five separate African EPAs are currently being contemplated.15
It is difficult to see them being conflated into one single arrangement.
IV. Developing Countries and the WTO: From Mega
Debates to Lesser Expectations 
There is general agreement that developing countries should be more actively
and constructively involved in the WTO. These nations cannot prosper in 
isolation. Many commentators will go further and call for WTO reforms so
that development needs can be better accommodated. Others point to larger
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systemic benefits for developing countries (e.g., more clout in trade negotia-
tions) and the fact that the system will become more legitimate with increased
participation by developing countries. John Jackson has observed, while 
commenting on the WTO dispute settlement system, that the ‘participation
of developing countries in this system is, in the opinion of many, vital to the
long-term durability and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system,
and therefore, probably the WTO itself ’.16
The realpolitik undertone in Jackson’s observation serves as a reminder
that international organizations function best in stable and ‘legitimate’ envi-
ronments. It is neither desirable nor practical that large parts of the world are
absent from multilateral arrangements. Lasting solutions for global problems
cannot be worked out by the selected few, as the protection of the environ-
ment and the debate about security issues have demonstrated. Globalization
has caused quicker spillover effects into more and more areas, while the juris-
dictional boundaries of international organizations tend to become softer. The
concerns about the effects of poverty on the international system straddle
many agendas. Multilateral organizations are required to respond.
Developing countries will claim that the multilateral trade system is not
geared to the accommodation of their needs. Then the debate about goals, def-
initions, graduation, and responsibilities starts all over again. The fact that the
WTO is a ‘member-driven’ organization and a forum for trade negotiations
between sovereign states means that the emphasis is on consensually derived
rules for international trade. Underdevelopment may (or may not), from time
to time, be on the agenda but it is not the WTO’s raison d’être. The WTO
Agreements are not about development assistance in the sense of providing
funds or technical assistance to solve infrastructural problems. These agreements
focus on the movement of goods and services across borders. The WTO rules
provide the benefits of certainty, predictability, transparency, and information
about conditions in export markets.
The accepted wisdom is that the WTO is not a ‘development organization’.
This raises further questions. Does it imply that the development challenge is
compartmentalized and is the purview of specifically designed bodies where
a big-bang solution will be found? We know that the totality of the challenges
is too complex to expect specialized institutions such as the World Bank to
deal with them by means of recipes such as domestic reconstruction plans or
a Washington consensus, valid as such plans might have been at certain times
and under specific conditions.
The Sutherland Report points out that certain prerequisites and condi-
tions must be in place for developing countries to benefit from the WTO
regime. These nations must have the ‘capacity to participate’, they must put in
368 Part VI Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
place ‘an environment offering security, institutional integrity and administra-
tive efficiency without which their exporters can never be competitive and
investors will never show interest’.17 They should abandon failed policies of
protectionism and their political leadership must ‘respond to the opportuni-
ties presented by the WTO’.18 In meeting this challenge, developing countries
still face an uphill struggle.
The suspension of the Doha Development Round in July 2008 has chal-
lenged expectations that WTO mega-debates (in the sense of trade rounds)
can achieve comprehensive solutions for development problems. It also confirms
many of the caveats about how to deal (or not to deal) with the challenge posed
by issues clustered under the ‘development’ rubric. The Doha talks did not 
fail because certain developing countries demanded special safeguards for 
agricultural products. ‘Development’ cannot provide the ratio for a WTO trade
negotiation round. The development problem the Doha Round has to tackle
does not fit into the logic and procedures of a trade round. The pursuit of
pro-development outcomes has become lost in the detail, demands for conces-
sions, and a timetable beyond control. In the words of a negotiator from a
developing country:
The current impasse in the Doha Round negotiations arises fundamentally, in my
view, from a displacement as the priority matters of developmental issues by com-
mercial demands of interest groups in the developed world. The WTO negotiation
process has been described as a schmorgasbord, where one puts something into
the pot in order to take something out. Only the naïve would imagine that in such
a process there would not be some payment for the reforms and demands sought
by the developing world.19
The very cause of the impasse as identified in this observation is also the rea-
son that it is unlikely that the Doha Round can be revived as a ‘development
round’. Trade rounds are about concessions. The accommodation of develop-
ment needs within the multilateral trade order requires a different approach.
The required political will (and domestic support is a precondition) must first
exist to pursue this particular objective (development) and to agree on outcomes
capable of solving the problem at hand. The WTO is not geared toward gen-
erating this type of consensus. Rather, the WTO is the overseer of the system
for rules-based, multilateral trade liberalization. The current international
financial crisis and the signs of economic nationalism are additional reasons
why the revival of the Doha Round (with the expectation that it will bring
about real benefits for the poor countries) becomes increasingly unlikely.
Power relationships among WTO Members have changed but have not
resulted in a reorientation of priorities to the benefit of poorer nations. China,
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India, and Brazil have become dealmakers but they are not, despite the polit-
ical rhetoric, ‘developing countries’. Their objectives in WTO deliberations are
to secure their new status and protect their rights of market access into rich
economies. It would be unrealistic to expect otherwise. The Doha Round has
not and cannot produce a clear set of principles on which all nations loosely
described as developing countries are in agreement. The development dis-
course has in fact become more nuanced and more difficult.
Where does this leave us with regard to the discussion suggested in the title
of this chapter? When it comes to addressing underdevelopment and poverty
in the international system, there are mega-debates and those that focus on
specific sets of challenges. The mega-debates fulfil a useful political function,
and developing countries insist on having them. Such occasions are viewed as
evidence that the multilateral community cares for and recognizes the valid-
ity of their concerns. This chapter addresses the accommodation of develop-
ing countries in a more limited context, focusing on the EPAs as new agreements
to replace the regime governing trade between the European Union and the ACP
countries. The previous EU–ACP regime existed alongside the WTO order.
Will the EPA negotiations result in fundamentally different outcomes for the
ACP countries? Will the negotiations be more difficult for the developing coun-
tries engaged in these talks because they are negotiating in small groups? Answers
to these questions are tentative because these negotiations are ongoing20 and the
EPA negotiations are being conducted among different configurations of devel-
oping nations. The EPAs could, in principle, produce positive outcomes and
tailor-made results, but that is not yet evident. There are, in the mean time,
enough facts to merit a discussion and to support certain conclusions.
V. Economic Partnership Agreements: Origins,
Intentions, and Realities
The origins of the EPA negotiations go back to the Lomé Convention of 1975,
which granted ACP goods tariff-free access into the European Union, while also
providing for aid flows and export-earning guarantee schemes. The Cotonou
Agreement, concluded in June 2000, extended this regime until the end of 2007.
After 1995, the ACP countries continued to trade with the European Union,
their biggest trading partner, pursuant to a WTO waiver permitting exceptional
and preferential treatment.21 That waiver expired at the end of 2007.
The European Union’s non-reciprocal preferences for goods imported 
from former colonies gradually became an awkward and WTO-incompatible
remnant of a former era. The object of the current EPA negotiations is to
replace the previous preferential trade arrangement with a more modern and
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WTO-compatible regime. EPA negotiations currently concern the European
Union and the 79 ACP countries. There will be several separate EPAs. They
will be rules-based agreements covering trade in goods and, according to the
European Commission, also services and investment. The EPAs must also
address long-standing developmental challenges and promote deeper regional
integration among ACP nations.
To date, the European Union has not successfully concluded any EPAs with
African states. However, some states have initialled interim EPAs. The negoti-
ations about services and investment are continuing, and the European Union
hopes that they will be completed by the end of 2009, a goal that is unlikely 
to be reached.
EPA negotiations between the European Union and Caribbean states were
completed in 2007. Thirteen Caribbean Forum member states and the European
Union signed the ‘full’ Caribbean Forum–European Community Economic
Partnership Agreement in early October 2008. Guyana signed a few days later.
The Government of Haiti requested more time to review this EPA.22 Negotiations
to conclude a single EPA for the Pacific region are also continuing, though sev-
eral issues remain outstanding. Ministers from these states agreed that a compre-
hensive EPA might include provisions relating to intellectual property rights
with obligations not going beyond those contained in the Cotonou Agreement.23
The collapse of the Doha Development Round in July 2008 was a major set-
back to the EPA negotiation process. The game plan for the EPAs (the Coto-
nou Agreement) has been linked to certain expectations about these multilateral
talks. It was hoped that the Doha Round’s emphasis on ‘development’ would
create space to accommodate the special needs of the ACP countries, such as
more ‘flexibility’ with regard to the requirements of Article XXIV GATT. New
rules on safeguards in services trade were also expected. These outcomes have
not, as yet, materialized. The result is that WTO compatibility of the EPAs as
regional trade arrangements will be measured by rules designed in 1947, with
the added qualification that the EPAs will now be justiciable.
EPA negotiations have been tough, and the ACP countries have found it
increasingly difficult to carve out ‘development-friendly’ arrangements. The
world has changed since the time when the Cotonou Agreement was adopted.
Brussels’ new ‘Global Europe’ strategy emphasizes
a more results-oriented approach that focuses on concrete problems that EU busi-
nesses face in third country markets…. A strong market access policy is a key func-
tion of the common commercial policy, and a key area in which the EU can deliver
real economic benefits for its Member States. When it comes to taking action
against trade barriers, we need to identify ways to improve the use of the existing
tools and—where possible—to develop new ones.24
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Civil society organizations have joined the debate about the EPAs and the WTO
rules to be met. Most are critical of the approach and the proposals of the
European Commission. One criticism has been that the EPAs go beyond WTO
requirements and thus would increase the burden to implement new obliga-
tions. Others point to the tough legal commitments demanded of the European
Union by ACP states, unfair benefits for European firms (reciprocity is part and
parcel of the new arrangements), and failure of the European Union to deliver
on promised development assistance. African regional integration plans, it is
argued, will be derailed by the different EPA configurations and concomitant
WTO requirements.
For its part, the European Union denies these claims. The European Union
view is that aid, provided by other programs, must be used effectively25 and that
‘the success of the regional integration process also requires national public insti-
tutions to be strengthened and involved more in a climate of democratic gov-
ernance’. For the European Union, regional integration is an ongoing process
to boost the underlying logic of development:
[In] harmonised markets, the free movement of goods, services, capital and peo-
ple permits economies of scale, stimulates investment and boosts economic growth
and South-South trade. But, in the light of past experience, policies of this kind
yield the best results when combined, supported and generally backed up with
the simultaneous implementation of sectoral policies agreed at national and
regional level aimed at increasing productive capacity, improving the competi-
tiveness of the ACP economies and promoting sustainable social and environ-
mental development in partner countries and regions.26
Articles 36–38 of the Cotonou Agreement reveal the original intention of the
EPA scheme:
• The EPAs must be WTO-compatible and be introduced gradually.
• Non-reciprocal trade preferences will be maintained during a transition
phase.
• The parties reaffirmed the importance of the commodity protocols.
• The original target date for the entry into force of EPAs was 1 January
2008.
• The preparatory phase had to be used for capacity building, in the pub-
lic and private sectors of the ACP countries, with ‘appropriate assistance
to budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform, as well as for infrastructure
upgrading and development, and for investment promotion’. The ACP
countries claim that this objective has been moved to the back burner.
• Duty-free access for products from all least developed countries had to
be assured.
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• There had to be a timetable for the progressive removal of trade barriers,
in accordance with the relevant WTO rules.
• Negotiations had to take account of the level of development and the
socio-economic impact of trade measures on ACP countries and their
capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalization process.
‘Negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible in establishing the
duration of a sufficient transitional period, the final product coverage,
taking into account sensitive sectors, and the degree of asymmetry in
terms of [a] time table for tariff dismantlement, while remaining in con-
formity with WTO rules then prevailing.’ The parties undertook to col-
laborate in the WTO to defend the arrangements reached, in particular
with regard to the degree of flexibility available.
• A joint ACP–European Union Trade Committee was established to pay
special attention to ongoing multilateral trade negotiations, with a view to
preserve the benefits for the ACP–European Union trading arrangements.
There were several rounds of negotiations in 2007 to conclude ‘interim’ EPAs
before the WTO waiver expired at the end of that year. Some interim benefits
have been achieved. Since the beginning of 2008, goods from ACP countries
have enjoyed duty-free and quota-free access to European markets. The Euro-
pean Commission, which negotiates on behalf of the European Union, insists
that these advantages will become permanent only once the EPAs have been
signed. If these discussions fail and no new agreements are concluded, the 
ACP countries outside the EPA system will trade with the European Union on
the basis of the Generalized System of Preferences, with LDCs qualifying for the
Everything but Arms scheme. This will bring disadvantages for specific countries
with regard to coverage and conditions. For example, Namibia’s main export, beef,
is not included in the GSP. In this regard, the European Union has stated:
The European Union qualified its offer by undertaking that it would not be tied
to the requirement of equivalent openness from the ACP countries. The EPAs are
not free trade agreements in the classic sense. Flexibility under WTO rules means
that ACP counties will have to offer market access, but this will phase in over many
years. The ACP will also retain the right to protect sensitive products where the
removal of import duties could threaten local producers.27
So what happened? The membership of the various EPA configurations in
Africa became, from the outset, a major problem. African countries had to
propose their own configurations to negotiate with the EC. What they came
up with did not always match their existing regional arrangements. Some
African states have blamed the EC for the choices made, an allegation that
Brussels denies.
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Some peculiar and complicated EPA configurations have emerged, and
future integration schemes in Africa will face new complications as a result. The
SADC EPA is not an EPA for the Southern African Development Community.
The 15 SADC member states are negotiating their EPAs in about five different
configurations.28 Tanzania remained part of the SADC EPA group for a long
time, despite being a founding member of the East African Community (EAC).29
It later decided to rejoin the EAC EPA.
The 2007 negotiations were largely conducted on the basis of EC propos-
als, with detailed provisions on inter alia rules of origin, trade remedies, non-
tariff measures, customs and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, SPS
measures, dispute settlement, and development cooperation. The second round
of negotiations will address services and investment.
The fact that the expected WTO flexibility for free trade agreements with
developing members has not materialized has been a major stumbling block.
The promise in the Cotonou Agreement that the EPAs would not be ‘free trade
agreements in the classic sense’ has remained an elusive goal. There are no new
rules on flexibility, and one will have to wait and see how other WTO Mem-
bers will respond once the EPAs are notified and whether there will be a WTO
regime for ‘development-oriented’ trade agreements via the EPAs.
VI. The SADC EPA and the Challenges of 
Regional Integration
The Interim SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) between the
European Union, and the members of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) and Mozambique (but excluding South Africa) was finally initialled
at the end of 2007. Angola is part of this group but has not initialled the IEPA.
This interim document covers trade in goods only.
The initialling of the text of the interim agreement proved, in the end, to
be quite a diplomatic challenge. This can partly be explained by the fact that
the SADC EPA is a complex arrangement. Obligations due to existing struc-
tures had to be taken into account and there are new legal and institutional chal-
lenges. The failure to develop internal integration policies for SADC beforehand
created additional complications.
The implications for SACU may be even more serious. The membership of
this organization is divided over further negotiations with the European Union
and the implementation of the interim arrangements for the trade in goods will
pose considerable challenges.30 The five SACU states are all members of SADC
but they have not agreed on strategies for promoting regional integration or
ensuring that both SACU and SADC pursue the same game plan.
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SADC proclaimed itself a free trade agreement in July 2008 (including all
15 members) and wants to be a customs union by 2010. This has to be fol-
lowed by a common market. This time frame is unrealistic and the general
aim is over-ambitious. An even grander scheme has subsequently been added
in the form of a decision in October 2008 to launch a tripartite FTA consist-
ing of all the members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
the EAC, and SADC. There is overlapping membership between these organ-
izations and all three of them have plans to become customs unions.
The exclusion of South Africa from the SADC EPA, the fact that Mozam-
bique (not a member of SACU) is a party, the different policy decisions of
SACU’s members regarding the second phase of negotiations (on services and
investment), and the reservations by Namibia before it initialled the SADC
IEPA text are some of the problem areas still to be addressed. Namibia refused
to initial the text together with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and on 
23 November 2003 Mozambique entered certain reservations. Angola will
apparently join the process when ready. Accession at a later date is possible.31
South Africa and Namibia decided not to participate in the second phase,
where trade in services and investment will be negotiated with the EC.
Article 31(3) of the SACU agreement remains another obstacle. It requires the
consent of all members before new trade agreements with third parties can 
be entered into. Before the SADC EPA can enter into force this issue will have to
be resolved, and South Africa holds the key, at least with regard to the letter of the
law. There is no procedure as to how Article 31 consent can be demonstrated.
This is a problem that a common negotiating mechanism, which Article 31 also
calls for, could have solved. SACU has as yet no common negotiating mechanism.
When Namibia initialled the SADC IEPA late in 2007, it noted several con-
cerns that needed to be resolved before negotiations could continue. South Africa
and Angola share Namibia’s concerns and have raised additional ones. They point
to the detrimental effects of the IEPA on regional integration among the SADC
EPA states, including diminished space for national development policies, incon-
sistency with WTO obligations, and tension with the entitlements in the Cotonou
Agreement. There are also complaints about the objectives of the IEPA text.32
The most-favoured-nation clause in the SADC EPA text constitutes a 
particular problem. Article 28 of the SADC IEPA deals with future free trade
agreements and states that
the SADC EPA States shall accord to the EC Party any more favourable treatment
applicable as a result of the SADC EPA States or any Signatory SADC EPA State
becoming party to a free trade agreement with any major trading country after the
signature of this Agreement.
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A ‘major trading economy’ is defined as 
any developed country, or any country accounting for a share of world merchan-
dise exports above 1 percent in the year before the entry into force of the eco-
nomic integration agreement referred to in paragraph 2, or any group of countries
acting individually, collectively or through an economic integration agreement
accounting collectively for a share of world merchandise exports above 1.5 percent
in the year before the entry into force of the economic integration agreement
referred to in paragraph 2.
It is true that the EPAs offer duty-free and quote-free access for ACP goods
and that in this regard there cannot be an advantage to be lost. The concern is,
however, about lost bargaining space when negotiating new free trade agree-
ments with other parties, particularly when third parties know in advance that
offers between them and the ACP countries will automatically benefit the EU.
Future free trade agreements between developing countries and third parties
may, in addition, contain provisions on other types of preferences and meas-
ures not granted by the EPAs. The EU would then be able to demand the same.
Brazil has raised its concern about how this regional most-favoured-nation
provision will undermine the possibility in the Enabling Clause for develop-
ing countries to meet less severe standards when concluding regional agreements
inter se. The EPAs will also operate ex nunc, and previous advantages already
granted in other free trade agreements concluded by the EU are excluded.
Export taxes and levies are another concern. They are introduced by Arti-
cle 24 of the interim SADC EPA, dealing with ‘duties, taxes or other fees and
charges on exports’. It prohibits ‘new customs duties on exports or charges
having equivalent effect… ’. Namibia claims that this provision hampers its free-
dom to adopt domestic policies in areas such as beneficiation in the mining
industry. Namibia is further concerned about the provision on infant indus-
try protection and the refusal by the EC to accommodate its proposal to insert
a clause along the lines found in existing regional agreements binding on the
SADC EPA states.
Article 27 of the interim SADC EPA regulates the free movement of goods.
It provides that ‘customs duties shall be levied only once for goods originat-
ing in the EC Party or in the SADC EPA States in the territory of the other
Party.’ The SADC EPA states are not a homogenous block and belong to organ-
izations with overlapping membership. SACU is a customs union, with a sin-
gle customs territory and common external tariff. Mozambique and Angola are
not members of this customs union, though they are members of SADC and
administer their own customs territories. The implementation of this provi-
sion will require special and new legal arrangements between Mozambique
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(and later Angola) on the one hand and SACU (or some of its members) on
the other. This will undermine the administration of SACU’s common exter-
nal tariff. Trade facilitation measures will be another casualty and there is the
additional danger of trade deflection. These concerns are still on the negoti-
ating agenda.
VII. GATT Article XXIV and the SADC EPA
Article XXIV determines how WTO compatibility of regional trade agree-
ments is to be achieved. They must be notified to the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements (CRTA). CRTA reports can be adopted (on the basis of con-
sensus) without necessarily deciding the question of consistency. Express deci-
sions that a notified scheme is inconsistent with the rules are rare.33 Many
regional trade arrangements have not been notified and most existing ones
‘have not received an affirmative consensus decision that they are GATT-con-
sistent’.34 The consistency of a customs union or free trade agreement with
WTO rules can be challenged in disputes between WTO Members under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding. But as one commentary notes after hav-
ing analyzed WTO practice and case law: ‘As a result, except for some obvious
cases, we simply cannot tell whether the numerous plurilateral trade agree-
ments currently in practice are GATT consistent or not.’35
There are no legal instruments specifically designed for regional trade
agreements between developed countries, on the one hand, and developing
countries and LDCs, on the other. The rules of Article XXIV cannot be discerned
with sufficient clarity, and even if they could, they should not, according to
the Cotonou Agreement, be applied stricto jure; flexibility had to be built in.
The extent of the flexibility cannot be determined in advance because there is
no formula for flexibility.
Flexibility should find its application in asymmetry and in formulations rec-
ognizing the needs (i.e., the development component) of the developing coun-
tries and the LDCs in the EPAs. Flexibility is also about a specific approach to
a negotiated outcome. In this instance, the challenge is to develop offers and
to agree on outcomes (this goal must be shared by all parties) that will demon-
strate an honest effort to comply with the general concerns underpinning
GATT Article XXIV, while striving to accommodate the needs of developing
countries and specifically LDCs. It is not an open-ended approach, but neither
is it a case of adhering to strict rules; there are no such rules. It must be pos-
sible to eventually justify the negotiated outcome by demonstrating approxi-
mation with the general requirements of GATT Article XXIV.
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Most ACP countries have complained about the lack of flexibility on the
part of the EC, including neglect of the ‘development dimension’. This is a
demonstration of how difficult it has become to accommodate development
needs through standard WTO arrangements. Article XXIV was negotiated as
part of the 1947 GATT. No specific attention was then given to the needs of
developing countries. It is, therefore, in its pure form, not suitable for evalu-
ating the EPAs for the purpose of determining WTO compatibility.
The Enabling Clause came later in the life of GATT but cannot accommo-
date the needs of the SADC EPA because the latter is not strictly speaking
about a free trade agreement between developing countries. It does, however,
provide indications of how the development dimension has been accommo-
dated, and in particular that it must be done flexibly.
The substantially all-trade requirement in GATT Article XXIV poses another
problem. Two types of measurement approaches have developed: quantitative
and qualitative. The first uses a statistical benchmark to indicate the percent-
age of trade and the other refers to the notion that no sector or major sector
should be excluded.36 In the Doha Negotiating Group on Rules, it has been
observed that the ‘percentage of trade method has been traditionally favoured
as an indication of regional trade agreement coverage… ’.37 However, there is
a willingness to explore how to supplement ‘a benchmark based on coverage
by trade with an assessment of trade coverage measured by number of tariff
lines’.38 This may result in a combined average threshold. Substantially all trade
also refers to other trade restrictions. Duties are a self-interpreting term. This
is not the case with respect to substantially all trade. One commentator quotes
from the working Party Report on EC—Agreement with Portugal and con-
cludes that there ‘is no exact definition of the expression referring to the term
“substantially all trade”’.39
The literature discusses a number of working reports and cases but provides
no examples of how an EPA-type arrangement has been dealt with. This leaves
negotiators with the challenge to be innovative, while endeavouring to approx-
imate their offers to the general principles underpinning Article XXIV as well
as accommodating the development dimension.
VIII. Where Do Services and Investment Fit In?
It has been argued that the Cotonou Agreement contains no clear obligation
to negotiate services as part of the EPAs. Article 41 of the Cotonou Agreement
confirms ‘the growing importance of services in international trade and their
major contribution to economic and social development’. The only undertak-
ing appears in Article 41(4):
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The Parties further agree on the objective of extending under the economic part-
nership agreements, and after they have acquired some experience in applying the
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment under GATS, their partnership to encom-
pass the liberalisation of services in accordance with the provisions of GATS and
particularly those relating to the participation of developing countries in liberal-
isation agreements.
It is not particularly useful to base decisions about trade in services on argu-
ments about the extent of legal obligations. Are services necessary for devel-
opment and regional and global integration? The evidence is that they are and
that, therefore, they should be included in new negotiations.40 Services repre-
sent about two-thirds of the global GDP and the share of value added by serv-
ices in GDP tends to rise with national income.41 Economists emphasize the
links between services and competitiveness when it comes to trade in goods.
The ACP economies cannot be integrated into the global economy unless trade
in services is given the necessary attention. It is unfortunate that South Africa
and Namibia have decided to exclude themselves from these EPA negotiations.
They argue that they are not yet ready and that they will pursue liberalization
in services under the GATS.
Article 67 of the Interim SADC EPA provides that the parties will com-
plete negotiations on services liberalisation on the basis of a liberalisation
schedule for each participating SADC EPA State, including a commitment to
a standstill as specified in Article V.1.b(ii) GATS for all services sectors anda-
greement to negotiate progressive liberalization with substantial sectoral cov-
erage within a period of three years following the conclusion of the full EPA.
It was also agreed ‘to support capacity building aimed at strengthening the
regulatory framework of the participating SADC EPA States.’
The parties have further agreed to adopt an investment chapter, ‘taking
into account the relevant provisions of the SADC Protocol on Finance and
Investment, no later than 31 December 2008’. However, the SADC Finance and
Investment Protocol has not yet been finalized, and a general Services Proto-
col for SADC is an even more remote prospect. Namibia and South Africa,
although not included in the SADC EPA services negotiations, are involved
(as SADC members) in the negotiations for this SADC Protocol and will in all
likelihood be parties thereto.
A study by Fink and Jansen makes important points about the economic
effects of services in regional trade agreements.42 Multilateral liberalization
generally yields greater welfare gains. However, there are additional gains from
preferential trade, associated with greater economies of scale and knowledge
transfer. If ‘learning by doing’ effects are important, preferential liberalization
may enable domestic service suppliers to become more efficient, as they face
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some competition within the free trade agreement territory but are not yet
exposed to global competition. This rationale applies mainly to agreements
among developing countries, where firms operate below best-practice produc-
tivity levels.43
The issue of regional most-favoured-nation provisions also appears in serv-
ices provisions of regional trade agreements. Most regional trade agreements
negotiated by EFTA, Japan, and the United States have incorporated them.44
They are also included in the EPAs. Fink and Jansen discuss the reasons for
including non-party most-favoured-nation clauses in regional trade agreements:
The inclusion of a non-party in a MFN clause in a services RTA [regional trade
agreement] or BIT [bilateral investment treaty]is best explained by bargaining
considerations. To begin with, for any given RTA each party has an incentive to ask
its trading partner for MFN treatment and it ensures that domestic services ben-
efits from current and future trade preferences are extended to non-parties. How-
ever, a country bound by many non-party MFN obligations faces a less favourable
bargaining situation in future RTAs. A new RTA partner knows that any negoti-
ated preferences will be extended automatically to others. Thus, service importers
and investors from that partner will not have access to the domestic market, reduc-
ing the value of a future RTA commitment. Consequently, the willingness of a
new RTA partner to ‘pay’ for additional market opening may be reduced. On bal-
ance, a country with liberal trade policies in services has a stronger interest in a
non-party MFN clause than a country that maintains substantial trade restric-
tions under a RTA. The former has few preferences left to grant and can only ben-
efit from the extension of future market opening measures by RTA partners. The
latter may be more cautious about widening the scope of any future liberaliza-
tion undertaken and may not want to weaken its bargaining position with trade
to other parties. It is thus not surprising that RTAs involving developed countries
typically feature a non-party MFN obligation, whereas agreements between devel-
oping countries do not always incorporate such a discipline.45
Regional trade agreements dealing with services do not, unlike the regional
arrangements for trade in goods, give rise to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ concern of over-
lapping membership and difficult rules of origin. In services, rules of origin 
primarily deal with the origin of service providers rather than the origin of
the traded services. This point brings Fink and Jansen to observe that ‘a world
of barrier-free service RTAs will indeed approximate free multilateral trade’.46
They are of the belief that 
only time will tell whether the current wave of RTAs proves to be helpful or harm-
ful for the WTO. A multitude of political economy forces are pushing in different
directions. In the specific case of services, however, there are reasons to believe
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that preferential agreements are more likely to be building blocks than stumbling
stones. The main grounds for this more optimistic outlook are the weakly dis-
criminatory nature of services RTAs and the web of non-party MFN clauses to
which many countries are already bound in existing agreements. There is some con-
cern about preferential market opening of mode 4 and regulatory cooperation
agreements, which are inherently more discriminatory. However, it is not clear to
what extent full multilateral progress in these areas will ever be feasible.47
The main source of discrimination in regional services liberalization lies in
the preferential regulatory cooperation agreements that may accompany
regional trade agreements. This is an unknown factor that may not be of pri-
mary importance in the case of such agreements between developing countries.
Their growing regional integration will, however, increase the use of such
implicit regulatory barriers, as will, in principle, also happen in the EPAs. The
GATS endeavours to discipline the use of regulatory measures in Article VI(4),
which states:
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall,
through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines.
Work has started to develop disciplines for the accounting sector, and the
Working Party on Professional Services has been renamed the Working Party
on Domestic Regulation, focusing on the extension of these disciplines to other
professions.48
What are the prospects for regulating trade in services among ACP coun-
tries and within their own regional organizations? This is a neglected topic. Most
ACP nations invoke arguments about capacity constraints and are hesitant to
commit to new services obligations. The SADC states have only recently started
a debate about trade in services as part of their integration plans but the process
is limited to the financial sector. The SACU agreement does not cover serv-
ices.49 South Africa has consistently refused to discuss services with the EC in the
context of the SADC EPA. This does not mean that trade in services (involving
South African firms) does not take place. They are important suppliers of many
services (such as telecoms, construction, retail, and energy) in sub-Saharan
Africa. The tourism sector is important for African countries generally and
most of the ACP countries, in the context of the EPA, seem ready to negotiate
with respect to this sector.
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IX. Conclusion
As it becomes more difficult to make substantive progress in multilateral trade
negotiations, the limits as to what mega-trade debates can generate (and under
what circumstances) have become more obvious. Mega-outcomes to mega-
debates depend on, among others, the right mix of conditions. The conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round is an example. More and more commentators have
been calling for plurilateralism in international trade negotiations, which would
allow the willing few to move forward. Such a development will not be with-
out its dangers for the WTO.50
The conditions conducive to a successful mega-trade deal do not currently
exist. So what are the implications for the EPA negotiations? Would it, never-
theless, be possible to get them accepted in the WTO as a special category of
free trade agreement? This depends on a variety of factors, such as the politi-
cal resolve to design and notify them as such.
Do the EPAs have the right architecture and the necessary political support?
The current evidence is not reassuring. The European Union and the African
ACP countries have adopted different approaches. The EC has offered broad
access for goods but, in exchange, insists on the inclusion of new generation
issues and firm rules. African states want special assistance for domestic needs
and enough time to develop their own policies and regulations. They are not keen
on binding international legal instruments, formal dispute resolution, and new
disciplines. The debate is not really about the design of a new genre of free trade
agreements within the WTO system but rather about immediate bargains.
What about implementation assistance? The EPAs have been and are being
negotiated in different configurations, which create opportunities for tailor-
made answers to local problems. However, a proper ‘implementation assis-
tance’ dimension will come about only if the EPAs generate a new philosophy
about development and accept firm disciplines about implementation.
Outcomes should be monitored and be measurable. Such plans should be
linked to national and regional programs in ACP countries directed toward
the same goals and should be co-owned by the European Union.
The outcomes depend on what the negotiators finally settle on, the mem-
bership structures of the EPAs, and how ACP countries will pursue domestic and
regional reforms. Currently, the European Union does not offer special or new
development assistance packages; existing programs should suffice. The African
governments are also not very clear as to how new development formulas
should look. The notion of ‘implementation assistance’, which requires a dif-
ferent design and specific commitments, is not really on the table. New obli-
gations are never popular, but for implementation assistance to be acceptable
382 Part VI Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
and achievable, commitments about national and regional reforms should 
be included in the texts of new agreements. That would have the additional 
benefit of clarifying regional integration issues in Africa, which currently look
rather confused.
The potential of the EPAs to promote regional integration in Africa is uncer-
tain. There are in fact two debates and two sets of integration initiatives proceed-
ing concurrently: the EPAs and the African Union debates. These two discourses
do not share the same conception and potential outcomes of integration. The
EPA process is also not synchronised with Africa’s home-grown integration
plans. The result is lack of focus regarding an important aspect of the struc-
tural framework for development, which regional integration can provide.
The idea that the EPAs should result in a new and sui generis type of free
trade agreement with ACP countries has brought larger systemic issues con-
cerning regional integration into sharper focus. The linear approach to inte-
gration (to move from a free trade agreement to a customs union and common
market within a tight time frame) generally being pursued in Africa must be
questioned. Grand schemes and rapid progress under tight time frames have
resulted in many missed deadlines and scant respect for legal obligations.51
Integration is not an end in itself. Configurations should make sense and
should be designed on the basis of achievable goals, realistic membership
choices, a serious commitment to implement and respect rules, sound institu-
tions, and the potential to promote trade. Regional trade arrangements require
a carefully designed architecture and attention to local needs. Current plans for
regional integration in Africa will not escape the dangers of the ‘spaghetti bowl’,
which is caused by duplication and overlapping membership. A parallel stream
of new integration initiatives via the EPAs may complicate matters further.
The integration debate requires a new start and a single, integrated focus.
The EPA negotiations have not generated the right debate and are not asking 
the critical questions.
Many of the current problems have their origin in old issues. Negotiations
on the SADC EPA have focused attention more sharply on the unconsolidated
nature of SACU under its new agreement. This is an old customs union but is
burdened by a specific legacy with an emphasis on revenue sharing. Although
the new SACU Agreement emphasizes the importance of ‘common policies
and common institutions’, the actual focus is still on revenue sharing, rather
than on the adoption of policies to promote deeper integration, common trade
negotiations, or joint industrial development.
What do these developments and tendencies imply for developing country
participation in the WTO? It will be an uphill battle to sell the EPAs as devel-
opment-friendly free trade agreements. The WTO framework for doing so is
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absent as the multilateral system was designed for a different fabric and at a time
when regional trade did not figure as prominently as they now do. The rules
contained in Article XXIV have not been designed for the current explosion of
regional trade agreements. Article V GATS is still very much untested terrain.
In the words of a recent study:
Whatever else the GATT/WTO has achieved over the six decades of its existence—
and many would agree that these achievements have been significant—the fact
remains that to all intents and purposes, the WTO has been something of a pas-
sive observer as regionalism has exploded.52
The regional most-favoured nation clause in the EPAs constitutes a contro-
versial feature. They generate an inherent multiplier that cannot be ignored by
developed countries (or the likes of China, India, and Brazil) when they have
to decide whether to conclude new trade agreements, be they regional or bilat-
eral, with states already locked into the obligations of the EPAs.
Developing countries in Africa struggle with the rules-based dimension of
international trade, whether with regard to their WTO membership or in the
context of regional trade arrangements. Once the EPAs are in place, it will no
longer to possible to invoke waivers or unilateral preferences, neither in 
Brussels nor in the capitals of the ACP countries. Other WTO Members will
monitor compliance and may decide to raise disputes when they consider their
rights to be violated.
This predicament will become more acute. In most instances, national trade
laws and procedures in ACP countries are not WTO compliant, and the pri-
vate sector cannot reap the benefits of WTO membership. These countries need
a considerable amount of technical assistance (together with their own efforts),
which must focus on domestic reforms and capacity building to implement
and adhere to WTO disciplines and the new rules associated with the EPAs.
There is no template for solving these problems. Patience, dedication, and
well-focused efforts are necessary and must be backed up by technical assistance,
financial support, and realistic legal and institutional arrangements within
developing countries and their regional trade arrangements. National govern-
ments, civil society, and the private sector must be part of the answer. They must
‘own’ development programs, while solutions must be developed to address par-
ticular local needs.
The mega-debate regarding the accommodation of developing countries
in the WTO will continue. It will be a difficult debate and the usefulness of a
‘Development Round’ as the way forward is doubtful. As some have argued, it
requires a new approach within the WTO:
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As for the issue of development, which has largely caused the negotiation process
of the WTO to become stalled, it remains the most important issue on the WTO
agenda and it will be negotiated again although not necessarily in the same man-
ner as pursued in the Doha Round. Development is clearly a bigger issue than the
machinery (trade negotiation) by which it has been addressed in the Doha Round.
It will be necessary to rethink what the WTO can accomplish in economic devel-
opment that is still consistent with the inherent capabilities and constraints of the
trade negotiating process. Then, too, it may be necessary to rethink the hoary con-
struct of ‘developing country’, and to question whether this construct as it is cur-
rently employed in WTO negotiations is conducive to dealing with the problems
of underdevelopment and poverty in the international system. Developing coun-
tries are an economic diverse group in the WTO, and the most destabilizing dimen-
sion of this diversity is, in fact, economic development. It may be necessary to
determine what about ‘developing country’ can be effectively addressed in a mul-
tilateral trade negotiation, and what about ‘developing country’ needs to be
addressed by other policy tools.53
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Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance:
The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as 
a ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes
HENRY GAO AND CHIN LENG LIM*
I. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)1 have mushroomed
worldwide.2 The consensus in trade circles now is that ‘regionalism is here to
stay’,3 ‘will [not] disappear’,4 and that ‘little can be done to prevent …
[the] … spread of [RTAs]’. 5 Such proliferation of RTAs has created a renewed
sense of urgency for the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO must
act to avoid the fate of being eclipsed into irrelevance. There are a number of
options for the WTO today.
The first option sees the WTO as an RTA ‘terminator’. Theoretically speaking,
the best approach would be to heighten the level of ambition in global trade
talks to reduce all trade barriers to zero so that the discriminatory effect 
created by RTAs could be reduced or even eliminated.6 In reality, however,
Members would probably never adopt such an approach. First, while an RTA,
by reducing the tariffs of its members to zero at the regional level, increases the
incentive for non-RTA members to urge WTO Members to reduce tariffs to zero
at the WTO, it will also increase the incentive for the RTA members not to
extend zero tariffs to non-RTA members for fear of erosion of their RTA pref-
erences.7 As the decision whether to reduce tariffs is to be taken by RTA mem-
bers, it is highly unlikely that they will choose to harm their own interests.
Second, even if assuming, arguendo, that somehow the members to an RTA could
overcome their fear of preference erosion and offer to non-RTA members in
the WTO the same tariff concessions they can offer to their fellow members,
it would be irrational to assume that they would be willing to offer more than
what they are willing to give each other at the regional level. As several studies
have shown, many RTAs have carved out certain sectors, with agriculture being
the most well-known example, from the tariff reduction schedules.8 Thus, at
least with regard to those sectors, the RTA has entrenched trade protectionism
and made it more difficult, rather than easier, for RTA members to agree to fur-
ther reduce tariffs at the WTO. Third, while history is filled with examples of
the ebb and flow of regional trade deals followed by major breakthroughs in
multilateral trade negotiations, thus far it has not been possible for multilat-
eral economic integration to reach the same level and depth of liberalization
as regional economic integration. While the increased technical complexity of
trade negotiations together with the increased number of participants is one
explanation, a more plausible explanation is that regional integration is rarely
about trade alone; instead, most RTAs, if not all, are driven more by the need
to trade small economic losses for major political and strategic gains.9 Offer-
ing zero tariffs to everyone at the WTO, however, would not score any politi-
cal gains for most countries, as the WTO has become so large that it includes
the friends and rivals of almost every country.
The second option sees the WTO as an RTA ‘confessor’.10 If preferential
treatment is regarded as a cardinal sin in the religion of free trade, the ‘termi-
nator’ would wipe out those sins by eliminating the preferences. Under the
second option, countries might seek, through ‘confession’, to alleviate their
guilt even if they cannot wipe out their sins. According to this view, the WTO
could, first, provide objective research to help better understand the impact
of RTAs on non-members; second, set up a negotiating forum for the coordi-
nation, standardization, and harmonization of rules of origin;11 and, third,
draft ‘best practices’ or model RTAs12 to minimize the effect of further fragmen-
tation created by different breeds of RTAs. However, there are several reasons
that this approach is not entirely satisfactory.
First, while the authors agree that the WTO would be the best institution
to examine the pros and cons of different RTAs in the general sense, critical find-
ings on particular RTAs would make the WTO (Secretariat) vulnerable to crit-
icisms of infringing upon Member’s rights to conclude RTAs under Article
XXIV, and allegations of breaching the impartiality of the WTO and the Sec-
retariat. Moreover, as it will be politically incorrect for the WTO to outsource
such research to external researchers, the WTO most likely would assign the
work to its Trade Policies Review Division13 or the Economic Research and
Statistics Division.14 Even though these two are the largest divisions among 
all the functional divisions in the WTO,15 their resources are still limited if
the task to be performed is considered, i.e., examining the complex web of
400 RTAs16 that currently involve all but one WTO Member.
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Second, using the WTO to harmonize rules of origin is also difficult to
achieve. First of all, since many preferential rules of origin are intentionally
designed as devices to deny non-RTA members preferences, it is doubtful
whether WTO Members would be willing to get rid of these carefully crafted
devices. Second, even if assuming such reluctance can be overcome in most
sectors, it would still be nearly impossible to streamline rules of origin for
some politically sensitive sectors.17 Third, even if the rules of origin can be
harmonized in general, the application of such standardized rules of origin to
particular products could still create problems An example of this would be a
product that is manufactured with a 20 percent value-added in each of the five
countries to an RTA, while the WTO adopts a uniform 30 percent value-added
rule of origin for all RTAs with no provision for cumulation rules.
Third, with regard to the role of the WTO as an authoritative source of ‘best
practices’ for RTAs or a model RTA, the problems are that first, as each country
brings its unique blessings and predicaments to the RTA negotiating table, a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach might not work. One possible solution to this is to draft ‘best
practices’ or a model RTA in such a way that different options for a given rule are
provided for potential RTAs to choose from. The danger, however, is that a coun-
try would simply choose the worst possible combinations, resulting in a ‘Franken-
stein’RTA to defeat the very purpose of having such best practices in the first place.
Yet another option offered is to turn the WTO into an ‘inquisitor’ by
strengthening the existing WTO monitoring system. The 2006 rules on trans-
parency is a recent example of this.18 Unfortunately, because the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) is hamstrung by the consensus rule, merely
having heightened monitoring rules would not be of much practical use here.
This chapter discusses a fourth option: to make the WTO an ‘enforcer’ by
using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a venue for resolving at least
some disputes among RTA parties, and possibly even disputes between RTA and
non-RTA WTO Members. In a certain sense, this option complements rather
than replaces the previous options. The rationale underlying this initiative is
that, by using the WTO dispute settlement system for some RTA disputes, the
Members will be able to develop, albeit gradually, incrementally, and pragmat-
ically, a body of ‘common law’ on RTAs. Such a body of common principles
could form the basis of multilateral rules on RTAs or harmonize RTA rules. This
could minimize the harmful effect of RTAs.
In order to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a ‘common good’ for
RTAs, three further questions must be addressed:
• Can the WTO dispute settlement system be used to adjudicate at least
some RTA disputes? 
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• Which rules can the WTO apply in RTA disputes? 
• How can the WTO machinery be equipped to deal with RTA disputes?
This chapter provides some preliminary thinking on these matters in the hope
that our suggestions will trigger greater discussion about how the WTO could
become more relevant given the current invasion of RTAs.
II. Panel and Appellate Body Jurisdiction
Can the WTO dispute settlement system be used to address disputes arising
from RTAs? Consider two scenarios. The first concerns the power of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to adjudicate disputes that involve general
requirements imposed on the formation of RTAs under the relevant WTO
agreements. These include,19 for example, whether an RTA satisfies the ‘sub-
stantially all trade’ requirement in GATT Article XXIV.8.b or the ‘substantial
sectoral coverage’ requirement under GATS Article V, whether an interim agree-
ment exceeds the ‘reasonable length of time’ as provided for under GATT 
Article XXIV.5.c, whether particular trade policy instruments constitute ‘other
restrictive regulations of commerce’ under GATT Article XXIV.8.a.i, whether
‘the duties and other regulation of commerce’ for non-members are ‘higher or
more restrictive’ than the pre-RTA level under GATT Article XXIV.5, or how
to determine if particular products are ‘products originating in such territo-
ries [of RTA Members]’, etc. Most of these are preconditions that an RTA must
satisfy before its Members could invoke GATT Article XXIV or GATS Article V
to justify its deviation from the MFN obligation. As the CRTA was given an
explicit mandate to examine individual regional agreements,20 there used to be
doubt about whether the WTO Panel and Appellate Body could conduct an
examination themselves. In the Turkey—Textile case, however, the Appellate
Body made it clear that the panel does have the necessary jurisdiction to exam-
ine the consistency of an RTA with the requirements under GATT Article XXIV.21
While the Appellate Body’s ruling on this issue has been subject to the 
criticism that it upsets the institutional balance between the WTO’s political
and judicial organs,22 this is probably the only practical solution. Otherwise
Article XXIV could be used to justify all kinds of violations of GATT obliga-
tions. Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) specifically
mandates a panel to ‘address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement
or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute’23 and make ‘an objective
assessment of … the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements’.24 It seems then that a panel could be in breach of its obligations
under the DSU if it fails to address the consistency of an RTA with the requirements
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under GATT Article XXIV. After all, Article XXIV itself is a provision in the 
‘covered agreements’. This is further confirmed by the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. It provides that ‘any
matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV’ shall
be subject to the normal dispute settlement procedure under the DSU.
The second issue concerns the power of the WTO DSB to adjudicate dis-
putes on substantive rules in individual RTAs. In order to fully discuss this
question, a few preliminary observations are required.
First, according to a number of DSU articles, including Articles 1.1, 3.2,
7.1, and 11, the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to claims under the WTO
covered agreements.25
Second, while a panel is obliged to ‘address the relevant provisions in any
covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute’26 and
make ‘an objective assessment of … the applicability of and conformity with
the relevant covered agreements’,27 there is no obligation for a panel to address
provisions that are not part of a ‘covered agreement’. On the other hand, just
like a judicial organ or arbitral body, the panel has inherent jurisdictional pow-
ers. Pauwelyn characterized such powers as powers of ‘incidental or implied
jurisdiction’, and he took this to mean the jurisdiction (1) ‘to interpret the 
submissions of the parties’ in order to ‘isolate the real issue in the case and to
identify the object of the claim’; (2) to determine whether one has substantive
jurisdiction to decide a matter (the principle of la compétence de la compé-
tence); (3) to decide whether one should refrain from exercising validly estab-
lished substantive jurisdiction;28 and (4) to decide all matters linked to the
exercise of substantive jurisdiction and inherent in the judicial function (such
as claims under rules on the burden of proof, due process, and other general
international law rules on the judicial settlement of disputes or state respon-
sibility, including the power to order cessation, assurances of non-repetition,
and reparations).29
Thus, where a substantive rule is provided for under only the RTA but not
under any WTO agreement, it can provide the basis for a claim only under the
RTA but not the WTO. This also means that a WTO panel will apparently have
no jurisdiction in such a case. One example would be an RTA that, for exam-
ple, contains national treatment obligations for the legal services sector. If none
of the RTA members have scheduled such an obligation in their GATS sched-
ule in the WTO, disputes arising from the RTA commitment can be brought
only under the RTA’s dispute settlement system. Another example occurs when
an RTA contains an investment chapter akin to NAFTA Chapter 11, and it 
provides for an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. Such disputes
typically cannot be brought before the WTO.30 Note that in the example given,
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the reason the dispute cannot be brought before the WTO is that the substantive
obligations do not arise from the WTO ‘covered agreements’, not because the
RTA has its own dispute settlement mechanism or that the RTA mechanism is
meant to be exclusive. This issue will be addressed below.
The most problematic situation, however, occurs when both the RTA and
the WTO contain overlapping substantive obligations, thus a claim is possible
under either regime. This would be a situation of ‘true conflict’ or jurisdic-
tional overlap. An example would be the national treatment obligation for
goods, something that can be found under both the WTO and many RTAs. In
such cases, as the obligation arises from the ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO,
the WTO dispute settlement system clearly has jurisdiction over the claim. The
more difficult question, however, is whether that jurisdiction should be exclu-
sive. DSU Article 23 seems to suggest that this is the case, where it states that31
[w]hen Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullifica-
tion or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment
to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
In such cases, Members shall … not make a determination to the effect that a vio-
lation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attain-
ment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this
Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the find-
ings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an
arbitration award rendered under this Understanding….
This view (i.e., of exclusive WTO jurisdiction) would be uncontroversial in
the following kinds of cases:
1. Where the RTA does not include any dispute settlement provision, or 
2. Where an RTA provides applicable rules to resolve jurisdictional 
conflicts between the RTA and the WTO, and where such provisions
explicitly make the WTO the forum of choice in case of conflict. This
might be referred to as the ‘exclusive forum selection clause’ scenario.
An example is the EC–Chile Interim Agreement,32 which provides in
Article 189.4.(c) that:
[u]nless the Parties otherwise agree, when a Party seeks redress of a violation of
an obligation under this Part of the Agreement which is equivalent in substance
to an obligation under the WTO, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and
procedures of the WTO Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the provisions
of this Agreement.33
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To sum up, the WTO definitely has exclusive jurisdiction in cases regarding
the general requirements for RTAs under the relevant WTO agreements, but
does not have jurisdiction in cases concerning substantive rules that are provided
for only in the RTA. Beyond these two scenarios are relatively uncharted waters.
III. WTO–RTA Jurisdictional Conflicts
Short of simply saying that DSU Article 23.2.(a) means that WTO Members
have no recourse but to submit to WTO dispute settlement whenever there is
a question involving the violation of an obligation under a covered agreement
of the WTO, the exclusivity of WTO jurisdiction may be called into question
in situations involving the following:
1. An exclusive forum selection clause, electing RTA dispute settlement:
The most obvious example occurs when there exists an exclusive forum
selection clause choosing the RTA as the exclusive forum for all disputes
or a certain class of disputes.
2. A non-exclusive forum selection clause: The RTA provides for an alter-
native dispute settlement system in addition to the one available under
the WTO and gives the Members the choice to resort to either system
even if the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the WTO. This method
may be found, for example, in Article 56(2) of the EFTA–Singapore
FTA.34 Another example is Article 1 of MERCOSUR’s Olivos Protocol.35
3. The Lis Alibi Pendens Approach: Another model, which is tagged on to
the EFTA–Singapore FTA and Olivos Protocol model above, requires the
dispute to be brought exclusively within the RTA’s dispute settlement
procedure where the dispute is first submitted under that procedure (i.e.,
as opposed to WTO dispute settlement). Under such a ‘lis pendens’ clause
approach, it could also work the other way. A dispute brought before
WTO dispute settlement could preclude the same dispute being brought
under the RTA. In addition to the two examples above, the most famous
example of this sort of forum selection clause is Article 2005.6 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),36 which states that:
[o]nce dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article 2007 or
dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under the GATT, the forum
selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other, unless a Party makes a
request pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4.
As can be seen, that example also contains an exception to the rule.
Another interesting feature is that unlike the post-WTO RTAs, NAFTA
Article 2005.6 as with its predecessor rule, Article 1801 of the
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Canada–U.S. FTA, is lex priori and therefore may be said to be subject
to the later rule in Article 23 of the DSU.37 The same cannot be said of
post-WTO RTAs.
4. The Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Approach:38 Another variant is
to eschew the lis alibi pendens approach in favour of a res judicata or
collateral estoppel approach. An example would be Article 26 of
MERCOSUR’s Olivos Protocol. Notwithstanding the Olivos Protocol,
Brazil still argued in the Argentina—Poultry case that the res judicata
rule did not apply as it was bringing a fresh dispute on a different legal
basis before WTO dispute settlement.39
5. The Comity Approach: Comity is a principle whereby a court declines
to exercise jurisdiction over matters that would be more appropriately
heard by another tribunal. In a recent article,40 Henckels argues that,
following the examples set by other international tribunals such as the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the arbitral tribunal under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the WTO should use
its ‘inherent power to apply comity’ and decline to exercise jurisdiction
in appropriate cases of competing jurisdiction.41 However, there are sev-
eral problems with this approach, the most notable one being that there
is no textual basis in the DSU for this.42 Henckels argues, however, that
‘[t]he inherent power to find no jurisdiction in limine litis or to decline
to exercise jurisdiction arises notwithstanding the text of the DSU, unless
these inherent powers are specifically extinguished or modified in the
text’.43 One difficulty with this approach is that if a panel were to apply
comity and decline jurisdiction in a particular case, it may be accused
of having breached its obligation under the DSU not to ‘add to or dimin-
ish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’44 and
violated the rights of WTO Members to ‘have recourse to … the rules
and procedures of [the DSU]’.45 Indeed, as Henckels concedes, this is
how the WTO Panel and Appellate Body have approached the issue in
Mexico—Soft Drinks and Argentina—Poultry, two cases where, accord-
ing to Henckel’s theory, the WTO should have applied the comity prin-
ciple.46 There seems to be a reluctance, at the very least, on the WTO’s
side to press the comity argument too far.
6. Further complexities arise when the RTA includes a provision not to
invoke the WTO dispute settlement system between the parties. This
could mean that the dispute should be referred to the RTA tribunal or
that there is no dispute settlement system at all and all disputes shall be
settled by consultations and negotiations among the parties. An example
for the latter case is Article 19.5 of the Closer Economic Partnership
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Arrangement (CEPA) between Mainland China and Hong Kong, which
provides that ‘any problems arising from the interpretation or implemen-
tation of the CEPA’ shall be resolved ‘through consultation in the spirit
of friendship and cooperation’.47
While these cases all differ from each other in some ways, the key legal issue
involved in all of them is the same, i.e., whether a party can challenge the juris-
diction of the panel in a case by resorting to non-WTO law and whether in turn
the panel can decline to exercise jurisdiction by resorting to non-WTO law.
The Appellate Body’s jurisprudence is equivocal at best on this point.
Perhaps the most basic assumption is that RTAs form an exception to the WTO
system. Based on this assumption, the impression created is that any overlap
between RTA and WTO dispute settlement is the exception, not the rule. This
is based on the view that RTAs are themselves the exception, at the very least
to the MFN doctrine, under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. There-
fore, while the DSU includes GATT and GATS as covered agreements, RTAs
emerge as ‘uncovered’ agreements and therefore fall into a dispute settlement
vacuum. Whether this is true remains contestable. Currently, controversy con-
tinues as to the extent to which GATT Article XXIV provides an exception to
WTO obligations other than the MFN principle. The issue has arisen in 
relation to safeguards, for example.48 Similar arguments may also be offered 
in relation to RTA dispute settlement mechanisms.
Is the assumption that RTAs form an exception to the WTO system—in
other words that they fall into a ‘black hole’—justified? The suggestion receives
some support from the Appellate Body’s ruling in Mexico—Soft Drinks, where
the Appellate Body seems to have considered that NAFTA disputes are 
‘non-WTO disputes’ and that it is not the function of panels and the Appel-
late Body to adjudicate on such non-WTO disputes.49 Before Mexico—Soft
Drinks, the panel ruling in Argentina—Poultry had, quite sensibly, suggested that
a WTO panel may construe an RTA in relation to a provision therein govern-
ing the relationship between the RTA and WTO dispute settlement.50 The
decision of the Appellate Body in Mexico—Soft Drinks, however, seems to have
cast some doubt on the panel’s decision in Argentina—Poultry.
The Appellate Body in Mexico—Soft Drinks also went on to suggest that an
overlap with RTA regulation will not necessarily prevent a WTO dispute 
settlement as panels and the Appellate Body do not have a discretion to decline
to rule in cases brought before them absent special circumstances. But the
Appellate Body appears also to have confined itself specifically to ‘the
case … before it’.51 One possible reading is that the Appellate Body would not
rule on non-WTO disputes and would usually not decline jurisdiction because,
absent ‘other circumstances’, it would not have the discretion to do so.52
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Exercising judicial economy, however, the Appellate Body did not further
explain what might constitute such ‘special’ or ‘other’ circumstances.
Can Mexico—Soft Drinks be read to suggest that in exceptional circum-
stances at least WTO panels or the Appellate Body may decline their own juris-
diction in favour of RTA dispute settlement? If so, might this also be taken to
suggest that having separate RTA dispute settlement procedures is not per se
violative of DSU Article 23? Is a conflicting RTA provision a ground for invok-
ing such exceptional circumstances—what the Appellate Body in Mexico—Soft
Drinks referred to blandly as ‘other circumstances’ in a highly couched ruling?
Does Mexico—Soft Drinks mean that RTA dispute settlement clauses could, in
exceptional or special circumstances, prevail over a WTO dispute settlement? 
Even if the answer to all the questions above is yes, it would still be worth-
while to consider, or even to make, the WTO at least an optional forum for the
RTA parties for the reasons suggested later in this chapter. If the WTO were to
serve such a function, the current DSU may however require amendment so
that the jurisdiction of a WTO panel and Appellate Body would not be limited,
at least in some cases, to ‘covered agreements’. This is especially important
where no general rule of international law may be relied on to resolve the prob-
lem by way of some interpretative or jurisdictional rule.
The largest question here would have to do with when the WTO should have
the jurisdictional authority to develop RTA rules. Should the WTO confine
itself to resolving situations of conflict only, or should it play a larger role?
This jurisdictional problem will be addressed after dealing with the question
of applicable law below.
IV. Applicable Law
The problem here is related to but not exactly the same as the first question.
Can a WTO panel and Appellate Body apply non-WTO rules in a WTO dis-
pute? It is important to note the difference between the two sorts of question
from the outset. Clearly, some questions, on the basis of the Mexico—Soft
Drinks doctrine, cannot be adjudicated by WTO dispute settlement. But it
raises the question of what rules panels and the Appellate Body can and can-
not apply, or in an even further refinement, when it has jurisdiction over the
parties to the dispute, and when such jurisdiction is precluded over certain
subject matter involving the rules to be applied. Here, the distinction between
‘jurisdiction’ and ‘applicable law’ is made for the sake of simplicity.53 Put slightly
differently, a principal difference is that while the jurisdictional question is
mainly concerned with the jurisdictional basis for a claim in a dispute, the
question of applicable law is about what arguments you may use to support your
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own claim or to defend yourself against claims made by others. As the Appellate
Body stated in EC—Hormones, even though ‘[p]anels are inhibited from
addressing legal claims falling outside their terms of reference’, ‘nothing in the
DSU limits the faculty of a panel freely to use arguments submitted by any of
the parties—or to develop its own legal reasoning—to support its own find-
ings and conclusions on the matter under its consideration’.54 Thus, the inquiry
on applicable law could be totally independent of the jurisdictional question.
While perhaps no WTO scholar would seriously disagree that the DSU
limits the jurisdiction of the panel to claims brought under WTO-covered
agreements,55 the real question is whether, in examining such claims, non-
WTO norms could be brought into play. Generally speaking, non-WTO rules
might be introduced in the WTO dispute settlement process under three 
different circumstances.
The first is to use non-WTO rules, mostly general principles of law, to solve
procedural issues that have not been clearly spelled out in WTO rules.56 Exam-
ples include the participation of private lawyers in panel proceedings, the
admissibility of amicus briefs in panel and Appellate Body proceedings,57 treat-
ment of domestic law as questions of law or facts, etc. Even though neither the
DSU nor the other WTO agreements have explicitly provided the power to
apply these rules to panels or the Appellate Body,58 the issue has largely been
uncontroversial because these are widely regarded as implied powers of a tri-
bunal, and it would have been very difficult for the panels or the Appellate
Body to carry out their job without such powers.59
The second is to use rules of treaty interpretation to interpret certain 
provisions in the covered agreements. This relates mainly to the treaty interpre-
tation rules under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),60 espe-
cially Articles 31 and 32.While there might be some uncertainty as to whether the
panels and the Appellate Body had such a power during the early days of the exis-
tence of the WTO, such doubt has since dissipated, especially since the Appellate
Body made the resounding warning that WTO rules shall not be read ‘in clinical 
isolation’from public international law in the US–Gasoline case.61 That pronounce-
ment rests on the explicit reference to ‘customary rules of interpretation of public
international law’ in the DSU as tools for clarifying WTO provisions.62
The third is to apply non-WTO rules as norms that create substantive,
rather than procedural, rights and obligations. As discussed earlier, under the
current WTO regime, non-WTO norms cannot be invoked as a basis for stak-
ing out claims in a dispute. Instead, their only possible substantive use would
be as defence against claims of violation or justification for adopting meas-
ures that are inconsistent with WTO obligations. This is the hardest of the
three scenarios, and it is also where the real controversy lies.
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This third scenario can be analyzed at two levels: first, whether such non-
WTO norms could be invoked by parties and applied by panels at all; second,
even if they could be invoked despite running against WTO norms (which
would typically be the case as otherwise the party invoking them would have
relied on some WTO provision instead), whether they may prevail against
WTO norms.63
To some commentators, the answer to the first question is yes. Pauwelyn,
for example, has urged that ‘the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of WTO
panels is limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does not mean
that the applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO
covered agreements’.64 He offers the following reasons:
First, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have not limited themselves to
the four corners of WTO covered agreements: they have referred to general prin-
ciples of law and customary international law, such as the VCLT.65 In this sense,
rules other than the WTO’s treaty rules can be applied in WTO proceedings.
A key assumption underlying Pauwelyn’s argument is that there is no legal
basis in ‘the four corners of WTO covered agreements’ for the application of
the VCLT. A closer examination of the Appellate Body’s famous statement in
US—Gasoline reveals, however, that the reference to general principles of law
and customary international law or even the VCLT by the panel and the Appel-
late Body is made exactly pursuant to the mandate within ‘the four corners of
WTO covered agreements’ as the Appellate Body clearly based its decision on the
requirement under Article 3.2 of the DSU that the panel and the Appellate Body
shall ‘clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law’.66 Moreover, the mere
fact that panels and the Appellate Body have referred to rules of interpretation to
help clarify the meaning of the substantive obligations in the covered agreements
does not necessarily mean that they can refer to other non-WTO rules to change
the substantive obligations under the WTO covered agreements.
Secondly, Pauwelyn notes that among those ‘customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law’ referred to in DSU Article 3.2 lies Article
31.3 of the VCLT. It states that the treaty interpreter shall take into account
not only the treaty itself but also ‘any subsequent agreement between the par-
ties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provi-
sions’.67 In this further sense, he argues that ‘non-WTO law’ can and should be
applied in WTO cases.
Unfortunately, this is, again, a misreading. First of all, while Article 31 states
that a treaty shall be interpreted ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty’, the ‘subsequent agreement’ and ‘rele-
vant rules of international law’ are only to be ‘taken into account, together with
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the context’ (emphasis added). This means that, while the terms of the treaty
at issue shall be directly applied, the other relevant agreements and rules shall
only be used to supplement the interpretation based on the context and may
not be applied directly. Second, the scope of such agreements is not as expan-
sive as Pauwelyn may have suggested. Instead, only subsequent agreements
that are concluded ‘between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
or the application of its provisions’ (emphasis added) could be used as a sup-
plementary interpretive tool. It means that the only agreements that can be
invoked are those that are both made between exactly the same parties to the
original agreement and regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the appli-
cation of its provisions specifically. It is easy to see that most RTAs would not
satisfy either requirement, because first, RTAs are, by definition, limited to a sub-
set of WTO Members; and second, they are mainly concerned with establish-
ing obligations beyond those agreed in the WTO rather than the interpretation
or application of WTO obligations. For these reasons, RTA rules should not be
applicable in WTO disputes.
Third, according to Pauwelyn, the WTO agreement is a treaty and there-
fore is part of public international law. Thus, ‘even without the explicit confir-
mation in DSU Article 3.2, the WTO agreement cannot … be applied in
isolation from other rules of international law’.68 To illustrate his point, Pauwe-
lyn draws an analogy between contract law and international law:69
Just as private contracts are automatically born into a system of domestic law, so
treaties are automatically born into the system of international law. Much the way
private contracts do not need to list all the relevant legislative and administrative
provisions of domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract, so treaties need
not explicitly set out rules of general international law for them to be applicable
to the treaty.
However, this argument is probably not as strong as it might at first appear.
An initial objection may be dealt with swiftly. First, the basic assumption under-
lying Pauwelyn’s analogy has to do with the degree of similarity between domes-
tic and international legal systems. The analogy is not altogether unproblematic.
As Philip Allott puts it, the international legal system still lacks ‘most of the
essential characteristics of their national legal systems’.70 Assuming however
that such an analogy is sustainable in the current case, the real reason behind
the parties’ decision to enter into private contracts is not because they want to
incorporate general contract rules, but because they want to vary the default
rules between them absent explicit provisions in each individual contract.71
Thus to say that general international law applies even when the WTO 
Members have decided to establish some specific rights and obligations in 
Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance Henry Gao and Chin Leng Lim 401
the covered agreements ignores the purpose of WTO Members in taking the 
trouble to negotiate WTO agreements in the first place. At the very least it
raises the question of what general, background international rights and 
obligations the Members have sought to vary and which they have sought to
leave intact. One example is the extent to which the WTO’s dispute settlement
rules have been intended to replace the classic international law rule that self-
help might be resorted to in the face of a breach of an international treaty 
obligation.72 The usual answer is that this is the whole point of the DSU. Yet
what this chapter tries to show is that the answer is not as simple as it seems.
There may yet be further trade obligations undertaken outside the WTO that
are subject to rules concerning their breach and the consequences of such
breach that stand in uneasy relation to the WTO rules on dispute settlement.
Third, even accepting that ‘treaties are automatically born into the system of
international law’ just like private contracts,73 it does not necessarily follow
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body must necessarily apply non-WTO
norms in WTO disputes. Again the question here is related to jurisdiction: the
WTO dispute settlement panel is not a tribunal of general jurisdiction; instead
its jurisdiction is limited only to claims founded on WTO rules.74 Fourth,
notwithstanding our previous analysis, even if Pauwelyn’s argument that WTO
norms ‘are automatically born into the system of international law’
were accepted, and that international law should simply be applied in WTO dis-
putes without further qualification, it will not be of any help to the argument
that RTA rules should be applied by panels and the Appellate Body in WTO 
disputes. The reason is simply that most RTAs did not even exist when the
GATT or the WTO was established. Thus it’s more accurate to state that 
the RTA rules are born into a system of WTO rules that in its relation with
general international law is properly considered to be lex specialis.
Fourth, while Pauwelyn recognizes that Article 3.2 specifies that WTO panels
or the Appellate Body cannot ‘change’ the WTO treaty, he argues that this does
not limit the extent to which WTO Members may conclude or have concluded
other treaties that can influence their mutual WTO rights and obligations.75
Thus, Pauwelyn concludes:
As important as the distinction is between Panel jurisdiction (WTO claims only)
and applicable law (potentially all international law), so too is the distinction
between interpreting WTO rules (and the prohibition to add or detract from those
rules in the process) and examining WTO claims in the context of other applica-
ble international law (where the expression of state consent and conflict rules of
international law must decide the outcome).76
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As Pauwelyn does not provide further illustration on this point in his article,
it is not always clear what exactly he means by this. One logical interpretation
of the argument seems to be this:
Even though the Panel and the Appellate Body have no power to change the rights
and obligations of the Members, the Members themselves can always conclude
other treaties (such as RTAs) to change their rights and obligations under the
WTO. To give effect to these treaties, the panel and the Appellate Body shall have
the power to apply them in WTO disputes as well. Otherwise, the power of Mem-
bers to conclude other treaties would be diminished.
While Article 30.3 of the VCLT seems to confirm Pauwelyn’s argument by stating
that ‘[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later
treaty …, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are
compatible with those of the later treaty’, anyone who rushes to the conclusion
that the VCLT is applicable here would fail to appreciate the crucial differences
between the rights and obligations established under WTO agreements and
those under the garden variety of multilateral treaties. First, for concessions on
trade in goods, while most of the tariff negotiations today are formula based,
the GATT/WTO regime has a long history of negotiating tariffs based on other
approaches. Moreover, even today, not all negotiations on goods are based on
formulae as there are special rules for tariff cuts by developing countries or
sensitive products by certain countries. This is more so with trade in services,
which has been dominated by a bilateral request-offer approach.77 This means
that, when two countries negotiate an RTA and cut all tariffs to zero, not only
are they making concessions on the products that they themselves are most
interested in, they are also extending concessions on products that do not inter-
est the other party. Yet, through the operation of the MFN principle, it will
affect the interests of a third country that has a keen export interest in such prod-
ucts. This is wholly different from the case of, say, a treaty between three coun-
tries to solve their border disputes. Now suppose two of the three countries later
on make another treaty to change a boundary on their mutual border but this
does not affect the border of the third country; of course the second treaty
would not have affected the interests of the third country. In contrast, because
of the MFN rule, the multilateral, even the plurilateral, obligations of the 
WTO are not merely ‘bilateral obligations multiplied’.78 They have a very far-
reaching effect.
Second, the legal effect of an RTA is only to create new rights and obliga-
tions for the members under the RTA regime, rather than changing the rights
and obligations under the ‘covered agreements’ of the WTO. The reason for this,
as argued by Trachtman, is that since the WTO Agreement provides exclusive
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procedures to be followed in amending the obligations under the ‘covered
agreements’, any amendment must follow such prescribed procedures before
it could change the content of the ‘covered agreements’ under the WTO.79
Of course, this does not mean that WTO Members cannot change their trade
obligations outside of the WTO framework. However, even if such non-WTO
rules are agreed between the parties, such modifications would not usually be
applicable law in WTO dispute settlement.80
This leads to the third point, that is, for those RTAs that either do not provide
for formal dispute settlement or do provide a dispute settlement system that
is, however, not compulsory, the very fact that members to such RTAs inten-
tionally chose to shun the WTO dispute settlement system, or any dispute 
settlement system for that matter, probably means that they never intended to
make such an agreement enforceable through the WTO dispute settlement
system. If, however, a panel follows Pauwelyn’s advice and decides to drag 
a Member into a formal WTO dispute settlement proceeding, that is clearly an
infringement on the sovereign rights of a Member that never intended to 
be held to account in the WTO for breaches of its obligations under these non-
WTO treaties.
Assuming, arguendo, that the RTA rules could be invoked in WTO disputes,
should such rules, to the extent that they are inconsistent with WTO norms,
prevail over WTO rules? For many public international lawyers, the answer
seems to be yes when one applies the two familiar rules for resolving treaty
conflicts, that is, lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali.81
The arguments are that, first, because the RTAs are concluded after the WTO
agreements have been concluded, they are later rules and must prevail over
prior rules; second, because the RTAs are special rules that are created on top
of the general rules under the WTO agreements, the RTA rules must prevail as
well. Again, however, the issues are not that simple. First of all, WTO rules are
not carved in stone. Both the general rules for the WTO and the specific con-
cessions of individual Members are periodically modified in successive rounds
of trade negotiations. Thus, even if an RTA that was concluded in 2000 prevails
over the WTO agreements concluded in 1994, should whatever results Mem-
bers manage to reach in the Doha Round, say in 2010, also prevail over all
RTAs among WTO Members between 1994 and 2010? Second, even though
most RTAs are concluded after the WTO came into being, there are some RTAs,
such as NAFTA, that were concluded before the WTO agreements entered into
force. If the lex posterior rule is applicable here, does it mean that these RTAs
have been effectively rendered useless by the establishment of the WTO? 
At the very least, an attempt to resolve the issue by resorting to the lex poste-
riori rule would produce arbitrary solutions each time. It would amount to
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nothing more than checkerboard justice.82 Third, to the extent that the lex
posterior and lex specialis rules are applicable, they can be applied only among
laws that are of the same hierarchy. That is why the Marrakesh Agreement
states in Article XVI.3 that ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between a provision of
this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements,
the provision of [the Marrakesh] Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the
conflict’. Thus, to the extent that a WTO obligation may be said to be situated
higher in the hierarchy of norms than RTA rules, it cannot be overruled 
simply because of an RTA obligation.
In sum, under the current WTO legal framework, RTA rules can be applied
only under limited circumstances, just as there may be practical or doctrinal
limits to what may be brought under WTO dispute settlement. New thinking
is needed if the WTO dispute settlement system is to apply RTA rules and gen-
erate a body of ‘common law’ for RTAs—what might be tentatively called the
‘public international law of trade’.
In this regard, it would be worthwhile as a practical matter to make the
WTO at least an optional forum for the RTA parties so that the WTO could
contribute to the development of such a body of ‘common law’, and that in
this way, under the stewardship of the Appellate Body, the law will in time
work itself pure.83 But if the WTO were to serve such a function, the current
DSU may require amendment so that the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel and
Appellate Body would not be limited, at least in some cases, to ‘covered agree-
ments’. Alternatively, even if they would not be limited in all cases, amend-
ment would provide much needed certainty and clarity. Coupled with the
jurisdictional problem discussed earlier above, DSU Article 23.2.(a) may yet be
taken to mean that WTO Members have no recourse but to submit to WTO 
dispute settlement where there is a question involving the violation of a 
WTO covered agreement obligation.
V. ‘Farming Out’ the WTO Dispute Settlement Proce-
dure for RTA Disputes: The ‘Best Forum’ Argument
The idea that there are multiple options to the compulsory settlement of
international disputes is hardly novel.
The traditional difficulty with subjecting diplomatic dispute over various
subjects to compulsory dispute settlement was the principle of sovereign choice.
Sovereigns chose how they would have their disputes resolved. But one option
that had been revived from antiquity during the nineteenth century is inter-
national arbitration. The commission established under the 1794 Jay Treaty
was one such example,84 and arbitration was given renewed impetus with the
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Alabama Claims (or ‘Geneva’) arbitration.85 The idea of compulsory jurisdiction
may be traced to this but at present has been muddled with the idea of exclu-
sive jurisdiction.
Exclusive compulsory dispute settlement is only a subset. That the WTO
dispute settlement procedure may provide for the compulsory settlement of
trade disputes today is nothing new. But does it mean that the WTO’s jurisdic-
tion is exclusive? The option of electing WTO dispute settlement in some RTA
provisions is only the latest manifestation of a far more established doctrine;
namely, that of the free choice of means of settling sovereign disputes.86 Of
course, the immediate retort to this is that DSU Article 23 is meant to foreclose
the doctrine of sovereign choice. Is that true? 
Viewed carefully, the difficulty in the modern RTA context involves conflicts
of jurisdiction, not a failure of compulsory dispute settlement. True, the prob-
lem is particularly acute in light of the widespread appreciation post–Uruguay
Round that trade disputes would be semi-automatically submitted to WTO
dispute settlement. In other words, the problem arises because RTAs threaten
to undermine the WTO dispute settlement process. But unless an uncompro-
mising stance is taken in the name of WTO law, there is no clear prohibition
of a future treaty prevailing over an earlier treaty, at least with regard to inter-
national law doctrine. The same applies in the case of a more specific treaty rule
prevailing over a general rule.
It might be thought that the practical problem arises because arbitrators
tasked with settling an RTA dispute might not recognize the WTO’s jurisdic-
tion as prevailing over their own. This has some legal justification in arbitra-
tion law. The doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz had been established for far
longer than it has been in WTO jurisprudence.87 Arbitrators are liable to fail
to comprehend why WTO dispute settlement should somehow constitute an
exception to a well-known arbitral doctrine. Put differently, if arbitrators can
rely on the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine against national courts, why would
they be precluded from doing so against WTO dispute settlement?
One neat solution may be to channel the actual handling of WTO disputes
to the WTO dispute settlement process itself. In cases where it is particularly
unclear whether a WTO or RTA rule controls the dispute, the idea of having
the choice of court process settled in advance of the choice of law issue seems
particularly attractive. Practical wisdom might also suggest that if you put the
issue before the right ‘forum’, the ‘right’ choice of law would be more likely to
follow.88 In other words, some RTA disputes might best be resolved by those per-
sons who have some knowledge, familiarity, or professional credibility in apply-
ing WTO rules. This would also ensure the harmonization of rules, particularly
those rules dealing with WTO-RTA jurisdictional conflicts.
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The fundamental problem here seems to be this. Had parties really wished
to have all their trade disputes resolved at the WTO they would have said so.
So the question should ideally be taken back to be resolved in Geneva’s mul-
tilateral setting. There are other advantages to a multilateral solution in Geneva.
Aside from the obvious psychological advantage in favour of a multilateral
solution, virtually all the active RTA-pursuing countries and all WTO Mem-
bers would be present. This allows the question of whether a WTO mandated
solution should be preferred to be pursued but without sacrificing bilateral
consultations between WTO Members.
To help the WTO carry out this task, the following is suggested as a possi-
ble starting point for deeper reflection on the issues:
1. The DSU should be amended to provide the possibility for RTA Mem-
bers to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve their RTA 
disputes. To provide the legal basis for this, Members to an RTA should
insert the following clause on dispute settlement in their RTAs:
The Parties agree to refer all relevant disputes under this agreement to the
WTO dispute settlement body. The WTO dispute settlement body shall have
the exclusive competence to decide whether a dispute constitutes a relevant
dispute for the purposes of the present provision. A ruling on a relevant dis-
pute by the WTO dispute settlement body shall be considered binding before
any arbitral or other dispute settlement body or procedure established pur-
suant to the present Agreement.
Correspondingly, Appendix 1 of the DSU could be amended to include the
following:
(D) Regional Trade Agreements
The applicability of this Understanding to the Regional Trade Agreements 
of Members (‘the individual agreement’) shall be subject to the adoption of
a decision by the parties to the individual agreement setting out the terms for
the application of this Understanding to such agreements, including any 
special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in Appendix 2, as notified
to the DSB.
2. In order to facilitate the adjudication of RTA disputes by the panel or
the WTO Appellate Body, any RTA that adopts the WTO dispute settle-
ment system should also grant the panel and Appellate Body the pow-
ers to decide on the following two issues: First, whether the RTA fully
complies with the requirements under GATT Article XXIV or GATS
Article V. To the extent that an RTA cannot be justified, the Members
will not be allowed to invoke the RTA as a defence against non-compliance
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of their relevant WTO obligations. Second, whether or not the RTA affects
the interests of non-Members. To the extent that it does, such non-
Member shall be given the opportunity to join in the dispute as well.
VI. Institutional Design 
One last question has to do with what kind of institutional framework might
be adopted for the adjudication of RTA disputes at the WTO. Should the nor-
mal rules for the constitution and operation of WTO panels be retained, or
should the institutional framework under individual RTAs be adopted? In
other words, should it be more akin to ad hoc arbitration or the kind of insti-
tutional arbitration that simply resorts to institutional arbitration rules for
the convenience they might afford?89 What, in other words, should be the lex
arbitri?90 In our view, to maintain the integrity of the WTO dispute settlement
system, the current procedural rules and practices under the DSU should be
adopted to the furthest extent possible, while providing the possibility for the
panel to adopt different procedures. If so, a further clause should also be inserted
into the RTA stating this. With regard to the specific procedural issues, our
suggestions are as follows:
1. Parties to the dispute: Generally speaking, only parties to a specific 
dispute can be parties of a case. In cases involving substantive rules in
the RTA that affect all members of the RTA, the other RTA members
that are not parties to the dispute should have the right to join in the 
dispute settlement proceeding. Even in cases that involve only the sub-
stantive rights of the parties to the particular dispute, non-party mem-
bers can join as third parties if the main parties to the dispute agree. In
cases involving the substantive rights of non-RTA members, such non-
RTA members should also have the right to join in the dispute settlement
proceeding. Even in cases that involve only the substantive rights of
RTA members, non-RTA members can join as third parties if all the
members of the RTA agree. Such an arrangement will ensure that 
the interests of all parties, RTA members and non-members alike, are
adequately represented in such dispute settlement proceedings. This
will ensure not only the highest degree of support among all parties
who might have an interest in such cases, but also the highest degree of
uniformity between different cases as well.
2. Composition of a panel: While panellists should have a sufficient under-
standing of the particular issues facing the members of an RTA, because
RTAs are tolerated in the multilateral trading system only because they
are perceived as ‘building blocks’ that contribute to the ultimate goal of
408 Part VI Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
global trade liberalization through the gradual expansion of regional
economic integration, the idiosyncrasies in particular RTAs should not
be used as an excuse to upset the carefully negotiated balance of rights
and obligations in the WTO as a whole. Therefore, of the three panel-
lists to each panel, at least one should be someone who is not chosen by
one of the RTA parties. This should be a person of recognized authority,
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade, and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally. The other two would be
nominated respectively by the two principal parties to the dispute. In case
of disagreement among the two panellists nominated by the RTA members,
the ruling of the third panellist shall prevail. Such arrangement is
intended to ensure not only that the panel has the necessary expertise
to solve the dispute at hand, but also consistency with WTO jurispru-
dence would be maintained.
3. Generally, the proceedings of the panel may be kept confidential and
limited only to the disputing parties. If all the parties to the dispute
agree, however, or if the RTA whose provisions are called into question
provides expressly for public hearings, then the proceedings may be
open to the general public. The reports of a panel should, however,
be generally made available to WTO Members so that such reports can
gradually build up the ‘common law’ of RTA.
4. The meetings of the panel may be held either in Geneva or at another
mutually agreed location, such as in the territory of an RTA member or
in a third country. To the extent possible, both the WTO Secretariat and
the secretariat for the RTA shall provide the necessary legal and admin-
istrative support to the panel.
5. While the particular findings and recommendations of the panel in a 
particular dispute shall be binding only on the parties to the dispute, the
analysis by the panel on substantive rules in an RTA should ideally also
apply to future cases between members of the same RTA, while the
analysis by the panel of general WTO provisions shall also be of persua-
sive value for future disputes involving similar provisions between the
members of other RTAs.
6. If a party to a dispute is not satisfied with the ruling of a panel, it shall
have a right to appeal the report to the Appellate Body.
7. To avoid the diversion of resources from the current responsibilities
and functions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body, the expenses for
a case from an RTA should be funded by the RTA members involved in
such dispute. Special and differential treatment could be provided to
RTA members that are developing countries.
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VII. Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the possibility of using the WTO dispute settlement
system as a common good for RTA disputes. In answering this question, the 
doctrinal analysis has been separated from recommendations for reform, that
is, what could be done to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a common
good for RTA disputes under the WTO legal framework as it stands, versus
how the current WTO legal framework should be changed to make it more
useful. While it is desirable to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve
RTA disputes, there are significant uncertainties under the current WTO legal
framework. Ideally, that framework should be amended. By confronting the con-
flict between the current WTO dispute settlement rules and RTA disputes in
a direct manner, the temptation to twist the current rules to achieve such results
has been avoided. Such shortcuts create false hope for those who believe that
the WTO dispute settlement system has a role to play in RTA disputes. It also
threatens the integrity and legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system
as a whole by trying to feed it with something that it cannot readily digest,
resulting in congestion and possibly a great combustion of the WTO dispute
settlement system.
While we recommend that a new treaty rule should be undertaken on a
plurilateral basis, WTO Members which might encounter difficulty in signing
on to the new regime should nonetheless be allowed to bring their RTA con-
flicts to WTO dispute settlement by way of special agreement instead. This
additional flexibility has in any case proven extremely useful in the context of
disputes before the ICJ.91
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Regional Agreements and the WTO: 
The Gyrating Gears of Interdependence
PABLO HEIDRICH AND DIANA TUSSIE
I. Introduction 
In order to map a route it first helps to know where you are going. Before delving
into the challenges posed by proliferating regional and preferential trade agree-
ments, it is necessary to outline some central assumptions that underlie this
chapter. This chapter does not treat regionalism and multilateralism as oppo-
sites, but rather as interdependent phenomena. Interdependence here is defined
as mutual dependence.1 Interdependence refers to situations characterized by
reciprocal, though not necessarily symmetrical, effects. The term ‘effect’ is cru-
cial: interactions that have no significant effects are simply interconnections.
Interdependence involves costs. There is no guarantee that interdependence
will lead to mutual benefit at all times and tensions are bound to arise over
such issues. There may be joint gains and losses, and there may, at the same time,
be relative gains and distributional losses. This distinction is vital to this chap-
ter’s discussion of how multilateralism interacts with regionalism and how
each contributes to the other’s existence over different time periods. Not only
are national policies affected by international considerations, but each coun-
try makes demands on the international system that in turn contribute to 
shaping it. In this vein, the ties of interdependence fall into two categories:
(1) issues of systemic relevance; and (2) issues of relevance to the individual
members of regional trade agreements.
This chapter focuses on both forms of interdependence as seen through 
the lens of south-south regionalism. Developing countries, once a blind spot
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have become the
fastest-growing constituency inside the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Simultaneously, from a mere trickle, the number of south-south arrangements
has increased dramatically.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, the perceived interaction
between regional and multilateral agreements is canvassed. Second, the sys-
temic issues at stake are considered. Third, the WTO surveillance procedures
that apply, in particular to south-south regional trade agreements, are reviewed.
Fourth, this chapter highlights how countries actively involved in regional
agreements also remain active in and make use of WTO-specific services. A
case study of the disputes raised by Latin American regional agreements in the
WTO, and a comparison with the trends in the use of regional arbitration
mechanisms, is presented.
Disputes regarding regional trade arrangements and their discriminatory
effects on third parties have been precedent setting and attracted attention for
good reasons. However, such disputes have arisen rather infrequently. The
most prominent of these wide-ranging disputes has been the so-called banana
dispute. In April 1993, five Latin American countries filed a complaint before
the GATT concerning the European Union’s (EU) banana import regime under
the Lomé Convention (now the Cotonou Agreement). The central issue was
whether the Lomé Convention fell under the category of free trade area as
defined in GATT Article XXIV and thus could not discriminate against banana
imports from non-Lomé signatories. The panel concluded that the Lomé 
Convention was a non-reciprocal agreement and hence did not meet the GATT
Article XXIV definition of a free trade area.2
A second significant dispute concerns India’s request for the establishment
of a WTO Panel in 2003 to review the European Union’s special tariff prefer-
ences under a program for drug eradication that benefited only 12 developing
countries. Much like the banana dispute, the panel found the European Union’s
arrangement to be inconsistent with WTO obligations because it discrimi-
nated against other developing countries.3 Neither of these schemes, which
benefited limited groups of developing countries, met the criteria stipulated in
GATT Article XXIV and hence were deemed to require a waiver from WTO
rules. These precedent-setting cases have been the subject of significant 
academic attention. This chapter does not seek to revisit these cases but rather
to evaluate some of the subtle undercurrents that were present in them.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding has been used with striking
frequency to address regional trade relations. Neither GATT Article XXIV nor
GATS Article V exert much discipline on the workings of regional trade agree-
ments. In any case, discipline is exerted after rather than before the event.
This ex post facto reliance suggests that it is the underlying assurance of the
WTO itself as an enforcer of last resort that makes these regional agreements
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possible. In this form of cooperation and interdependence, the judicial function
of the WTO acquires much greater relevance, while the legislative functions recede
to the background.
II. The Interface Between Regional Trade Agreements
and the Multilateral Trading System
Hirschman’s case study of Germany and Bulgaria remains the classic case of how
commercial relations can be tied to national political power where there is a
significant difference in size and market power of the countries involved.4 In
1938, the bilateral trade between the two countries represented 52 and 59 percent
of Bulgaria’s total imports and exports respectively. However, for Germany,
trade with Bulgaria represented less than 2 percent of its total trade for both
imports and exports. While the trade between the two was balanced (i.e., no
trade deficit), Hirschman suggested that ‘it will be much more difficult for
Bulgaria to shift her trade with Germany to other countries than it will be 
for Germany to replace Bulgaria as a selling market and a source of supplies’.5
This notion of asymmetry as a function of territory and market size remains
evident in commercial diplomacy and perhaps more so today where countries
are engaging in numerous regional trade agreements. As noted by Hirschman,
the ability to credibly threaten the termination of trade was once at the core of
trade policy. The establishment of a most-favoured-nation clause in international
trade as a global policing mechanism was meant to curb the ability of the more
powerful market to create political dependence on the trade concessions.
It is well known that the GATT system was conceived as a means of
preventing the resurgence of the competing economic blocs that had prevailed
prior to World War II. The GATT, therefore, adopted non-discrimination as a
pillar. Most-favoured-nation was viewed as a means of eroding imperial 
preferences, while at the same time protecting the interests of smaller and
weaker territories. Most-favoured-nation can also been viewed as an instrument
favouring larger-producing interests since it guarantees them a right of access
on an equal footing with all others. Both conceptions have always been in 
tension in the historical justifications for most-favoured-nation.
The Draft Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO), which
was put forward by the U.S. government in 1946, recognized only customs
unions as exceptions to the most-favoured-nation rule.6 It was at the drafting
conference that the original concept of free trade areas appeared. In 1947,
developing countries introduced the initial concept of free trade areas where
‘two or more developing countries might be prepared to abolish all trade bar-
riers among themselves, though not wishing to construct a common tariff
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towards the rest of the world’.7 Developing countries thought that non-
discrimination principles did not always benefit them and a certain degree of
preferential treatment would be necessary in order to promote their economic
development. Moreover, they regarded customs unions as poor mechanisms
for utilizing preferential treatment owing to their strict conditions.8 The con-
cept of a free trade area received support from many participants in the draft-
ing session, especially from European countries, and it was successfully
incorporated into the draft agreement. European countries regarded the 
concept of free trade areas as an extension of the bilateral preferential trade
arrangements that had been a common practice in Europe before World War
II. Most of the GATT founding Contracting Parties had in effect taken the
position that some discrimination would help to promote trade liberalization
and that not all discrimination was bad.9
During the ITO drafting session, the United States had intended that 
preferences should ultimately be eliminated. Yet the U.S. government also
desired any agreement to apply as widely as possible in order to enhance its reach
and effectiveness. As a result, the United States compromised on the issue of
including new preferences and accepted free trade areas as an exception to the
unconditional most-favoured-nation rule. While the exception, articulated in
GATT Article XXIV, is not the only exception in the trading rules to most-
favoured-nation, it is probably the most important. The increasing number
of regional trade agreements brings into question the extent to which free trade
areas are truly an exception and what core functions the WTO actually retains.
In effect, the interface between regional trade agreements and the WTO defines
the role and functioning of the system itself. This relationship is usually under-
stood by examining both the substantive rules and institutional controls that
are provided to secure it. In any case, dispute settlement presents an opportunity
to resolve issues not addressed in negotiations, though few cases concerning
regional trade agreements have been brought to the WTO.
The erosion of most-favoured-nation has gone hand in hand with deep
tariff cuts. Tariffs are now so low they no longer constitute, as in the 1930s, a
source of effective discrimination. If the early post–World War II mind-frame
was marked by a fear of the re-emergence of warring economic blocs, the
GATT of the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by the structural contraposition
between developed and developing countries. This focus on north-south trade,
however, needs to be reshaped, with a new emphasis on south-south trade
relations. History marches on. As developing countries become the fastest-
growing constituency in the WTO, old mind-frames need to be reshaped and
new issues are raised, namely that of intra-south relations. In today’s circum-
stances, the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism must be
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recast in a novel light: how do regional trade agreements use WTO services, and
how are these services increasingly required and currently provided, especially
with regard to ordering the interstices among regional members themselves
rather than with third parties. These latter types of issues are infrequently a point
of controversy. In this light, when considering rule enforcement there are two
sets of issues that need to be addressed: (1) issues of systemic relevance, and
(2) issues of relevance to the members of regional trade agreements taken indi-
vidually. These two issues will be canvassed over the following four sections.
III. General Systemic Issues in Regional Trade Agreements
Systemic issues in regional trade agreements relate to the potential and actual
costs that can be incurred by third parties. The work program of the current
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations includes a provision dealing
with these systemic implications of GATT Article XXIV. Paragraph 29 of the
Doha Declaration states:
We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and
procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agree-
ments. The negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of
regional trade agreements.10
Work on systemic issues in regional trade agreements has proceeded in the
Negotiating Group on Rules, which reports to the Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee (TNC). There have been lengthy and unwieldy discussions on the issue of
coverage. The concept of coverage requires that duties and other restrictive reg-
ulations of commerce must be eliminated on ‘substantially all the trade’ between
the constituent territories of a customs union or a free trade area. Because of its
imprecision, the term ‘substantially all trade’ is at the centre of the debate and has
produced submissions proposing qualitative and quantitative indicators that could
be used to clarify the concept. Progress in this debate has been grim, and there
appears to be little hope for consensus on a more specific test for trade coverage.
One area that has begun to see some progress is the improvement of trans-
parency and reporting requirements vis-à-vis regional trade agreements. In
this regard, a draft with the title of ‘Transparency Mechanism for Regional
Trade Agreements’ was forwarded by the Negotiating Rules Committee in the
summer of 2006 and adopted by a decision of the General Council in Decem-
ber of 2006.11 This decision has important implications for the functioning of
the regional trade agreements, including the following:
• Early announcement provisions upon commencement of negotiations
and signature of a regional trade agreement;
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• Formal notification of regional trade agreements to the WTO no later
than directly following the parties’ ratification of the regional trade
agreement or any party’s decision on application of the relevant parts
of an agreement, and before the application of preferential treatment
between the parties;
• Preparation of a report concerning notified regional trade agreements
by the WTO Secretariat on the basis of the data submitted. This report
must refrain from value judgments on the questions of consistency with
rules and cannot be used as a basis for dispute resolution;
• A formal review meeting will be conducted to consider each notified
regional trade agreement;
• At the end of the implementation period, the parties to a regional trade
agreement shall submit to the WTO a short written report on the real-
ization of the liberalization commitments originally notified; and 
• Any Member may, at any time, bring to the attention of the committee
any regional trade agreement that it considers ought to have been sub-
mitted or notified.
Despite the considerable energy expended in the negotiation of these provisions,
it represents modest progress. The legacy of vague and incomplete rules has not
been addressed and the important issue of rules of origin remains untouched.
However, as noted by the Warwick Commission, ‘transparency is typically a pre-
condition for progress in improving the policy environment’.12 To this end,
added transparency may assist in addressing structural issues in respect of
regional trade agreements.
A central issue during negotiations of the decision was whether regional
trade agreements between developing countries notified according to the
Enabling Clause13 would be covered at all by the transparency provisions under
the decision. If so, another issue then became which committee within the
WTO would be entrusted with reviewing such regional trade agreements. The
compromise reached was that the Committee on Trade and Development
would remain responsible for agreements notified under the Enabling Clause.
Additional developing country issues raised in the discussions were the degree
of reciprocity between a developed and developing country for the elimination
of tariffs, and the different period of time for implementation (i.e., whether a
developing country can be entitled to a longer implementation period). Both
these issues raise the possibility of including special and differential treatment
(S&D) considerations into the text of GATT Article XXIV.
Despite a flurry of activity, negotiators have been unable to resolve these
questions. Negotiators are attempting to balance constraining discrimination
with retaining flexibility in the pursuit of new preferential agreements. For the
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time being, negotiations do not seem to be slowing down, and the multilateral
system and regional trade agreements remain intertwined. The complexities of
this relationship are especially profound for developing countries, which on one
hand have access to a two-track notification system, and on the other have
made active use of the dispute settlement mechanism to resolve their disputes
over regional trade agreements.
IV. Notification of South-South Agreements: 
Living with Inchoate Systemic Certification
Both the Enabling Clause and GATT Article XXIV allow for deviations from
the guiding principle of non-discrimination. However the necessary condi-
tions for regional trade agreements negotiated under the rules differ consid-
erably as between the Enabling Clause and the GATT. The criteria stipulated
in GATT Article XXIV are much stricter than those of the Enabling Clause. This
dualistic legal framework leaves room to conclude that developing countries
can be exempt from equal liberalization when they negotiate their trading
agreements. Developing countries have come to demand that their regional
agreements should be allowed to proceed even when they fall short of the con-
ditions stipulated in GATT Article XXIV.
The regular practice with respect to notification of developing country regional
trade agreements, including customs unions, to the WTO has been to present them
under the Enabling Clause rather than Article XXIV and subsequently to notify the
agreements to the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD). The mandate
of the CTD contemplates review of all matters relating to the Enabling Clause14
and has been extended to responsibility for reporting and transparency issues
related to developing country regional preferential arrangements for trade in goods.
There have been several occasions in which developing countries have contem-
plated the creation of a legal entity that falls within the criteria and definitions of
GATT Article XXIV.The legal consequences of the differences between the Enabling
Clause and GATT Article XXIV, including the allocation of supervision of south-
south regional trade agreements, has yet to be resolved under the DSU.
The question of the allocation of supervision is more relevant for the trans-
parency and reporting requirements than for the process of review itself. This
is because the CRTA appears to adopt the review procedures of the CTD when 
it examines developing country preferential arrangements that also fall within
the terms of GATT Article XXIV. Early in Doha Round negotiations concerning
GATT Article XXIV, opinion was split among Members on the question of whether
any new transparency and reporting requirements should also apply to the 
south-south agreements notified according to the Enabling Clause. Following 
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the adoption of the Transparency Mechanism in 2006, the debate appears to have
been resolved in favour of equivalent transparency for all agreements, including
GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, and Enabling Clause arrangements.
The difference between the review carried out by the CTD and the CRTA
is potentially more important. This is particularly true if a proposed regional
trade agreement seeks to be defined under the lower trade coverage require-
ment of the Enabling Clause as opposed to the customs union definition in
GATT Article XXIV. This issue can also arise in the notification of free trade
areas under the Enabling Clause, though the formation of a customs union
will potentially provoke stronger reactions by third parties. This is because
customs unions often involve a modification of most-favoured-nation tariff
rates applicable to other WTO Members. This in turn affects established export
interests and could provoke third party claims under GATT Articles I and II.
The only example to date of how a customs union among developing coun-
tries has been treated is that of the MERCOSUR. MERCUSOR predated the
Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV and the creation of the CRTA.
Nevertheless, the MERCOSUR case is illuminating given that the Council for
Trade in Goods decided to examine MERCOSUR under both the Enabling
Clause and the provisions of GATT Article XXIV. The terms of reference for
that examination reveal a striking duality:
To examine the Southern Common Market Agreement (MERCOSUR) in the light
of the relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause and of the GATT 1994, includ-
ing Article XXIV, and to transmit a report and recommendations to the Commit-
tee on Trade and Development for submission to the General Council, with a copy
of the report transmitted as well to the Council for Trade in Goods. The exami-
nation in the Working Party will be based on a complete notification and on writ-
ten questions and answers.15
Both committees have remained involved in subsequent reviews of MERCOSUR,
with the CTD being responsible for the reporting function. This duality of
review reveals the overlapping terms of reference for both the committees
whereby the CTD retains the prerogative to review all arrangements under the
Enabling Clause and the CRTA examines arrangements under GATT Article
XXIV and GATS Article V. But there has been no clarity as to whether the appli-
cation of the Enabling Clause overrides the substantive requirements for 
customs union formation under GATT Article XXIV(8), especially as it relates
to the issue of coverage.
Subsequent customs unions have yet to generate a dualistic approach 
similar to MERCUSOR. Table 1 outlines the customs unions that have been
notified to date.
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Both the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and
MERCOSUR were notified as customs unions while the Economic Commu-
nity of Western Africa (ECOWAS), the Common Market of East and South
Africa (COMESA), and the Western Africa Monetary Union (WAEMU) were
notified as preferential arrangements. Such a difference in the stated ambition
of the arrangement might result in the applications of stricter review criteria.
The 1977 Working Party Report on CARICOM treated this arrangement as
an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union. However,
that review also predated the 1979 Enabling Clause.16
A more recent example is the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation between the Association of South East Asian Nations
and the People’s Republic of China. This agreement was notified in December
2004 under the Enabling Clause as a preferential arrangement. To complicate
matters, the Framework Agreement takes a phased approach to trade liberaliza-
tion. The Framework Agreement triggered a first partial scope agreement and will
lead to a second-step commitment to a future free trade area.17 The uncertainty
between each of the steps was raised by some WTO Members. After losing both
the banana and drug-related preferences disputes, the EU raised noted that 
the recently concluded FTA in goods should have been notified under GATT Article
XXIV and be referred to the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. The EC
strongly encourages the parties of the FTA to take the necessary steps towards this end.18
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Table 1: Notification of South–South Agreements
Date of entry Date of Related Type of 
Agreement into force notification provision agreement Status
Andean 25 May 88 1 Oct 90 Enabling Customs No report
Community Clause union
COMESA 8 Dec 94 29 Jun 95 Enabling Preferential Examination
Clause arrangement not requested
MERCOSUR 29 Nov 91 5 Mar 92 Enabling Customs Factual
Clause union examination 
concluded
CARICOM 1 Aug 73 14 Oct 74 GATT Art. Customs Report
XXIV union adopted
WAEMU 1 Jan 00 3 Feb 00 Enabling Preferential Examination
Clause arrangement not requested
ECOWAS 1993 26 Sep 05 Enabling Preferential Examination
Clause arrangement not requested
Source: www.wto.org, ‘Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force by GATT/
WTO Related Provision’, in Regional Trade Agreements gateway (accessed 8 December 8, 2008).
Was the EU looking to settle an old score, or was this mere formality? If the 
latter, why do parties to an arrangement simply avoid drawing attention to 
the uncertainty and drop either the reference to Article XXIV or the term ‘free
trade area’? At the same time, if the terms of the Enabling Clause are so vague
that they allow any arrangement between developing countries, what difference
does it make what the Members want to call their arrangements or what trade
coverage they include or even what sectors they wish to exclude? 
Some countries have attempted to structure their arrangements so as to
avoid this definitional conundrum. For example, the Cotonou Agreement
between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states pro-
claims that the agreement’s trade provisions are ‘WTO compatible trading
arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and
enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade.’19 To provide a stronger
legal footing, the preferences under the Cotonou Agreement will not be noti-
fied under the Enabling Clause. When completed, the trade preferences will be
treated under WTO law by a notification to the Council on trade in goods and
for services, and then referred to the CRTA for examination under GATT Arti-
cle XXIV and GATS Article V.20
The above discussion of how review and supervision are treated in the 
proliferating regional trade agreements under the WTO is illustrative of the ten-
sions and contradictions in the global trading system.. Supervision is plagued
with ambiguity and a number of loopholes. Since its inception, the Enabling
Clause removed the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement for customs unions or
free trade agreements among developing countries. The Doha Round is not
addressing the Enabling Clause requirements for south-south agreements,
though arguably this may not be within the Doha Round’s work program.
Rules are more often the result of power relations than they are the causes of
its limitation. Restrained or unrestrained, south-south regional trade agree-
ments, especially between the larger and rapidly growing developing coun-
tries, are likely to be created. What is emerging is a gap between the
member-driven political system of ‘mutual indulgence’21 and the strongly
legalistic Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), on which members of
regional trade agreements rely to fill in gaps and provide interpretations.
While there is wide consensus that the proliferation of regional trade agree-
ments is a threat to the WTO system, there is another realpolitik view suggest-
ing that it is the underlying assurances of the WTO itself that makes these
regional agreements possible. If regional trade agreements are generating trade
benefits for their members, so the argument goes, and this is the vehicle of
choice for realizing the trade objectives of countries, then so be it. In this sce-
nario the judicial function of the WTO acquires greater relevance while the
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legislative functions recede. Making the WTO an ‘enforcer’ among regional
trade agreement parties and between regional trade agreement and non-regional
trade agreement WTO Members would create an opportunity for the incremen-
tal development of a body of common law of regional trade agreements that
could eventually form the basis of multilateral rules on regional trade agree-
ments. This could turn regional trade agreements from stumbling blocks into
building blocks of the multilateral trading system.22 In fact, many developing
countries have made wide use of the dispute resolution process within the
WTO framework to address disagreements of interpretation. The traditional
systemic contribution of the WTO to the global most favoured nation gover-
nance of trade pale in relation to its specific contribution to the partners tied
by regional trade agreements. Latin America is a case in point.
V. Use of the DSU: The Case of Latin America
Since 1995, Latin American countries have been frequent participants in cases
brought under the DSU. Five Latin American countries (Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), first excluded from the banana regime
under the Lomé Convention and then from the Cotonou arrangements, have
requested panels that clarified the interpretation of the Enabling Clause as
applicable to north-south agreements. Perhaps surprising is that, despite Latin
American countries accounting for only 5 percent of global trade, 23 percent
of all the disputes brought to the WTO have involved these countries. Nearly
12.5 percent of all disputes brought to the WTO have involved disagreements
between Latin American Members. Again, this is surprising given that intra-
regional trade accounts for barely 20 percent of total trade. Based on this, it is
fair to say that Latin American trade appears to generate a disproportionate
number of WTO cases.
Table 2 outlines the cases brought by or against Latin American countries
under the DSU. Interestingly, despite being a major regional political force,
Brazil has been a party to only five disputes.
In relation to regional trade agreements, the consultation requests made by
Latin American WTO Members is quite telling. There are essentially three
kinds of preferential trade arrangements in the region. The first are those that
are under the old Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) system of
1980, covered by the Enabling Clause and based on a philosophy of gradual and
partial trade liberalization. Second, free trade agreements, roughly compara-
ble to others done in the rest of the developing world, have developed. Third
are the more ambitious integration schemes, such as those of MERCOSUR,
the Central American Common Market, and the Andean Community. The a
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priori expectation would be that those agreements pursing ambitious integration
would produce more instances of intra-Latin American litigation at the WTO,
particularly given the known problems of institution-building and rule-enforce-
ment in most trade integration initiatives among developing countries.23
The reality tells a different story. As Tables 3 to 6 demonstrate, more ambi-
tious Latin American integration schemes have not stirred up much WTO
activity. To date, just four cases have arisen out of the region’s customs unions,
despite the fact that these integration schemes implicated 75 percent of the
region’s trade in 2007. Free trade agreements signed among Latin American
countries have accounted for ten of the cases considered at the DSU. Countries
that have the most superficial form of integration via the Economic Cooper-
ation Agreements in the LAIA accounted for 14 other cases. The remaining 7
cases of intra–Latin American WTO disputes have been among countries that
do not have any sort of treaty signed for preferential trade.24
The most notorious Economic Cooperation Agreement is between Argentina
and Chile. These two countries have sought repeated consultations on policies
related to the agricultural and agro-industrial exports sectors. Argentina sought
consultations in respect of countervailing duties applied by Chile through its
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Table 2: Participation of Latin America in the DSU
Country Complainant Respondent Total
Argentina 7 3 10
Brazil 4 1 5
Chile 6 8 14
Colombia 3 2 5
Costa Rica 1 0 1
Guatemala 3 2 5
Honduras 3 0 3
Mexico 5 5 10
Nicaragua 1 2 3
Panama 2 1 3
Dominican Rep. 0 3 3
Ecuador 0 3 3
Peru 0 4 4
Uruguay 0 1 1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, op cit, footnote 10.
Table 3: Cases Arising from Deeper Integration Schemes 
(MERCOSUR, Andean Pact, Central American Free Trade Agreement)
Complainant Respondent Grouping Year
Honduras Nicaragua CACM 2000
Argentina Brazil MERCOSUR 2006
Brazil Argentina MERCOSUR 2001
Brazil Argentina MERCOSUR 2000
policy to maintain price bands on agricultural goods, such as vegetable oils, and
fructose.25 The full implementation of the WTO ruling in favour of Argentina26
remains an outstanding issues. Chile sought consultations over imposition of
duties on its exports of processed peaches and eventually obtained a favourable
panel ruling.27 Colombia and Guatemala have also taken Chile to the WTO
concerning alleged protectionist agricultural policies.28
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Table 4: Cases Arising from Latin American FTAs
Complainant Respondent Grouping Year
Chile Mexico FTA 1998 2001
Costa Rica Dominican Republic FTA 1998 2005
Honduras Dominican Republic FTA 1998 2003
Honduras Dominican Republic FTA 1998 2003
Nicaragua Mexico FTA 1998 2003
Guatemala Chile FTA 1999 2001
Guatemala Mexico Northern Triangle FTA 2000 2005
Guatemala Mexico Northern Triangle FTA 2000 2003
Mexico Guatemala Northern Triangle FTA 2000 1999
Mexico Guatemala Northern Triangle FTA 2000 1996
Table 5: Cases Arising from Economic Cooperation Agreements Groupings
Complainant Respondent Grouping Year
Colombia Chile ECA 1994 2001
Colombia Chile ECA 1994 2001
Chile Ecuador ECA 1995 2003
Argentina Chile ECA 1996 2006
Argentina Chile ECA 1996 2006
Argentina Chile ECA 1996 2002
Argentina Chile ECA 1996 2001
Argentina Chile ECA 1996 2000
Chile Uruguay ECA 1996 2002
Chile Argentina ECA 1996 2001
Chile Peru ECA 1998 2002
Chile Peru ECA 1998 2001
Argentina Peru ECA 2003 2002
Brazil Peru ECA 2003 1997









Tables 7 and 8 canvass the products and the types of measures at issue in
WTO cases between Latin American Members. The prevailing measures chal-
lenged among trade partners have been anti-dumping and safeguard meas-
ures, both applied to provide temporary relief from imports. Combining the
information on the products and the type of measure, it can be concluded that
cases are brought to the WTO to protect or support industries often charac-
terized by strong concentration in domestic markets or a strong regional export
propensity, a feature that is particularly present in the region because of the rel-
atively high volume of competitive intra-regional trade.
WTO disputes between Latin American Members have tended to involve
sectors with larger businesses present in the market. For example, in the cases
brought between Chile and Argentina, the companies on the complainant side
were strong players, such as the Argentine oil seeds crushers, dairy exporters,
and the Chilean peach exporters.29 For those involving Mexico and Guatemala,
it was the large (by most standards monopolistic) cement companies that
sought action through their governments. Disputes between Guatemala,
Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina concerning steel pipes and tubes were also
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Table 7: WTO Cases between Latin American Members by Product
Sector Number of cases Examples
Agricultural 2 black beans, fresh fruits, wheat
Agro-industrial 12 edible oils, dairy products, pasta, flour, poultry, 
fructose
Commodities 8 cement, sugar
Manufactures 12 cigarettes, buses, steel pipes, textiles, shoes, matches,
electric transformers
All goods 3 custom values, import financing
No data 1
Total 38
Table 8: WTO Cases between Latin American Members by Measures 
Challenged




Exchange rate fee 1
Modification of tariff lines 1
Safeguard measures 12
SPS 1
Tariff by origin 2
No data 1
Total 38
litigated in support of large exporting national producers30 that still compete
intensely with each other and have not yet come under merger pressure.
As in most other regional agreements, intra–Latin American trade 
agreements have opened markets to large regional business interests. However,
these agreements have not been accompanied by regional production agree-
ments or common industrial policies, such as those adopted in early stages 
of the European Economic Community or the European steel restructuring
plans of the 1970s. Neither have intra–Latin American trade agreements
required parties to eliminate or curtail their use of trade remedies. The com-
bined result has been use of the DSU by Latin American trading partners 
to resolve sensitive disputes that have not been amenable to bilateral or 
multilateral negotiation.
VI. Comparison of Latin American Regional Trade 
Dispute Mechanisms and the WTO DSU
The main reason for the extensive use of the WTO DSU by Latin American
countries has been a lack of comparable and enforceable regional dispute set-
tlement mechanisms, particularly among least developed preferential trade
agreements in the region. However, some of the region’s more advanced agree-
ments such as MERCUSOR and the Andean Pact31 do provide for dispute set-
tlement. A comparison between these regional dispute mechanisms and the
WTO DSU can help locate areas of common interest and assist in evaluating
the place of regional trading systems in the WTO context.32
A. Usage of the MERCOSUR Dispute Mechanism
Since its formation in 1991, MERCOSUR has handled 542 disputes. Most of
these disputes (some 53 percent) have involved Argentina and Brazil. The bulk
of the disputes (85 percent) arose between 1995 and 2001. This period coin-
cided with economic crises in Argentina and Brazil, including a devaluation in
Brazil in 1999 that altered trade flows inside MERCOSUR. Furthermore, this
period coincided with the implementation of free trade within the customs
union. The fact that no provision had been made with regard to remedial trade
measures in the original MERCOSUR agreement likely played a role in the
significant increase in disputes between 1995 and 2001. Table 9 reviews all 
disputes between 1991 and 2007.
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B. Usage of the Andean Pact Dispute Mechanisms
The Andean Pact has a long history of institutional development, including
one of the oldest regional schemes to address trade disputes. The secretariat of
the Andean Pact has its own juridical identity, enabling it to open cases against
any or even all the members when alleged non-compliance with common 
legislation arises. Furthermore, individuals and firms can file cases in the dis-
pute arbitration mechanism of the Andean Pact against those government
policies that fall under its jurisdiction (i.e., trade and investment).
Table 10 outlines the number of disputes and the parties to disputes under
the Andean Pact. One item of note is that over half the cases have been initi-
ated by the Andean Pact’s Secretariat. This power of initiation may explain
why Andean Pact members have not initiated as many cases. Among individ-
ual members, Colombia has initiated the single largest number of cases, an
unsurprising fact given its larger economic size inside this integration initia-
tive and, thus, larger economic interests. The private sector has also participated
often, accounting for almost 15 percent of all complaints.
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Table 9: Mercosur Dispute Cases
Respondent
Complainant Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Multiple parties Total
Argentina 167 14 43 4 228
Brazil 122 16 26 2 166
Paraguay 31 25 12 0 68
Uruguay 24 23 5 4 56
Multiple parties 5 7 3 9 24
Total 182 222 38 90 10 542
Table 10: Disputes under the Andean Pact
Respondent
Multiple Private 
Complainant Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela parties sector Total
Secretariat 13 40 65 39 44 201
Bolivia 1 1 2 1 2 1 8
Colombia 0 14 9 16 22 61
Ecuador 0 5 1 2 12 20
Peru 3 3 3 5 11 25
Venezuela 0 4 3 1 5 13
Multiple parties 0
Private sector 2 14 5 6 9 7 4 47
Total 18 67 91 58 77 59 5 375
C. Comparing Usage of the Regional Dispute Mechanisms
and of the WTO DSU
The types of disputes brought before the WTO, MERCOSUR, and Andean
Pact tend to be strikingly similar. For example, the topics most often raised at
the WTO DSU are those related to anti-dumping and safeguards. Anti-dumping
has also frequently been the cause of regional disputes. Interestingly,
MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact have been preferred by countries in the
region to resolve differences over sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) issues,
even though there is a specific WTO agreement on this topic.
A sectoral analysis shows that most disputes within both MERCOSUR and
the Andean Community relate to the agro-industrial complex, which explains
the recurrence of SPS in regional disputes. Other disputes have focused on
non-agricultural commodities and manufactured exports. These similarities
naturally correspond to the particularities of intra-regional trade, but also
point to the areas where lessons are being learned, with regional agreements
advancing beyond the WTO.
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Table 12: Sectors Making Use of WTO and Regional DSU
WTO intra–Latin America MERCOSUR Andean Pact 
(1995–2007) (1995–2007) (1974–2007)
Agricultural 2 6 11
Agro-industrial 12 180 115
Commodities 8 50 46
Manufactures 12 62 64
All goods 3 126 97
Others 1 115 47
Total 38 542 375
Table 11: Issues Submitted to the WTO and Regional DSU
WTO intra–Latin American MERCOSUR Andean Pact 
Type of measure (1995–2007) (1993–2007) (1974–2007)
Anti-dumping 12 113 30
Competition policies 0 40 29
Customs procedures 4 105 15
Domestic taxation 4 93 92
Exchange rate fee 1 0 0
Modified tariff lines 1 89 56
Safeguard measures 12 3 81
SPS 1 59 35
Tariff by origin 2 23 5
No data / Others 1 17 32
Total 38 542 375
VII. Conclusions: Multilateral Relevance Anew 
The wheels connecting regionalism with multilateralism seem to be turning ever
faster as trading grounds and linkages become more crowded and intense. They
do not stop for a moment. Because the pattern defies rationalization into tidy cells
does not mean that we must view it through an ominous lens. The fact that the
ex ante disciplines are not clear, after the 13 years of the WTO’s life, perhaps tells
a more relevant story about the convenience or realpolitik interests of regional-
ism of the more powerful countries inside the WTO decision-making process.
The fuzziness that has characterized the reporting process for regional trade
agreements is only one part of an otherwise normal trade cooperation picture.
The chapter has examined a group of developing countries that trade quite
intensely with each other and are particularly litigious. These countries resort
to the WTO DSU in order to settle high-stakes trade disputes that seem almost
too big to be resolved by regional agreements or are of a precedent-setting
nature, such as bilateral FTAs or the more limited economic complementary
agreements. The WTO might be highlighting the main shortcomings of those
regional trade deals, such as lack of adjustment or remedial measures, and the
inability to manage the ambitious schedules of liberalization. The fact that
most conflicts in the Latin American example are coming from the shallow
integration initiatives, as opposed to the deeper agreements such as MERCOSUR,
the Andean Pact, and CACM, might indicate that the WTO has attained by
default a role of tutor or marker to assist some types of regional objectives.
The establishment of a general most-favoured-nation clause in international
trade was seen as a global policing mechanism to curb the ability of the more pow-
erful markets to threaten the suspension of concessions, therefore effectively
switching suppliers. While most-favoured-nation attempted to provide equal
treatment, erosion of most-favoured-nation demands new attention from broader
multilateral institutions to address problems of asymmetric interdependence,
especially in circumstances where countries are engaging in numerous regional
trade agreements with a multitude of partners of all sizes and colours. The notion
of asymmetry remains alive even in south-south commercial diplomacy.
The multilateral lever is being used to clarify lacunae arising within and
among regional trade agreements. At the same time, enhanced transparency will
gradually lead to the strengthening of notification and a more systematic exam-
ination of regional trade agreements. Overly strict multilateral monitoring of
regional trade agreements could impede regional endeavours, without neces-
sarily guaranteeing a renewed emphasis on multilateralism. Yet one would
expect that as the process of cooperation advances, agreed-upon benchmarks
for new regional trade agreements can and will emerge.
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